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The Hon.ble John Sherard Esq.r

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THE ANCIENT

HISTORY

OF THE

EGYPTIANS,

CARTHAGINIANS,

ASSYRIANS,

BABYLONIANS,

MEDES and PERSIANS,

MACEDONIANS,

AND

GRECIANS.

By Mr. ROLLIN, *late Principal of the Univerſity of Paris, now Profeſſor of Eloquence in the Royal College, and Member of the Royal Academy of Inſcriptions and Belles-Lettres.*

Tranſlated from the FRENCH.

VOL. III.

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BOOK VII.

Artaxerxes Longimanus. Life of Cimon. Rebellion of Megabyzus. Eſdras and Nehemiah ſent to Jeruſalem. Life of Pericles. Diviſions between Athens and Sparta. Thucydides oppoſed to Pericles. Reigns of Gelon, Hiero, and Thraſybulus in Sicily. Hiſtory of ſome Grecian cities, and famous philoſophers, as Pythagoras, *&c.* The Peloponneſian war. Siege of Platææ. Plague of Athens, *&c.* Death of Artaxerxes.

BOOK VIII.

Sequel of the Peloponneſian war, under the reigns of Xerxes II, Sogdianus, and Darius Nothus. Revolt of Egypt and Media. Expeditions of Braſidas into Thrace. Defeat of the Athenians. Death of Cleon and Braſidas. Life of Alcibiades. Nicias general of the Athenians. Their expedition againſt Sicily under Alcibiades, Nicias and Lamachus. Alcibiades accuſed. He is recalled, and flies to Sparta. Deſcription of Syracuſe. Siege laid to that city by Nicias. Exploits of Gylippus. Nicias defeated at ſea, *&c.* Deſpondency of the Athenians. Nicias and Demoſthenes taken priſoners by the Syracuſans, and put to death, *&c.*

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INTRODUCTION.

BEFORE I enter upon the hiſtory of the PERSIANS and GRECIANS, I ſhall, 1. prefix here ſome preliminary obſervations, by way of introduction. 2. I ſhall lay down the plan and diviſion of the ſeveral parts of this third volume; and 3. an abridgment of the Lacedæmonian hiſtory, from the eſtabliſhment of their kings to the reign of Darius, where this third volume begins.

ARTICLE I.

A brief idea of the hiſtory contained in this third volume. What uſe is to be made of it.

THIS third volume of the antient hiſtory, will open an entirely new ſcene to the reader's view, not unworthy his curioſity and attention. In the preceding volume, we have ſeen two ſtates of no great conſideration, Media and Perſia, extend themſelves far and wide, under the conduct of Cyrus, like a torrent or devouring fire, and by an amazing rapidity conquer and ſubdue many provinces and kingdoms. In this we ſhall ſee that vaſt empire ſetting the nations under its dominion in motion, the Perſians, Medes, Phœnicians, Egyptians, Babylonians, Indians, and many others, and falling with all the forces of Aſia and the Eaſt upon a little country, of very ſmall extent, and deſtitute of all foreign aſſiſtance; I mean Greece. When, on the one hand, we behold ſo many nations united together, ſuch preparations of war made for ſeveral years with ſo much diligence; innumerable armies by ſea and land, and ſuch fleets as the ſea could hardly contain: and, on the other

hand, two weak cities, Athens and Lacedæmon, abandon'd by all their allies, and left almoſt entirely to themſelves: have we not reaſon to believe, that theſe two little cities are going to be utterly deſtroyed and ſwallowed up by ſo formidable an enemy; and that there will not be ſo much as any footſteps of them left remaining? and yet we ſhall find, that they prove victorious; and by their invincible courage, and the ſeveral battles they gained, both by ſea and land, made the Perſian empire lay aſide all thoughts of ever turning their arms againſt Greece any more.

The hiſtory of the war between the Perſians and the Greeks, will illuſtrate the truth of this maxim; that it is not the number, but the valour of the troops, and the conduct of the generals, on which depends the ſucceſs of military expeditions. The reader will admire the ſurprizing courage and intrepidity of the great men at the head of the Grecian affairs, whom neither all the world in motion againſt them could deject, nor the greateſt of misfortunes diſconcert; who undertook, with an handful of men, to make head againſt innumerable armies; who, notwithſtanding ſuch a prodigious inequality of forces, durſt hope for ſucceſs; who even compelled victory to declare on the ſide of merit and virtue; and taught all ſucceeding generations what infinite reſources and expedients are to be found in prudence, valour, and experience; in a zeal for liberty and our country; in the love of our duty, and in all the ſentiments of noble and generous ſouls.

This war of the Perſians againſt the Grecians will be followed by another amongſt the Greeks themſelves, but of a very different kind from the former. In the latter, there will ſcarce be any actions, but what in appearance are of little conſequence, and ſeemingly unworthy of a reader's curioſity, who is fond of great events: in this he will meet with little beſides private quarrels between certain cities, or ſome ſmall commonwealths; ſome inconſiderable ſieges, (excepting

that

that of Syracuſe, one of the moſt important related in antient hiſtory) though ſeveral of theſe ſieges were of conſiderable duration; ſome battles between armies, where the numbers were ſmall, and but little blood ſhed. What is it then, that has render'd theſe wars ſo famous in hiſtory? Salluſt informs us in theſe words; "* The actions of the Athenians doubtleſs were great, "and yet I believe they were ſomewhat leſs than fame "is for having us to conceive of them. But becauſe "Athens had noble writers, the acts of that republic "are celebrated throughout the whole world as the "moſt glorious: and the gallantry of thoſe heroes "who perform'd them, has had the good fortune to "be thought as tranſcendent as the eloquence of thoſe "who have deſcribed them."

Salluſt, though jealous enough of the glory the Romans had acquired by a ſeries of diſtinguiſhed actions, with which their hiſtory abounds, yet he does juſtice in this paſſage to the Grecians, by acknowledging, that their exploits were truly great and illuſtrious, tho' ſomewhat inferior, in his opinion, to their fame. What is then this foreign and borrowed luſtre, which the Athenian actions have derived from the eloquence of their hiſtorians? It is, that the whole univerſe agrees in looking upon them as the greateſt and moſt glorious, that were ever performed. *Per terrarum orbem Athenienſium facta pro maximis celebrantur.* All nations ſeduced and enchanted, as it were, with the beauties of the Greek authors, think that people's exploits ſuperior to any thing that was ever done by any other nation. This, according to Salluſt, is the ſervice the Greek authors have done the Athenians, by their excellent manner of deſcribing their actions; and very unhappy it is for us, that our hiſtory, for want

* Athenienſium res geſtæ, ſicuti ego exiſtimo, ſatis amplæ magnificæque fuerunt: verùm aliquanto minores tamen, quàm famâ feruntur. Sed quia provenere ibi ſcriptorum magna ingenia, per terrarum orbem Athenienſium facta pro maximis celebrantur. Ita eorum, quæ fecere, virtus tanta habetur, quantum eam verbis potuere extollere præclara ingenia. *Salluſt. in bell. Catilin.*

of the like aſſiſtance, has left a thouſand bright actions and fine ſayings unrecorded, which would have been put in the ſtrongeſt light by the antient writers, and have done great honour to our country.

But, however this be, it muſt be confeſs'd, that we are not always to judge of the value of an action, or the merit of the perſons who had ſhared in it, by the importance of the event. 'Tis rather in ſuch little ſieges and engagements, as we find recorded in the hiſtory of the Peloponneſian war, that the conduct and abilities of a general are truly conſpicuous. Accordingly it is obſerved, that it was chiefly at the head of ſmall armies, and in countries of no great extent, that our beſt generals of the laſt age diſtinguiſhed their capacity, and behaved with a conduct not inferior to the moſt celebrated captains of antiquity. In actions of this ſort, chance has no ſhare, and does not cover any overſights, that are committed. Every thing is conducted and carried on by the prudence of the general. He is truly the ſoul of the army, which neither acts, nor moves, but by his direction. He ſees every thing, and is preſent every where. Nothing eſcapes his vigilance and attention. Orders are ſeaſonably given, and ſeaſonably executed. Fineſſe, ſtratagems, falſe marches, real or feigned attacks, incampments, decampments, in a word, every things depends upon him alone.

On this account the reading of the Greek hiſtorians, ſuch as Thucydides, Xenophon, and Polybius, is of infinite ſervice to young officers; becauſe thoſe hiſtorians, who were alſo excellent commanders, enter into all the particulars of the military art, and lead the readers, as it were, by the hand through all the ſieges and battles they deſcribe; ſhewing them by the example of the greateſt generals of antiquity, and by a kind of anticipated experience, in what manner war is to be carried on.

Nor is it only with regard to military exploits, that the Grecian hiſtory affords us ſuch excellent models.

We

We ſhall there find celebrated legiſlators, able politicians, magiſtrates born for government, men that have excelled in all arts and ſciences, philoſophers, that carried their enquiries as far as was poſſible in thoſe early ages, and who have left us ſuch maxims of morality, as many chriſtians ought to bluſh at.

It is true, theſe very philoſophers, notwithſtanding their penetration in ſome points, were entirely blind and ignorant as to others, even to the degree of conteſting ſome of the moſt evident principles of the law of nature; and very often ſuffered their practice to bely their doctrine, and themſelves to fall into the moſt groſs irregularities. The divine providence permitted it ſo to be, and thought fit to give them up to a reprobate mind, in order to puniſh their pride, and to teach us by their example, what enormities men are capable of, even the wiſeſt and moſt knowing, when they are left to their own weakneſs and natural depravity; and from what an abyſs the mercy of our divine mediator has delivered us. But tho' they fell into ſome errors, both with reſpect to the underſtanding and the heart, which we are obliged to deteſt; yet that does not hinder their books from containing many excellent maxims, which, according to (*a*) St. Auſtin, we are entitled to claim as a benefit appertaining to us, in the ſame manner as the Iſraelites, when they came out of Egypt, enriched themſelves with the ſpoils thereof: for this has been the practice of all the ſaints: (*b*) *Ipſi Gentiles ſiquid divinum & rectum in doctrinis uis habere potuerunt, non improbaverunt ſancti noſtri.*

The ſame thing may be ſaid with regard to the virtuous actions of the heathens, whereof we ſhall find a great abundance in the Grecian hiſtory. We are told by St. Auſtin *, that according to the rule of juſtice,

(*a*) St. Aug. de Doctr. Chriſ. l. 6. c. 40. (*b*) De bapt. con. Donat. l. 6. c. 87.

* Habendi ſunt in eorum numero, quorum etiam impiorum, nec Deum verum veraciter juſtéque colentium, quædam tamen facta vel legimus,

ſecundum juſtitiæ regulam, we ought to be ſo far from blaming and condemning thoſe actions, that we are obliged in reaſon to commend and extol them. Not that thoſe actions were good and laudable in every reſpect; St. Auſtin † was very far from entertaining ſuch an opinion. He looked upon them only as good in their nature, and with reſpect to the duty of the agents: but as to the end, for which they were done, that father thought them very blameable, becauſe they were not directed to the glory of God. Theſe men had no recourſe to the true God, (for him they did not know) nor was it to him they addreſſed themſelves for wiſdom in their counſels, ſucceſs in their undertakings, the improvement of their talents or their virtue. It was not to the true God, they returned thanks for theſe bleſſings; nor did they give him the glory of them by an humble acknowledgment. They did not conſider him, either as the ſource and principle, or as the end of all the good they were capable of doing. Their beſt actions were corrupted either by ſelf-love or ingratitude: they could not therefore be available towards ſalvation, which is only to be obtained thro' faith in Jeſus Chriſt.

(*c*) But notwithſtanding this, according to the ſame father, it may be very uſeful to chriſtians, both for their inſtruction and the regulation of their manners, to have the virtuous actions of the heathens laid before them in their full light, provided they ſet not too high a value upon them: for what the ſame father ſays of the virtues of the antient Romans, may undoubtedly be applied with equal reaſon to thoſe of the Grecians.

(*c*) St. Auſt. de Civ. Dei, l. 5. c. 18.

legimus, vel novimus, vel audimus, quæ ſecundum juſtitiæ regulam non ſolùm vituperare non poſſumus, verùm etiam meritò rectéque laudamus. *S. Aug. lib. de Spir. & lit.* n. 48.

† Noveris itaque non officiis ſed finibus à vitiis diſcernendas eſſe virtutes. Officium autem eſt, quod faciendum eſt; finis verò, propter quod faciendum eſt. *Id. contr. Julian.* lib. 4. c. 3. n. 21. Non erat in eis vera juſtitia, quia non actibus ſed finibus penſantur officia. *Ibid.* n. 26.

He

He employs a whole chapter, and that a pretty long one, in pointing out the moſt illuſtrious actions and ſignal virtues of that people: as their love of the publick good; their devoted attachment to their country; their conſtancy in ſuffering the moſt cruel torments, and even death itſelf; their noble and generous diſintereſtedneſs; their eſteeming and chuſing poverty; their profound reverence for religion and the gods. He makes ſeveral reflections upon this ſubject, which well deſerve a place here.

In the firſt place he ſuppoſeth, that it was in order to recompence the Romans for all theſe virtues, which yet were virtues only in name and appearance, that the divine providence gave them the empire of the univerſe, a recompence very ſuitable to their deſerts, and with which they were weak enough to be contented. * For the ſame reaſon he ſuppoſes God thought fit to let their name be ſo glorious, and ſo much eſteemed by all nations and in all ages, that ſo many great and illuſtrious actions ſhould not paſs entirely unrewarded.

In the ſecond place he obſerves, that ſuch virtues, notwithſtanding their being falſe, are of publick advantage to mankind, and that they enter into the ſecret deſigns of God towards the puniſhing or rewarding of his creatures. The love of glory, which is a vice, yet ſerves to ſuppreſs many other vices, of a more hurtful and miſchievous nature, ſuch as injuſtice, violence, and cruelty. And can it be queſtioned, † whether a magiſtrate, a governor of a province, or a ſovereign, that are gentle, patient, juſt, chaſte, and beneficent, though merely upon human motives of intereſt or vain-glory, are not infinitely more ſerviceable to the commonwealth, than they would be, if they

* Si Romanis Deus neque hanc terrenam gloriam excellentiſſimi imperii concederet, non redderetur merces bonis artibus eorum, (*i. e.* virtutibus) quibus ad tantam gloriam pervenire nitebantur. At non eſt quod de ſummi & veri Dei juſtitia conquerantur: perceperunt mercedem ſuam. *Ibid.* cap. 15.

† Conſtat eos, qui cives non ſint civitatis æternæ, utiliores eſſe terrenæ civitati quando habent virtutem vel ipſam, quam ſi nec ipſam. *Ibid.* cap. 19.

were deſtitute of thoſe external appearances and ſhadows of virtue; and whether men of ſuch diſpoſitions may be reckoned among the moſt valuable preſents of heaven? We may the better judge of this matter, if we only compare ſuch magiſtrates and princes with thoſe of a contrary character, who, laying aſide all honour and probity, deſpiſing reputation, and trampling upon the moſt ſacred laws, acknowledge no other but their brutal paſſions: who are, in a word, ſuch as God in his wrath ſets over a people he intends to puniſh, and which he thinks worthy of ſuch maſters. (e) *Et talibus quidem dominandi poteſtas non datur niſi ſummi Dei providentiâ, quando res humanas judicat talibus dominis dignas.*

The third and laſt reflection this father makes, and which is the moſt pertinent to my ſubject, and to the end I propoſe in writing this antient hiſtory, relates to the uſe that ought to be made of the praiſes given to the virtuous heathens. It ſhews what advantage a prudent reader ſhould reap from the relation of the great exploits and virtuous actions of the Grecians, which will be the principal ſubject of this, and the following volumes. When we ſee theſe men ſacrificing their eſtates and fortunes to the relief of their fellow-citizens, their lives to the preſervation of the ſtate, and even their fame and glory to the publick good; when we ſee them practiſing the moſt arduous virtues, and that on motives purely human, in order to acquire a tranſient reputation: † what reproaches ought we not to make to ourſelves, and how much ought we to be aſhamed, if, profeſſing a religion, that recommends itſelf to us by the promiſes of eternal rewards, and has ſuch powerful motives to enforce our love and gratitude, we

(e) Ibid. c. 19.

† Ideo nobis propoſita ſunt neceſſariæ commonitionis exempla, ut, ſi virtutes, quarum iſtæ utcunque ſunt ſimiles, quas iſti pro civitatis terrenæ gloriâ tenuerunt, pro Dei glorioſiſſimâ civitate non tenuerimus, pudore pungamur; ſi tenuerimus, ſuperbiâ non extollamur. *Ibid.* c. 18.

however

however want the courage and reſolution to practiſe the ſame virtues? And if we are ſo happy as to fulfil our engagements, and duty, how can we be proud of it, when we conſider how much greater things were done on a motive of mere vain-glory, by men who knew not God, and who confined all their deſires to the goods of this preſent life?

This then, according to St. Auſtin, is the principal uſe to be made of the ſtudy and reading of prophane hiſtory: nor did the † divine providence ſuffer the Greeks and Romans to become ſo famous and illuſtrious, but in order to give the greater weight to thoſe examples of virtue with which their hiſtory abounds, that by our reading them with ſerioufneſs and attention, we ſhould learn, from the love they bore to an earthly country, and to a glory of ſo ſhort a duration, what longing we ought to have after an heavenly country, where an eternity of happineſs waits us.

If the virtues related in hiſtory, may ſerve us for models in the conduct of our lives; their vices and failings, on the other hand, are no leſs proper to caution and inſtruct us; and the ſtrict regard, which an hiſtorian is obliged to have for truth, will not allow him to diſſemble the latter, out of fear of eclipſing the luſtre of the former. Nor does what I here advance, contradict the rule laid down by Plutarch (*f*), on the ſame ſubject, in his preface to the life of Cimon. He requires, that the illuſtrious actions of great men be repreſented in their full light: but as to the faults, which may ſometimes eſcape them thro' paſſion or ſurprize, or into which they may be drawn by the neceſſity of affairs, ‖ conſidering them rather as a certain degree of perfection wanting to their virtue, than as vices or

(*f*) In Cim. p. 479, & 480.

† Ut cives æternæ illius civitatis, quamdiu hic peregrinantur, diligenter & ſobriè illa intueantur exempla, & videant quanta dilectio debeatur ſupernæ patriæ propter vitam æternam, ſi tantum à ſuis civibus terrena dilecta eſt propter minimam gloriam. *Ibid.* c. 16.

‖ Ἐλλείματα μᾶλλον ἀρετῆς τινος, ἢ κακίας πεπτώματα.

crimes, that proceed from any corruption of the heart; ſuch imperfections as theſe, he would have the hiſtorian, out of compaſſion to the weakneſs of human nature, which produces nothing entirely perfect, content himſelf with touching very lightly: in the ſame manner as an able painter, when he has a fine face to draw, in which he finds ſome little blemiſh or defect, does neither entirely ſuppreſs it, nor think himſelf obliged to repreſent it with a ſtrict exactneſs; becauſe the one would ſpoil the beauty of the picture, and the other would deſtroy the likeneſs. The very compariſon Plutarch uſes, ſhows, that he ſpeaks only of ſlight and excuſable faults. But as to actions of injuſtice, violence, and brutality, they ought not to be concealed, or diſguiſed on any account; nor can we ſuppoſe, that the ſame privilege ſhould be allowed in hiſtory as is in painting; which invented the * profile, to repreſent the ſide-face of a prince, who had loſt an eye, and by that means ingeniouſly conceal'd ſo diſagreeable a deformity. Hiſtory, the moſt eſſential rule of which is ſincerity, will by no means admit of ſuch indulgences, that indeed would deprive it of its greateſt advantage.

Shame, reproach, infamy, hatred, and the execrations of the publick, which are the inſeparable attendants on criminal and brutal actions, are no leſs proper to excite an horror for vice; than the glory, which perpetually attends good actions, is to inſpire us with the love of virtue. And theſe, according to † Tacitus, are the two ends, which every hiſtorian ought to propoſe to himſelf, by making a judicious choice of what is moſt extraordinary both in good and evil, in order to occaſion that publick homage to be paid to virtue, which is juſtly due to it; and to create the

* Habet in pictura ſpeciem tota facies. Apelles tamen imaginem Antigoni latere tantùm altero oſtendit, ut amiſſi oculi deformitas lateret. *Quin.* l. 2. c. 13.

† Exequi ſententias haud inſtitui, niſi inſignes per honeſtum aut notabili dedecore: quod præcipuum munus annalium reor ne virtutes ſileantur, utque pravis dictis factiſque ex poſteritate & infamiâ metus ſit. *Tacit. Ann.* l. 3. c. 65.

greater

greater abhorrence for vice, on account of that eternal infamy that attends it.

The hiſtory I write only furniſhes too many examples of the latter ſort. With reſpect to the Perſians, it will appear, by what is ſaid of their kings, that thoſe princes, whoſe power has no other bounds but thoſe of their will, often abandon themſelves to all their paſſions; that nothing is more difficult than to reſiſt the deluſions of a man's own greatneſs, and the flatteries of thoſe that ſurround him; that the liberty of gratifying all one's deſires, and of doing evil with impunity, is a dangerous ſituation; that the beſt diſpoſitions can hardly withſtand ſuch a temptation; that, even after having preſerved themſelves in the beginning, they are inſenſibly corrupted by ſoftneſs and effeminacy, by pride, and their averſion to ſincere counſels; and that it rarely happens they are wiſe enough to conſider that, when they find themſelves exalted above all laws and reſtraints, they ſtand then moſt in need of moderation and wiſdom, both in regard to themſelves and others; and that in ſuch a ſituation they ought to be doubly wiſe, and doubly ſtrong, in order to ſet bounds within by their reaſon to a power that has none without.

With reſpect to the Grecians, the Peloponneſian war will ſhow the miſerable effects of their inteſtine diviſions, and the fatal exceſſes, into which they were led by their thirſt of dominion: ſcenes of injuſtice, ingratitude, and perfidy, together with the open violation of treaties, or mean artifices and unworthy tricks to elude their execution. It will ſhow, how ſcandalouſly the Lacedæmonians and Athenians debaſed themſelves to the Barbarians, in order to beg aids of money from them: how ſhamefully the great deliverers of Greece renounced the glory of all their paſt labours and exploits, by ſtooping and making their court to certain haughty and inſolent ſatrapæ, and by going, ſucceſſively with a kind of emulation, to implore the protection of the common enemy, whom they had ſo often

often conquered; and in what manner they employed the ſuccours they obtained from them, in oppreſſing their antient allies, and extending their own territories by unjuſt and violent methods.

On both ſides, and ſometimes in the ſame perſon, we ſhall find a ſurpriſing mixture of good and bad, of virtues and vices, of glorious actions and mean ſentiments; and ſometimes perhaps we ſhall be ready to aſk ourſelves, whether theſe can be the ſame perſons and the ſame people, of whom ſuch different things are related; and whether it be poſſible, that ſuch a bright and ſhining light, and ſuch thick clouds of ſmoak and darkneſs, can proceed from the ſame fund. I relate things, as I find them in antient authors; and the pictures I preſent the reader with are always drawn after thoſe original monuments, which hiſtory has tranſmitted to us, concerning the perſons I ſpeak of; and, I might likewiſe add, after human nature itſelf. But, in my opinion, even this medly of good and evil, tho' very odd in itſelf, may be of great advantage to us, and ſerve as a preſervative againſt a danger ſufficiently common and natural.

For if we found, either in any nation, or particular perſons, a probity and a nobleneſs of ſentiments always uniform, and free from all blemiſh and weakneſs, we ſhould be tempted to believe that heatheniſm is capable of producing real and perfect virtues, though our religion teaches us, that thoſe virtues we moſt admire among the heathens, are really no more than the ſhadow and appearance of them. But when we ſee the defects and imperfections, the vices and crimes, and thoſe ſometimes of the blackeſt die, that are intermixed with, and often very cloſely follow their moſt virtuous actions; we are taught to moderate our eſteem and admiration of them, and at the ſame time that we commend what appears noble, worthy and great among the Pagans, not prodigally to pay to the phantom of virtue, that entire and unreſerved homage, which is only due to virtue itſelf.

With theſe reſtrictions I deſire to be underſtood, when I praiſe the great men of antiquity and their illuſtrious actions; and if, contrary to my intention, any expreſſions ſhould eſcape me, which may ſeem to exceed theſe bounds, I deſire the reader to interpret them candidly, and reduce them to their juſt value and meaning.

ARTICLE II.

The general plan and diviſion of the third volume.

THE hiſtory contained in this third volume includes the ſpace of one hundred and ſeventeen years, during the reigns of ſix kings of Perſia; Darius, the firſt of the name, the ſon of Hyſtaſpes; Xerxes the firſt; Artaxerxes, ſurnamed Longimanus; Xerxes the ſecond; Sogdianus; (the two laſt of which reigned but a very little time) and Darius the ſecond, commonly called Darius Nothus. This hiſtory begins at the year of the world 3483, and extends to the year 3600. As this whole period naturally divides itſelf into two parts, I ſhall alſo divide it into two diſtinct books.

PART THE FIRST.

The firſt part, which conſiſts of ninety years, contains from the beginning of the reign of Darius the firſt, to the forty-ſecond year of Artaxerxes, the ſame year in which the Peloponneſian war began, that is, from the year of the world 3483, to the year 3573. This part chiefly contains the different enterprizes and expeditions of the Perſians againſt Greece, which never produced more great men and great events, nor ever diſplayed more conſpicuous or more ſolid virtues. Here you will ſee the famous battles of Marathon, Thermopylæ, Artemiſa, Salamin, Platææ, Mycale, Eurymedon, &c. Here the moſt eminent commanders of Greece ſignalized their courage, Miltiades, Leonidas, Themiſtocles, Ariſtides, Cimon, Pauſanias, Pericles, Thucydides, &c.

To

To enable the reader the more eaſily to recollect, what paſſed within this ſpace of time among the Jews, and alſo among the Romans, the hiſtory of both which nations is entirely foreign to that of the Perſians and Greeks, I ſhall here ſet down in few words the principal epochas relating to them,

Epochas of the Jewiſh hiſtory.

The people of God were at this time returned from their Babyloniſh captivity to Jeruſalem, under the conduct of Zorobabel. Uſher is of opinion, that the hiſtory of Eſther ought to be placed in the reign of Darius. The Iſraelites, under the ſhadow of this prince's protection, and animated by the warm exhortations of the prophets Haggai and Zechariah, did at laſt finiſh the building of the temple, which had been interrupted for many years by the cabals of their enemies. Artaxerxes was no leſs favourable to the Jews than Darius: he firſt of all ſent Ezra to Jeruſalem, who reſtored the publick worſhip, and the obſervation of the law; then Nehemiah, who cauſed walls to be built round the city, and fortified it againſt the attacks of their neighbours, who were jealous of its reviving greatneſs. It is thought that Malachi, the laſt of the prophets, was contemporary with Nehemiah, or that he propheſied not long after him.

This interval of the ſacred hiſtory extends from the reign of Darius I, to the beginning of the reign of Darius Nothus; that is to ſay, from the year of the world 3485, to the year 3581. After which the ſcripture is entirely ſilent, till the time of the Macchabees.

Epochas of the Roman hiſtory.

The firſt year of Darius was the 233d of the building of Rome. Tarquin the Proud was then on the throne, and about ten years afterwards was depoſed, when the conſular government was ſubſtituted to that of the kings. In the ſucceeding part of this period happened the war againſt Porſenna; the creation of the tribunes of the people; Coriolanus's retreat among the

the Volſci, and the war that enſued thereupon; the wars of the Romans againſt the Latins, the Vejentes, the Volſci, and other neighbouring nations; the death of Virginia under the Decemvirate; the diſputes between the people and ſenate about marriages and the conſulſhip, which occaſioned the creating of military tribunes inſtead of conſuls. This period of time terminates in the 323d year from the foundation of Rome.

PART THE SECOND.

The ſecond part of this volume, which conſiſts of twenty-ſeven years, extends from the 43d year of Artaxerxes Longimanus, to the death of Darius Nothus; that is, from the year of the world 3573, to the year 3600. It contains the nineteen firſt years of the Peloponneſian war, which continued twenty-ſeven, of which Greece and Sicily were the ſeat, and wherein the Greeks, who had before triumphed over the Barbarians, turned their arms againſt each other. Among the Athenians, Pericles, Nicias, and Alcibiades; among the Lacedæmonians, Braſidas, Gylippus, and Lyſander, diſtinguiſhed themſelves in the moſt extraordinary manner.

Rome continues to be agitated by different diſputes between the ſenate and people. Towards the end of this period, and about the 350th year of Rome, the Romans formed the ſiege of Veji, which laſted ten years.

ARTICLE III.

An abridgment of the Lacedæmonian hiſtory, from the eſtabliſhment of their kings, to the reign of Darius the firſt king of Perſia.

(g) I Have already obſerved in a former volume, that eighty years after the taking of Troy, the Heraclides, that is, the deſcendants of Hercules, return-

(g) A. M. 2900. Ant. J. C. 1104.

ed

ed into the Peloponneſus, and made themſelves maſters of Lacedæmon, where two of them, who were brothers, Euriſthenes and Procles, ſons of Ariſtodemus, reigned jointly together. (*h*) Herodotus obſerves, that theſe two brothers were, during their whole lives, at variance, and that almoſt all their deſcendents inherited the like diſpoſition of mutual hatred and antipathy: ſo true is it, that the ſovereign power will admit of no partnerſhip, and that two kings will always be too many for one kingdom! However, after the death of theſe two, the deſcendents of both ſtill continued to ſway the ſcepter jointly: and, what is very remarkable, theſe two branches ſubſiſted for near nine hundred years, from the return of the Heraclides into the Peloponneſus to the death of Cleomenes, and ſupplied Sparta with kings without interruption, and that generally in a regular ſucceſſion from father to ſon, eſpecially in the elder branch of the family.

SECT. I. *The origin and condition of the Elotæ, or Helots.*

WHEN the Lacedæmonians firſt began to ſettle in Peloponneſus, they met with great oppoſition from the inhabitants of the country, whom they were obliged to ſubdue one after another by force of arms, or receive into their alliance on eaſy and equitable terms, as the paying them a ſmall tribute. Strabo (*i*) ſpeaks of a city, called Elos, not far from Sparta, which, after having ſubmitted to the yoak, as others had done, revolted openly and refuſed to pay the tribute. Agis, the ſon of Euriſthenes, newly ſettled in the throne, was ſenſible of the dangerous tendency of this firſt revolt, and therefore immediately marched with an army againſt them, together with Soüs his collegue. They laid ſiege to the city, which after a pretty long reſiſtance, was forced to ſurrender at diſcretion. This prince thought it proper to make ſuch an example of them, as ſhould intimidate all

(*h*) Lib. 6. c. 50. (*i*) Lib. 8. p. 365. Plut. in Lyc. p. 40.

their

their neighbours, and deter them from the like attempts, and yet not alienate their minds by too cruel a treatment. For which reaſon he put none to death. He ſpared the lives of all the inhabitants, but at the ſame time deprived them of their liberty, and reduced them all to a ſtate of ſlavery. From thenceforward they were employed in all mean and ſervile offices, and treated with extreme rigour. Theſe were the people who were called Elotæ. The number of them exceedingly increaſed in proceſs of time, the Lacedæmonians giving undoubtedly the ſame name to all the people they reduced to the ſame condition of ſervitude. As they themſelves were averſe to labour, and entirely addicted to war, they left the cultivation of their lands to theſe ſlaves, aſſigning every one of them a certain portion of ground, of which they were obliged to carry the products every year to their reſpective maſters, who endeavoured by all ſorts of ill uſage to make their yoak more grievous and inſupportable. This was certainly very bad policy, and could only tend to breed a vaſt number of dangerous enemies in the very heart of the ſtate, who were always ready to take arms and revolt on every occaſion. The Romans acted more prudently in this reſpect; for they incorporated the conquered nations into their ſtate, by aſſociating them into the freedom of their city, and thereby converted them, from enemies into brethren and fellow-citizens.

SECT. II. *Lycurgus the Lacedæmonian law-giver.*

(*k*) EURYTION, or Eurypon, as he is named by others, ſucceeded Soüs. In order to gain his people's affection, and render his government agreeable, he thought fit to recede in ſome points from the abſolute power exerciſed by the kings his predeceſſors: this rendered his name ſo dear to his ſubjects, that all his ſucceſſors were, from him, called Eurytionides. But this relaxation gave birth to horrible confuſion,

(*k*) Plut. in Lyc. p. 40.

and

and an unbounded licentiouſneſs in Sparta, and for a long time occaſioned infinite miſchiefs. The people became ſo inſolent, that nothing could reſtrain them. If Eurytion's ſucceſſors attempted to recover their authority by force, they became odious; and if, through complaiſance or weakneſs, they choſe to diſſemble, their mildneſs ſerved only to render them contemptible: ſo that order was in a manner aboliſhed, and the laws no longer regarded. Theſe confuſions haſtened the death of Lycurgus's father, whoſe name was Eunomus, and who was killed in an inſurrection. Polydectes, his eldeſt ſon and ſucceſſor, dying ſoon after without children, every body expected Lycurgus would have been king. And indeed he was ſo in effect, as long as the pregnancy of his brother's wife was uncertain: but as ſoon as that was manifeſt, he declared, that the kingdom belonged to her child, in caſe it proved a ſon: and from that moment he adminiſtred the government, as guardian to his unborn nephew, under the title of Prodicos, which was the name given by the Lacedæmonians to the guardians of their kings. When the child was born, Lycurgus took him in his arms, and cried out to the company that was preſent, *Behold, my lords of Sparta, this new-born child is your king:* and at the ſame time he put the infant into the king's ſeat, and named him Charilaus, becauſe of the joy the people expreſſed upon occaſion of his birth. The reader will find, towards the end of the ſecond volume of this hiſtory, all that relates to the hiſtory of Lycurgus, the reformation he made, and the excellent laws he eſtabliſhed in Sparta. Ageſilas was at this time king in the elder branch of the family.

SECT. III. *War between the Argives and the Lacedæmonians.*

(*l*) SOME time after this, in the reign of Theopompus, a war broke out between the Argives and Lacedæmonians, on account of a little country,

(*l*) Her. l. 1. c. 12.

called

called Thyrea, that lay upon the confines of the two ſtates, and to which each of them pretended a right. When the two armies were ready to engage, it was agreed on both ſides, in order to ſpare the effuſion of blood, that the quarrel ſhould be decided by three hundred of the braveſt men on both ſides, and that the land in queſtion ſhould become the property of the victorious party. To leave the combatants more room to engage, the two armies retired to ſome diſtance. Thoſe generous champions then, who had all the courage of two mighty armies, boldly advanced towards each other, and fought with ſo much reſolution and fury, that the whole number, except three men, two on the ſide of the Argives, and one on that of the Lacedæmonians, lay dead upon the ſpot: and only the night parted them. The two Argives looking upon themſelves as the conquerors, made what haſte they could to Argos to carry the news: the ſingle Lacedæmonian, Othryades by name, inſtead of retiring, ſtript the dead bodies of the Argives, and carrying their arms into the Lacedæmonian camp, continued in his poſt. The next day the two armies returned to the field of battle. Both ſides laid equal claim to the victory: the Argives, becauſe they had more of their champions left alive, than the enemy had; the Lacedæmonians, becauſe the two Argives, that remained alive, had fled; whereas their ſingle ſoldier had remained maſter of the field of battle, and had carried off the ſpoils of the enemy. In ſhort, they could not determine the diſpute without coming to another engagement. Here fortune declared in favour of the Lacedæmonians, and the little territory of Thyrea was the prize of their victory. But Othryades, not able to bear the thoughts of ſurviving his brave companions, or of enduring the ſight of Sparta after their death, killed himſelf on the ſame field of battle where they had fought, reſolving to have one fate and tomb with them.

SECT. IV. *Wars between the Meſſenians and Lacedæmonians.*

THERE were no leſs than three ſeveral wars between the Meſſenians and the Lacedæmonians, all of them very fierce and bloody. Meſſenia was a country in Peloponneſus, not far weſtward from Sparta; it was of conſiderable ſtrength, and had its own particular kings.

THE FIRST MESSENIAN WAR.

(*m*) The firſt Meſſenian war laſted twenty years, and broke out the ſecond year of the ninth Olympiad. The Lacedæmonians pretended to have received ſeveral conſiderable injuries from the Meſſenians, and among others, that of having had their daughters raviſhed by the inhabitants of Meſſenia, when they went, according to cuſtom, to a temple, that ſtood on the borders of the two nations; as alſo that of the murder of Telecles, their king, which was a conſequence of the former. Probably a deſire of extending their dominion, and of ſeizing a territory which lay ſo convenient for them, might be the true cauſe of the war. But be that as it will, the war broke out in the reign of Polydorus and Theopompus kings of Sparta, at the time when the office of Archon at Athens was ſtill decennial.

(*n*) Euphaes, the thirteenth deſcendant from Hercules, was then king of Meſſenia. He gave the command of his army to Cleonnis. The Lacedæmonians opened the campaign with the ſiege of Amphea, a ſmall, inconſiderable city, which however, they thought, would be very proper to make a place of arms. The town was taken by ſtorm, and all the inhabitants put to the ſword. This firſt blow ſerved only to animate the Meſſenians, by ſhowing them what they were to expect from the enemy, if they did not defend themſelves with vigour. The Lacedæmonians,

(*m*) A. M. 3261. Ant. J. C. 743. Pauſ. l. 4. p. 216—240. Juſtin. l. 3. c. 4.

(*n*) Pauſ. p. 223 & 226.

on

on their part, bound themſelves by an oath, not to lay down their arms, or return to Sparta, till they had made themſelves maſters of all the cities and lands belonging to the Meſſenians; ſuch an aſſurance had they of the ſucceſs of their arms, and of their invincible courage.

(o) Two battles were fought, wherein the loſs was pretty equal on both ſides. But after the ſecond, the Meſſenians ſuffered extremely thro' the want of proviſions, which occaſioned a great deſertion in their troops, and at laſt brought the plague among them.

Hereupon they conſulted the oracle of Delphos, which directed them, in order to appeaſe the wrath of the gods, to offer up a virgin of the royal blood in ſacrifice. Ariſtomenes, who was of the race of the Epytides, offered his own daughter. The Meſſenians then conſidering, that if they left garriſons in all their towns, they ſhould extremely weaken their army, reſolved to abandon all their towns, except Ithoma, a little place ſeated on the top of a hill of the ſame name, about which they incamped and fortified themſelves. In this ſituation were ſeven years ſpent, during which nothing paſſed but ſlight ſkirmiſhes on both ſides, the Lacedæmonians not daring in all that time to force the enemy to a battle.

Indeed they almoſt deſpaired of being able to reduce them; nor was there any thing, but the obligation of the oath, by which they had bound themſelves, that made them continue ſo burdenſome a war. (p) What gave them the greateſt uneaſineſs, was, their apprehenſion, leſt their abſence and diſtance from their wives for ſo many years, and which might ſtill continue many more, ſhould deſtroy their families at home, and leave Sparta deſtitute of citizens. To prevent this misfortune, they ſent home ſuch of their ſoldiers, as were come to the army, ſince the fore-mentioned oath had been taken, and made no ſcruple of proſtituting their wives to their embraces. The chil-

(o) Ibid. p. 227—234. (p) Diod. l. 15. p. 778.

dren,

dren, that ſprung from theſe unlawful copulations, were called Partheniatæ, a name given them to denote the infamy of their birth. As ſoon as they were grown up, not being able to endure ſuch an opprobrious diſtinction, they baniſhed themſelves from Sparta with one conſent, and under the conduct of † Phalanthus, went and ſettled at Tarentum in Italy, after driving out the antient inhabitants.

(q) At laſt, in the 8th year of the war, which was the 13th of Euphaes's reign, a fierce and bloody battle was fought near Ithoma. Euphaes pierced thro' the battalions of Theopompus with too much heat and precipitation for a king. He there received a multitude of wounds, ſeveral of which were mortal. He fell, and ſeemed to give up the ghoſt. Whereupon wonderful efforts of courage were exerted on both ſides; by the one, to carry off the king; by the other, to ſave him. Cleonnis killed eight Spartans, who were dragging him along, and ſpoiled them of their arms, which he committed to the cuſtody of ſome of his ſoldiers. He himſelf received ſeveral wounds, all in the forepart of his body, which was a certain proof, that he had never turned his back upon his enemies. Ariſtomenes fighting on the ſame occaſion, and for the ſame end, killed five Lacedæmonians, whoſe ſpoils he likewiſe carried off, without receiving any wound. In ſhort, the king was ſaved and carried off by the Meſſenians, and, all mangled and bloody as he was, he expreſſed great joy, that they had not been worſted. Ariſtomenes, after the battle was over, met Cleonnis, who, by reaſon of his wounds, could neither walk by himſelf, nor with the aſſiſtance of thoſe that lent him their hands. He therefore took him upon his ſhoulders without quitting his arms, and carried him to the camp.

As ſoon as they had applied the firſt dreſſing to the wounds of the king of Meſſenia and of his officers, there aroſe a new combat among the Meſſenians, that

(q) Pauſ. p. 234, 235. Diod. in Frag.

† Et regnata petam Laconi rura Phalanto, *Hor. Ode* 6. *l.* 2.

was purſued with as much warmth as the former, but was of a very different kind, and yet the conſequence of the other. The affair in queſtion was the adjudging the prize of glory to him, that had ſignalized his valour moſt in the late engagement. For it was even then an antient cuſtom among them, publickly to proclaim after a battle, the name of the man, that had ſhewed the greateſt courage. Nothing could be more proper to animate the officers and ſoldiers, to inſpire them with reſolution and intrepidity, and to ſtifle the natural apprehenſion of death and danger. Two illuſtrious champions entered the liſts on this occaſion, namely, Cleonnis and Ariſtomenes.

The king, notwithſtanding his weak condition, being attended with the principal officers of his army, preſided in the council, where this important diſpute was to be decided. Each competitor pleaded his own cauſe. Cleonnis began, and founded his pretenſions upon the great number of the enemies he had ſlain, and upon the multitude of wounds he had received in the action, which were ſo many undoubted teſtimonies of the courage, with which he had faced both death and danger: whereas, according to him, the condition, in which Ariſtomenes came out of the engagement, without hurt and without wound, ſeemed to ſhew, that he had been very careful of his own perſon, or at moſt could only prove, that he had been more fortunate than he, but not more brave, or couragious. And as to his having carried him on his ſhoulders into the camp, that action indeed might ſerve to prove the ſtrength of his body, but nothing further: and the thing in diſpute at this time, ſays he, is not ſtrength, but valour.

The only thing Ariſtomenes was reproached for, was, his not being wounded: therefore he confined himſelf to that point, and anſwered in the following manner: "I am, ſays he, called fortunate, becauſe I "have eſcaped from the battle without wounds. If "that were owing to my cowardiſe, I ſhould deſerve "another

" another epithet than that of fortunate; and inſtead " of being admitted to diſpute the prize, ought to un- " dergo the rigour of the laws, that puniſh cowards. " But what is objected to me as a crime, is in truth " my greateſt glory. For whether the enemies, aſto- " niſhed at my valour, durſt not venture to attack or " oppoſe me, it is no ſmall degree of merit, that I " made them fear me; or that whilſt they engaged " me, I had at the ſame time ſtrength to cut " them in pieces, and ſkill to guard againſt their at- " tacks, I muſt then have been at once both valiant " and prudent. For whoever, in the midſt of an en- " gagement, can expoſe himſelf to dangers with " caution and ſecurity, ſhews, that he excels at the " ſame time both in the virtues of the mind and the " body. As for courage, no man living can reproach " Cleonnis with any want of it: but for his honour's " ſake I am ſorry, that he ſhould appear to want " gratitude."

After the concluſion of theſe harangues, the queſtion was put to the vote. The whole army is in ſuſpenſe, and impatiently waits for the deciſion. No diſpute could be ſo warm and intereſting as this. It is not a competition for gold or ſilver, but ſolely for honour. The proper reward of virtue is pure, diſintereſted glory. Here the judges are unſuſpected. The actions of the competitors ſtill ſpeak for them. It is the king himſelf, ſurrounded with his officers, who preſides and adjudges. A whole army are the witneſſes. The field of battle is a tribunal without partiality and cabal. In ſhort, all the votes concurred in favour of Ariſtomenes, and adjudged him the prize.

(r) Euphaes, the king, died not many days after the deciſion of this affair. He had reigned thirteen years, and during all that time been engaged in war with the Lacedæmonians. As he died without children, he left the Meſſenians at liberty to chuſe his ſucceſſor. Cleonnis and Damis were candidates in oppo-

(r) Pauſ. l. 4. p. 235, 241.

ſition

ſition to Ariſtomenes: but he was elected king in preference to them. When he was on the throne, he did not ſcruple to confer on his two rivals the principal offices of the ſtate: All ſtrongly attached to the publick good, even more than to their own glory, competitors, but not enemies, theſe great men were actuated by a zeal for their country, and were neither friends nor adverſaries to one another, but for its preſervation.

In this relation, I have followed the opinion of the late Monſieur † Boivin, the elder, and have made uſe of his learned diſſertation upon a fragment of Diodorus Siculus, which the world was little acquainted with. He ſuppoſes and proves in it, that the king, ſpoken of in that fragment, is Euphaes; and that Ariſtomenes is the ſame that Pauſanias calls Ariſtodemus, according to the cuſtom of the antients, who were often called by two different names.

Ariſtomenes, otherwiſe called Ariſtodemus, reigned near ſeven years, and was equally eſteemed and beloved by his ſubjects. (*s*) The war ſtill continued all this time. Towards the end of his reign he beat the Lacedæmonians, took their king Theopompus, and in honour of Jupiter of Ithoma, ſacrificed three hundred of them, among whom their king was the principal victim. Shortly after, Ariſtodemus ſacrificed himſelf upon the tomb of his daughter, in conformity to the anſwer of an oracle. Damis was his ſucceſſor, but without taking upon him the title of king.

(*t*) After his death, the Meſſenians never had any ſucceſs in their affairs, but found themſelves in a very wretched and hopeleſs condition. Being reduced to the laſt extremity, and utterly deſtitute of proviſions, they abandoned Ithoma, and fled to ſuch of their allies as were neareſt to them. The city was immediately raz'd, and all the people that remained ſubmitted. They were made to engage by oath never to forſake

(*s*) Clem. Alex. in Protrop. p. 20. Euſeb. in Præpar. l. 4. c. 16.
(*t*) Pauſ. p. 241—247.

† *Memoirs of the Academy of Inſcriptions*, Vol. II. p. 84—115.

the party of the Lacedæmonians, and never to revolt from them: a very uſeful precaution, only proper to make them add the guilt of perjury to their rebellion. Their new maſters impoſed no tribute upon them; but contented themſelves with obliging them to bring to the Spartan market one half of the corn they ſhould reap every harveſt. It was likewiſe ſtipulated, that the Meſſenians, both men and women, ſhould attend, in mourning, the funerals either of the kings, or chief citizens of Sparta: which the Lacedæmonians probably looked upon as a mark of the others dependance, and as a kind of homage paid to their nation. (*u*) Thus ended the firſt Meſſenian war, after having laſted twenty years.

THE SECOND MESSENIAN WAR.

(*x*) The lenity with which the Lacedæmonians treated the Meſſenians at firſt, was of no long duration. When once they found the whole country had ſubmitted, and thought the people incapable of giving them any further trouble, they returned to their natural character of inſolence and haughtineſs, that often degenerated into cruelty, and ſometimes even into ferocity. Inſtead of treating the vanquiſhed with kindneſs, as friends and allies, and endeavouring by gentle methods to win thoſe they had ſubdued by force, they ſeemed intent upon nothing but aggravating their yoke, and making them feel the whole weight of ſubjection. They laid heavy taxes upon them; delivered them up to the avarice of the collectors of thoſe taxes; gave no ear to their complaints; rendered them no juſtice; treated them like vile ſlaves; and committed the moſt crying outrages againſt them.

Man, who is born for liberty, can never reconcile himſelf to ſervitude: the moſt gentle ſlavery exaſperates, and provokes him to rebel. What could be expected then from ſo cruel a one, as that the Meſſenians groaned under? After having endured it with

(*u*) A. M. 3281. Ant. J. C. 723. (*x*) Paul. l. 4. p. 242, 261. Juſtin. l. 3. c. 5.

great

great uneaſineſs * near forty years, they reſolved to throw off the yoke, and to recover their antient liberty. (y) This was in the 4th year of the 23d Olympiad: the office of Archon at Athens was then made annual; and Anaxander and Anaxidamus reigned at Sparta.

The Meſſenians firſt care was to ſtrengthen themſelves with the alliance of the neighbouring nations. Theſe they found well inclined to enter into their views, as very agreeable to their own intereſts. For it was not without jealouſy and apprehenſions, that they ſaw ſo powerful a city riſing up in the midſt of them, which manifeſtly ſeemed to aim at extending her dominion over all the reſt. The people therefore of Elis, the Argives and Sicyonians declared for the Meſſenians. But before their forces were joined, a battle was fought between the Lacedæmonians and Meſſenians. † Ariſtomenes, the ſecond of that name, was at the head of the latter. He was a commander of intrepid courage, and of great abilities in war. The Lacedæmonians were beat in this engagement. Ariſtomenes, to give the enemy at firſt an advantagious opinion of his bravery, knowing what influence it has on the ſucceſs of future enterprizes, boldly ventured to enter into Sparta by night, and upon the gate of the temple of Minerva, who was ſurnamed Chalcioecos, to hang up a ſhield, on which was an inſcription, ſignifying, that it was a preſent offered by Ariſtomenes to the goddeſs, out of the ſpoils of the Lacedæmonians.

This bravado did in reality aſtoniſh the Lacedæmonians. But they were ſtill more alarmed at the formidable league that was formed againſt them. The Delphic oracle, which they conſulted, in order to

(y) A. M. 3320. Ant. J. C. 684.

* Cùm per complures annos gravia ſervitutis verbera plerumque ac vincula cæteraque captivitatis mala perpeſſi eſſent, poſt longam pœnarum patientiam bellum inſurant. *Juſtin.* l. 3. c. 5.

† *According to ſeveral hiſtorians, there was another Ariſtomenes in the firſt Meſſenian war.* Diod. l. 15. p. 378.

know by what means they ſhould be ſucceſsful in this war, directed them to ſend to Athens for a commander, and to ſubmit to his counſel and conduct. This was a very mortifying ſtep to ſo haughty a city as Sparta. But the fear of incurring the god's diſpleaſure by a direct diſobedience, prevailed over all other conſiderations. They ſent an embaſſy therefore to the Athenians. The people of Athens were ſomewhat perplexed at the requeſt. On the one hand, they were not ſorry to ſee the Lacedæmonians at war with their neighbours, and were far from deſiring to furniſh them with a good general: on the other, they were afraid alſo of diſobeying the god. To extricate themſelves out of this difficulty, they offered the Lacedæmonians a perſon called Tyrtæus. He was a poet by profeſſion, and had ſomething original in the turn of his wit, and diſagreeable in his perſon; for he was lame. Notwithſtanding theſe defects, the Lacedæmonians received him as a general, ſent them by heaven itſelf. Their ſucceſs did not at firſt anſwer their expectation, for they loſt three battles ſucceſſively.

The kings of Sparta, diſcouraged by ſo many diſappointments, and out of all hopes of better ſucceſs for the future, were entirely bent upon returning to Sparta, and marching home again with their forces. Tyrtæus oppoſed this deſign very warmly, and at length brought them over to his opinion. He ſpoke to the troops, and repeated to them verſes he had made on the occaſion, and on which he had beſtowed great pains and application. He firſt endeavoured to comfort them for their paſt loſſes, which he imputed to no fault of theirs, but only to ill fortune, or to fate, which no human wiſdom can ſurmount. He then repreſented to them, what a ſhame it would be for Spartans to fly from an enemy; and how glorious it would be for them rather to periſh ſword in hand, in fighting for their country, if it was ſo decreed by fate. Then, as if all danger was vaniſhed, and the gods, fully ſatisfied and appeaſed with their late calamities, were entirely

turned

turned to their ſide, he ſet victory before their eyes as preſent and certain, and as if ſhe herſelf were inviting them to battle. (z) All the antient authors, who have made any mention of the ſtile and character of Tyrtæus's poetry, obſerve, that it was full of a certain fire, ardor, and enthuſiaſm, that animated the minds of men, that exalted them above themſelves, that inſpired † them with ſomething generous and martial, that extinguiſhed all fear and apprehenſion of danger or death, and made them wholly intent upon the preſervation of their country and their own glory.

Tyrtæus's verſes had really this effect on the ſoldiers upon this occaſion. They all deſired with one voice, to march againſt the enemy. Being become indifferent as to their lives, they had no thoughts but to ſecure themſelves the honour of a burial. To this end they all tied ſtrings round their right arms, on which were inſcribed their own and their fathers names, that, if they chanced to be killed in the battle, and to have their faces ſo altered through time, or accidents, as not to be diſtinguiſhable, it might certainly be known who each of them was by theſe marks. Soldiers determined to die, are very valiant. This appeared in the battle that enſued. It was very bloody, the victory being a long time diſputed on both ſides: but at laſt the Meſſenians gave way. When Tyrtæus went afterwards to Sparta, he was received with the greateſt marks of diſtinction, and incorporated into the body of citizens.

The gaining of this battle did not put an end to the war, which had already laſted three years. Ariſtomenes having aſſembled the remains of his army, retired to the top of a mountain, of difficult acceſs, which was called Ira. The conquerors attempted to carry the place by aſſault; but that brave prince defended himſelf there for the ſpace of eleven years,

(z) Plat. l. 1. de Legib. p. 620. Plut. in Agid. & Cleom. p. 805.

† Tyrtæuſque mares animos in martia bella
Verſibus exacuit. *Hor. in Art. Poet.*

and performed the most extraordinary actions of bravery. He was at last obliged to quit it, only by surprize and treachery, after having defended it like a lion. Such of the Messenians as fell into the hands of the Lacedæmonians on this occasion, were reduced to the condition of the Helots or slaves. The rest seeing their country ruined, went and settled at Zancle, a city in Sicily, which afterwards took its name from this people, and was called Messana; the same place called at this day Messina. Aristomenes, after having conducted one of his daughters to Rhodes, whom he had given in marriage to the tyrant of that place, thought of passing on to Sardis, and to remain with Ardys king of the Lydians, or to Ecbatana with Phraortes, king of the Medes; but death prevented the execution of all his designs.

(*a*) The second Messenian war was of fourteen years duration, and ended the first year of the twenty-seventh Olympiad.

There was a third war between this people and the Lacedæmonians, which began both at the time, and on the occasion of a great earthquake, that happened at Sparta. We shall speak of this war in its place.

(*a*) A. M. 3334. Ant. J. C. 670.

BOOK

BOOK THE SIXTH.

THE HISTORY OF THE Perſians *and* Grecians.

This book contains the hiſtory of the PERSIANS and GRECIANS, in the reigns of Darius I. and Xerxes I. during the ſpace of forty-eight years, from the year of the world 3483 to the year 3531.

CHAPTER I.

The hiſtory of Darius intermixed with that of the Greeks.

(*b*) BEFORE Darius came to be king, he was called Ochus. At his acceſſion he took the name of Darius, which, according to Herodotus, in the Perſian language, ſignifies an avenger, or a man that defeats the ſchemes of another; probably becauſe he had puniſhed and put an end to the inſolence of the Magian impoſtor. He reigned thirty-ſix years.

SECT. I. *Darius's marriage. The impoſition of tributes. The inſolence and puniſhment of Intaphernes*

(*b*) Herod. l. 6. c. 98. Val. Max. l. 9. c. 2.

The death of Oretes. The ſtory of Democedes a phyſician. The Jews permitted to carry on the building of their temple. The generoſity of Syloſon rewarded.

BEFORE Darius was elected king, he had married the daughter of Gobryas, whoſe name is not known. Artabarzanes, his eldeſt ſon by her, afterwards diſputed the empire with Xerxes.

(*c*) When Darius was ſeated in the throne, the better to ſecure himſelf therein, he married two of Cyrus's daughters, Atoſſa and Ariſtona. The former had been wife to Cambyſes, her own brother, and afterwards to Smerdis the Magian, during the time he poſſeſſed the throne. Ariſtona was ſtill a virgin, when Darius married her; and of all his wives, was the perſon he moſt loved. He likewiſe married Parmys, daughter of the true Smerdis, who was Cambyſes's brother, as alſo Phedyma, daughter to Otanes, by whoſe management the impoſture of the Magian was diſcovered. By theſe wives he had a great number of children of both ſexes.

We have already ſeen, that the ſeven conſpirators, who put the Magus to death, had agreed among themſelves, that he, whoſe horſe, on a day appointed, firſt neighed, at the riſing of the ſun, ſhould be declared king; and that Darius's horſe, by an artifice of his groom, procured his maſter that honour. (*d*) The king, deſiring to tranſmit to future ages, his gratitude for this ſignal and extraordinary ſervice, cauſed an equeſtrian ſtatue to be ſet up with this inſcription: *Darius, the ſon of Hyſtaſpes, acquired the kingdom of Perſia by means of his horſe* (*whoſe name was inſerted*) *and of his groom, Oebares.* There is in this inſcription, in which we ſee the king is not aſhamed to own himſelf indebted to his horſe and his groom for ſo tranſcendent a benefaction as the regal diadem, when it was his intereſt, one would think, to have it conſidered as the fruits of a ſuperior merit: there is, I ſay, in this

(*c*) A. M. 3483. Ant. J. C. 521. Her. l. 3. c. 88. (*d*) Ibid.

inſcription

inſcription a ſimplicity and ſincerity peculiar to the genius of thoſe antient times, and extremely remote from the pride and vanity of ours.

(*e*) One of the firſt cares of Darius, when he was ſettled in the throne, was to regulate the ſtate of the provinces, and to put his finances into good order. Before his time, Cyrus and Cambyſes had contented themſelves with receiving from the conquered nations ſuch free gifts only, as they voluntarily offered, and with requiring a certain number of troops when they had occaſion for them. But Darius conceived, that it was impoſſible for him to preſerve all the nations, ſubject to him, in peace and ſecurity, without keeping up regular forces, and without aſſigning them a certain pay; or to be able punctually to give them that pay, without laying taxes and impoſitions upon the people.

In order therefore to regulate the adminiſtration of his finances, he divided the whole empire into twenty diſtricts, or governments, each of which was annually to pay a certain ſum to the ſatrap, or governor appointed for that purpoſe. The natural ſubjects, that is, the Perſians, were exempt from all impoſts. Herodotus has an exact enumeration of theſe provinces, which may very much contribute to give us a juſt idea of the extent of the Perſian empire.

In Aſia it comprehended all that now belongs to the Perſians and Turks; in Africa, it took in Egypt and part of Nubia, as alſo the coaſts of the Mediterranean, as far as the kingdom of Barca; in Europe, part of Thrace and Macedonia. But it muſt be obſerved, that in this vaſt extent of country, there were ſeveral nations, which were only tributary, and not properly ſubjects to Perſia; as is the caſe at this day with reſpect to the Turkiſh empire.

(*f*) Hiſtory obſerves, that Darius, in impoſing theſe tributes, ſhewed great wiſdom and moderation. He ſent for the principal inhabitants of every province; ſuch as were beſt acquainted with the condition and

(*e*) Her. l. 3. c. 89—97. (*f*) Plut. in Apophthegm. p. 172.

ability of their country, and were obliged in intereſt to give him a true and impartial account. He then aſked them, if ſuch and ſuch ſums, which he propoſed to each of them for their reſpective provinces, were not too great, or did not exceed what they were able to pay; his intention being, as he told them, not to oppreſs his ſubjects, but only to require ſuch aids from them, as were proportion'd to their incomes, and abſolutely neceſſary for the defence of the ſtate. They all anſwered, that the ſums he propoſed were very reaſonable, and ſuch as would not be burthenſome to the people. The king however was pleaſed to abate one half, chuſing rather to keep a great deal within bounds, than to riſk a poſſibility of exceeding them.

But notwithſtanding this extraordinary moderation on the king's part, as there is ſomething odious in all impoſts, the Perſians, who gave the ſurname of father to Cyrus, and of maſter to Cambyſes, thought fit to characterize Darius with that of * merchant.

The ſeveral ſums levied by the impoſition of theſe tributes or taxes, as far as we can infer from the calculation of Herodotus, which is attended with great difficulties, amounted in the whole to about forty four millions *per annum* French, or ſomething leſs than two millions Engliſh money.

(g) After the death of the Magian impoſtor, it was agreed, that the Perſian noblemen, who had conſpired againſt him, ſhould, beſides ſeveral other marks of diſtinction, have the liberty of free acceſs to the king's preſence at all times, except when he was alone with the queen. Intaphernes, one of theſe noblemen, being refuſed admittance into the king's apartment, at a time when the king and queen were in private together, in a violent rage fell foul upon the officers of the palace, abuſed them outragiouſly, cutting their

(g) Her. l. 3. c. 118, 119.

* Κάπηλος *ſignifies ſomething ſtill more mean and contemptible; but I do not know how to expreſs it in our language. It may ſignify a* Broker, *or a* Retail, *any one that buys to ſell again.*

faces

faces with his ſcimitar. Darius highly reſented ſo heinous an inſult; and at firſt apprehended it might be a conſpiracy amongſt the noblemen. But when he was well aſſured of the contrary, he cauſed Intaphernes, with his children and all that were of his family to be taken up, and had them all condemned to be put to death, confounding through a blind exceſs of ſeverity the innocent with the guilty. In theſe unhappy circumſtances the criminal's lady went every day to the gates of the palace, crying and weeping in the moſt lamentable manner, and never ceaſing to implore the king's clemency with all the pathetick eloquence of ſorrow and diſtreſs. The king could not reſiſt ſo moving a ſpectacle, and beſides her own, granted her the pardon of any one of her family, whom ſhe ſhould chuſe. This gave the unhappy lady great perplexity, who deſired, no doubt, to ſave them all. At laſt, after a long deliberation ſhe determined in favour of her brother. This choice, wherein ſhe ſeemed not to have followed the ſentiments which nature ſhould dictate to a mother and a wife, ſurprized the king, who deſiring her to be aſked the reaſon of it, ſhe made anſwer, that by a ſecond marriage the loſs of an huſband and children might be retriev'd; but that, her father and mother being dead, there was no poſſiblity of recovering a brother. Darius, beſides the life of her brother, granted her the ſame favour for the eldeſt of her children.

(*b*) I have already related in the foregoing volume, by what an inſtance of perfidiouſneſs Oretes, one of the king's governors in Aſia minor, brought about the death of Polycrates, tyrant of Samos. So black and deteſtable a crime did not go unpuniſhed. Darius found out, that Oretes ſtrangely abuſed his power, making no account of the blood of thoſe perſons, who had the misfortune to diſpleaſe him. This ſatrap carried his inſolence ſo far, as to put to death a meſſenger ſent him by the king, becauſe the orders he had brought

(*b*) Her. l. 3. c. 120, 128.

him

him were diſagreeable. Darius, who did not yet think himſelf well ſettled in the throne, would not venture to attack him openly: for the ſatrap had no leſs than a thouſand ſoldiers for his guard, not to mention the forces he was able to raiſe from his government, which included Phrygia, Lydia, and Ionia. The king therefore thought fit to proceed in a ſecret manner, to rid himſelf of ſo dangerous a ſervant. With this commiſſion he intruſted one of his officers, of approved fidelity and attachment to his perſon. The officer, under pretence of other buſineſs, went to Sardis: where with great dexterity he ſifted into the diſpoſitions of the people. To pave the way to his deſign, he firſt gave the principal officers of the governor's guard letters from the king, which contained nothing but general orders. A little while after he delivered them other letters, in which their orders were more expreſs and particular. And aſſoon as he found himſelf perfectly ſure of the diſpoſition of the troops, he then read them a third letter, wherein the king in plain terms commanded them to kill the governor; and this order was executed without delay. All his effects were confiſcated to the king; and all the perſons belonging to his family and houſhold were removed to Suſa. Among the reſt, there was a celebrated phyſician of Crotona, whoſe name was Democedes. This phyſician's ſtory is very ſingular, and happened to be the occaſion of ſome conſiderable events.

(*i*) Not long after the fore-mentioned tranſaction, Darius chanced to have a fall from his horſe in hunting, by which he wrenched one of his feet in a violent manner, and put his heel out of joint. The Egyptians were then reckoned the moſt ſkilful in phyſick; for which reaſon the king had ſeveral phyſicians of that nation about him. Theſe undertook to cure the king, * and exerted all their ſkill on ſo important an occaſion: but they were ſo unhandy in the operation

(*i*) Her. l. 3. c. 129, 130.

* *Antiently the ſame perſons practiſed both as phyſicians and ſurgeons.*

and

and in the handling and managing the king's foot, that they put him to incredible pain; ſo that he paſſed ſeven days and ſeven nights without ſleeping. Democedes was mentioned on this occaſion by ſome perſon, who had heard him extolled at Sardis, as a very able phyſician. He was ſent for immediately and brought to the king in the condition he was in, with his irons on, and in a very poor apparel: for he was at that time actually a priſoner. The king aſked him, whether he had any knowledge of phyſick. At firſt he denied he had, fearing, that if he ſhould give any proofs of his ſkill, he ſhould be detained in Perſia, and by that means be for ever debarred from returning to his own country, for which he had an exceeding affection. Darius, diſpleaſed with his anſwer, ordered him to be put to the torture. Democedes found it was neceſſary to own the truth; and therefore offered his ſervice to the king. The firſt thing he did was to apply gentle fomentations to the parts affected. This remedy had a ſpeedy effect: the king recovered his ſleep; and in a few days was perfectly cured, both of the ſprain and the diſlocation. To recompenſe the phyſician the king made him a preſent of two pair of golden chains. Upon which Democedes aſked him, whether he meant to reward the happy ſucceſs of his endeavours, by doubling his misfortune. The king was pleaſed with that ſaying; and ordered his eunuchs to conduct Democedes to his wives, that they might ſee the perſon, to whom he was indebted for his recovery. They all made him very magnificent preſents; ſo that in one day's time he became extremely rich.

(*k*) Democedes was a native of Crotona, a city of Græcia major, in the lower Calabria in Italy, from whence he had been obliged to fly, on account of the ill treatment he received from his father. He firſt went to * Egina, where by ſeveral ſucceſsful cures he acquired great reputation: the inhabitants of this place

(*k*) Her. l. 3. c. 131.

* *An iſland between Attica and Peloponneſus.*

ſettled

ſettled on him a yearly penſion of a talent. The talent contained ſixty mina's, and was worth about three thouſand livres, French money. Some time after, he was invited to Athens; where they augmented his penſion to five thouſand * livres *per annum*. After this, he was received into the family of Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, who gave him a penſion of two thouſand crowns ‖. It is very much for the honour of cities, or princes, by handſome penſions and ſalaries to engage ſuch perſons in their ſervice, as are of publick benefit to mankind; and even to induce foreigners of worth and merit to come and ſettle among them. The Crotonians from this time had the reputation of having the ableſt phyſicians; and next after them, the people of Cyrene in Africa. The Argives were at the ſame time reputed to excel in muſick.

(*l*) Democedes, after performing this cure upon the king, was admitted to the honour of eating at his table, and came to be in great credit at Suſa. At his interceſſion, the Egyptian phyſicians were pardoned, who had all been condemned to be hanged for having been leſs ſkilful than the Grecian phyſician; as if they were obliged to anſwer for the ſucceſs of their remedies, or that it was a crime not to be able to cure a king. This is a ſtrange abuſe, though too common an effect of unlimited power, which is ſeldom guided by reaſon or equity, and which, being accuſtomed to ſee every thing give way implicitly to its authority, expects that its commands, of what nature ſoever, ſhould be infallibly performed! We have ſeen ſomething of this kind in the hiſtory of Nebuchadnezzar, who pronounced a general ſentence of death upon all his magicians, becauſe they could not divine what it was he had dreamed in the night, which he himſelf had forgot. Democedes procured alſo the enlargement of ſeveral of thoſe perſons, who had been impriſoned with him. He

(*l*) Her. l. 3. c. 132.

* *An hundred mina's.* ‖ *Two talents.*

lived

lived in the greateſt affluence, and was in the higheſt eſteem and favour with the king. But he was at a great diſtance from his own country, upon which his thoughts and deſires were continually bent.

(*m*) He had the good fortune to perform another cure, which contributed to raiſe his credit and reputation ſtill higher. Atoſſa, one of the king's wives, and daughter to Cyrus, was attacked with a cancer in her breaſt. As long as the pain of it was tolerable, ſhe bore it with patience, not being able to prevail on herſelf, out of modeſty, to diſcover her diſorder. But at laſt ſhe was conſtrained to it, and ſent for Democedes; who promiſed to cure her, and at the ſame time requeſted, that ſhe would be pleaſed to grant him a certain favour he ſhould beg of her, entirely conſiſtent with her honour. The queen engaged her word, and was cured. The favour promiſed the phyſician was to procure him a journey into his own country: and the queen was not unmindful of her promiſe. * It is worth while to take notice of ſuch events, which tho' not very conſiderable in themſelves, often give occaſion to the greateſt enterprizes of princes, and are even the ſecret ſprings and diſtant cauſes of them.

As Atoſſa was converſing one day with Darius, ſhe took occaſion to repreſent to him, that, being in the flower of his age, and of a vigorous conſtitution, capable of enduring the fatigues of war, and having great and numerous armies at command, it would be for his honour to form ſome great enterprize, and let the Perſians ſee, they had a man of courage for their king. You have hit my thoughts, replied Darius; which were upon invading the Scythians. I had much rather, ſays Atoſſa, you would firſt turn your arms againſt Greece. I have heard great things ſaid in praiſe of the women of Lacedæmon, of Argos, Athens, and Corinth; and ſhould be very glad to have

(*m*) Cap. 135, 137.

* Non ſine uſu fuerit introſpicere illa primo aſpectu levia, ex queis magnarum ſæpe rerum motus oriuntur. *Tac.* l. 4. c. 32.

ſome

ſome of them in my ſervice. Beſides, you have a perſon here, that might be very uſeful to you in ſuch an enterprize, and could give you a perfect knowledge of the country: the perſon I mean is Democedes, who hath cured both you and me. This was enough for the king, and the affair was reſolved immediately. Fifteen Perſian noblemen were appointed to accompany Democedes into Greece, and to examine with him all the maritime places, as thoroughly as poſſible. The king further charged thoſe perſons, above all things, to keep a ſtrict eye upon the phyſician, that he did not give them the ſlip, and to bring him back with them to the Perſian court.

Darius in giving ſuch an order, plainly ſhewed, he did not underſtand the proper methods for engaging men of wit and merit to reſide in his dominions, and for attaching them to his perſon. To pretend to do this by authority and compulſion, is the ſure way of ſuppreſſing all knowledge and induſtry, and of driving away the liberal arts and ſciences, which muſt be free and unconfined, like the genius from whence they ſpring. For one man of genius, that will be kept in a country by force, thouſands will be driven away, who would probably have choſen to reſide in it, if they could enjoy their liberty, and meet with kind treatment.

When Darius had formed his deſign of ſending into Greece, he acquainted Democedes with it, laid open his views to him, and told him the occaſion he had for his ſervice to conduct the Perſian noblemen thither, particularly to the maritime towns, in order to obſerve their ſituation and ſtrength; at the ſame time earneſtly deſiring him, that, when that was done, he would return back with them to Perſia. The king permitted him to carry all his moveables with him, and give them, if he pleaſed, to his father and brothers, promiſing at his return to give him as many of greater value; and ſignified to him further, that he would order the galley, in which he was to ſail, to be laden

with very rich preſents, for him to beſtow as he thought fit on the reſt of his family. The king's intention appeared by his manner of ſpeaking to be undiſguiſed and without artifice: but Democedes was afraid it might be a ſnare laid for him, to diſcover whether he intended to return to Perſia, or not: and therefore to remove all ſuſpicion, he left his own goods behind him at Suſa, and only took with him the preſents deſigned for his family.

The firſt place they landed at was Sidon in Phœnicia, where they equipped two large veſſels for themſelves, and put all they had brought along with them on board another veſſel of burden. After having paſſed through and carefully examined the chief cities of Greece, they went to Tarentum in Italy. Here the Perſian noblemen were taken up as ſpies; and Democedes taking advantage of this arreſt, made his eſcape from them, and fled to Crotona. When the Perſian lords had recovered their liberty, they purſued him thither, but could not prevail upon the Crotonians to deliver up their fellow-citizen. The city moreover ſeized the loaded veſſel: and the Perſians having loſt their guide, laid aſide the thoughts of going over the other parts of Greece, and ſet out for their own country. Democedes let them know, at their departure, that he was going to marry the daughter of Milo, a famous wreſtler of Crotona, whoſe name was very well known to the king, and of whom we ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak hereafter. This voyage of the Perſian noblemen into Greece, was attended with no immediate conſequence; becauſe on their return home they found the king engaged in other affairs.

(*p*) In the third year of this king's reign, which was but the ſecond according to the Jewiſh computation, the Samaritans excited new troubles againſt the Jews. In the preceding reigns, they had procured an order to prohibit the Jews from proceeding any further in building of the temple of Jeruſalem. But, upon the lively

(*p*) Eſdr. c. v.

exhor-

exhortation of the prophets, and the expreſs order of God, the Iſraelites had lately reſumed the work, which had been interrupted for ſeveral years, and carried it on with great vigour. The Samaritans had recourſe to their antient practices, to prevent them. To this end they applied to Thatanai, whom Darius had made governor of the provinces of Syria and Paleſtine. They complained to him of the audacious proceeding of the Jews, who, of their own authority, and in defiance of the prohibitions to the contrary, preſumed to rebuild their temple: which muſt neceſſarily be prejudicial to the king's intereſts. Upon this repreſentation of theirs, the governor thought fit to go himſelf to Jeruſalem. And being a perſon of great equity and moderation, when he had inſpected the work, he did not think proper to proceed violently, and to put a ſtop to it without any further deliberation; but enquired of the Jewiſh elders, what licence they had for entering upon a work of that nature. The Jews hereupon producing the edict of Cyrus made in that behalf, he would not of himſelf ordain any thing in contradiction of it, but ſent an account of the matter to the king, and deſired to know his pleaſure. He gave the king a true repreſentation of the matter, acquainting him with the edict of Cyrus which the Jews alledged in their juſtification, and deſiring him to order the regiſters to be conſulted, to know, whether Cyrus had really publiſhed ſuch an edict in their favour, and thereupon to ſend him inſtructions of what he thought fit to order in the affair. (q) Darius having commanded the regiſters to be examined, the edict was found at Ecbatana in Media, the place where Cyrus was, at the time of its being granted. Now Darius having a great reſpect for the memory of that prince, confirmed his edict, and cauſed another to be drawn up, wherein the former was referred to, and ratified. This motive of regard to the memory of Cyrus, had there been nothing elſe to influence the king, would

(q) Eſdr. c. vi.

be

be very laudable: but the ſcripture informs us, that it was God himſelf, who influenced the mind and heart of the king, and inſpired him with a favourable diſpoſition to the Jews. The truth of this appears pretty plain from the edict itſelf. In the firſt place it ordains, that all the victims, oblations, and other expences of the temple, be abundantly furniſhed the Jews, as the prieſts ſhould require: in the ſecond place it enjoins the prieſts of Jeruſalem, when they offered their ſacrifices to the God of heaven, to pray for the preſervation of the life of the king and the princes his children: and laſtly it goes ſo far, as to denounce imprecations againſt all princes and people, that ſhould hinder the carrying on of the building of the temple, or that ſhould attempt to deſtroy it: by all which Darius evidently acknowledges, that the God of Iſrael is able to overturn the kingdoms of the world, and to dethrone the moſt mighty and powerful princes.

By virtue of this edict, the Jews were not only authorized to proceed in the building of their temple, but all the expences thereof were alſo to be furniſhed to them, out of the taxes and impoſts of the province. What muſt have become of the Jews, when the crimes of diſobedience and rebellion were laid to their charge, if at ſuch a juncture their ſuperiors had only hearkened to their enemies, and not given them leave to juſtify themſelves!

The ſame prince, ſome time after, gave ſtill a more ſignal proof of his love for juſtice, and of his abhorrence for accuſers and informers, a deteſtable race of men, that are, by their very nature and condition, enemies to all merit and all virtue. It is pretty obvious, that I mean the famous edict, publiſhed by this prince againſt Haman, in favour of the Jews at the requeſt of Eſther, whom the king had taken to his bed in the room of Vaſthi, one of his wives. According to archbiſhop Uſher, this Vaſthi is the ſame perſon as is called by prophane writers Atoſſa; and the Ahaſuerus of the holy ſcriptures the ſame as Darius: but, according

cording to others, it is Artaxerxes. The fact is well known, being related in the ſacred hiſtory: I have given however a brief account of it in a former volume (*r*).

Such actions of juſtice do great honour to a prince's memory: as do alſo thoſe of gratitude, of which Darius on a certain occaſion gave a very laudable inſtance. (*s*) Syloſon, brother to Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, had once made Darius a preſent of a ſuit of cloaths, of a curious red colour, which extremely pleaſed Darius's fancy, and would never ſuffer him to make any return for it. Darius at that time was but a private gentleman, an officer in the guards of Cambyſes, whom he accompanied to Memphis in his Egyptian expedition. When Darius was on the throne of Perſia, Syloſon went to Suſa, preſented himſelf at the gate of his palace, and ſent up word to the king that there was a Grecian below, to whom his majeſty was under ſome obligation. Darius, ſurprized at ſuch a meſſage, and curious to know the truth of it, ordered him to be brought in. When he ſaw him, he remembred him, and acknowledged him to have been his benefactor; and was ſo far from being aſhamed of an adventure, which might ſeem not to be much for his honour, that he ingenuouſly applauded the gentleman's generoſity, which proceeded from no other motive than that of doing a pleaſure to a perſon, from whom he could have no expectations; and then propoſed to make him a conſiderable preſent of gold and ſilver. But money was not the thing Syloſon deſired: the love of his country was his predominant paſſion. The favour he required of the king was, that he would ſettle him at Samos, without ſhedding the blood of the citizens, by driving out the perſon, that had uſurped the government ſince the death of his brother. Darius conſented, and committed the conduct of the expedition to Otanes, one of the principal lords of his court, who undertook it with joy, and performed it with ſucceſs.

(*r*) Vol. II. (*s*) Her. l. 3. c. 139, 149.

SECT.

SECT. II. *Revolt and reduction of Babylon.*

(*t*) IN the beginning of the fifth year of Darius, Babylon revolted, and could not be reduced till after a twenty months ſiege. This city, formerly miſtreſs of the Eaſt, grew impatient of the Perſian yoak, eſpecially after the removing of the imperial ſeat to Suſa, which very much diminiſhed Babylon's wealth and grandeur. The Babylonians, taking advantage of the revolution that happened in Perſia, firſt on the death of Cambyſes, and afterwards on the maſſacre of the Magians, made ſecretly for four years together all kinds of preparations for war. When they thought the city ſufficiently ſtored with proviſions for many years, they ſet up the ſtandard of rebellion; which obliged Darius to beſiege them with all his forces. Now God continued to accompliſh thoſe terrible threatnings he had denounced againſt Babylon: that he would not only humble and bring down that proud and impious city, but depopulate and lay it waſte with fire and blood, utterly exterminate it, and reduce it to an eternal ſolitude. In order to fulfil theſe predictions, God permitted the Babylonians to rebel againſt Darius, and by that means to draw upon themſelves the whole force of the Perſian empire: and they themſelves were the firſt in putting theſe prophecies in execution, by deſtroying a great number of their own people, as will be ſeen preſently. It is probable, that the Jews, of whom a conſiderable number remained at Babylon, went out of the city, before the ſiege was formed, as the prophets (*u*) Iſaiah and Jeremiah had exhorted them long before, and Zachariah very lately, in the following terms: *Thou Sion, that dwelleſt with the daughter of Babylon, flee from the country, and ſave thy ſelf.*

The Babylonians, to make their proviſions laſt the longer, and to enable them to hold out with the

(*t*) A. M. 3488. Ant. J. C. 516. Her. l. 3. c. 150—160.
(*u*) Iſ. xlviii. 20. Jer. l. 8. li. 6, 9, 45. Zach. ii. 6, 9.

greater

greater vigour, took the moſt deſperate and barbarous reſolution that ever was heard of; which was, to deſtroy all ſuch of their own people, as were unſerviceable on this occaſion. For this purpoſe they aſſembled together all their wives and children, and ſtrangled them. Only every man was allowed to keep his beſt beloved wife, and one ſervant-maid to do the buſineſs of the family.

After this cruel execution, the unhappy remainder of the inhabitants, thinking themſelves out of all danger, both on account of their fortifications, which they looked upon as impregnable, and the vaſt quantity of proviſions they had laid up, began to inſult the beſiegers from the tops of their walls, and to provoke them with opprobrious language. The Perſians, for the ſpace of eighteen months, did all that force or ſtratagem were capable of, to make themſelves maſters of the city; nor did they forget to make uſe of the ſame means, as had ſo happily ſucceeded with Cyrus ſome years before; I mean, that of turning the courſe of the river. But all their efforts were fruitleſs; and Darius began almoſt to deſpair of taking the place, when a ſtratagem, till then unheard of, opened the gates of the city to him. He was ſtrangely ſurprized one morning to ſee Zopyrus, one of the chief noblemen of his court, and ſon of Megabyſes, who was one of the ſeven lords, that made the aſſociation againſt the Magians; to ſee him, I ſay, appear before him all over blood, with his noſe and ears cut off, and his whole body wounded in a terrible manner. Starting up from his throne he cried out, Who is it, Zopyrus, that has dared to treat you thus? You yourſelf, O king, replied Zopyrus. The deſire I had of rendering you ſervice has put me into this condition. As I was fully perſuaded, that you never would have conſented to this method, I have conſulted none but the zeal I have for your ſervice. He then opened to him his deſign of going over to the enemy; and they ſettled every thing together that was proper to be done.

The king could not ſee him ſet out upon this extraordinary project without the utmoſt affliction and concern. Zopyrus approached the walls of the city; and having told them who he was, was ſoon admitted. They then carried him before the governor, to whom he laid open his misfortune, and the cruel treatment he had met with from Darius, for having diſſuaded him from continuing any longer before a city, which it was impoſſible for him to take. He offered the Babylonians his ſervice, which could not fail of being highly uſeful to them, ſince he was acquainted with all the deſigns of the Perſians, and ſince the deſire of revenge would inſpire him with freſh courage and reſolution. His name and perſon were both well known at Babylon: the condition in which he appeared, his blood and his wounds teſtified for him; and, by proofs not to be ſuſpected, confirmed the truth of all he advanced. They therefore entirely believed whatever he told them, and gave him moreover the command of as many troops as he deſired. In the firſt ſally he made, he cut off a thouſand of the beſiegers: a few days after he killed them double the number; and on the third time, four thouſand of their men lay dead upon the ſpot. All this had been before agreed upon between him and Darius. Nothing was now talked of in Babylon but Zopyrus: the whole city ſtrove who ſhould extol him moſt, and they had not words ſufficient to expreſs their high value for him, and how happy they eſteemed themſelves in having gained ſo great a man. He was now declared generaliſſimo of their forces, and entruſted with the care of guarding the walls of the city. Darius approaching with his army towards the gates, at the time agreed on between them, Zopyrus opened the gates to him, and made him by that means maſter of the city, which he never could have been able to take either by force or famine.

As powerful as this prince was, he found himſelf incapable of making a ſufficient recompence for ſo great a ſervice;

a ſervice; and he uſed often to ſay, that he would with pleaſure ſacrifice a hundred Babylons, if he had them, to reſtore Zopyrus to the condition he was in, before he inflicted that cruel treatment upon himſelf. He ſettled upon him during life the whole revenue of this opulent city, of which he alone had procured him the poſſeſſion, and heaped all the honours upon him, that a king could poſſibly confer upon a ſubject. Megabyſus, who commanded the Perſian army in Egypt againſt the Athenians, was ſon to this Zopyrus; and that Zopyrus, who went over to the Athenians as a deſerter, was his grandſon.

No ſooner was Darius in poſſeſſion of Babylon, but he ordered the hundred gates to be pulled down, and all the walls of that proud city to be entirely demoliſhed, that ſhe might never be in a condition to rebel more againſt him. If he had pleaſed to make uſe of all the rights of a conqueror, he might upon this occaſion have exterminated all the inhabitants. But he contented himſelf with cauſing three thouſand of thoſe who were principally concerned in the revolt to be impaled, and granted a pardon to all the reſt. And, in order to hinder the depopulation of the city, he cauſed fifty thouſand women to be brought from the ſeveral provinces of his empire, to ſupply the place of thoſe, which the inhabitants had ſo cruelly deſtroyed at the beginning of the ſiege. Such was the fate of Babylon; and thus did God execute his vengeance on that impious city, for the cruelty ſhe had exerciſed towards the Jews, in falling upon a free people without any reaſon or provocation; in deſtroying their government, laws and worſhip; in forcing them from their country, and tranſporting them to a ſtrange land; where they impoſed a moſt grievous yoke of ſervitude upon them, and made uſe of all their power to cruſh and afflict an unhappy nation, favoured however by God, and having the honour to be ſtiled his peculiar people.

SECT.

SECT. III. *Darius prepares for an expedition againſt the Scythians. A digreſſion upon the manners and cuſtoms of that nation.*

(x) AFTER the reduction of Babylon, Darius made great preparations for the war againſt the Scythians, who inhabited that large tract of land, which lies between the Danube and the Tanais. His pretence for undertaking this war was to be revenged of that nation for the * invaſion of Aſia by their anceſtors: a very frivolous and ſorry pretext; and a very ridiculous ground for reviving an old quarrel, which had ceaſed an hundred and twenty years before. Whilſt the Scythians were employed in that irruption, which laſted eight and twenty years, the Scythians wives married their ſlaves. When the huſbands were on their return home, theſe ſlaves went out to meet them with a numerous army, and diſputed their entrance into their country. After ſome battles fought with pretty equal loſs on both ſides, the maſters conſidering, that it was doing too much honour to their ſlaves to put them upon the foot of ſoldiers, marched againſt them in the next encounter with whips in their hands, to make them remember their proper condition. This ſtratagem had the intended effect: for not being able to bear the ſight of their maſters thus armed, they all ran away.

I deſign in this place to imitate Herodotus, who in writing of this war takes occaſion to give an ample account of all that relates to the cuſtoms and manners of the Scythians. But I ſhall be much more brief in my account of this matter than he is.

A digreſſion concerning the Scythians.

Formerly there were Scythians both in Europe and Aſia, moſt of them inhabiting thoſe parts that lie towards the North. I deſign now chiefly to treat of the firſt, namely, of the European Scythians.

(x) Her. l. 4. c. 1. Juſtin. l. 2. c. 5.

* *Mention is made of this in the ſecond volume*, p. 61, &c.

The hiſtorians, in the accounts they have left us of the manners and character of the Scythians, relate things of them, that are entirely oppoſite and contradictory to one another. One while they repreſent them as the juſteſt and moſt moderate people in the world: another while they deſcribe them as a fierce and barbarous nation, which carries its cruelty to ſuch horrible exceſſes, as are ſhocking to human nature. This contrariety is a manifeſt proof, that thoſe different characters are to be applied to different nations of Scythians, all comprized in that vaſt and extenſive tract of country; and that, though they were all comprehended under one and the ſame general denomination of Scythians, we ought not to confound them or their characters together.

(*y*) Strabo has quoted authors, who mention Scythians dwelling upon the coaſt of the Euxine ſea, that cut the throats of all ſtrangers who came amongſt them, fed upon their fleſh, and made pots and drinking-veſſels of their ſculls, when they had dried them. (*z*) Herodotus in deſcribing the ſacrifices, which the Scythians offered to the god Mars, ſays, they uſed to offer human ſacrifices. Their manner * of making treaties, according to this author's account, was very ſtrange and particular. (*a*) They firſt poured wine into a large earthen veſſel, and then the contracting parties, cutting their arms with a knife, let ſome of their blood run into the wine, and ſtained likewiſe their armour therein; after which they themſelves, and all that were preſent, drank of that liquor, making the ſtrongeſt imprecations againſt the perſon that ſhould violate the treaty.

(*b*) But what the ſame hiſtorian relates, concerning the ceremonies obſerved at the funeral of their kings,

(*y*) Strabo, l. 7. p. 298. (*z*) Her. l. 4. c. 62.
(*a*) Ibid. c. 70. (*b*) Ibid. c. 71, 72.

* *This cuſtom was ſtill practiſed by the Iberians, that were originally Scythians, in the time of Tacitus, who makes mention of it.* Ann. l. 12. c. 47.

is ſtill more extraordinary. I ſhall only mention ſuch of thoſe ceremonies, as may ſerve to give us an idea of the cruel barbarity of this people. When their king died, they embalmed his body, and wrapped it up in wax; this done, they put it into an open chariot, and carried it from city to city, expoſing it to the view of all the people under his dominion. When this circuit was finiſhed, they laid the body down in the place appointed for the burial of it, and there they made a large grave, in which they interred the king, and with him one of his wives, his chief cup-bearer, his great chamberlain, his maſter of horſe, his chancellor, his ſecretary of ſtate, all which perſons were put to death for that purpoſe. To theſe they added ſeveral horſes, a great number of drinking-veſſels, and a certain part of every kind of houſhold goods and furniture belonging to their deceaſed monarch: after which they filled up the grave and covered it with earth. This was not all. When the anniverſary of his interment came, they cut the throats of fifty more of the dead king's officers, and of the ſame number of horſes, and placed the officers on horſeback round the king's tomb, having firſt prepared and embalmed their bodies for the purpoſe; this they did probably to ſerve him as guards. Theſe ceremonies poſſibly took their riſe from a notion they might have of their king's being ſtill alive: and upon this ſuppoſition they judged it neceſſary, that he ſhould have his court and ordinary officers ſtill about him. Whether employments, which terminated in this manner, were much ſought after, I will not determine.

It is now time to paſs to the conſideration of their manners and cuſtoms, that had more of humanity in them; though poſſibly in another ſenſe they may appear to be equally ſavage. The account I am going to give of them is chiefly taken from (*b*) Juſtin. According to this author, the Scythians lived in great innocence and ſimplicity. They were ignorant indeed

(*b*) Juſtin. l. 2. c. 2.

of all arts and ſciences, but then they were equally unacquainted with vice. They did not make any diviſion of their lands amongſt themſelves, ſays Juſtin: it would have been in vain for them to have done it; ſince they did not apply themſelves to cultivate them. Horace, in one of his odes, of which I ſhall inſert a part by and by, tells us, that ſome of them did cultivate a certain portion of land allotted to them for one year only, at the expiration of which they were relieved by others, who ſucceeded them on the ſame conditions. They had no houſes, nor ſettled habitation; but wandered continually with their cattle and their flocks from country to country. Their wives and children they carried along with them in waggons, covered with the ſkins of beaſts, which were all the houſes they had to dwell in. Juſtice * was obſerved and maintained amongſt them thro' the natural temper and diſpoſition of the people, without any compulſion of laws, with which they were wholly unacquainted. No crime was more ſeverely puniſhed among them, than theft and robbery; and that with good reaſon. For, their herds and their flocks, in which all their riches conſiſted, being never ſhut up, how could they poſſibly ſubſiſt, if theft had not been moſt rigorouſly puniſhed? They coveted neither ſilver nor gold, like the reſt of mankind; and made milk and honey their principal diet. They were ſtrangers to the uſe of linen or woollen manufactures; and to defend themſelves from the violent and continual cold weather of their climate, they made uſe of nothing but the ſkins of beaſts.

I ſaid before, that theſe manners of the Scythians would appear to ſome people, very wild and ſavage. And indeed, what can be ſaid for a nation, that has lands, and yet does not cultivate them; that has herds of cattle, of which they content themſelves to eat the milk, and neglect the fleſh? The wool of their ſheep might ſupply them with warm and comfortable cloaths, and yet they uſe no other raiment than the ſkins of

* Juſtitia gentis ingeniis culta, non legibus.

animals. But, that which is the greateſt demonſtration of their ignorance and ſavageneſs, according to the general opinion of mankind, is their utter neglect of gold and ſilver, which have always been had in ſuch great requeſt in all civilized nations.

But, oh! how happy was this ignorance; how vaſtly preferable this ſavage ſtate to our pretended politeneſs! * This contempt of all the conveniences of life, ſays Juſtin, was attended with ſuch an honeſty and uprightneſs of manners, as hindered them from ever coveting their neighbour's goods. For the deſire of riches can only take place, where riches can be made uſe of. And, would to God, ſays the ſame author, we could ſee the ſame moderation prevail among the reſt of mankind, and the like indifference to the goods of other people! If that were the caſe, the world would not have ſeen ſo many wars perpetually ſucceeding one another in all ages, and in all countries: nor would the number of thoſe, that are cut off by the ſword, exceed that of thoſe who fall by the irreverſible decree and law of nature.

Juſtin finiſhes his character of the Scythians with a very judicious reflection. † It is a ſurprizing thing, ſays he, that an happy, natural diſpoſition, without the aſſiſtance of education, ſhould carry the Scythians to ſuch a degree of wiſdom and moderation, as the Grecians could not attain to, neither by the inſtitutions of their legiſlators, nor the rules and precepts of all their philoſophers; and that the manners of a barbarous nation ſhould be preferable to thoſe of a people ſo much

* Hæc continentia illis morum quoque juſtitiam indidit, nihil alienum concupiſcentibus. Quippe ibidem divitiarum cupido eſt, ubi & uſus. Atque utinam reliquis mortalibus ſimilis moderatio & abſtinentia alieni foret! profectò non tantum bellorum per omnia ſecula terris omnibus continuaretur: neque plus hominum ferrum & arma, quam naturalis fatorum conditio raperet.

† Prorſus ut admirabile videatur, hoc illis naturam dare, quod Græci longa ſapientium doctrina præceptiſque philoſophorum conſequi nequeunt, cultoſque mores incultæ barbariæ collatione ſuperari. Tanto plus in illis proficit vitiorum ignoratio, quàm in his cognitio virtutis!

improved and refined by the polite arts and ſciences. So much more effectual and advantagious was the ignorance of vice in the one, than the knowledge of virtue in the other!

(*c*) The Scythian fathers thought with good reaſon, that they left their children a valuable inheritance, when they left them in peace and union with one another. One of their kings, whoſe name was Scylurus, finding himſelf draw near his end, ſent for all his children, and giving to each of them one after another a bundle of arrows tied faſt together, deſired them to break them. Each uſed his endeavours, but was not able to do it. Then untying the bundle, and giving them the arrows one by one, they were very eaſily broken. Let this image, ſays the father, be a leſſon to you of the mighty advantage that reſults from union and concord. (*d*) In order to ſtrengthen and enlarge theſe domeſtick advantages, the Scythians uſed to admit their friends into the ſame terms of union with them as their relations. Friendſhip was conſidered by them as a ſacred and inviolable alliance, which differed but little from the alliance nature has put between brethren, and which they could not infringe without being guilty of a heinous crime.

Antient authors ſeem to have ſtrove, who ſhould moſt extol the innocence of manners, that reigned among the Scythians, by magnificent encomiums. That of Horace I ſhall tranſcribe at large. That poet does not confine it entirely to them, the Scythians, but joins the Getæ with them, their near neighbours. It is in that beautiful ode, where he inveighs againſt the luxury and irregularities of the age he lived in. After he had told us, that peace and tranquillity of mind is not to be procured either by immenſe riches, or ſumptuous buildings, he adds, "An hundred times happier are the Scythians, who roam "about in their itinerant houſes, their waggons; and "happier even are the frozen Getæ. With them the

(*c*) Plut. de garrul. p. 511. (*d*) Lucian. in Tex. p. 51.

"earth,

"earth, without being divided by land-marks, pro-
"duceth her fruits which are gathered in common.
"There each man's tillage is but of one year's con-
"tinuance; and when that term of his labour is ex-
"pired, he is relieved by a ſucceſſor, who takes his
"place, and manures the ground on the ſame condi-
"tions. There the innocent ſtepmothers form no
"cruel deſigns againſt the lives of their huſbands chil-
"dren by a former wife. The wives do not pre-
"tend to domineer over their huſbands on account of
"their fortunes, nor are to be corrupted by the in-
"ſinuating language of ſpruce adulterers. The great-
"eſt portion of the maiden, is her father and mo-
"ther's virtue, her inviolable attachment to her huſ-
"band, and her perfect diſregard to all other men.
"They dare not be unfaithful, becauſe they are con-
"vinced that infidelity is a crime, and its reward
"is death." *

When we conſider the manners and character of the Scythians without prejudice, can we poſſibly forbear to look upon them with eſteem and admiration? Does not their manner of living, as to the exterior part of it at leaſt, bear a great reſemblance to that of the patriarchs, who had no fixed habitation; who did not till the ground; who had no other occupation than

* Campeſtres meliùs Scythæ,
Quorum plauſtra vagas ritè trahunt domos,
Vivunt, & rigidi Getæ;
Immetata quibus jugera liberas
Fruges & Cererem ferunt!
Nec cultura placet longior annuâ,
Defunctumque laboribus
Æquali recreat ſorte vicarius.
Illic matre carentibus
Privignis mulier temperat innocens:
Nec dotata regit virum
Conjux, nec nitido fidit adultero.
Dos eſt magna parentium
Virtus, & metuens alterius viri
Certo fœdere caſtitas:
Et peccare nefas, aut pretium eſt mori.
Hor. lib. iii. Od. 24.

that of feeding their flocks and herds; and who dwelt in tents? Can we believe this people were much to be pitied, for not underſtanding, or rather for deſpiſing the uſe of gold and ſilver? * Is it not to be wiſhed, that thoſe metals had for ever lain buried in the bowels of the earth, and that they had never been dug from thence to become the cauſes and inſtruments of all vices and iniquity? What advantage could gold or ſilver be of to the Scythians, who valued nothing but what the neceſſities of man actually require, and who took care to ſet narrow bounds to thoſe neceſſities? It is no wonder, that, living as they did, without houſes, they ſhould make no account of thoſe arts that were ſo highly valued in other places, as architecture, ſculpture, and painting: or that they ſhould deſpiſe fine cloaths and coſtly furniture, ſince they found the ſkins of beaſts ſufficient to defend them againſt the inclemency of the ſeaſons. After all, can we truly ſay, that theſe pretended advantages contribute to the real happineſs of life? Were thoſe nations that had them in the greateſt plenty, more healthful or robuſt than the Scythians? Did they live to a greater age than they? Or did they ſpend their lives in greater freedom and tranquillity, or a greater exemption from cares and troubles? Let us acknowledge it, to the ſhame of antient philoſophy; the Scythians, who did not particularly apply themſelves to the ſtudy of wiſdom, carried it however to a greater height in their practice, than either the Egyptians, Grecians, or any other civilized nation. They did not give the name of goods or riches to any thing, but what, in a human way of ſpeaking, truly deſerved that title, as health, ſtrength, courage, the love of labour and liberty, innocence of life, ſincerity, an abhorrence of all fraud and diſſimulation, and, in a word, all ſuch qualities, as render a

* Aurum irrepertum, & ſic melius ſitum
Cum terra celat, ſpernere fortior,
Quam cogere humanos in uſus
Omne ſacrum rapiente dextrâ.

Hor. lib. iii. *Od.* 3.

man

man more virtuous and more valuable. If to theſe happy diſpoſitions, we add the knowledge and love of God and of our Redeemer, without which the moſt exalted virtues are of no value and ineffectual, they would have been a perfect people.

When we compare the manners of the Scythians with thoſe of the preſent age, we are tempted to believe, that the pencils which drew ſo beautiful a picture, were not free from partiality and flattery; and that both Juſtin and Horace have decked them with virtues, that did not belong to them. But all antiquity agrees in giving the ſame teſtimony of them; and Homer in particular, whoſe opinion ought to be of great weight, calls them *the moſt juſt and upright of men.*

But at length (who could believe it) luxury, that might be thought only to thrive in an agreeable and delightful ſoil, penetrated into this rough and uncultivated region; and breaking down the fences, which the conſtant practice of ſeveral ages, founded in the nature of the climate, and the genius of the people, had ſet againſt it, did at laſt effectually corrupt the manners of the Scythians, and bring them, in that reſpect, upon a level with the other nations, where it had long been predominant. It is (*e*) Strabo that acquaints us with this particular, which is very worthy of our notice: he lived in the time of Auguſtus and Tiberius. After he has greatly commended the ſimplicity, frugality, and innocence of the antient Scythians, and their extreme averſion to all diſſimulation and deceit, he owns, that their intercourſe in later times with other nations had extirpated thoſe virtues, and planted the contrary vices in their ſtead. One would think, ſays he, that the natural effect of ſuch an intercourſe with civilized and polite nations ſhould have conſiſted only in rendering them more humanized and courteous, by ſoftening that air of ſavageneſs and ferocity, which they had before: but, inſtead of that, it introduced a total diſſolution of manners amongſt them,

(*e*) Strabo, l. 7. p. 301.

and quite transformed them into different creatures. It is undoubtedly with reference to this change that Athenæus (*f*) ſays, the Scythians abandoned themſelves to voluptuouſneſs and luxury, at the ſame time that they ſuffered ſelf-intereſt and avarice to prevail amongſt them.

Strabo, in making the remark I have been mentioning, does not deny, but that it was to the Romans and Grecians this fatal change of manners was owing. Our example, ſays he, has perverted almoſt all the nations of the world: by carrying the refinements of luxury and pleaſure amongſt them, we have taught them inſincerity and fraud, and a thouſand kinds of ſhameful and infamous arts to get money. It is a miſerable talent and a very unhappy diſtinction for a nation, through its ingenuity in inventing modes, and refining upon every thing that tends to nouriſh and promote luxury, to become the corrupter of all its neighbours, and the author, as it were, of their vices and debauchery.

It was againſt theſe Scythians, but at a time when they were yet uncorrupted, and in their utmoſt vigour, that Darius undertook an unſucceſsful expedition; which I ſhall make the ſubject of the next article.

SECT. IV. *Darius's expedition againſt the Scythians.*

(*g*) I Have already obſerved, that the pretence uſed by Darius, for undertaking this war againſt the Scythians, was the irruption formerly made by that people into Aſia: but in reality he had no other end therein, than to ſatisfy his own ambition, and to extend his conqueſts.

His brother Artabanes, for whom he had a great regard, and who on his ſide had no leſs zeal for the true intereſts of the king his brother, thought it his duty on this occaſion to ſpeak his ſentiments with all the freedom that an affair of ſuch importance re-

(*f*) Athen. l. 12. p. 524.

(*g*) Her. l. 4. c. 83—96.

quired.

quired. "Great prince, ſays he to him, * they, "who form any great enterprize, ought carefully to "conſider, whether it will be beneficial or prejudi-"cial to the ſtate; whether the execution of it will "be eaſy or difficult; whether it be likely to aug-"ment or diminiſh their glory; and laſtly, whe-"ther the thing deſigned be conſiſtent with or con-"trary to the rules of juſtice. For my own part, I "cannot perceive, Sir, even though you were ſure of "ſucceſs, what advantage you can propoſe to your "ſelf in undertaking a war againſt the Scythians. "Conſider the vaſt diſtance between them and you; "and the prodigious ſpace of land and ſea, that ſe-"parates them from your dominions: beſides, they "are a people that dwell in wild and uncultivated "deſarts; that have neither towns nor houſes; that "have no fixt ſettlement, or places of habitation; "and that are deſtitute of all manner of riches. What "ſpoil or benefit can accrue to your troops from ſuch "an expedition; or, to ſpeak more properly, what "loſs have you not reaſon to apprehend?

"As they are accuſtomed to remove from country "to country, if they ſhould think proper to fly before "you, not out of cowardiſe or fear, for they are a "very couragious and warlike people, but only with "a deſign to harraſs and ruin your army by continual "and fatiguing marches, what would become of us "in ſuch an uncultivated, barren, and naked coun-"try, where we ſhall neither find forage for our "horſes, nor proviſion for our men? I am afraid, "Sr, that through a falſe notion of glory, and the "influence of flatterers, you may be hurried into a "war, which may turn to the diſhonour of the na-"tion. You now enjoy the ſweets of peace and tran-"quillity in the midſt of your people, where you are "the object of their admiration, and the author of

* Omnes qui magnarum rerum conſilia ſuſcipiunt, æſtimare debent, an, quod inchoatur, reipublicæ utile, ipſis glorioſum, aut promptum effectu, aut certè non arduum ſit. *Tacit. Hiſt.* l. 2. c. 76.

"their

" their happineſs. You are ſenſible the gods have " placed you upon the throne to be their co-adjutor, " or, to ſpeak more properly, to be the diſpenſer of " their bounty, rather than the miniſter of their pow- " er. It is your pleaſure to be the protector, the " guardian, and the father of your ſubjects: and you " often declare to us, becauſe you really believe ſo, that " you look upon yourſelf as inveſted with ſovereign " power, only to make your people happy. What " exquiſite joy muſt it be to ſo great a prince as you " are, to be the ſource of ſo many bleſſings; and " under the ſhadow of your name to preſerve ſuch in- " finite numbers of people in ſo deſirable a tranquil- " lity! Is not the glory of a king, who loves his ſub- " jects, and is beloved by them; who, inſtead of " making war againſt neighbouring or diſtant na- " tions, makes uſe of his power to keep them in peace " and amity with each other; is not ſuch a glory " vaſtly preferable to that of ravaging and ſpoiling " of nations, of filling the earth with ſlaughter and " and deſolation, with horror, conſternation and " deſpair? But there is one motive more, which " ought to have a greater influence upon you than all " others, I mean that of juſtice. Thanks to the " gods, you are not of the number of thoſe princes, " who * acknowledge no other law than that of " force, and who imagine that they have a peculiar " privilege annexed to their dignity, which private " perſons have not, of invading other men's proper- " ties. † You do not make your greatneſs conſiſt in " being able to do whatever you will, but in willing " only what may be done, without infringing the " laws, or violating juſtice. To ſpeak plain, ſhall " one man be reckoned unjuſt, and a robber, for

* Id in ſumma fortuna æquius, quod validius: & ſua retinere, privatæ domus; de alienis certare, regiam laudem eſſe. *Tacit. Annal.* l. 25. c. 1.

† Ut fælicitatis eſt quantum velis poſſe, ſic magnitudinis velle quantum poſſis. *Plin. in Pan. Traj.*

" ſeizing

"seizing on a few acres of his neighbour's eſtate; "and ſhall another be reckoned juſt and great, and "have the title of hero, only becauſe he ſeizes upon "and uſurps whole provinces? Permit me, Sir, to aſk "you, what title have you to Scythia? What injury "have the Scythians done you? What reaſon can you "alledge for declaring war againſt them? The war "indeed, in which you have been engaged againſt the "Babylonians, was at the ſame time both juſt and ne-"ceſſary: the gods have accordingly crowned your "arms with ſucceſs. It belongs to you, Sir, to judge "whether that which you are now going to under-"take, be of the ſame nature."

Nothing but the generous zeal of a brother, truly concerned for the glory of his prince, and the good of his country, could inſpire ſuch a freedom: as on the other hand, nothing but a perfect moderation in the prince could make him capable of bearing with it. Darius, as † Tacitus obſerves of another great emperor, had the art of reconciling two things, which are generally incompatible, the ſovereignty and liberty. Far from being offended at the freedom uſed by his brother, he thanked him for his good advice, tho' he did not follow it: for he had taken his reſolution. He departed from Suſa at the head of an army of ſeven hundred thouſand men; and his fleet, conſiſting of ſix hundred ſail of ſhips, was chiefly manned with Ionians, and other Grecian nations, that dwelt upon the ſea-coaſts of Aſia minor and the Helleſpont. He marched his army towards the Thracian Boſphorus, which he paſſed upon a bridge of boats: after which having made himſelf maſter of all Thrace, he came to the banks of the Danube, otherwiſe called the Iſter, where he had ordered his fleet to join him. In ſeveral places on his march he cauſed pillars to be erected with magnificent inſcriptions, in one of which he ſuffered

† Nerva Cæſar res olim diſſociabiles miſcuit, principatum & libertatem. *Tacit. in vit. Agric.* cap. 3.

himſelf

himſelf to be called, *the beſt and handſomeſt of all men living.* What a littleneſs of ſoul and vanity was this!

And yet if all this prince's faults had terminated only in ſentiments of pride and vanity, perhaps they would appear more excuſable than they do, at leaſt they would not have been ſo pernicious to his ſubjects. (*b*) But how ſhall we reconcile Darius's diſpoſition, which ſeemed to be ſo exceeding humane and gentle, with a barbarous and cruel action of his towards Oebaſus, a venerable old man, whoſe merit, as well as quality, entitled him to reſpect? This nobleman had three ſons, who were all preparing themſelves to attend the king in this expedition againſt the Scythians. Upon Darius's departure from Suſa, the good old father begged as a favour of him, that he would pleaſe to leave him one of his ſons at home, to be a comfort to him in his old age. *One*, replied Darius, *will not be ſufficient for you; I will leave you all the three:* and immediately he cauſed them all to be put to death.

(*i*) When the army had paſſed the Danube upon a bridge of boats, the king was for having the bridge broke down, that his army might not be weakened by leaving ſo conſiderable a detachment of his troops, as were neceſſary to guard it. But one of his officers repreſented to him, that it might be proper to keep that, as a neceſſary reſource, in caſe the war with the Scythians ſhould prove unfortunate. The king gave into this opinion, and committed the guarding of the bridge to the care of the Ionians, who built it; giving them leave at the ſame time to go back to their own country, if he did not return in the ſpace of two months: He then proceeded on his march to Scythia.

(*k*) Aſſoon as the Scythians were informed that Darius was marching againſt them, they immediately entered into conſultation upon the meaſures neceſſary to be taken. They were very ſenſible, that they were not in a condition to reſiſt ſo formidable an enemy

(*b*) Her. l. 4. c. 84. Senec. de ira, c. 16. (*i*) Her. l. 4. c. 99, 101. (*k*) Her. l. 4. c. 102, 118, 119.

alone. They applied therefore to all the neighbouring people, and desired their assistance, alledging that the danger was general and concerned them all, and that it was their common interest to oppose an enemy, whose views of conquest were not confined to one nation. Some returned favourable answers to their demand: others absolutely refused to enter into a war, which, they said, did not regard them; but they had soon reason to repent their refusal.

(*l*) One wise precaution taken by the Scythians, was to secure their wives and children by sending them in carriages to the most northern parts of the country; and with them likewise they sent all their herds and flocks, reserving nothing to themselves but what was necessary for the support of their army. Another precaution of theirs was to fill up all their wells, and stop up their springs, and to consume all the forage in those parts through which the Persian army was to pass. This done, they marched, in conjunction with their allies, against the enemy, not with the view of giving him battle, for they were determined to avoid that, but to draw him into such places, as suited best their interest. Whenever the Persians seemed disposed to attack them, they still retired farther up into the country: and thereby drew them on from place to place, into the territories of those nations that had refused to enter into alliance with them, by which means their lands became a prey to the two armies of the Persians and Scythians.

(*m*) Darius, weary of these tedious and fatiguing pursuits, sent an herald to the king of the Scythians, whose name was Indathyrsus, with this message in his name: "Prince of the Scythians, wherefore dost "thou continually fly before me? Why dost thou not "stop somewhere or other, either to give me battle, "if thou believest thy self able to encounter me; or, "if thou thinkest thy self too weak, to acknowledge "thy master, by presenting him with earth and wa-

(*l*) Her. l. 4. c. 120, 125. (*m*) Her. l. 4. c. 126, 127.

"ter?"

" ter?" The Scythians were an high-ſpirited people, extremely jealous of their liberty, and profeſſed enemies to all ſlavery. Indathyrſus ſent Darius the following anſwer: " If I fly before thee, prince of the " Perſians, it is not becauſe I fear thee: what I do " now, is no more than what I am uſed to do in " time of peace. We Scythians have neither cities " nor lands to defend: if thou haſt a mind to force " us to come to an engagement, come and attack the " tombs of our fathers, and thou ſhalt find what " manner of men we are. As to the title of maſter, " which thou aſſumeſt, keep it for other nations " than the Scythians. For my part I acknowledge " no other maſter, than the great Jupiter, one of my " own anceſtors, and the goddeſs Veſta."

(*n*) The farther Darius advanced into the country, the greater hardſhips his army was expoſed to. Juſt when it was reduced to the laſt extremity, there came an herald to Darius from the Scythian prince, with a bird, a mouſe, a frog, and five arrows for a preſent. The king deſired to know the meaning of thoſe gifts. The meſſenger anſwered, that his orders were only to deliver them, and nothing more; and that it was left to the Perſian king to find out the meaning. Darius concluded at firſt, that the Scythians thereby conſented to deliver up the earth and water to him, which were repreſented by a mouſe and a frog; as alſo their cavalry, whoſe ſwiftneſs was repreſented by the bird; together with their own perſons and arms, ſignified by the arrows. But Gobrias, one of the ſeven lords, that had depoſed the Magian impoſtor, expounded the enigma in the following manner: " Know," ſays he to the Perſians, " that unleſs you can fly a- " way in the air like birds, or hide your ſelves in the " earth like mice, or ſwim in the water like frogs, " you ſhall in no wiſe be able to avoid the arrows of " the Scythians."

(*o*) And indeed, the whole Perſian army marching

(*n*) Ibid. c. 128, 130. (*o*) Strabo, l. 7. p. 305. &. l. 16. p. 737.

in

in a vaſt, uncultivated, and barren country, in which there was no water, it was reduced to ſo deplorable a condition, that they had nothing before their eyes but inevitable ruin: nor was Darius himſelf exempt from the common danger. He owed his preſervation to a camel, which was loaded with water, and followed him with great difficulty through that wild and deſart country. The king afterwards did not forget his benefactor: to reward him for the ſervice he had done him, and the fatigues he had undergone, on his return into Aſia, he ſettled a certain diſtrict of his own upon him for his peculiar uſe and ſubſiſtance, for which reaſon the place was called Gangamele, that is, in the Perſian tongue, *the camel's habitation.* It was near this ſame place that Darius Codomannus received a ſecond overthrow by Alexander the Great.

(*p*) Darius deliberated no longer, finding himſelf under an abſolute neceſſity of quitting his imprudent enterprize. He began then to think in earneſt upon returning home; and ſaw but too plainly, that there was no time to be loſt. Therefore aſſoon as night came, the Perſians, to deceive the enemy, lighted a great number of fires, as uſual; and leaving the old men and the ſick behind them in the camp, together with all their aſſes, which made a ſufficient noiſe, they marched away, as faſt as they could, in order to reach the Danube. The Scythians did not perceive they were gone, till the next morning: whereupon they immediately ſent a conſiderable detachment as quick as poſſible to the Danube: this detachment being perfectly well acquainted with the roads of the country, arrived at the bridge a great while before the Perſians. The Scythians had ſent expreſſes beforehand to perſuade the Ionians to break the bridge, and to return to their own country: and the latter had promiſed to do it, but without deſign to execute their promiſe. The Scythians now preſſed them to it more earneſtly, and repreſented to them, that the time pre-

(*p*) Her. l. 4. c. 134, 140.

ſcribed

ſcribed by Darius for ſtaying there was elapſed; that they were at liberty to return home without either violating their word or their duty; that they now had it in their power to throw off for ever the yoke of their ſubjection, and make themſelves a happy and free people; and that the Scythians would render Darius incapable of forming any more enterprizes againſt any of his neighbours.

The Ionians entered into conſultation upon the affair. Miltiades, an Athenian, who was prince, or, as the Greeks call it, tyrant of the Cherſoneſus of Thrace at the mouth of the Helleſpont, was one of thoſe that had accompanied Darius, and furniſhed him with ſhips for his enterprize. Having † the publick intereſt more at heart than his private advantage, he was of opinion, that they ſhould comply with the requeſt of the Scythians, and embrace ſo favourable an opportunity of recovering the liberty of Ionia: all the other commanders gave into his ſentiments, except Hyſtiæus, the tyrant of Miletos. When it came to his turn to ſpeak, he repreſented to the Ionian generals, that their fortune was linked with that of Darius; that it was under that prince's protection, each of them was maſter in his own city; and if the power of the Perſians ſhould ſink, or decline, the cities of Ionia would not fail to depoſe their tyrants, and recover their freedom. All the other chiefs gave into his opinion; and, as is uſual in moſt caſes, the conſideration of private intereſt prevailed over the publick good. The reſolution they came to was to wait for Darius: but, in order to deceive the Scythians, and hinder them from undertaking any thing, they declared to them, they had reſolved to retire, purſuant to their requeſt; and, the better to carry on the fraud, they actually began to break one end of the bridge, exhorting the Scythians at the ſame time to do their part, to return ſpeedily back to meet the common enemy, to attack and defeat them. The Scythians

† Amicior omnium libertati quam ſuæ dominationi fuit. *Corn. Nep.*

being

being too credulous, retired, and were deceived a ſecond time.

(q) They miſſed Darius, who had taken a different rout from that in which they expected to come up with him. He arrived by night at the bridge over the Danube, and finding it broke down, he no longer doubted but the Ionians were gone, and that conſequently he ſhould be ruined. He made his people call out with a loud voice for Hyſtiæus, the Miletian, who at laſt anſwered, and put the king out of his anxiety. They entirely repaired the bridge; ſo that Darius repaſſed the Danube, and came back into Thrace. There he left Megabyſus, one of his chief generals, with part of his army, to compleat the conqueſt of that country, and entirely reduce it to his obedience. After which he repaſſed the Boſphorus with the reſt of his troops, and went to Sardis, where he ſpent the winter and the greateſt part of the year following, in order to refreſh his army, which had ſuffered extremely in that ill-concerted and unfortunate expedition.

(r) Megabyſus continued ſome time in Thrace; whoſe inhabitants, according to Herodotus, would have been invincible, had they had the diſcretion to unite their forces, and to chuſe one chief commander. Some of them had very particular cuſtoms. In one of their diſtricts, when a child came into the world, all the relations expreſſed great ſorrow and affliction, bitterly weeping at the proſpect of miſery the new-born infant had to experience. As on the other hand, when any perſon died, all their kindred rejoiced, becauſe they looked upon the deceaſed perſon, as happy only from that moment, wherein he was delivered for ever from the troubles and calamities of this life. In another diſtrict, where polygamy was in faſhion, when a huſband died, it was a great diſpute among his wives, which of them was the beſt beloved. She, in whoſe favour the conteſt was decided, had the privilege of being ſacrificed by her neareſt relation upon the tomb

(q) Her. l. 4. c. 141, 144. (r) Her. l. 5. c. 1.

of

of her huſband, and of being buried with him; whilſt all the other wives envied her happineſs, and thought themſelves in ſome ſort diſhonoured.

(s) Darius, on his return to Sardis after his unhappy expedition againſt the Scythians, having learnt for certain, that he owed both his own ſafety and that of his whole army to Hyſtiæus, who had perſuaded the Ionians not to deſtroy the bridge on the Danube, ſent for that prince to his court, and deſired him freely to aſk any favour, in recompence of his ſervice. Hyſtiæus hereupon deſired the king to give him Mircina of Edonia, a territory upon the river Strymon in Thrace, together with the liberty of building a city there. His requeſt was readily granted: whereupon he returned to Miletos, where he cauſed a fleet of ſhips to be equipped, and then ſet out for Thrace. Having taken poſſeſſion of the territory granted him, he immediately ſet about the execution of his project in building a city.

(t) Megabyſus, who was then governor of Thrace for Darius, immediately perceived how prejudicial that undertaking would be to the king's affairs in thoſe quarters. He conſidered, that this new city ſtood upon a navigable river; that the country round about it abounded in timber fit for building of ſhips; that it was inhabited by different nations, both Greeks and Barbarians, that might furniſh great numbers of men for land and ſea-ſervice; that, if once thoſe people were under the management of a prince ſo ſkilful and enterprizing as Hyſtiæus, they might become ſo powerful both by ſea and land, that it would be no longer poſſible for the king to keep them in ſubjection: eſpecially conſidering, that they had a great many gold and ſilver mines in that country, which would enable them to carry on any projects or enterprizes. At his return to Sardis, he repreſented all theſe things to the king, who was convinced by his reaſons, and therefore ſent for Hyſtiæus to come to him at Sardis, pretending

(s) Ibid. c. 11. & 23. (t) Ibid. c. 23. & 25.

to

to have ſome great deſigns in view, wherein he wanted the aſſiſtance of his counſel. When he had brought him to his court by this means, he carried him to Suſa, making him believe, that he ſet an extraordinary value upon a friend of his fidelity and underſtanding; two qualifications that had rendered him ſo very dear to him, and of which he had given ſuch memorable proofs in the Scythian expedition; and giving him to underſtand at the ſame time, that he ſhould be able to find ſomething for him in Perſia, which would make him ample amends for all that he could leave behind him. Hyſtiæus, pleaſed with ſo honourable a diſtinction, and finding himſelf likewiſe under a neceſſity of complying, accompanied Darius to Suſa, and left Ariſtagoras to govern at Miletos in his room.

(*u*) Whilſt Megabyſus was ſtill in Thrace, he ſent ſeveral Perſian noblemen to Amintas, king of Macedonia, to require him to give earth and water to Darius his maſter: this was the uſual form of one prince's ſubmitting to another. Amintas readily complied with that requeſt, and paid all imaginable honours to the envoys. At an entertainment, which he made for them, they deſired at the latter end of it, that the ladies might be brought in, which was a thing contrary to the cuſtom of the country: however the king would not venture to refuſe them. The Perſian noblemen, being heated with wine, and thinking they might uſe the ſame freedom as in their own country, did not obſerve a due decorum towards thoſe princeſſes. The king's ſon, whoſe name was Alexander, could not ſee his mother and ſiſters treated in ſuch a manner, without great reſentment and indignation. Wherefore upon ſome pretence or other he contrived to ſend the ladies out of the room, as if they were to return again preſently; and had the precaution to get the king, his father, alſo out of the company. In this interval he cauſed ſome young men to be dreſt like women, and to be armed with poignards under their

(*u*) Ibid. c. 17. & 21.

garments.

garments. These pretended ladies came into the room instead of the others; and when the Persians began to treat them, as they had before treated the princesses, they drew out their poignards, fell violently upon them, and killed, not only the noblemen, but every one of their attendants. The news of this slaughter soon reached Susa; and the king appointed commissioners to take cognizance of the matter: but Alexander, by the power of bribes and presents, stifled the affair, so that nothing came of it.

(x) The Scythians, to be revenged of Darius for invading their country, passed the Danube, and ravaged all that part of Thrace, that had submitted to the Persians, as far as the Hellespont. Miltiades, to avoid their fury, abandoned the Chersonesus: but after the enemy retired, he returned thither again, and was restored to the same power he had before over the inhabitants of the country.

SECT. V. *Darius's conquest of India.*

(y) ABOUT the same time, which was in the 13th year of Darius's reign, this prince having an ambition to extend his dominion eastwards, first resolved, in order to facilitate his conquests, to get a proper knowledge of the country. (z) To this end, he caused a fleet to be built and fitted out at Caspatyra, a city upon the Indus, and did the same at several other places on the same river, as far as the frontiers of * Scythia. The command of this fleet was given to † Scylax, a Grecian of Caryandia, a town of Caria, who was perfectly well versed in maritime affairs. His orders were to sail down that river, and get all the knowledge he possibly could of the country, on both sides,

(x) Her. l. 6. c. 40.
(z) Her. l. 4. c. 44.
(y) A. M. 3496. Ant. J. C. 508.

* *He means the Asiatic Scythia.*

† *There is a treatise of geography entitled* περίπλους, *and composed by one Scylax of Caryandia, who is thought to be the same person spoken of in this place. But that opinion is attended with some difficulties, which have given occasion to many learned dissertations.*

quite

quite down to the mouth of the river; to paſs from thence into the ſouthern ocean, and to ſteer his courſe afterwards to the weſt, and ſo return back that way to Perſia. Scylax, having exactly obſerved his inſtructions, and ſailed quite down the river Indus, entered the Red ſea by the ſtreights of Babelmandel; and after a voyage of thirty months from the time of his ſetting out from Caſpatyra, he arrived in Egypt at the ſame port (*a*), from whence Nechao, king of Egypt, had formerly ſent the Phœnicians, who were in his ſervice, with orders to ſail round the coaſts of Africa. Very probably, this was the ſame port where now ſtands the town of Suez, at the farther end of the Red ſea. From thence Scylax returned to Suſa, where he gave Darius an account of all his diſcoveries. Darius afterwards entered India with an army, and ſubjected all that vaſt country. The reader will naturally expect to be informed of the particulars of ſo important a war. But (*b*) Herodotus ſays not one word about it: he only tells us, that India made the twentieth province, or government of the Perſian empire, and that the annual revenue of it was worth three hundred and ſixty talents of gold to Darius, which amount to near eleven millions of livres French money, ſomething leſs than five hundred thouſand pounds ſterling.

SECT. VI. *The revolt of the Ionians.*

(*c*) DARIUS, after his return to Suſa from his Scythian expedition, had given his brother Artaphernes the government of Sardis, and made Otanes commander in Thrace, and the adjacent countries along the ſea-coaſt, in the room of Megabyſus.

(*d*) From a ſmall ſpark, kindled by a ſedition at Naxus, a great flame aroſe, which gave occaſion to a conſiderable war. Naxus was the moſt important iſland of the Cyclades in the Egæan ſea, now called the Archipelago. In this ſedition the principal inhabi-

(*a*) Ibid. c. 42. (*b*) L. 3. c. 94. (*c*) A. M. 3500. Ant. J. C. 504. Her. l. 5. c. 25. (*d*) Ibid. c. 28. & 34.

tants

tants having been overpowered by the populace, who were the greater number; many of the richeſt families were baniſhed out of the iſland. Hereupon they fled to Miletos, and addreſſed themſelves to Ariſtagoras, imploring him to reinſtate them in their own city. He was at that time governor of that city, as lieutenant to Hyſtiæus, to whom he was both nephew and ſon-in-law, and whom Darius had carried along with him to Suſa. Ariſtagoras promiſed to give theſe exiles the aſſiſtance they deſired.

But, not being powerful enough himſelf to execute what he had promiſed, he went to Sardis and communicated the affair to Artaphernes. He repreſented to him, that this was a very favourable opportunity for reducing Naxus under the power of Darius; that if he were once maſter of that iſland, all the reſt of the Cyclades would fall of themſelves into his hands, one after another; that in conſequence the iſle of Eubœa, (now Negropont) which was as large as Cyprus, and lay very near it, would be eaſily conquered, which would give the king a free paſſage into Greece, and the means of ſubjecting all that country; and in ſhort, that an hundred ſhips would be ſufficient for the effectual execution of this enterprize. Artaphernes was ſo pleaſed with the project, that inſtead of one hundred veſſels, which Ariſtagoras required, he promiſed him two hundred, in caſe he obtained the king's conſent to the expedition.

The king, charmed with the mighty hopes with which he was flattered, very readily approved the enterprize, though at the bottom it was founded only in injuſtice and a boundleſs ambition; as alſo upon perfidiouſneſs on the part of Ariſtagoras and Artaphernes. No conſideration gave him a moment's pauſe. The moſt injurious project is formed and accepted without the leaſt reluctance or ſcruple: motives of advantage and convenience ſolely determine. The iſle lies convenient for the Perſians: this is conceived a ſufficient title, and a warrantable ground to reduce it by force of arms.

And

And indeed, moſt of the other expeditions of this prince had no better principle.

Aſſoon as Artaphernes had obtained the king's conſent to this project, he made the neceſſary preparations for executing it. The better to conceal his deſign, and to ſurprize the people of Naxus, he ſpread a report, that this fleet was going towards the Helleſpont, and the ſpring following he ſent the number of ſhips he had promiſed to Miletos under the command of Megabates, a Perſian nobleman of the royal family of Archæmenes. But, being directed in his commiſſion to obey the orders of Ariſtagoras, that haughty Perſian could not bear to be under the command of an Ionian, eſpecially one who treated him in a lofty and imperious manner. This pique occaſioned a breach between the two generals, which roſe ſo high, that Megabates, to be revenged of Ariſtagoras, gave the Naxians ſecret intelligence of the deſign formed againſt them. Upon which intelligence they made ſuch preparations for their defence, that the Perſians, after having ſpent four months in beſieging the capital of the iſland, and conſumed all their proviſions, were obliged to retire.

(*e*) This project having thus miſcarried, Megabates threw all the blame upon Ariſtagoras, and entirely ruined his credit with Artaphernes. The Ionian foreſaw, that this accident would be attended, not only with the loſs of his government, but with his utter ruin. The deſperate ſituation he was in made him think of revolting from the king, as the only expedient, whereby he could poſſibly ſave himſelf. No ſooner had he formed this deſign, but a meſſenger came to him from Hyſtiæus, who gave him the ſame counſel. Hyſtiæus, who had now been ſome years at the Perſian court, being diſguſted with the manners of that nation, and having an ardent deſire to return to his own country, thought this the moſt likely means of bringing it about, and therefore gave Ariſtagoras

(*e*) Her. l. 5. c. 35, 36.

that counſel. He flattered himſelf, that in caſe any troubles aroſe in Ionia, he could prevail with Darius to ſend him thither to appeaſe them: and in effect the thing happened according to his opinion. Aſſoon as Ariſtagoras found his deſigns ſeconded by the orders of Hyſtiæus, he imparted them to the principal perſons of Ionia, whom he found extremely well diſpoſed to enter into his views. He therefore deliberated no longer, but being determined to revolt, applied himſelf wholly in making preparations for it.

(*f*) The people of Tyre, having been reduced to ſlavery, when their city was taken by Nebuchadnezzar, had groaned under that oppreſſion for the ſpace of ſeventy years. But after the expiration of that term, they were reſtored, according to Iſaiah's prophecy *, to the poſſeſſion of their antient privileges, with the liberty of having a king of their own; which liberty they enjoyed till the time of Alexander the Great. It ſeems probable, that this favour was granted them by Darius, in conſideration of the ſervices he expected to receive from that city, (which was ſo powerful by ſea) in reducing the Ionians to their antient ſubjection. This was in the 19th year of Darius's reign.

(*g*) The next year, Ariſtagoras, in order to engage the Ionians to adhere the more cloſely to him, re-inſtated them in their liberty, and in all their former privileges. He began with Miletos, where he diveſted himſelf of his power, and reſigned it into the hands of the people. He then made a journey through all Ionia, where by his example, his credit, and perhaps by the fear that they would be forced to it whether they would or no, he prevailed upon all the other tyrants to do the ſame in every city. They complied the more readily with it, as the Perſian power, ſince the check it received in Scythia, was the leſs able to

(*f*) A. M. 3502. Ant. J. C. 502.

* *And it ſhall come to paſs after the end of ſeventy years, that the Lord will viſit Tyre, and ſhe ſhall turn to her hire.* Iſai. xxiii. 17.

(*g*) Her. l. 5. c. 37, 38.

protect

protect them againſt the Ionians, who were naturally fond of liberty and a ſtate of independency, and profeſſed enemies to all tyranny. Having united them all in this manner in one common league, of which he himſelf was declared the head, he ſet up the ſtandard of rebellion againſt the king, and made great preparations by ſea and land for ſupporting a war againſt him.

(*b*) To enable himſelf to carry on the war with more vigour, Ariſtagoras went in the beginning of the year following to Lacedæmon, in order to bring that city into his intereſts, and engage it to furniſh him with ſuccours. Cleomenes was at this time king of Sparta. He was the ſon of Anaxandrides by a ſecond wife, whom the Ephori had obliged him to marry, becauſe he had no iſſue by the firſt. He had by her three ſons beſides Cleomenes, namely, Doriæus, Leonidas, and Cleombrotus, the two laſt of which aſcended the throne of Lacedæmon in their turns. Ariſtagoras then addreſſed himſelf to Cleomenes, and the time and place for an interview between them being agreed on, he waited upon him, and repreſented to him, that the Ionians and Lacedæmonians were countrymen; that Sparta being the moſt powerful city of Greece, it would be for her honour to concur with him in the deſign he had formed of reſtoring the Ionians to their liberty; that the Perſians, their common enemy, were not a warlike people, but exceeding rich and wealthy, and conſequently would become an eaſy prey to the Lacedæmonians; that, conſidering the preſent ſpirit and diſpoſition of the Ionians, it would not be difficult for them to carry their victorious arms even to Suſa, the metropolis of the Perſian empire, and the place of the king's reſidence: he ſhewed him, at the ſame time, a deſcription of all the nations and towns thro' which they were to paſs, engraven upon a little plate of braſs which he had brought along with him. Cleomenes deſired three days time to conſider of his propoſals. That term being expired, he aſked the Ionian how far

(*b*) Ibid. c. 38, 41, 49 & 51.

it was from the Ionian ſea to Suſa, and how much time it required to go from the one place to the other. Ariſtagoras, without conſidering the effect his anſwer was likely to have with Cleomenes, told him, that from Ionia to Suſa was about a three months * journey. Cleomenes was ſo amazed at this propoſal, that he immediately ordered him to depart from Sparta before ſun-ſet. Ariſtagoras nevertheleſs followed him home to his houſe, and endeavoured to win him by arguments of another ſort, that is, by preſents. The firſt ſum he offered him was only ten talents, which were equivalent to thirty thouſand livres French money: that being refuſed, he ſtill roſe in his offers, till at laſt he propoſed to give him fifteen talents. Gorgo, a daughter of Cleomenes, about eight or nine years of age, whom her father had not ordered to quit the room, as apprehending nothing from ſo young a child, hearing the propoſals that were made to her father, cried out: *Fly, father, fly, this ſtranger will corrupt you.* Cleomenes laughed, but yet obſerved the child's admonition, and actually retired: Ariſtagoras left Sparta.

(*i*) From hence he proceeded to Athens, where he found a more favourable reception. He had the good fortune to arrive there at a time, when the Athenians were extremely well diſpoſed to hearken to any propoſals that could be made to them againſt the Perſians, with whom they were highly offended on the following occaſion. Hippias, the † ſon of Piſiſtratus, tyrant of Athens, about ten years before the time we

(*i*) Ibid. c. 55, & 96, 97.

* *According to Herodotus's computation, who reckons the paraſanga a Perſian meaſure, to contain* 30 *ſtadia, it is from Sardis to Suſa* 450 *paraſangas, or* 13500 *ſtadia, which make* 675 *of our leagues: (for we generally reckon* 20 *ſtadia to one of our common leagues.) So that by travelling* 150 *ſtadia per day, which make ſeven leagues and an half, our meaſure, it is ninety days journey from Sardis to Suſa. If they ſet out from Epheſus, it would require about four days more: for Epheſus is* 540 *ſtadia from Sardis.*

† *This fact has been treated at large in the former volume.*

are ſpeaking of, having been baniſhed, after having try'd in vain abundance of methods for his re-eſtabliſhment, at laſt went to Sardis, and made his application to Artaphernes. He inſinuated himſelf ſo far into the good opinion of that governor, that he gave a favourable ear to all he ſaid, to the diſadvantage of the Athenians, and became extremely prejudiced againſt them. The Athenians, having intelligence of this, ſent an ambaſſador to Sardis, and deſired of Artaphernes, not to give ear to what any of their out-laws ſhould inſinuate to their diſadvantage. The anſwer of Artaphernes to this meſſage was, that if they deſired to live in peace, they muſt recal Hippias. When this haughty anſwer was brought back to the Athenians, the whole city were violently enraged againſt the Perſians. Ariſtagoras, coming thither juſt at this juncture, eaſily obtained all he deſired. Herodotus remarks on this occaſion, how much eaſier it is to impoſe upon a multitude, than upon a ſingle perſon: and ſo Ariſtagoras found it; for he prevailed with thirty thouſand Athenians to come to a reſolution, into which he could not perſuade Cleomenes alone. They engaged immediately to furniſh twenty ſhips to aſſiſt him in his deſign: and it may be truly ſaid, that this little fleet was the original ſource of all the calamities, in which both the Perſians and Grecians were afterwards involved.

(*k*) In the 3d year of this war, the Ionians, having collected all their forces together, with the twenty veſſels furniſhed by the city of Athens, and five more from Eretria, in the iſland of Eubœa, they ſet ſail for Epheſus, where leaving their ſhips they marched by land to the city of Sardis; and finding the place in a defenceleſs condition, they ſoon made themſelves maſters of it; but the citadel into which Artaphernes retired, they were not able to force. As moſt of the houſes of this city were built with reeds, and conſequently were very combuſtible, an Ionian ſoldier ſet

(*k*) Ibid. c. 99, 103.

fire to one houſe, the flames of which ſpreading and communicating itſelf to the reſt, reduced the whole city to aſhes. Upon this accident the Perſians and Lydians, aſſembling their forces together for their defence, the Ionians judged it was time for them to think of retreating: and accordingly they marched back with all poſſible diligence, in order to reimbark at Epheſus: but the Perſians arriving there almoſt as ſoon as they, attacked them vigorouſly, and deſtroyed a great number of their men. The Athenians, after the return of their ſhips, would never engage any more in this war, notwithſtanding all the inſtances and ſollicitations of Ariſtagoras.

(*l*) Darius being informed of the burning of Sardis, and of the part the Athenians took in that affair, he reſolved from that very time to make war upon Greece: and, that he might never forget his reſolution, he commanded one of his officers to cry out to him with a loud voice every day, when he was at ſupper: *Sir, remember the Athenians.* In the burning of Sardis it happened, that the temple of Cybele, the goddeſs of that country, was conſumed with the reſt of the city. This accident ſerved afterwards as a pretence to the Perſians to burn all the temples they found in Greece: to which they were likewiſe induced by a motive of religion, which I have explained in another † place.

(*m*) As Ariſtagoras, the head and manager of this revolt, was Hyſtiæus's lieutenant at Miletos, Darius ſuſpected that the latter might probably be the contriver of the whole conſpiracy: for which reaſon he entered into a free conference with him upon the ſubject, and acquainted him with his thoughts, and the juſt grounds he had for his ſuſpicions. Hyſtiæus, who was a craſty courtier, and an expert maſter in the art of diſſembling, appeared extremely ſurprized and afflicted; and ſpeaking in a tone that at once expreſſed both ſorrow and indignation, thus endeavoured to purge himſelf to

(*l*) Ibid. c. 105. (*m*) Her. l. 5. c. 105. & 107.

† Vol. II.

the

the king: "Is it poſſible then for your majeſty to "have entertained ſo injurious a ſuſpicion of the moſt "faithful and moſt affectionate of your ſervants? I "concerned in a rebellion againſt you! Alas! What "is there in the world that could tempt me to it? Do "I want any thing here? Am I not already raiſed to "one of the higheſt ſtations in your court? And be-"ſides the honour I have of aſſiſting at your councils, "do I not daily receive new proofs of your bounty, "by the numberleſs favours you heap upon me?" After this he inſinuated, that the revolt in Ionia proceeded from his abſence and diſtance from the country; that they had waited for that opportunity to rebel; that if he had ſtaid at Miletos, the conſpiracy would never have been formed; that the ſureſt way to reſtore the king's affairs in that province, would be to ſend him thither; that he promiſed him, on the forfeiture of his head, to deliver Ariſtagoras into his hands; and engaged, beſides all this, to make the large iſland of Sardinia* tributary to him. The beſt princes are often too credulous; and when they have once taken a ſubject into their confidence, it is with difficulty they withdraw it from him; nor do they eaſily undeceive themſelves. Darius impoſed upon by the air of ſincerity, with which Hyſtiæus ſpoke on this occaſion, believed him on his own word, and gave him leave to return to Ionia, on condition he came back to the Perſian court, aſſoon as he had executed what he promiſed.

(*n*) The revolters in the mean time, tho' deſerted by the Athenians, and notwithſtanding the conſiderable check they had received in Ionia, did not loſe courage, but ſtill puſhed on their point with reſolution. Their fleet ſet ſail towards the Helleſpont, and the Propontis, and reduced Bizantium, with the major

(*n*) Ibid. c. 103, 104, 108, & 122.

* *This iſland is very remote from Ionia, and could have no relation to it. I am therefore apt to believe it muſt be an error that has crept into the text of Herodotus.*

part of the other Grecian cities, in that quarter. After which, as they were returning back again, they obliged the Carians to join with them in this war, as alſo the people of Cyprus. The Perſian generals, having divided their forces among themſelves, marched three different ways againſt the rebels, and defeated them in ſeveral encounters, in one of which Ariſtagoras was ſlain.

(o) When Hyſtiæus came to Sardis, his intriguing temper formed a plot againſt the government, into which he drew a great number of Perſians. But, perceiving by ſome diſcourſe he had with Artaphernes, that the part he had had in the revolt of Ionia was not unknown to that governor, he thought it not ſafe for him to ſtay any longer at Sardis, and retired ſecretly the night following to the iſle of Chios; from thence he ſent a truſty meſſenger to Sardis, with letters for ſuch of the Perſians as he had gained to his party. This meſſenger betrayed him, and delivered his letters to Artaphernes, by which means the plot was diſcovered, all his accomplices put to death, and his project utterly defeated. But ſtill imagining, that he could bring about ſome enterprize of importance, if he were once at the head of the Ionian league, he made ſeveral attempts to get into Miletos, and to be admitted into the confederacy by the citizens: but none of his endeavours ſucceeded, and he was obliged to return to Chios.

(p) There, being aſked why he had ſo ſtrongly urged Ariſtagoras to revolt, and by that means involved Ionia in ſuch calamities, he made anſwer, that it was becauſe the king had reſolved to tranſport the Ionians into Phœnicia, and to plant the Phœnicians in Ionia. But all this was a mere ſtory and fiction of his own inventing, Darius having never conceived any ſuch deſign. The artifice however ſerved his purpoſe extremely well, not only for juſtifying him to the Ionians, but alſo for engaging them to proſecute the

(o) Her. l. 6. c. 1—5. (p) Ibid. c. 3.

war

war with vigour. For, being alarmed at the thoughts of this tranſmigration, they came to a firm reſolution to defend themſelves againſt the Perſians to the laſt extremity.

(q) Artaphernes and Otanes, with the reſt of the Perſian generals, finding that Miletos was the center of the Ionian confederacy, they reſolved to march thither with all their forces; concluding, that if they could carry that city, all the reſt would ſubmit of courſe. The Ionians, having intelligence of their deſign, determined in a general aſſembly to ſend no army into the field, but to fortify Miletos, and to furniſh it as well as poſſible with proviſions and all things neceſſary for enduring a ſiege: and to unite all their forces to engage the Perſians at ſea, their dexterity in maritime affairs inducing them to believe that they ſhould have the advantage in a naval battle. The place of their rendezvous was Lada, a ſmall iſle over-againſt Miletos, where they aſſembled a fleet of three hundred fifty three veſſels. At the ſight of this fleet, the Perſians, though ſtronger by one half with reſpect to the number of their ſhips, were afraid to hazard a battle, till by their emiſſaries they had ſecretly debauched the greateſt part of the confederates, and engaged them to deſert: So that when the two fleets came to blows, the ſhips of Samos, of Leſbos, and ſeveral other places, ſailed off, and returned to their own country, and the remaining fleet of the confederates did not conſiſt of above an hundred veſſels, which were all quickly overpowered by numbers, and almoſt entirely deſtroyed. After this, the city of Miletos was beſieged, and became a prey to the conquerors, who utterly deſtroyed it. This happened ſix years after Ariſtagoras's revolt. All the other cities, as well on the continent as on the ſea-coaſt and in the iſles, returned to their duty ſoon after, either voluntarily or by force. Thoſe perſons that ſtood out were treated as they had been threatened beforehand. The handſomeſt of the young men were

(q) Ibid. c. 6, 20, 31, & 33.

choſen to ſerve in the king's palace; and the young women were all ſent into Perſia; the cities and temples were reduced to aſhes. Theſe were the effects of the revolt, into which the people were drawn by the ambitious views of Ariſtagoras and Hyſtiæus.

(r) The laſt of theſe two had his ſhare in the general calamity: for that ſame year he was taken by the Perſians, and carried to Sardis, where Artaphernes cauſed him to be immediately hanged, without conſulting Darius, leſt that prince's affection for Hyſtiæus ſhould incline him to pardon him, and by that means a dangerous enemy ſhould be left alive, who might create the Perſians new troubles. It appeared by the ſequel, that Artaphernes's conjecture was well grounded: for when Hyſtiæus's head was brought to Darius, he expreſſed great diſſatisfaction at the authors of his death, and cauſed the head to be honourably interred, as being the remains of a perſon to whom he had infinite obligations, the remembrance whereof was too deeply engraven on his mind, ever to be effaced by the greatneſs of any crimes he had afterwards committed. Hyſtiæus was one of thoſe reſtleſs, bold, and enterprizing ſpirits, in whom many good qualities are joined with ſtill greater vices; with whom all means are lawful and good, that ſeem to promote the end they have in view; who look upon juſtice, probity, and ſincerity, as mere empty names; who make no ſcruple to employ lying or fraud, treachery or even perjury, when it is to ſerve their turn; and who reckon it as nothing to ruin nations, or even their own country, if neceſſary to their own elevation. His end was worthy his ſentiments, and what is common enough to theſe irreligious politicians, who ſacrifice every thing to their ambition, and acknowledge no other rule of their actions, and hardly any other God, but their intereſt and fortune.

(r) Ibid. c. 29 & 30.

SECT.

SECT. VII. *The expedition of Darius's armies againſt Greece.*

(s) DARIUS, in the twenty-eighth year of his reign, having recalled all his other generals, ſent Mardonius the ſon of Gobryas, a young lord of an illuſtrious Perſian family, who had lately married one of the king's daughters, to command in chief throughout all the maritime parts of Aſia, with a particular order to invade Greece, and to revenge the burning of Sardis upon the Athenians and Eretrians. The king did not ſhew much wiſdom in this choice, by which he preferred a young man becauſe he was a favourite, to all his oldeſt and moſt experienced generals; eſpecially as it was in ſo difficult a war, the ſucceſs of which he had very much at heart, and wherein the glory of his reign was infinitely concerned. His being ſon-in-law to the king was a quality indeed, that might augment his credit, but added nothing to his real merit, or his capacity as a general.

Upon his arrival in Macedonia, into which he had marched with his land-forces after having paſſed thro' Thrace, the whole country, terrified by his power, ſubmitted. But his fleet, attempting to double mount Athos (now called Capo Santo) in order to gain the coaſts of Macedonia, was attacked with ſo violent a ſtorm of wind, that upwards of three hundred ſhips, with above twenty thouſand men, periſhed in the ſea. His land-army met at the ſame time with no leſs fatal a blow. For, being incamped in a place of no ſecurity, the Thracians attacked the Perſian camp by night, made a great ſlaughter of the men, and wounded Mardonius himſelf. All this ill ſucceſs obliged him ſhortly after to return into Aſia, with grief and confuſion at his having miſcarried both by ſea and land in this expedition.

Darius, perceiving too late, that Mardonius's youth and inexperience had occaſioned the defeat of his

(s) A. M. 3510. Ant. J. C. 494. Her. l. 6. c. 43, 45.

troops,

troops, recalled him, and put two other generals in his place, Datis a Mede, and Artaphernes, ſon of his brother Artaphernes, who had been governor of Sardis. The king's thoughts were earneſtly bent upon putting in execution the great deſign he had long had in his mind, which was, to attack Greece with all his forces, and particularly to take a ſignal vengeance of the people of Athens and Eretria, whoſe enterprize againſt Sardis was perpetually in his thoughts.

1. *The ſtate of Athens. The characters of Miltiades, Themiſtocles, and Ariſtides.*

Before we enter upon this war, it will be proper to refreſh our memories with a view of the ſtate of Athens at this time, which alone ſuſtained the firſt ſhock of the Perſians at Marathon; as alſo to form ſome idea beforehand of the great men, who ſhared in that celebrated victory.

Athens, juſt delivered from that yoke of ſervitude, which ſhe had been forced to bear for above thirty years under the tyranny of Piſiſtratus and his children, now peaceably enjoyed the advantages of liberty, the ſweetneſs and value of which were only heightned and improved by that ſhort privation. Lacedæmon, which was at this time the miſtreſs of Greece, and had contributed at firſt to this happy change in Athens, ſeemed afterwards to repent of her good offices: and growing jealous of the tranquillity ſhe herſelf had procured for her neighbours, ſhe attempted to diſturb it, by endeavouring to reinſtate Hippias the ſon of Piſiſtratus, in the goverment of Athens. But all her attempts were fruitleſs, and ſerved only to manifeſt her ill-will, and her grief, to ſee Athens determined to maintain its independence even of Sparta itſelf. Hippias hereupon had recourſe to the Perſians. Artaphernes, governor of Sardis, ſent the Athenians word, as we have already mentioned, that they muſt re-eſtabliſh Hippias in his authority, unleſs they choſe rather to draw the whole power of Darius upon them. This ſecond at-

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tempt ſucceeded no better than the firſt, Hippias was obliged to wait for a more favourable juncture. We ſhall ſee preſently, that he ſerved as a conductor or guide to the Perſian generals, ſent by Darius againſt Greece.

Athens, from the recovery of her liberty, was quite another city than under her tyrants, and diſplayed a very different kind of ſpirit. (*t*) Among the citizens, Miltiades diſtinguiſhed himſelf moſt in the war with the Perſians, which we are going to relate. He was the ſon of Cimon an illuſtrious Athenian. This Cimon had a half-brother by the mother's ſide, whoſe name was likewiſe Miltiades, of a very antient and noble family in Egina, who had lately been received into the number of the Athenian citizens. He was a perſon of great credit even in the time of Piſiſtratus: but, being unwilling to bear the yoke of a deſpotic government, he joyfully embraced the offer made him, of going to ſettle with a colony in the Thracian Cherſoneſus, whither he was invited by the Dolonci, the inhabitants of that country, to be their king, or, according to the language of thoſe times, their tyrant. He dying without children, left the ſovereignty to Steſagoras, who was his nephew, and eldeſt ſon of his brother Cimon; and Steſagoras dying alſo without iſſue, the ſons of Piſiſtratus, who then ruled the city of Athens, ſent his brother Miltiades, the perſon we are now ſpeaking of, into that country to be his ſucceſſor. He arrived there, and eſtabliſhed himſelf in the government in the ſame year Darius undertook his expedition againſt the Scythians. He attended that prince with ſome ſhips as far as the Danube; and was the perſon who adviſed the Ionians to deſtroy the bridge, and return home without waiting for Darius. During his reſidence in the Cherſoneſus, he married * Hegeſipyla, daughter of Olorus, a Thracian king in the

(*t*) Ibid. c. 34, 41. Cor. Nep. in Mil. cap. 1—3.

* *After the death of Miltiades, this princeſs had by a ſecond huſband a ſon, who was called Olorus, after the name of his grandfather, and who was the father of Thucydides the hiſtorian.* Herod. ibid.

neigh-

neighbourhood, by whom he had Cimon, the famous Athenian general, of whom a great deal will be ſaid in the ſequel. Miltiades, having for ſeveral reaſons abdicated his government in Thrace, embarked, and took all that he had on board five ſhips, and ſet ſail for Athens. There he ſettled a ſecond time, and acquired great reputation.

(*u*) At the ſame time two other citizens, younger than Miltiades, began to diſtinguiſh themſelves at Athens, namely Ariſtides and Themiſtocles. Plutarch obſerves, that the former of theſe two had endeavoured to form himſelf upon the model of Cliſthenes, one of the greateſt men of his time, and a zealous defender of liberty, who had very much contributed to the reſtoring it at Athens, by expelling the Piſiſtratides out of that city. It was an excellent cuſtom among the antients, and which it were to be wiſhed might prevail amongſt us, that the young men, ambitious of publick employments, particularly * attached themſelves to ſuch aged and experienced perſons, as had diſtinguiſhed themſelves moſt eminently therein; and who, both by their converſation and example, could teach them the art of acting themſelves, and governing others with wiſdom and diſcretion. Thus, ſays Plutarch, did Ariſtides attach himſelf to Cliſthenes, and Cimon to Ariſtides; and he mentions ſeveral others, among the reſt Polybius, whom we have mentioned ſo often, and who in his youth was the conſtant diſciple, and faithful imitator of the celebrated Philopœmen.

Themiſtocles and Ariſtides were of very different diſpoſitions; but they both rendered great ſervices to the commonwealth. Themiſtocles, who naturally inclined to popular government, omitted nothing, that could contribute to render him agreeable to the people, and to gain him friends; behaving himſelf with great affability and complaiſance to every body, always

(*u*) Plut. in Ariſt. p. 319, 320. & in Them. p. 112, 113. An ſeni ſit ger. Reſp. p. 790, 791.

* Diſcere à peritis, ſequi optimos. *Tacit. in Agric.*

ready to do ſervice to the citizens, every one of whom he knew by name; nor was he very nice about the means he uſed to oblige them. (x) Some body talking with him once on this ſubject, told him, he would make an excellent magiſtrate, if his behaviour towards the citizens was more equal, and if he was not biaſſed in favour of one more than another: *God forbid*, replied Themiſtocles, *I ſhould ever ſit upon a tribunal, where my friends ſhould find no more credit or favour, than ſtrangers.* Cleon, who appeared ſome time after at Athens, obſerved a quite different conduct, but yet ſuch as was not wholly exempt from blame. When he came into the adminiſtration of public affairs, he aſſembled all his friends, and declared to them, that from that moment he renounced their friendſhip, leſt it ſhould prove an obſtacle to him in the diſcharge of his duty, and cauſe him to act with partiality and injuſtice. This was doing them very little honour, and judging hardly of their integrity. But, as Plutarch ſays, it was not his friends but his paſſions that he ought to have renounced.

Ariſtides had the diſcretion to obſerve a juſt medium between theſe two vicious extremes. Being a favourer of ariſtocracy in imitation of Lycurgus, whoſe great admirer he was, he in a manner ſtruck out a new path of his own: not endeavouring to oblige his friends at the expence of juſtice, and yet always ready to do them ſervice when conſiſtent with it. He carefully avoided making uſe of his friends recommendations for obtaining employments, leſt it ſhould prove a dangerous obligation upon him, as well as a plauſible pretext for them, to require the ſame favour from him on the like occaſion. He uſed to ſay, that the true citizen, or the honeſt man, ought to make no other uſe of his credit and power, than upon all occaſions to practiſe what was honeſt and juſt, and engage others to do the ſame.

Conſidering this contrariety of principles and hu-

(x) Cic. de Senect. Plut. An ſeni ſit ger. Reſp. p. 806, 807.

mours

mours among theſe great men, we are not to wonder, if, during their adminiſtration, there was a continual oppoſition between them. Themiſtocles, who was bold and enterprizing in almoſt all his attempts, was ſtill ſure almoſt always to find Ariſtides againſt him, who thought himſelf obliged to thwart the other's deſigns, even ſometimes when they were juſt and beneficial to the public, leſt he ſhould get too great an aſcendant and authority, which might become pernicious to the commonwealth. One day, having got the better of Themiſtocles, who had made ſome propoſal really advantagious to the ſtate, he could not contain himſelf, but cried out aloud as he went out of the aſſembly, *That the Athenians would never proſper, till they threw them both into the Barathrum:* the Barathrum was a pit, into which malefactors condemned to die were thrown. (y) But notwithſtanding this mutual oppoſition, when the common intereſt was at ſtake, they were no longer enemies: and whenever they were to take the field, or engage in any expedition, they agreed together to lay aſide all differences on leaving the city, and to be at liberty to reſume them on their return, if they thought fit.

The predominant paſſion of Themiſtocles was ambition and the love of glory, which diſcovered itſelf from his childhood. After the battle of Marathon, which we ſhall ſpeak of preſently, when the people were every where extolling the valour and conduct of Miltiades, who had won it, Themiſtocles never appeared but in a very thoughtful and melancholy humour: he ſpent whole nights without ſleep, and was never ſeen at public feaſts and entertainments as uſual. When his friends, aſtoniſhed at this change, aſked him the reaſon of it, he made anſwer, *that Miltiades's trophies would not let him ſleep.* Theſe were a kind of incentive, which never ceaſed to prompt and animate his ambition. From this time Themiſtocles addicted

(y) Plut. Apophthegm. p. 186.

himſelf

himſelf wholly to arms; and the love of martial glory wholly engroſſed him.

As for Ariſtides, the love of the public good was the great ſpring of all his actions. What he was moſt particularly admired for, was his conſtancy and ſteadineſs under the unforeſeen changes, to which thoſe, who have the adminiſtration of affairs, are expoſed; for he was neither elevated with the honour conferred upon him, nor caſt down at the contempt and diſappointments he ſometimes experienced. On all occaſions, he preſerved his uſual calmneſs and temper, being perſuaded, that a man ought to give himſelf up entirely to his country, and to ſerve it with a perfect diſintereſtedneſs, as well with regard to glory as to riches. The general eſteem for the uprightneſs of his intentions, the purity of his zeal for the intereſts of the ſtate, and the ſincerity of his virtue, appeared one day in the theatre, when one of Æſchylus's plays was acting. For when the actor had repeated that verſe, which deſcribes the character of Amphiarus, *He does not deſire to ſeem an honeſt and virtuous man, but really to be ſo*, the whole audience caſt their eyes upon Ariſtides, and applied the ſenſe to him.

Another thing related of him, with relation to a public employment, is very remarkable. He was no ſooner made treaſurer-general of the republic, but he made it appear, that his predeceſſors in that office had cheated the ſtate of vaſt ſums of money; and among the reſt Themiſtocles in particular: for this great man, with all his merit, was not irreproachable on that head. For which reaſon, when Ariſtides came to paſs his accounts, Themiſtocles raiſed a mighty faction againſt him, accuſed him of having embezzled the public treaſure, and prevailed ſo far, as to have him condemned and fined. But the principal inhabitants, and the moſt virtuous part of the citizens, riſing up againſt ſo unjuſt a ſentence, not only the judgment was reverſed and the fine remitted, but he was elected treaſurer again for the year enſuing. He then ſeemed

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to repent of his former adminiſtration; and by ſhewing himſelf more tractable and indulgent towards others, he found out the ſecret of pleaſing all that plundered the commonwealth. For, as he neither reproved them, nor narrowly inſpected their accompts; all thoſe plunderers, grown fat with ſpoil and rapine, now extolled Ariſtides to the ſkies. It would have been eaſy for him, as we perceive, to have enriched himſelf in a poſt of that nature, which ſeems, as it were, to invite a man to it by the many favourable opportunities it lays in his way; eſpecially as he had to do with officers, who for their part were intent upon nothing but robbing the public, and would have been ready to conceal the frauds of the treaſurer their maſter, upon condition he did them the ſame favour.

Theſe very officers now made intereſt with the people to have him continued a third year in the ſame employment. But, when the time of election was come, juſt as they were upon the point of electing Ariſtides unanimouſly, he roſe up, and warmly reproved the Athenian people: "What, ſays he, when I managed "your treaſure with all the fidelity and diligence an "honeſt man is capable of, I met with the moſt cruel "treatment, and the moſt mortifying returns; and "now that I have abandoned it to the mercy of all "theſe robbers of the public, I am an admirable "man, and the beſt of citizens! I cannot help de"claring to you, that I am more aſhamed of the "honour you do me this day, than I was of the con"demnation you paſſed againſt me this time twelve"month: and with grief I find, that it is more "glorious with us to be complaiſant to knaves, than "to ſave the treaſures of the republic." By this declaration he ſilenced the public plunderers, and gained the eſteem of all good men.

Such were the characters of theſe two illuſtrious Athenians, who began to diſtinguiſh their extenſive merit, when Darius turned his arms againſt Greece.

2. *Darius*

2. *Darius ſends heralds into Greece, in order to ſound the people, and to require them to ſubmit.*

(z) Before this prince would directly engage in this enterprize, he judged it expedient, firſt of all to ſound the Grecians, and to know in what manner the different ſtates ſtood affected towards him. With this view he ſent heralds into all parts of Greece, to require earth and water in his name: this was the form uſed by the Perſians when they exacted ſubmiſſion from thoſe they were for ſubjecting to them. On the arrival of theſe heralds, many of the Grecian cities dreading the power of the Perſians, comply'd with their demands: as did alſo the inhabitants of Ægina, a little iſle, over-againſt and not far from Athens. This proceeding of the people of Ægina was looked upon as a public treaſon. The Athenians repreſented the matter to the Spartans, who immediately ſent Cleomenes, one of their kings, to apprehend the authors of it. The people of Ægina refuſed to deliver them, under pretence that he came without his collegue. This collegue was Demaratus, who had himſelf ſuggeſted that excuſe. As ſoon as Cleomenes was returned to Sparta, in order to be revenged on Demaratus for that affront, he endeavoured to get him depoſed, as not being of the royal family; and ſucceeded in his attempt by the aſſiſtance of the prieſteſs of Delphos, whom he had ſuborned to give an anſwer favourable to his deſigns. Demaratus, not being able to endure ſo groſs an injury, baniſhed himſelf from his country, and retired to Darius, who received him with open arms, and gave him a conſiderable ſettlement in Perſia. He was ſucceeded in the throne by Leutychides, who joined his collegue, and went with him to Ægina, from whence they brought away ten of the principal inhabitants, and committed them to the cuſtody of the Athenians, their declared enemies. Cleomenes dying not long after, and the fraud he had committed

(z) Her. l. 6. c. 49 & 86.

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at Delphos being diſcovered, the Lacedæmonians endeavoured to oblige the people of Athens to ſet thoſe priſoners at liberty, but they refuſed.

(*a*) The Perſian heralds, that went to Sparta and Athens, were not ſo favourably received, as thoſe that had been ſent to the other cities. One of them was thrown into a well, and the other into a deep ditch, and were bid to take there earth and water. I ſhould be leſs ſurprized at this unworthy treatment, if Athens alone had been concerned in it. It was a proceeding ſuitable enough to a popular government, raſh, impetuous, and violent; where reaſon is ſeldom heard, and every thing determined by paſſion. But I do not find any thing in this agreeable to the Spartan equity and gravity. They were at liberty to refuſe what was demanded: but to treat public officers in ſuch a manner, was an open violation of the law of nations. (*b*) If what the hiſtorians ſay on this head be true, the crime did not remain unpuniſhed. Talthybius, one of Agamemnon's heralds, was honoured at Sparta as a god, and had a temple there. He revenged the indignities done to the heralds of the king of Perſia, and made the Spartans feel the effects of his wrath, by bringing many terrible accidents upon them. In order to appeaſe him, and to expiate their offence, they ſent afterwards ſeveral of their chief citizens into Perſia, who voluntarily offered themſelves as victims for their country. They were delivered into the hands of Xerxes, who would not let them ſuffer, but ſent them back to their own country. As for the Athenians, Talthybius executed his vengeance on the family of Miltiades, who was principally concerned in the outrage committed upon Darius's heralds.

3. *The Perſians defeated at Marathon by Miltiades.*

(*c*) Darius immediately ſent away Datis and Artaphernes, whom he had appointed generals in the room

(*a*) Her. l. 7. c. 133, 136. Paſ. in Lacon. p. 182 & 183. (*b*) Ibid. c. 135 & 136. (*c*) A. M. 3514. Ant. J. C. 490.

of

of Mardonius. Their inſtructions were, to give up Eretria and Athens to be plundered, to burn all the houſes and temples therein, to make all the inhabitants of both places priſoners, and to ſend them to Darius; for which purpoſe they went provided with a great number of chains and fetters. (*d*) They ſet ſail with a fleet of five or ſix hundred ſhips, and an army of five hundred thouſand men. After having made themſelves maſters of the iſles in the Ægæan ſea, which they did without difficulty, they turned their courſe towards Eretria, a city of Eubœa, which they took after a ſiege of ſeven days by the treachery of ſome of the principal inhabitants: they reduced it entirely to aſhes, put all the inhabitants in chains, and ſent them to Perſia. (*e*) Darius, contrary to their expectation, treated them kindly, and gave them a village in the country of Ciſſia for their habitation, which was but a day's journey from Suſa, where (*f*) Apollonius Tyaneus found ſome of their deſcendants ſix hundred years afterwards.

(*g*) After this ſucceſs at Eretria, the Perſians advanced towards Attica. Hippias conducted them to Marathon, a little town by the ſea-ſide. They took care to acquaint the Athenians with the fate of Eretria; and to let them know, that not an inhabitant of that place had eſcaped their vengeance, in hopes that this news would induce them to ſurrender immediately. The Athenians had ſent to Lacedæmon, to deſire ſuccours againſt the common enemy, which the Spartans granted them inſtantly and without deliberation; but which could not ſet out till ſome days after, on account of an antient cuſtom and a ſuperſtitious maxim amongſt them, that did not admit them to begin a march before the full of the moon. Not one of their other allies prepared to ſuccour them, ſo great terror had the formidable army of the Perſians ſpread on every

(*d*) Plut. in Moral. p. 829. (*e*) Her. l. 6. c. 119.
(*f*) Philoſtr. l. 1. c. 17. (*g*) Her. l. 6. c. 102 & 120. Cor. Nep. in Milt. c. 4—6. Juſtin. l. 2. c. 3. Plut. in Ariſtid. p. 321.

ſide.

ſide. The inhabitants of Platæa alone furniſhed them with a thouſand ſoldiers. In this extremity the Athenians were obliged to arm their ſlaves, which had never been done there before this occaſion.

The Perſian army commanded by Datis conſiſted of an hundred thouſand foot, and ten thouſand horſe. That of the Athenians amounted in all but to ten thouſand men. This had ten generals, of whom Miltiades was the chief; and theſe ten were to have the command of the whole army, each for a day, one after another. There was a great diſpute among theſe officers, whether they ſhould hazard a battle, or expect the enemy within their walls. The latter opinion had a great majority, and appeared very reaſonable. For, what appearance of ſucceſs could there be in facing with a handful of ſoldiers ſo numerous and formidable an army as that of the Perſians? Miltiades however declared for the contrary opinion, and ſhowed, that the only means to exalt the courage of their own troops, and to ſtrike a terror into thoſe of the enemy, was to advance boldly towards them with an air of confidence and intrepidity. Ariſtides ſtrenuouſly defended this opinion, and brought ſome of the other commanders into it, ſo that when the ſuffrages came to be taken, they were equal on both ſides of the queſtion. Hereupon Miltiades addreſſed himſelf to Callimachus, who was then * Polemarch, and had a right of voting as well as the ten commanders. He very warmly repreſented to him, that the fate of their country was then in his hands; that his ſingle vote was to determine, whether Athens ſhould preſerve her liberty, or be enſlaved; and that he had it in his power by one word to become as famous as Harmodius and Ariſtogiton, the authors of that liberty which the Athenians enjoyed. Callimachus pronounced that word

* *The Polemarch at Athens was both an officer and a conſiderable magiſtrate, equally employed to command in the army, and to adminiſter juſtice. I ſhall give a larger account of this office in another place.*

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in favour of Miltiades's opinion. And accordingly a battle was reſolved upon.

Ariſtides reflecting, that a command which changes every day, muſt neceſſarily be feeble, unequal, not of a piece, often contrary to itſelf, and incapable either of projecting, or executing any uniform deſign, was of opinion, that their danger was both too great and too preſſing for them to expoſe their affairs to ſuch inconveniences. In order to prevent them, he judged it neceſſary to veſt the whole power in one ſingle perſon: and to induce his collegues to act conformably, he himſelf ſet the firſt example of reſignation. When the day came, on which it was his turn to take upon him the command, he reſigned it to Miltiades, as the more able and experienced general. The other commanders did the ſame, all ſentiments of jealouſy giving way to the love of the public good: and by this day's behaviour we may learn, that it is almoſt as glorious to acknowledge merit in other perſons, as to have it one's ſelf. Miltiades however thought fit to wait till his own day came. Then, like an able captain, he endeavoured by the advantage of the ground to gain what he wanted in ſtrength and number. He drew up his army at the foot of a mountain, that the enemy ſhould not be able either to ſurround him, or charge him in the rear. On the two ſides of his army he cauſed large trees to be thrown, which were cut down on purpoſe, in order to cover his flanks, and render the Perſian cavalry uſeleſs. Datis, their commander, was very ſenſible, that the place was not advantagious for him: but, relying upon the number of his troops, which was infinitely ſuperior to that of the Athenians; and on the other hand, not being willing to ſtay till the reinforcement of the Spartans arrived, he determined to engage. The Athenians did not wait for the enemy's charging them. As ſoon as the ſignal of battle was given, they ran againſt the enemy with all the fury imaginable. The Perſians looked upon this firſt ſtep of the Athenians as a piece of madneſs, conſidering

ſidering their army was ſo ſmall, and utterly deſtitute both of cavalry and archers: but they were quickly undeceived. Herodotus obſerves, that this was the firſt time the Grecians began an engagement by running in this manner: which may ſeem ſomewhat aſtoniſhing. And indeed, was there not reaſon to apprehend, that their running would in ſome meaſure weaken the troops, and blunt the edge of their firſt impetuoſity; and that the ſoldiers having quitted their ranks, might be out of breath, ſpent, and in diſorder, when they came to the enemy, who, waiting to receive them, in good order and without ſtirring, ought, one would think, to be in a condition to ſuſtain their charge advantagiouſly? (*h*) This conſideration engaged Pompey, at the battle of Pharſalia, to keep his troops in a ſteady poſture, and to forbid them making any motion, till the enemy made the firſt attack: (*i*) but Cæſar * blames Pompey's conduct in this reſpect, and gives this reaſon for it: that the impetuoſity of an army's motion in running to engage inſpires the ſoldiers with a certain enthuſiaſm and martial fury, and it gives an additional force to their blows, and that it encreaſes and enflames their courage, which by the rapid movement of ſo many thouſand men together is blown up and animated, to uſe the expreſſion, like flames by the wind. I leave it to the gentlemen who profeſs arms, to decide the point between thoſe two great captains, and return to my ſubject.

The battle was very fierce and obſtinate. Miltiades had made the wings of his army exceeding ſtrong, but

(*h*) Cæſ. in bell. civil. l. 3. in Cæſ. p. 719.

(*i*) Plut. in Pomp. p. 656. &

* Quod nobis quidem nulla ratione factum à Pompeio videtur: propterea quod eſt quædam incitatio atque alacritas naturaliter innata omnibus quæ ſtudio pugnæ incenditur. Hanc non reprimere, ſed augere imperatores debent. *Cæſ.*

Καίσαρ περὶ τοῦτο διαμαρτεῖν φησὶ τὸν Πομπήϊον, ἀγνοήσαντα, τὴν μετὰ ὁρμῆς καὶ φοβερὰν ἐν ἀρχῇ γινομένην σύρραξιν, ὡς ἔντε ταῖς πληγαῖς βίαν προσιθησι, καὶ συνεκκαίει τὸν θυμὸν ἐκ πάντων ἀναῤῥιπιζόμενον. *Plut. in Cæſ.*

had

had left the main body more weak and not ſo deep; the reaſon of which ſeems manifeſt enough. Having but ten thouſand men to oppoſe to ſuch a numerous and vaſt army, it was impoſſible for him either to make a large front, or to give an equal depth to his battalions. He was obliged therefore to take his choice: and he imagined, that he could gain the victory no otherwiſe, than by the efforts he ſhould make with his two wings in order to break and diſperſe thoſe of the Perſians: not doubting, but, when his wings were once victorious, they would be able to attack the enemies main body in flank, and compleat the victory without much difficulty. This was the ſame plan as Hannibal followed afterwards at the battle of Cannæ, which ſucceeded ſo well with him, and which indeed can ſcarce ever fail of ſucceeding. The Perſians then attacked the main body of the Grecian army, and made their greateſt effort particularly upon their front. This was led by Ariſtides and Themiſtocles, who ſupported it a long time with an intrepid courage and bravery, but were at length obliged to give ground. At that very inſtant came up their two victorious wings, which had defeated thoſe of the enemy, and put them to flight. Nothing could be more ſeaſonable for the main body of the Grecian army, which began to be broken, being quite borne down by the number of the Perſians. The ſcale was quickly turned, and the Barbarians were entirely routed. They all betook themſelves to their heels and fled, not towards their camp, but to their ſhips, that they might make their eſcape. The Athenians purſued them thither, and ſet many of their veſſels on fire. On this occaſion it was that Cynægyrus, the brother of the poet Æſchylus, who laid hold of one of the ſhips, in order to get into it with thoſe that fled, * had his right hand cut off, and fell into the

* *Juſtin adds, that Cynægyrus, having firſt had his right and then his left hand cut off with an ax, laid hold of the veſſel with his teeth, and would not let go, ſo violent was his rage againſt the enemy. This account is utterly fabulous, and has not the leaſt appearance of truth in it.*

ſea and was drowned. The Athenians took ſeven of their ſhips. They had not above two hundred men killed on their ſide in this engagement; whereas on the ſide of the Perſians above ſix thouſand were ſlain, without reckoning thoſe who fell into the ſea as they endeavoured to eſcape, or thoſe that were conſumed with the ſhips ſet on fire.

Hippias was killed in the battle. That ungrateful and perfidious citizen, in order to recover the unjuſt dominion uſurped by his father Piſiſtratus over the Athenians, had the baſeneſs to become a ſervile courtier to a barbarian prince, and to implore his aid againſt his native country. Urged on by hatred and revenge, he ſuggeſted all the means he could invent to load his country with chains; and even put himſelf at the head of its enemies with deſign to reduce that city to aſhes, to which he owed his birth, and againſt which he had no other ground of complaint, than that ſhe would not acknowledge him for her tyrant. An ignominious death, together with everlaſting infamy entailed upon his name, was the juſt reward of ſo black a treachery.

(*k*) Immediately after the battle, an Athenian ſoldier, ſtill reeking with the blood of the enemy, quitted the army and ran to Athens to carry his fellow-citizens the happy news of the victory. When he arrived at the magiſtrates houſe, he only uttered two or three words, * *Rejoice, rejoice, the victory is ours*, and fell down dead at their feet.

(*l*) The Perſians had thought themſelves ſo ſure of victory, that they had brought marble to Marathon, in order to erect a trophy there. The Grecians took this marble, and cauſed a ſtatue to be made of it by Phidias, in honour of the goddeſs † Nemeſis, who had a temple near the place where the battle was fought.

(*k*) Plut. de glor. Athen. p. 347.

(*l*) Pauſ. l. 1. p. 62.

* Χαίρετε, Χαίρομεν. *I could not render the livelineſs of the Greek expreſſion in our language.*

† *This was the goddeſs, whoſe buſineſs it was to puniſh injuſtice and oppreſſion.*

The

The Perſian fleet, inſtead of ſailing by the iſlands, in order to re-enter Aſia, doubled the cape of Sunium, with the deſign of ſurprizing Athens, before the Athenian forces ſhould arrive there to defend the city. But the latter had the precaution to march thither with nine tribes to ſecure their country, and performed their march with ſo much expedition, that they arrived there the ſame day. The diſtance from Marathon to Athens is about forty miles, or fifteen French leagues. This was a great deal for an army, that had juſt undergone a long and rude battle. By this means the deſign of their enemies miſcarried.

Ariſtides, the only general that ſtayed at Marathon with his tribe, to take care of the ſpoil and priſoners, acted ſuitably to the good opinion that was entertained of him. For, though gold and ſilver were ſcattered about in abundance in the enemy's camp, and though all the tents as well as galleys that were taken, were full of rich cloaths and coſtly furniture, and treaſure of all kinds to an immenſe value, he not only was not tempted to touch any of it himſelf, but hindered every body elſe from touching it.

Aſſoon as the day of the full moon was over, the Lacedæmonians began their march with two thouſand men; and, having travelled with all imaginable expedition, arrived in Attica after three days hard marching; the length of the way from Sparta to Attica was no leſs than twelve hundred ſtadia, or one hundred and fifty Engliſh miles. (*m*) The battle was fought the day before they arrived: however they proceeded to Marathon, where they found the fields covered with dead bodies and riches. After having congratulated the Athenians on the happy ſucceſs of the battle, they returned to their own country.

They were hindered by a fooliſh and ridiculous ſuperſtition from having a ſhare in the moſt glorious action recorded in hiſtory. For it is almoſt without example that ſuch an handful of men, as the Athenians

(*m*) Iſocr. in Panegyr. p. 113.

were, ſhould not only make head againſt ſo numerous an army as that of the Perſians, but ſhould entirely rout and defeat them. One is aſtoniſhed to ſee ſo formidable a power attack ſo ſmall a city and miſcarry; and we are almoſt tempted to diſbelieve the truth of an event, that appears ſo improbable, and which nevertheleſs is very certain and unqueſtionable. This battle alone ſhows, what wonderful things may be performed by an able general, who knows how to take his advantages; by the intrepidity of ſoldiers, that are not afraid of death; by a zeal for one's country; the love of liberty; an hatred and deteſtation of ſlavery and tyranny; which were ſentiments natural to the Athenians, but undoubtedly very much augmented and enflamed in them by the very preſence of Hippias, whom they dreaded to have again for their maſter, after all that had paſſed between them.

(*n*) Plato, in more places than one, makes it his buſineſs to extol the battle of Marathon, and is for having that action conſidered as the ſource and original cauſe of all the victories that were gained afterwards. It was undoubtedly this victory that deprived the Perſian power of that terror, which had rendered them ſo formidable, and made every thing ſtoop before them: it was this victory that taught the Grecians to know their own ſtrength, and not to tremble before an enemy, terrible only in name; that made them find by experience, that victory does not depend ſo much upon the number, as the courage of troops; that ſet before their eyes in a moſt conſpicuous light, the glory there is in ſacrificing one's life in the defence of our country, and for the preſervation of liberty; and laſtly, that inſpired them, thro' the whole courſe of ſucceeding ages, with a noble emulation and warm deſire to imitate their anceſtors, and not to degenerate from their virtue. For, on all important occaſions, it was cuſtomary among them to put the people in mind of Miltiades and his invincible troop, that is, of a

(*n*) In Menex. p. 239, 240. Et lib. 3. de leg. p. 698 & 699.

little

little army of heroes, whoſe intrepidity and bravery had done ſo much honour to Athens.

(o) Thoſe that were ſlain in the battle, had all the honour immediately paid to them, that was due to their merit. Illuſtrious monuments were erected to them all, in the very place where the battle was fought; upon which their own names and that of their tribes were recorded. There were three diſtinct ſetts of monuments ſeparately ſet up, one for the Athenians, another for the Platæans, and a third for the ſlaves, whom they had admitted among their ſoldiers on that occaſion. Miltiades's tomb was erected afterwards in the ſame place.

(p) The reflection Cornelius Nepos makes upon what the Athenians did to honour the memory of their general, deſerves to be taken notice of. Formerly, ſays he, ſpeaking of the Romans, our anceſtors rewarded virtue by marks of diſtinction, that were not ſtately or magnificent, but ſuch as were rarely granted, and for that very reaſon were highly eſteemed; whereas now they are ſo profuſely beſtowed, that little or no value is ſet upon them. The ſame thing happened, adds he, among the Athenians. All the honour that was paid to Miltiades, the great deliverer of Athens and of all Greece, was, that in a picture of the battle of Marathon, drawn by order of the Athenians, he was repreſented at the head of the ten commanders, exhorting the ſoldiers, and ſetting them an example of their duty. But this ſame people in later ages, being grown more powerful, and corrupted by the flatteries of their orators, decreed three hundred ſtatues to Demetrius Phalereus.

(q) Plutarch makes the ſame reflection, and wiſely obſerves, that the † honour which is paid to great men ought not to be looked upon as the reward of their il-

(o) Pauſ. in Attic. p. 60, 61. (p) Cor. Nep. in Milt. c. 6.
(q) In præc. de rep. ger. p. 820.

† Οὐ γὰρ μισθὸν εἶναι δεῖ τῆς πράξεως, ἀλλὰ σύμβολον, τὴν τιμὴν, ἵνα καὶ διαμένῃ πολὺν χρόνον.

luſtrious actions, but only as a mark of the eſteem of them, whereof ſuch monuments are intended to perpetuate the remembrance. It is not then the ſtateline's or magnificence of public monuments, which gives them their value, or makes them durable, but the ſincere gratitude of thoſe that erect them. The three hundred ſtatues of Demetrius Phalereus were all thrown down even in his own life time, but the picture in which Miltiades's courage was repreſented was preſerved many ages after him.

(r) This picture was kept at Athens in a gallery, adorned and enriched with different paintings, all excellent in their kind, and done by the greateſt maſters; which for that reaſon was called ποικίλη, ſignifying varied and diverſified. The celebrated Polygnotus, a native of the iſle of Thaſos, and one of the fineſt painters of his time, painted this picture, or at leaſt the greateſt part of it; and, as he valued himſelf upon his honour, and was more attached to glory than intereſt, he did it *gratis*, and would not receive any recompence for it. The city of Athens therefore rewarded him with a ſort of coin, that was more acceptable to his taſte, by procuring an order from the Amphictyons to appoint him a public lodging in the city, where he might live during his own pleaſure.

(s) The gratitude of the Athenians towards Miltiades was of no very long duration. After the battle of Marathon, he deſired and obtained the command of a fleet of ſeventy ſhips, in order to puniſh and ſubdue the iſlands that had favoured the Barbarians. Accordingly he reduced ſeveral of them: but having had ill ſucceſs in the iſle of Paros, and upon a falſe report of the arrival of the enemy's fleet, having raiſed the ſiege which he had laid to the capital city, wherein he had received a very dangerous wound, he returned to Athens with his fleet; and was there impeached by a citizen, called Xanthippus, who accuſed him of

(r) Plin. l. 35. c. 9. Cor. Nep. in Milt. c. 7 & 8.

(s) Her. l. 6. c. 132 & 136.

having

having raiſed the ſiege through treachery, and in conſideration of a great ſum of money given him by the king of Perſia. As little probability as there was in this accuſation, it nevertheleſs took place againſt the merit and innocence of Miltiades. (*t*) He was condemned to loſe his life, and to be thrown into the Barathrum; a ſentence paſſed only upon the greateſt criminals and malefactors. The magiſtrate oppoſed the execution of ſo unjuſt a condemnation. All the favour ſhewn to this preſerver of his country, was to have the ſentence of death commuted into a penalty of fifty talents, or fifty thouſand crowns French money, being the ſum to which the expences of the fleet, that had been equipped upon his ſollicitation and advice, amounted. Not being rich enough to pay this ſum, he was put into priſon, where he died of the wound he had received at Paros. Cimon, his ſon, who was at this time very young, ſignalized his piety on this occaſion, as we ſhall find in the ſequel he did his courage afterwards. He purchaſed the permiſſion of burying his father's body, by paying the fine of fifty thouſand crowns, in which he had been condemned; which ſum the young man raiſed, as well as he could, by the aſſiſtance of his friends and relations.

Cornelius Nepos obſerves, that what chiefly induced the Athenians to act in this manner with regard to Miltiades, was only his merit and great reputation, which made the people, that were but lately delivered from the yoke of ſlavery under Piſiſtratus, apprehend, that Miltiades, who had been tyrant before in the Cherſoneſus, might affect the ſame at Athens. *They therefore choſe rather to puniſh an innocent perſon, than to be under perpetual apprehenſions of him. To this ſame principle was the inſtitution of the oſtraciſm at Athens owing. (*u*) I have elſewhere given an account of the moſt plauſible reaſons, upon which the

(*t*) Plut. in Georg. p. 519. (*u*) Man. d'etud. Tom. 3. p. 407.

* Hæc populus reſpiciens maluit eum innocentem plecti, quàm ſe diutius eſſe in timore.

oſtraciſm could be founded. But I do not ſee how we can fully juſtify ſo ſtrange a policy, to which all merit becomes ſuſpected, and virtue itſelf appears criminal.

(x) This appears plainly in the baniſhment of Ariſtides. His inviolable attachment to juſtice obliged him on many occaſions to oppoſe Themiſtocles, who did not pique himſelf upon his delicacy in that reſpect, and who ſpared no intrigues and cabals to engage the ſuffrages of the people, for removing a rival who always oppoſed his ambitious deſigns. * This is a ſtrong inſtance, that a perſon may be ſuperior in merit and virtue, without being ſo in credit. The impetuous eloquence of Themiſtocles bore down the juſtice of Ariſtides, and occaſioned his baniſhment. In this kind of trial the citizens gave their ſuffrages by writing the name of the accuſed perſon upon a ſhell, called in Greek ὄστρακον, from whence came the term oſtraciſm. On this occaſion a peaſant, who could not write, and did not know Ariſtides, applied to himſelf, and deſired him to put the name of Ariſtides upon his ſhell. "Has he done you any wrong, ſaid Ariſtides, that "you are for condemning him in this manner? No, "replied the other, I don't ſo much as know him; "but I am quite tired and angry with hearing every "body call him *the Juſt.*" Ariſtides, without ſaying a word more, calmly took the ſhell, wrote his own name in it, and returned it. He ſet out for his baniſhment, imploring the gods that no accident might befal his country to make it regret him. The † great Camillus, in a like caſe, did not imitate his generoſity,

(x) Plut. in Ariſt. p. 322, 323.

* In his cognitum eſt, quanto antiſtaret eloquentia innocentiæ. Quanquam enim adeo excellebat Ariſtides abſtinentia, ut unus poſt hominum memoriam, quod quidem nos audierimus, cognomine Juſtus ſit appellatus; tamen à Themiſtocle collabefactus teſtulâ illâ exilio decem annorum multatus eſt. *Cor. Nep. in Ariſt.*

† In exilium abiit, precatus ab diis immortalibus, ſi exilio ſibi ea injuria fieret, primo quoque tempore deſiderium ſui civitati ingratæ facerent. *Liv.* l. 5. n. 32.

and

and prayed to a quite different effect, desiring the gods to force his ungrateful country by some misfortune to have occasion for his aid, and recal him assoon as possible.

(y) O happy republic, cries out Valerius Maximus, speaking of Aristides's banishment, which after having so basely treated the most virtuous man it ever produced, has still been able to find citizens zealously and faithfully attached to her service! *Felices Athenas, quæ post illius exilium invenire aliquem aut virum bonum, aut amantem sui civem potuerunt; cum quo tunc ipsa sanctitas migravit!*

SECT. VIII. *Darius resolves to make war in person against Egypt and against Greece: is prevented by death. Dispute between two of his sons, concerning the succession to the crown. Xerxes is chosen king.*

(z) WHEN Darius received the news of the defeat of his army at Marathon, he was violently enraged; and that bad success was so far from discouraging or diverting him from carrying on the war against Greece, that it only served to animate him to pursue it with the greater vigour, in order to be revenged at the same time for the burning of Sardis, and for the dishonour incurred at Marathon. Being thus determined to march in person with all his forces, he dispatched orders to all his subjects in the several provinces of his empire to arm themselves for this expedition.

After having spent three years in making the necessary preparations, he had another war to carry on occasioned by the revolt of Egypt. It seems from what we read in (a) Diodorus Siculus, that Darius went thither himself to quel it, and that he succeeded. The historian relates, that upon this prince's desiring to have his statue placed before that of Sesostris, the chief priest of the Egyptians told him, *he had not*

(y) Val. Max. l. 5. c. 3. (z) Her. l. 7. c. 1.
(a) Lib. 1. p. 54 & 85.

yet equalled the glory of that conqueror; and that the king, without being offended at the Egyptian prieſt's freedom, made anſwer, that he would endeavour to ſurpaſs it. Diodorus adds farther, that Darius, deteſting the impious cruelty which his predeceſſor Cambyſes had exerciſed in that country, expreſſed great reverence for their gods and temples; that he had ſeveral converſations with the Egyptian prieſts upon matters of religion and government; and that having learnt of them, with what gentleneſs their antient kings uſed to treat their ſubjects, he endeavoured after his return into Perſia, to form himſelf upon their model. But (*b*) Herodotus, more worthy of belief in this particular than Diodorus, only obſerves, that this prince reſolving at once to chaſtiſe his revolted ſubjects, and to be avenged of his antient enemies, determined to make war againſt both at the ſame time, and to attack Greece in perſon with the groſs of his army, whilſt the reſt of it was employed in the reduction of Egypt.

(*c*) According to an antient cuſtom among the Perſians, their king was not allowed to go to war, without having firſt named the perſon that ſhould ſucceed him in the throne; a cuſtom wiſely eſtabliſhed to prevent the ſtate's being expoſed to the troubles, which generally attend the uncertainty of a ſucceſſor; to the inconveniences of anarchy, and to the cabals of various pretenders. Darius, before he undertook his expedition againſt Greece, thought himſelf the more obliged to obſerve this rule, as he was already advanced in years, and as there was a difference between two of his ſons, upon the point of ſucceeding to the empire; which difference might occaſion a civil war after his death, if he left it undetermined. Darius had three ſons by his firſt wife, the daughter of Gobrias, all three born before their father came to the crown; and four more by Atoſſa, the daughter of Cyrus, who were all born after their father's acceſſion to the throne.

(*b*) Lib. 6. c. 2. (*c*) Ibid. c. 2 & 3.

Arta-

Artabazanes, called by Juſtin Artemenes, was the eldeſt of the former, and Xerxes of the latter. Artabazanes alledged in his own behalf, that, as he was the eldeſt of all the brothers, the right of ſucceſſion, according to the cuſtom and practice of all nations, belonged to him preferably to all the reſt. Xerxes's argument was, that as he was the ſon of Darius by Atoſſa, the daughter of Cyrus, who founded the Perſian empire, it was more juſt that the crown of Cyrus ſhould devolve upon one of his deſcendants, than upon one that was not. Demaratus, a Spartan king, unjuſtly depoſed by his ſubjects, and at that time in exile at the court of Perſia, ſecretly ſuggeſted to Xerxes another argument to ſupport his pretenſions: that Artabazanes was indeed the eldeſt ſon of Darius, but he, Xerxes, was the eldeſt ſon of the king; and therefore, Artabazanes being born when his father was but a private perſon, all he could pretend to, on account of his ſeniority, was only to inherit his private eſtate; but that he, Xerxes, being the firſt born ſon of the king, had the beſt right to ſucceed to the crown. He further ſupported this argument by the example of the Lacedæmonians, who admitted none to inherit the kingdom, but thoſe children that were born after their father's acceſſion. The right of ſucceeding was accordingly determined in favour of Xerxes.

* Juſtin (*d*) and Plutarch place this diſpute after Darius's deceaſe. They both take notice of the prudent conduct of theſe two brothers on ſo nice an occaſion. According to their manner of relating this fact, Artabazanes was abſent when the king died; and Xerxes immediately aſſumed all the marks, and exerciſed all

(*d*) Juſtin. l. 2. c. 10. Plut. de frat. amore, p. 448.

* Adeò fraterna contentio fuit, ut nec victor inſultaverit, nec victus doluerit; ipſoque litis tempore invicem munera miſerint; jucunda quoque inter ſe non ſolum, ſed credula convivia habuerint: judicium quoque ipſum ſine arbitris, ſine convitio fuerit. Tanto moderatius tum fratres inter ſe regna maxima dividebant, quam nunc exigua patrimonia partiuntur. *Juſtin.*

the functions of the ſovereignty. But upon his brother's returning home, he quitted the diadem and the tiara, which he wore in ſuch a manner as only ſuited the king, went out to meet him, and ſhewed him all imaginable reſpect. They agreed to make their uncle Artabanes the arbitrator of their difference, and without any further appeal, to acquieſce in his deciſion. All the while this diſpute laſted, the two brothers ſhewed one another all the demonſtrations of a truly fraternal friendſhip, by keeping up a continual intercourſe of preſents and entertainments, from whence their mutual eſteem and confidence for each other baniſhed all fears and ſuſpicions on both ſides; and introduced an unconſtrained chearfulneſs, and a perfect ſecurity. This is a ſpectacle, ſays Juſtin, highly worthy of our admiration: to ſee, whilſt moſt brothers are at daggers-drawing with one another about a ſmall patrimony, with what moderation and temper both waited for a deciſion, which was to diſpoſe of the greateſt empire then in the univerſe. When Artabanes gave judgment in favour of Xerxes, Artabazanes the ſame inſtant proſtrated himſelf before him, acknowledging him for his maſter, and placed him upon the throne with his own hand; by which proceeding he ſhewed a greatneſs of ſoul, truly royal, and infinitely ſuperior to all human dignities. This ready acquieſcence in a ſentence ſo contrary to his intereſts, was not the effect of an artful policy, that knows how to diſſemble upon occaſion, and to derive honour to itſelf from what it could not prevent: No; it proceeded from a real reſpect for the laws, a ſincere affection for his brother, and an indifference for that which ſo warmly inflames the ambition of mankind, and ſo frequently arms the neareſt relations againſt each other. For his part, during his whole life, he continued firmly attached to the intereſts of Xerxes, and proſecuted them with ſo much ardor and zeal, that he loſt his life in his ſervice at the battle of Salamin.

At

(*e*) At whatever time this diſpute is to be placed, it is evident Darius could not execute the double expedition he was meditating againſt Egypt and Greece; and that he was prevented by death from purſuing that project. He had reigned thirty-ſix years. The epitaph * of this prince, which contains a boaſt, that he could drink much without diſordering his reaſon, proves that the Perſians actually thought that circumſtance for their glory. We ſhall ſee in the ſequel, that Cyrus the younger aſcribes this quality to himſelf, as a perfection that rendered him more worthy of the throne than his elder brother. Who in theſe times would think of annexing this merit to the qualifications of an excellent prince?

This prince had many excellent qualities, but they were attended with great failings; and the kingdom felt the effects both of the one and the other. † For ſuch is the condition of princes, they never act nor live for themſelves alone. Whatever they are, either as to good or evil, they are for their people: and the intereſts of the one and the other are inſeparable. Darius had a great fund of gentleneſs, equity, clemency, and kindneſs for his people: he loved juſtice, and reſpected the laws: he eſteemed merit, and was careful to reward it: he was not jealous of his rank or authority, ſo as to exact a forced homage, or to render himſelf inacceſſible; and notwithſtanding his own great experience and abilities in public affairs, he would hearken to the advice of others, and reap the benefit of their counſels. It is of him the holy (*f*) ſcripture ſpeaks, where it ſays, that he did nothing without conſulting the wiſe men of his court. He was not afraid of expoſing his perſon in battle, and was always cool even in the heat of action: (*g*) he ſaid of himſelf,

(*e*) Her. l. 6. c. 4. (*f*) Eſth. i. 13. (*g*) Plut. in Apoph. p. 172.

* Ἡδυνάμην καὶ οἶνον πίνειν πολὺν, καὶ τοῦτον φέρειν καλῶς. *Athen.* l. 10. p. 434.

† Ita nati eſtis, ut bona malaque veſtra ad remp. pertineant. *Tacit.* l. 4. c. 8.

that

that the moſt imminent and preſſing danger ſerved only to increaſe his courage and his prudence: in a word, there have been few princes more expert than he in the art of governing, or more experienced in the buſineſs of war. Nor was the glory of being a conqueror, if that may be called a glory, wanting to his character. For he not only reſtored and entirely confirmed the empire of Cyrus, which had been very much ſhaken by the ill conduct of Cambyſes and the Magian impoſtor, but he likewiſe added many great and rich provinces to it, and particularly India, Thrace, Macedonia, and the iſles contiguous to the coaſts of Ionia.

But ſometimes theſe good qualities of his gave way to failings of a quite oppoſite nature. Do we ſee any thing like Darius's uſual gentleneſs and good nature in his treatment of that unfortunate father, who deſired the favour of him to leave him one of his three ſons at home, while the other two followed the king in his expedition? Was there ever an occaſion, wherein he had more need of counſel, than when he formed the deſign of making war upon the Scythians? And could any one give more prudent advice, than what his brother gave him on that occaſion? But he would not follow it. Does there appear in that whole expedition any mark of wiſdom, or prudence? What do we ſee in all that affair, but a prince intoxicated with his greatneſs, who fancies there is nothing in the world that can reſiſt him; and whoſe weak ambition to ſignalize himſelf by an extraordinary conqueſt, has ſtifled all the good ſenſe, judgment, and even military knowledge he poſſeſs'd before?

What conſtitutes the ſolid glory of Darius's reign is, his being choſen by God himſelf, as Cyrus had been before, to be the inſtrument of his mercies towards his people, the declared protector of the Iſraelites, and the reſtorer of the temple at Jeruſalem. The reader may ſee this part of his hiſtory in the book of Ezra, and in the writings of the prophets Haggai and Zachariah.

CHAP-

CHAPTER II.

The history of Xerxes intermixed with that of the Greeks.

XERXES's reign lasted but twelve years, but abounds with great events.

SECT. I. *Xerxes, after having reduced Egypt, makes preparations for carrying the war into Greece. He holds a council. The wise discourse of Artabanes. War is resolved upon.*

(*b*) XERXES having ascended the throne, employed the first year of his reign in carrying on the preparations, begun by his father, for the reduction of Egypt. He also confirmed to the Jews at Jerusalem all the privileges granted them by his father, and particularly that which assigned them the tribute of Samaria, for the supplying of them with victims for the temple of God.

(*i*) In the second year of his reign he marched against the Egyptians, and having reduced and subdued those rebels, he made the yoke of their subjection more heavy; then giving the government of that province to his brother Achemenes, he returned about the latter end of the year to Susa.

(*k*) Herodotus, the famous historian, was born this same year at Halicarnassus in Caria. For he was fifty-three years old, when the Peloponnesian war first began.

(*l*) Xerxes, puffed up with his success against the Epyptians, determined to make war against the Grecians. (He (*m*) did not intend, he said, to buy the figs of Attica, which were very excellent, any longer, because he would eat no more of them till he was master of the country.) But before he engaged in

(*b*) A. M. 3519. Ant. J. C. 485. Her. l. 7. c. 5. Joseph. Antiq. l. 11. c. 5. (*i*) Her. l. 7. c. 7. A. M. 3520. Ant. J. C. 484. (*k*) Aul. Gel. l. 15. c. 23. (*l*) Her. l. 7. c. 8—18. (*m*) Plut. in Apoph. p. 173.

an

an enterprize of that importance, he thought proper to aſſemble his council, and take the advice of all the greateſt and moſt illuſtrious perſons of his court. He laid before them the deſign he had of making war againſt Greece, and acquainted them with his motives; which were, the deſire of imitating the example of his predeceſſors, who had all of them diſtinguiſhed their names and reigns by noble enterprizes; the obligation he was under to revenge the inſolence of the Athenians, who had preſumed to fall upon Sardis, and reduce it to aſhes; the neceſſity he was under, to avenge the diſgrace his country had received at the battle of Marathon; and the proſpect of the great advantages that might be reaped from this war, which would be attended with the conqueſt of Europe, the moſt rich and fertile country in the univerſe. He added farther, that this war had been reſolved on by his father Darius, and he meant only to follow and execute his intentions; he concluded with promiſing ample rewards to thoſe, who ſhould diſtinguiſh themſelves by their valour in the expedition.

Mardonius, the ſame perſon that had been ſo unſucceſsful in Darius's reign, grown neither wiſer, nor leſs ambitious by his ill ſucceſs, and extremely affecting the command of the army, was the firſt who gave his opinion. He began by extolling Xerxes above all the kings that had gone before or ſhould ſucceed him. He endeavoured to ſhew the indiſpenſable neceſſity of avenging the diſhonour done to the Perſian name: He diſparaged the Grecians, and repreſented them as a cowardly, timorous people, without courage, without forces, or experience in war. For a proof of what he ſaid, he mentioned his own conqueſt of Macedonia, which he exaggerated in a very vain and oſtentatious manner, as if that people had ſubmitted to him without any reſiſtance. He preſumed even to affirm, that not any of the Grecian nations would venture to come out againſt Xerxes, who would march with all the forces of Aſia; and if they had the temerity to preſent

ſent themſelves before him, they would learn, to their coſt, that the Perſians were the braveſt and moſt warlike nation in the world.

The reſt of the council perceiving that this flattering diſcourſe extremely pleaſed the king, were afraid to contradict it, and all kept ſilence. This was almoſt an unavoidable conſequence of Xerxes's manner of proceeding. A wiſe prince, when he propoſes an affair in council, and really deſires that every one ſhould ſpeak his true ſentiments, is extremely careful to conceal his own opinion, that he may put no conſtraint upon that of others, but leave them entirely at liberty. Xerxes, on the contrary, had openly diſcovered his own inclination, or rather reſolution to undertake the war. When a prince acts in this manner, he will always find artful flatterers, who being eager to inſinuate themſelves and to pleaſe, and ever ready to comply with his paſſions, will not fail to ſecond his opinion with ſpecious and plauſible reaſons; whilſt thoſe, that would be capable of giving good counſel, are reſtrained by fear; there being very few courtiers, who love their prince well enough, and have ſufficient courage to venture to diſpleaſe him by diſputing what they know to be his taſte or opinion.

The exceſſive praiſes given by Mardonius to Xerxes, which are the uſual language of flatterers, ought to have rendered him ſuſpicious to the king, and made him apprehend, that under an appearance of zeal for his glory, that nobleman endeavoured to cloak his own ambition, and the violent deſire he had to command the army. But theſe ſweet and flattering words, which glide like a ſerpent under flowers, are ſo far from diſpleaſing princes, that they captivate and charm them. They do not conſider, that men flatter and praiſe them, becauſe they believe them weak and vain enough to ſuffer themſelves to be deceived by commendations, that bear no proportion to their merits and actions.

This behaviour of the king made the whole council

cil mute. In this general ſilence, Artabanes, the king's uncle, a prince very venerable for his age and prudence, made the following ſpeech. "Permit me, "great prince", ſays he, addreſſing himſelf to Xerxes, "to deliver my ſentiments to you on this occaſion "with a liberty ſuitable to my age and to your inte- "reſt. When Darius, your father and my brother, "firſt thought of making war againſt the Scythians, "I uſed all my endeavours to divert him from it. I "need not tell you what that enterprize coſt, or what "was the ſucceſs of it. The people you are going "to attack are infinitely more formidable than the "Scythians. The Grecians are eſteemed the very "beſt troops in the world, either by land or ſea. "If the Athenians alone could defeat the numerous "army commanded by Datis and Artaphernes, what "ought we to expect from all the ſtates of Greece "united together? You deſign to paſs from Aſia into "Europe by laying a bridge over the ſea. And what "will become of us, if the Athenians proving victo- "rious ſhould advance to this bridge with their fleet, "and break it down? I ſtill tremble when I conſider, "that in the Scythian expedition, the life of the "king your father, and the ſafety of all his army "were reduced to depend upon the fidelity of one "ſingle man, and that if Hyſtiæus the Mileſian had, "in compliance with the ſtrong inſtances made to "him, conſented to break down the bridge, which "had been laid over the Danube, the Perſian empire "had been entirely ruined. Do not expoſe yourſelf, "Sir, to the like danger, eſpecially ſince you are not "obliged to do it. Take time at leaſt to reflect upon "it. When we have maturely deliberated upon an "affair, whatever happens to be the ſucceſs of it, we "have nothing to impute to ourſelves. Precipita- "tion, beſides its being imprudent, is almoſt always "unfortunate, and attended with fatal conſequences. "Above all, do not ſuffer yourſelf, great prince, to "be dazzled with the vain ſplendor of imaginary

"glory,

"glory, or with the pompous appearance of your "troops. The higheſt and moſt lofty trees have the "moſt reaſon to dread the thunder. As God alone "is truly great, he is an enemy to * pride, and takes "pleaſure in humbling every thing that exalteth it-"ſelf: and very often the moſt numerous armies fly "before an handful of men, becauſe he inſpires theſe "with courage, and ſcatters terror among the others."

Artabanes, after having ſpoke thus to the king, turned himſelf towards Mardonius, and reproached him with his want of ſincerity or judgment, in giving the king a notion of the Grecians ſo directly contrary to truth; and ſhewed, how extremely he was to blame for deſiring raſhly to engage the nation in a war, which nothing but his own views of intereſt and ambition could tempt him to adviſe. "If a war be "reſolved upon, added he, let the king, whoſe life "is dear to us all, remain in Perſia: and do you, ſince "you ſo ardently deſire it, march at the head of the "moſt numerous army that can be aſſembled. In the "mean time, let your children and mine be given up "as a pledge, to anſwer for the ſucceſs of the war. "If the iſſue of it be favourable, I conſent that "mine be put to death †: but if it proves otherwiſe, "as I well foreſee it will, then I deſire that your "children, and you yourſelf on your return, may be "treated in ſuch a manner as you deſerve, for the "raſh counſel you have given your maſter."

Xerxes, who was not accuſtomed to have his ſenti-ments contradicted in this manner, fell into a rage. "Thank the gods, ſays he to Artabanes, that you are "my father's brother; were it not for that, you "ſhould this moment ſuffer the juſt reward of your "audacious behaviour. But I will puniſh you for "it in another manner, by leaving you here among "the women, whom you too much reſemble in your

* Φιλεῖ ὁ θεὸς τὰ ὑπερέχοντα πάντα κολούειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐᾷ φρονέειν ἄλλον μέγα ὁ θεὸς, ἢ ἑωυτόν.

† *Why ſhould the children be puniſhed for their fathers faults?*

COW-

"cowardiſe and fear, whilſt I march at the head of "my troops, where my duty and glory call me."

Artabanes had expreſſed his ſentiment in very reſpectful and inoffenſive terms: Xerxes nevertheleſs was extremely offended. It is the * misfortune of princes, ſpoiled by flattery, to look upon every thing as dry and auſtere, that is ſincere and ingenuous, and to regard all counſel, delivered with a generous and diſintereſted freedom, as a ſeditious preſumption. They do not conſider, that even a good man never dares to tell them all he thinks, or diſcover the whole truth; eſpecially in things that may be diſagreeable to their humour: and that what they ſtand moſt in need of, is a ſincere and faithful friend, that will conceal nothing from them. A prince ought to think himſelf very happy, if in his whole reign he finds but one man born with that degree of generoſity, who certainly ought to be conſidered as the moſt valuable treaſure of the ſtate, as he is, if the expreſſion may be admitted, both the moſt neceſſary, and at the ſame time the moſt rare inſtrument † of government.

Xerxes himſelf acknowledged this upon the occaſion we are ſpeaking of. When the firſt emotions of his anger were over, and he had had time to reflect on his pillow upon the different counſels that were given him, he confeſſed he had been to blame to give his uncle ſuch harſh language, and was not aſhamed to confeſs his fault the next day in open council, ingenuouſly owning, that the heat of his youth and his want of experience had made him negligent in paying the regard due to a prince ſo worthy of reſpect as Artabanes, both for his age and wiſdom: and declaring at the ſame time, that he was come over to his opinion, notwithſtanding a dream he had had in the night, wherein a viſion had appeared to him, and warmly exhorted

* Ita formatis principum auribus, ut aſpera quæ utilia, nec quicquam niſi jucundum & lætum accipiant. *Tacit. Hiſt.* l. 3. c. 56.

† Nullum majus boni imperii inſtrumentum quam bonus amicus. *Tacit. Hiſt.* l. 4. c. 7.

him

him to undertake that war. All the lords who compoſed the council, were raviſhed to hear the king ſpeak in this manner; and to teſtify their joy, they fell proſtrate before him, ſtriving who ſhould moſt extol the glory of ſuch a proceeding: nor could their praiſes on ſuch an occaſion be at all ſuſpected. * For it is no hard matter to diſcern, whether the praiſes given to princes proceed from the heart, and are founded upon truth, or whether they drop from the lips only, as an effect of mere flattery and deceit. That ſincere and humble declaration of the king's, far from appearing as a weakneſs in him, was looked upon by them as the effort of a great ſoul, which riſes above its faults in bravely confeſſing them, by way of reparation and atonement. They admired the nobleneſs of this procedure the more, as they knew that princes educated like Xerxes, in a vain haughtineſs and falſe glory, are never diſpoſed to own themſelves in the wrong, and generally make uſe of their authority to juſtify, with pride and obſtinacy, whatever faults they have committed through ignorance or imprudence. We may venture, I think, to ſay, that it is more glorious to riſe in this manner, than it would be never to have fallen. Certainly there is nothing greater, and at the ſame time more rare and uncommon, than to ſee a mighty and powerful prince, and that in the time of his greateſt proſperity, acknowledge his faults, when he happens to commit any, without ſeeking pretexts or excuſes to cover them; pay homage to truth, even when it is againſt him and condems him; and leave other princes, who have a falſe delicacy concerning their grandeur, the ſhame of always abounding with errors and defects, and of never owning that they have any.

The night following, the ſame phantom, if we may believe Herodotus, appeared again to the king, and repeated the ſame ſollicitations with new menaces and

* Nec occultum eſt quando ex veritate, quando adumbrata lætitia, facta imperatorum celebrantur. *Tacit. Annal.* l. 4. c. 31.

threatnings

threatnings. Xerxes communicated what paſſed to his uncle, and in order to find out whether this viſion was divine or not, entreated him earneſtly to put on the royal robes, to aſcend the throne, and afterwards to take his place in his bed for the night. Artabanes hereupon diſcourſed very ſenſibly and rationally with the king upon the vanity of dreams; and then coming to what perſonally regarded him: * "I look upon it, "ſays he, almoſt equally commendable to think well "one's ſelf, or to hearken with docility to the good "counſels of others. You have both theſe qualities, "great prince; and if you followed the natural bent of "your own temper, it would lead you entirely to "ſentiments of wiſdom and moderation. You never "take any violent meaſures or reſolutions, but when "the arts of evil counſellors draw you into them, or "the poiſon of flattery miſleads you; in the ſame "manner as the ocean, which of itſelf is calm and "ſerene, and never diſturbed but by the extraneous "impulſe of other bodies. What afflicted me in the "anſwer you made me the other day, when I de-"livered my ſentiments freely in council, was not the "perſonal affront to me, but the injury you did your "ſelf, by making ſo wrong a choice between the dif-"ferent counſels that were offered; rejecting that "which led you to ſentiments of moderation and "equity; and embracing the other, which, on the "contrary, tended only to nouriſh pride, and to en-"flame ambition."

Artabanes, through complaiſance, paſſed the night in the king's bed, and had the ſame viſion which Xerxes had before; that is, in his ſleep he ſaw a man, who made him ſevere reproaches, and threatned him with the greateſt misfortunes, if he continued to oppoſe

* *This thought is in Heſiod*, Opera & Dies, v. 293. Cic. pro Cluent. n. 84. & Tit. Liv. l. 22. n. 19. Sæpe ego audivi, milites, eum primum eſſe virum, qui ipſe conſulat quid in rem ſit; ſecundum eum, qui benè monenti obediat: qui nec ipſe conſulere, nec alteri parere ſciat, eum extremi ingenii eſſe.

the king's intentions. This ſo much affected him, that he came over to the king's firſt opinion, believing that there was ſomething divine in theſe repeated viſions; and the war againſt the Grecians was reſolved upon. Theſe circumſtances I relate, as I find them in Herodotus.

Xerxes in the ſequel did but ill ſupport this character of moderation. We ſhall find, that he had but very ſhort intervals of wiſdom and reaſon, which ſhone out only for a moment, and then gave way to the moſt culpable and extravagant exceſſes. We may judge however even from thence, that he had very good natural parts and inclinations. But the moſt excellent qualities are ſoon ſpoiled and corrupted by the poiſon of flattery, and the poſſeſſion of abſolute and unlimited power: * *vi dominationis convulſus.*

It is a fine ſentiment in a miniſter of ſtate, to be leſs affected with an affront to himſelf, than with the wrong done his maſter by giving him evil and pernicious counſel.

Mardonius's counſel was pernicious; becauſe, as Artabanes obſerves, it tended only to nouriſh and increaſe that ſpirit of haughtineſs and violence in the prince, which was but too prevalent in him already, ὕβριν ἐοῦσαν; and † in that it diſpoſed and accuſtomed his mind ſtill to carry his views and deſires beyond his preſent fortune, ſtill to be aiming at ſomething farther, and to ſet no bounds to his ambition. ‖ This is the predominant paſſion of thoſe men, whom we uſually call conquerors, and whom, according to the language of the holy ſcripture, we might call with greater

* Tacit.

† Ὡς κακὸν εἴη διδάσκειν τὴν ψυχὴν πλέον τι δίζεσθαι αἰεὶ ἔχειν τοῦ παρέοντος.

‖ Nec hoc Alexandri tantùm vitium fuit, quem per Liberi Herculiſque veſtigia felix temeritas egit; ſed omnium, quos fortuna irritavit implendo. Totum regni Perſici ſtemma percenſe: quem invenies, cui modum imperii ſatietas fecerit? qui non vitam in aliqua ulteriùs procedendi cogitatione finierit? Nec id mirum eſt. Quicquid cupiditati contigit, penitùs hauritur & conditur: nec intereſt quantum eo, quod inexplebile eſt, congeras. *Senec.* l. 7. *de benef.* c. 3.

propriety,

propriety, (*p*) *robbers of nations.* If you conſider and examine the whole ſucceſſion of Perſian kings, ſays Seneca, will you find any one of them that ever ſtopped his career of his own accord; that was ever ſatisfied with his paſt conqueſts; or that was not forming ſome new project or enterprize, when death ſurprized him? Nor ought we to be aſtoniſhed at ſuch a diſpoſition, adds the ſame author: for ambition is a gulf and a bottomleſs abyſs, wherein every thing is loſt that is thrown in, and where, though you were to heap province upon province, and kingdom upon kingdom, you would never be able to fill up the mighty void.

SECT. II. *Xerxes begins his march, and paſſes from Aſia into Europe, by croſſing the ſtreights of the Helleſpont upon a bridge of boats.*

(*q*) THE war being reſolved upon, Xerxes, that he might omit nothing which might contribute to the ſucceſs of his undertaking, entered into a confederacy with the Carthaginians, who were at that time the moſt potent people of the weſt, and made an agreement with them, that whilſt the Perſian forces ſhould attack Greece, the Carthaginians ſhould fall upon the Grecian colonies that were ſettled in Sicily and Italy, in order to hinder them from coming to the aid of the other Grecians. The Carthaginians made Amilcar their general, who did not content himſelf with raiſing as many troops as he could in Africa, but with the money that Xerxes had ſent him, engaged a great number of ſoldiers out of Spain, Gaul, and Italy, in his ſervice; ſo that he collected an army of three hundred thouſand men, and a proportionate number of ſhips, in order to execute the projects and ſtipulations of the league.

Thus Xerxes, agreeably to the prophet (*r*) Daniel's prediction, *having through his power and his great*

(*p*) Jer. iv. 7.
(*q*) A. M. 3523. Ant. J. C. 481.
(*r*) Dan. xi. 2.

riches

riches ſtirred up all the nations of the then known world againſt the realm of Greece, that is to ſay, of all the weſt under the command of Amilcar, and of all the eaſt, that was under his own banner, (*s*) ſet out from Suſa, in order to enter upon this war, in the fifth year of his reign, which was the tenth after the battle of Marathon, and marched towards Sardis, the place of rendezvous for the whole land-army, whilſt the fleet advanced along the coaſts of Aſia Minor towards the Helleſpont.

(*t*) Xerxes had given orders to have a paſſage cut through mount Athos. This is a mountain in Macedonia, now a province of Turkey in Europe, which extends a great way into the Archipelago, in the form of a peninſula. It is joined to the land only by an Iſthmus of about half a league over. We have already taken notice, that the ſea in this place was very tempeſtuous, and occaſioned frequent ſhipwrecks. Xerxes made this his pretext for the orders he gave for cutting through the mountain: but the true reaſon was the vanity of ſignalizing himſelf by an extraordinary enterprize, and by doing a thing that was extremely difficult; as Tacitus ſays of Nero: *erat incredibilium cupitor*. Accordingly Herodotus obſerves, that this undertaking was more vain-glorious than uſeful, ſince he might with leſs trouble and expence have had his veſſels carried over the Iſthmus, as was the practice in thoſe days. The paſſage he cauſed to be cut through the mountain was broad enough to let two galleys with three banks of oars each paſs through it a-breaſt. (*u*) This prince, who was extravagant enough to believe, that all nature and the very elements were under his command, in conſequence of that opinion, writ a letter to mount Athos in the following terms: *Athos, thou proud and aſpiring mountain, that lifteſt up thy head unto the heavens, I adviſe thee not to be ſo audacious, as to put rocks and ſtones, which cannot be cut,*

(*s*) Her. l. 7. c. 26. A. M. 3524. Ant. J. C. 480. (*t*) Ibid. c. 21, 24. (*u*) Plut. de irâ cohib. p. 455.

in the way of my workmen. If thou giveſt them that oppoſition, I ſhall cut thee entirely down, and throw thee headlong into the ſea. (x) At the ſame time he ordered his labourers to be whipt, in order to make them carry on the work the faſter.

(y) A traveller, who lived in the time of Francis the firſt, and who wrote a book in Latin concerning the ſingular and remarkable things he had ſeen in his travels, doubts the truth of this fact, and takes notice, that as he paſſed near mount Athos, he could perceive no traces or footſteps of the work we have been ſpeaking of.

(z) Xerxes, as we have already related, advanced towards Sardis. Having left Cappadocia and paſſed the river Halys, he came to Celene, a city of Phrygia, near which is the ſource of the Mæander. Pythius, a Lydian, had his reſidence in this city, and next to Xerxes was the moſt opulent prince of thoſe times. He entertained Xerxes and his whole army with an incredible magnificence, and made him an offer of all his wealth towards defraying the expences of his expedition. Xerxes, ſurprized and charmed at ſo generous an offer, had the curioſity to enquire to what ſum his riches amounted. Pythius made anſwer, that having the deſign of offering them to his ſervice he had taken an exact account of them, and that the ſilver he had by him amounted to two thouſand * talents, (which make ſix millions French money); and the gold to four millions of Darics †, wanting ſeven thouſand, (that is to ſay, to forty millions of livres, wanting ſeventy thouſand, reckoning ten livres French money to the Daric.) All this money he offered him, telling him, that his revenues were ſufficient for the ſupport of his houſhold. Xerxes made him very hearty acknowledgments, entered into a particular friendſhip with him, and, that he might not be outdone in ge-

(x) Plut. de anim. tranq. p. 470. (y) Bellon. ſingul. rer. obſerv. p. 78. (z) Herod. l. 7. c. 26, 29.

* *About* 255000 l. *ſterling.* † *About* 1,700,000 l. *ſterling.*

neroſity,

neroſity, inſtead of accepting his offers, obliged him to accept of a preſent of the ſeven thouſand Darics, which were wanting to make up his gold a round ſum of four millions.

After ſuch a conduct as this, who would not think that * Pythius's peculiar character and particular virtue had been generoſity, and a noble contempt of riches? And yet he was one of the moſt penurious princes in the world; and, who beſides his ſordid avarice with regard to himſelf, was extremely cruel and inhuman to his ſubjects, whom he kept continually employed in hard and fruitleſs labour, always digging in the gold and ſilver mines, which he had in his territories. When he was abſent from home, all his ſubjects went with tears in their eyes to the princeſs his wife, laid their complaints before her, and implored her aſſiſtance. Commiſerating their condition, ſhe made uſe of a very extraordinary method to work upon her huſband, and to give him a clear ſenſe and a kind of palpable demonſtration of the folly and injuſtice of his conduct. On his return home, ſhe ordered an entertainment to be prepared for him, very magnificent in appearance, but what in reality was no entertainment. All the courſes and ſervices were of gold and ſilver; and the prince in the midſt of all theſe rich diſhes and ſplendid rarities could not ſatisfy his hunger. He eaſily divined the meaning of this ænigma, and began to conſider, that the end of gold and ſilver was not merely to be looked upon, but to be employed and made uſe of; and that to neglect, as he had done, the buſineſs of huſbandry and the tilling of lands, by employing all his people in digging and working of mines, was the direct way to bring a famine both upon himſelf and his country. For the future therefore he only reſerved a fifth part of his people for the buſineſs of mining. Plutarch has preſerved this fact in a treatiſe, wherein he has collected a great many others to prove the ability and induſtry of ladies. We have the ſame diſpoſition

* *Plutarch calls him Pythis.* Plut. de virt. mulier. p. 262.

of mind designed in fabulous story, in the example of a † prince, who reigned in this very country, for whom every thing that he touched was immediately turned into gold, according to the request which he himself had made to the gods, and who by that means was in danger of perishing with hunger.

(*b*) The same prince, who had made such obliging offers to Xerxes, having desired as a favour of him sometime afterwards, that out of his five sons who served in his army, he would be pleased to leave him the eldest, in order to be a support and comfort to him in his old age; the king was so enraged at the proposal, though so reasonable in itself, that he caused the eldest son to be killed before the eyes of his father, giving the latter to understand, that it was a favour he spared him and the rest of his children; and then causing the dead body to be cut in two, and one part to be placed on the right, and the other on the left, he made the whole army pass between them, as if he meant to purge and purify it by such a sacrifice. What a monster in nature is a prince of this kind! How is it possible to have any dependance upon the friendship of the great, or to rely upon their warmest professions and protestations of gratitude and service?

(*c*) From Phrygia Xerxes marched, and arrived at Sardis, where he spent the winter. From hence he sent heralds to all the cities of Greece, except Athens and Lacedæmon, to require them to give him earth and water, which, as we have taken notice before, was the way of exacting and acknowledging submission.

Assoon as the spring of the year came on, he left Sardis, and directed his march towards the Hellespont. (*d*) Being arrived there, he was desirous to see a naval engagement for his curiosity and diversion. To this end, a throne was erected for him upon an emi-

(*b*) Her. l. 7. c. 38, 39. Sen. de ira, l. 3. c. 17. (*c*) Her. l. 7. c. 30—32. (*d*) Ibid. c. 44 & 46.

† *Midas king of Phrygia.*

nence;

nence; and in that ſituation, ſeeing all the ſea crowded with his veſſels, and the land covered with his troops, he at firſt felt a ſecret joy diffuſe itſelf through his ſoul, in ſurveying with his own eyes the vaſt extent of his power, and conſidering himſelf as the moſt happy of mortals: but reflecting ſoon afterwards, that of ſo many thouſands, in an hundred years time there would not be one living ſoul remaining, his joy was turned into grief, and he could not forbear weeping at the uncertainty and inſtability of human things. He might have found another ſubject of reflection, which would have more juſtly merited his tears and affliction, had he turned his thoughts upon himſelf, and conſidered the reproaches he deſerved for being the inſtrument of ſhortning that fatal term to millions of people, whom his cruel ambition was going to ſacrifice in an unjuſt and unneceſſary war.

Artabanes, who neglected no opportunity of making himſelf uſeful to the young prince, and of inſtilling into him ſentiments of goodneſs for his people, laid hold of this moment, in which he found him touched with a ſenſe of tenderneſs and humanity, and led him into further reflections upon the miſeries with which the lives of moſt men are attended, and which render them ſo painful and unhappy; endeavouring at the ſame time to make him ſenſible of the duty and obligation of princes, who, not being able to prolong the natural life of their ſubjects, ought at leaſt to do all that lies in their power, to alleviate the pains, and allay the bitterneſs of it.

In the ſame converſation Xerxes aſked his uncle if he ſtill perſiſted in his firſt opinion, and if he would ſtill adviſe him not to make war againſt Greece, ſuppoſing he had not ſeen the viſion, which occaſioned him to change his ſentiments. Artabanes owned, he ſtill had his fears; and that he was very uneaſy concerning two things. What are thoſe two things, replies Xerxes? The land and the ſea, ſays Artabanes: the land, becauſe there is no country that can feed and

maintain ſo numerous an army; the ſea, becauſe there are no ports capable of receiving ſuch a multitude of veſſels. The king was very ſenſible of the ſtrength of this reaſoning; but, as it was now too late to go back, he made anſwer, that in great undertakings men ought not ſo narrowly to examine all the inconveniences that may attend them; that if they did, no ſignal enterprizes would ever be attempted; and that if his predeceſſors had obſerved ſo ſcrupulous and timorous a rule of policy, the Perſian empire would never have attained its preſent height of greatneſs and glory.

Artabanes gave the king another piece of very prudent advice, which he thought fit to follow no more than he had done the former: this advice was, not to employ the Ionians in his ſervice againſt the Grecians, from whom they were originally deſcended, and on which account he ought to ſuſpect their fidelity. Xerxes, however, after theſe converſations with his uncle, treated him with great friendſhip, paid him the higheſt marks of honour and reſpect, ſent him back to Suſa to take the care and adminiſtration of the empire upon him during his own abſence, and to that end veſted him with his whole authority.

(*e*) Xerxes, at a vaſt expence, had cauſed a bridge of boats to be built upon the ſea, for the paſſage of his forces from Aſia into Europe. The ſpace that ſeparates the two continents, formerly called the Helleſpont, and now called the ſtreights of the Dardanells, or of Gallipoli, is ſeven ſtadia's in breadth, which is near an Engliſh mile. A violent ſtorm riſing on a ſudden, ſoon after broke down the bridge. Xerxes hearing this news on his arrival, fell into a tranſport of paſſion; and in order to avenge himſelf of ſo cruel an affront, commanded two pair of chains to be thrown into the ſea, as if he meant to ſhackle and confine it, and that his men ſhould give it three hundred ſtrokes of a whip, and ſpeak to it in this manner: *Thou troubleſome and unhappy element, thus does thy maſter chaſtiſe*

(*e*) Her. l. 7. c. 33—36.

thee

thee for having affronted him without reaſon. Know, that Xerxes will eaſily find means to paſs over thy waters in ſpite of all thy billows and reſiſtance. The extravagance of this prince did not ſtop here; but making the undertakers of the work anſwerable for events, which do not in the leaſt depend upon the power of man, he ordered all the perſons to have their heads ſtruck off, that had been charged with the direction and management of that undertaking.

(*f*) Xerxes commanded two other bridges to be built, one for the army to paſs over, and the other for the baggage and beaſts of burden. He appointed workmen more able and expert than the former, who went about it in this manner. They placed three hundred and ſixty veſſels acroſs, ſome of them having three banks of oars, and other fifty oars a-piece, with their ſides turned towards the Euxine ſea; and on the ſide that faced the Ægæan ſea they put three hundred and fourteen. They then caſt large anchors into the water on both ſides, in order to fix and ſecure all theſe veſſels againſt the violence of the winds, and againſt the current * of the water. On the eaſt ſide they left three paſſages or vacant ſpaces between the veſſels, that there might be room for ſmall boats to go and come eaſily, as there was occaſion, to and from the Euxine ſea. After this upon the land on both ſides they drove large piles into the earth, with huge rings faſtened to them, to which were tied ſix vaſt cables, which went over each of the two bridges; two of which cables were made of hemp, and four of a ſort of reeds, called βίβλος, which were made uſe of in thoſe times for the making of cordage. Thoſe that were made of hemp muſt have been of an extraordinary ſtrength and thickneſs, ſince every cubit of thoſe cables weighed a

(*f*) Her. l. 7. c. 33—36.

* *Polybius remarks, that there is a current of water from the lake Mæotis and the Euxine ſea into the Ægæan ſea, occaſioned by the rivers, which empty themſelves into thoſe two ſeas.* Pol. l. 4. pag. 307, 308.

talent *. The cables laid over the whole extent of the veſſels lengthwiſe, reached from one ſide to the other of the ſea. When this part of the work was finiſhed quite over the veſſels lengthwiſe, and over the cables we have been ſpeaking of, they laid the trunks of trees, cut purpoſely for that uſe, and flat boats again over them, faſtened and joined together, to ſerve as a kind of floor or ſolid bottom: all which they covered over with earth, and added rails or battlements on each ſide, that the horſes and cattle might not be frightned with ſeeing the ſea in their paſſage. This was the form of thoſe famous bridges built by Xerxes.

When the whole work was compleated, a day was appointed for their paſſing over. And aſſoon as the firſt rays of the ſun began to appear, ſweet odours of all kinds were abundantly ſpread over both the bridges, and the way was ſtrewed with myrtle. At the ſame time Xerxes poured out libations into the ſea, and turning his face towards the ſun, the principal object of the Perſian worſhip, he implored the aſſiſtance of that god in the enterprize he had undertaken, and deſired the continuance of his protection till he had made the entire conqueſt of Europe, and had brought it into ſubjection to his power: this done, he threw the veſſel, which he uſed in making his libations, together with a golden cup, and a Perſian ſcymitar, into the ſea. The army was ſeven days and ſeven nights in paſſing over theſe ſtreights; thoſe who were appointed to conduct the march, laſhing the poor ſoldiers all the while with whips, in order to quicken their ſpeed, according to the cuſtom of that nation, which properly ſpeaking was only an huge aſſemblage of ſlaves.

* *A talent in weight conſiſted of 60 minæ, that is to ſay, of 42 pounds of our weight; and the mina conſiſted of 100 drachms.*

SECT.

SECT. III. *The number of Xerxes's forces. Demaratus delivers his ſentiments freely upon that prince's enterprize.*

(g) XERXES directing his march acroſs the Thracian Cherſoneſus, arrived at Dor, a city ſtanding at the mouth of the Hebrus in Thrace; where, having incamped his army, and given orders for his fleet to follow him along the ſhore, he reviewed them both.

He found the land-army, which he had brought out of Aſia, conſiſted of ſeventeen hundred thouſand foot, and of fourſcore thouſand horſe, which with twenty thouſand men that were abſolutely neceſſary at leaſt for conducting and taking care of the carriages and the camels, made in all eighteen hundred thouſand men. When he had paſſed the Helleſpont, the other nations that ſubmitted to him, made an addition to his army of three hundred thouſand men; which made all his land-forces together amount to two millions one hundred thouſand men.

His fleet, as it was when it ſet out from Aſia, conſiſted of twelve hundred and ſeven veſſels, or galleys, all of three banks of oars, and intended for fighting. Each veſſel carried two hundred men, natives of the country that fitted them out, beſides thirty more, that were either Perſians or Medes, or of the Sacæ: which made in all two hundred and ſeventy ſeven thouſand ſix hundred and ten men. The European nations augmented his fleet with an hundred and twenty veſſels, each of which carried two hundred men, in all four and twenty thouſand: theſe added to the other amount together to three hundred and one thouſand ſix hundred and ten men.

Beſides this fleet, which conſiſted all of large veſſels, the ſmall galleys of thirty and fifty oars, the tranſport ſhips, the veſſels that carried the proviſions, and that were employed in other uſes, amounted to

(g) Her. l. 7. c. 56—99. & 184—187.

three thouſand. If we reckon but eighty men in each of theſe veſſels, one with another, that made in the whole two hundred and forty thouſand men.

Thus when Xerxes arrived at Thermopylæ, his land and ſea-forces together made up the number of two millions, ſix hundred and forty one thouſand, ſix hundred and ten men, without including ſervants, eunuchs, women, ſutlers, and other people of that ſort, which uſually follow an army, and of which the number at this time was equal to that of the forces: ſo that the whole number of ſouls that followed Xerxes in this expedition, amounted to five millions, two hundred eighty-three thouſand two hundred and twenty. This is the computation which Herodotus makes of them, and in which Plutarch and Iſocrates agree with him. (*b*) Diodorus Siculus, Pliny, Ælian and others, fall very ſhort of this number in their calculation: but their accounts of the matter appear to be leſs authentic than that of Herodotus, who liv'd in the ſame age this expedition was made, and who repeats the inſcription engraved by the order of the Amphictyons, upon the monument of thoſe Grecians who were killed at Thermopylæ, which expreſſed that they fought againſt three millions of men.

(*i*) For the ſuſtenance of all theſe perſons there muſt be every day conſumed, according to Herodotus's computation, above an hundred and ten thouſand three hundred and forty medimni's of flour, (the medimnus was a meaſure, which according to Budæus was equivalent to ſix of our buſhels) allowing for every head the quantity of a chœnix, which was the daily portion or allowance that maſters gave their ſlaves among the Grecians. We have no account in hiſtory of any other army ſo numerous as this. And amongſt all theſe millions of men, there was not one that could vie with Xerxes in point of beauty, either for the comelineſs of his face, or the tallneſs of his perſon.

(*b*) Died. l. 11. p. 3. Plin. l. 33. c. 10. Ælian. l. 13. c. 3.
(*i*) Her. l. 7. c. 187.

But

But this is a poor merit or pre-eminence for a prince, when attended with no other. Accordingly Juſtin, after he has mentioned the number of theſe troops, adds, that this vaſt body of forces wanted a chief: *Huic tanto agmini dux defuit.*

We ſhould hardly be able to conceive how it was poſſible to find a ſufficient quantity of proviſions for ſuch an immenſe number of perſons, if the (*k*) hiſtorian had not informed us, that Xerxes had employed four whole years in making preparations for this expedition. We have ſeen already how many veſſels of burthen there were, that coaſted along continually to attend upon and ſupply the land-army: and doubtleſs there were freſh ones arriving every day, that furniſhed the camp with a ſufficient plenty of all things neceſſary.

(*l*) Herodotus acquaints us with the method they made uſe of to calculate their forces, which were almoſt innumerable. They aſſembled ten thouſand men in a particular place, and ranked them as cloſe together as was poſſible; after which they deſcribed a circle quite round them, and erected a little wall upon that circle about half the height of a man's body: when this was done, they made the whole army ſucceſſively paſs through this ſpace, and thereby knew to what number it amounted.

Herodotus gives us alſo a particular account of the different armour of all the nations this army conſiſted of. Beſides the generals of every nation, who each of them commanded the troops of their reſpective country, the land-army was under the command of ſix Perſian generals; *viz.* Mardonius, the ſon of Gobryas; Tirintatechmus, the ſon of Artabanes, and Smerdonus, ſon to Otanes, both near relations to the king; Maſiſtus, ſon of Darius and Atoſſa; Gergis, ſon of Ariazes; and Megabyzus, ſon of Zopyrus. The ten thouſand Perſians, who were called the im-

(*k*) Her. l. 7. c. 20. (*l*) Ibid. c. 60.

mo tal

mortal band, were commanded by Hydarnes. The cavalry had its particular commanders.

There were likewiſe four Perſian generals who commanded the fleet. In (*m*) Herodotus we have a particular account of all the nations by which it was fitted out. Artemiſa queen of Halicarnaſſus, who from the death of her huſband governed the kingdom for her ſon, that was ſtill a minor, brought but five veſſels along with her; but they were the beſt equipped, and the lighteſt ſhips in the whole fleet, next to thoſe of the Sidonians. This princeſs diſtinguiſhed herſelf in this war by her ſingular courage, and ſtill more by her prudence and conduct. Herodotus obſerves, that among all the commanders in the army, there was not one who gave Xerxes ſo good advice and ſuch wiſe counſel as this queen: but he was not prudent enough to apply it to his advantage.

When Xerxes had numbered his whole forces by land and ſea, he aſked Demaratus, if he thought the Grecians would dare to expect him. I have already taken notice, that this Demaratus was one of the two kings of Sparta, who being exil'd by the faction of his enemies, had taken refuge at the Perſian court, where he was entertained with the greateſt marks of honour and beneficence. (*n*) As the courtiers were one day expreſſing their ſurprize that a king ſhould ſuffer himſelf to be baniſhed, and deſired him to acquaint them with the reaſon of it: *It is*, ſays he, *becauſe the law is more powerful than the kings at Sparta.* This prince was very much conſidered in Perſia: but neither the injuſtice of the Spartan citizens, nor the kind treatment of the Perſian king, could make him forget his country *. Aſſoon as he knew that Xerxes was making preparations for the war, he found means to give the Grecians ſecret intelligence of it. And now being obliged on this occaſion to ſpeak his ſentiments to the

(*m*) Her. l. 7. c. 89, 99. (*n*) Plut. in Apoph. Lacon. p. 220.

* Amicior patriæ poſt fugam, quàm regi poſt beneficia. *Juſtin.*

king, he did it with ſuch a noble freedom and dignity, as became a Spartan, and a king of Sparta.

(*o*) Demaratus, before he anſwered the king's queſtion, deſired to know whether it was his pleaſure that he ſhould flatter him, or that he ſhould ſpeak his thoughts to him freely and truly. Xerxes having declared that he deſired him to act with entire ſincerity, he ſpoke in the following terms: "Great prince, "ſays Demaratus, ſince it is agreeable to your plea-"ſure and commands, I ſhall deliver my ſentiments "to you with the utmoſt truth and ſincerity. It "muſt be confeſſed, that from the beginning of time, "Greece has been trained up, and accuſtomed to po-"verty: but then ſhe has introduced and eſtabliſhed "virtue within her territories, which wiſdom culti-"vates, and the vigour of her laws maintains. And "it is by the uſe, which Greece knows how to make "of this virtue, that ſhe equally defends herſelf againſt "the inconveniences of poverty, and the yoke of "ſervitude. But, to ſpeak only of the Lacedæmo-"nians, my particular countrymen, you may aſſure "yourſelf, that as they are born and bred up in li-"berty, they will never hearken to any propoſals "that tend to ſlavery. Though they were deſerted "and abandoned by all the other Grecians, and re-"duced to a band of a thouſand men, or even to a "more inconſiderable number, they will ſtill come "out to meet you, and not refuſe to give you battle." Xerxes upon hearing this diſcourſe fell a laughing: and as he could not comprehend how men, in ſuch a ſtate of liberty and independence, as the Lacedæmonians were deſcribed to enjoy, who had no maſter to force and compel them to it, could be capable of expoſing themſelves in ſuch a manner to danger and death; Demaratus replied: (*p*) "The Spartans indeed "are free, and under no ſubjection to the will of any "man; but at the ſame time they have laws, to "which they are ſubject, and of which they ſtand

(*o*) Her. l. 7. c. 101, 105. (*p*) Ibid. c. 145, 146.

"in

" in greater awe than your ſubjects do of your ma-
" jeſty. Now by theſe laws they are forbid ever to
" fly in battle, let the number of their enemies be
" never ſo ſuperior; and are commanded, by abiding
" firm in their poſt, either to conquer or to die."

Xerxes was not offended at the liberty wherewith Demaratus ſpoke to him, and continued his march.

SECT. IV. *The Lacedæmonians and Athenians ſend to their allies in vain to require ſuccours from them. The command of the fleet given to the Lacedæmonians.*

(q) LACEDÆMON and Athens, which were the two moſt powerful cities of Greece, and the cities againſt which Xerxes was moſt exaſperated, were not indolent or aſleep, whilſt ſo formidable an enemy was approaching. Having received intelligence long before of the deſigns of this prince, they had ſent ſpies to Sardis, in order to have a more exact information of the number and quality of his forces. Theſe ſpies were ſeized, and as they were juſt going to be put to death, Xerxes countermanded it, and gave orders that they ſhould be conducted through his army, and then ſent back without any harm being done to them. At their return the Grecians underſtood what they had to apprehend from ſo potent an enemy.

They ſent deputies at the ſame time to Argos, into Sicily to Gelon tyrant of Syracuſe, to the iſles of Corcyra and Crete, to deſire ſuccours from them, and to form a league againſt the common enemy.

(r) The people of Argos offered a very conſiderable ſuccour, on condition they ſhould have an equal ſhare of the authority and command with the Lacedæmonians. The latter conſented, that the king of Argos ſhould have the ſame authority as either of the two kings of Sparta. This was granting them a great deal: but into what errors and miſchiefs are not men led by a miſtaken point of honour, and a fooliſh jealouſy of command! The Argives were not con-

(q) Her. l. 7. c. 145, 146. (r) Ibid. c. 148, 152.

tented

tented with this offer, and refuſed to enter into the league with the Grecians, without conſidering, that if they ſuffered them to be deſtroyed, their own ruin muſt inevitably follow.

(*s*) The deputies proceeded from Argos to Sicily, and addreſſed themſelves to Gelon, who was the moſt potent prince of the Greeks at that time. He promiſed to aſſiſt them with two hundred veſſels of three benches of oars, with an army of twenty thouſand foot and two thouſand horſe, two thouſand light-armed ſoldiers, and the ſame number of bow-men and ſlingers, and to ſupply the Grecian army with proviſions during the whole war, on condition they would make him generaliſſimo of all the forces both by land and ſea. The Lacedæmonians were highly offended at ſuch a propoſal. Gelon then abated ſomewhat in his demands, and promiſed the ſame, provided he had at leaſt the command either of the fleet or of the army. This propoſal was ſtrenuouſly oppoſed by the Athenians, who made anſwer, that they alone had a right to command the fleet, in caſe the Lacedæmonians were willing to give it up. Gelon had a more ſubſtantial reaſon for not leaving Sicily unprovided of troops, which was the approach of the formidable army of the Carthaginians, commanded by Amilcar, that conſiſted of three hundred thouſand men.

(*t*) The inhabitants of Corcyra, now called Corfu, gave the envoys a more favourable anſwer, and immediately put to ſea with a fleet of ſixty veſſels. But they advanced no farther than to the coaſts of Laconia, pretending they were hindered by contrary winds, but in reality waiting to ſee the ſucceſs of an engagement, that they might afterwards range themſelves on the ſide of the conqueror.

(*u*) The people of Crete, having conſulted the Delphic oracle, to know what reſolution they were to take on this occaſion, abſolutely refuſed to enter into the league.

(*s*) Ibid. c. 153—162. (*t*) Ibid. c. 168. (*u*) Ibid. c. 169—171.

Thus

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(*s*) Ibid. c. 153—162. (*t*) Ibid. c. 168. (*u*) Ibid. c. 169—171.

Thus

(x) Thus were the Lacedæmonians and Athenians left almoſt to themſelves, all the reſt of the cities and nations having ſubmitted to the heralds, that Xerxes had ſent to require earth and water of them, excepting the people of Theſpia and of Platæa. (y) In ſo preſſing a danger, their firſt care was to put an end to all diſcord and diviſion among themſelves; for which reaſon the Athenians made peace with the people of Ægina, with whom they were actually at war.

(z) Their next care was to appoint a general: for there never was any occaſion wherein it was more neceſſary to chooſe one, capable of ſo important a truſt, than in the preſent conjuncture, when Greece was upon the point of being attacked by the whole forces of Aſia. The moſt able and experienced captains, terrify'd at the greatneſs of the danger, had taken the reſolution of not preſenting themſelves as candidates. There was a certain citizen at Athens, whoſe name was Epicydes, that had ſome eloquence, but in other reſpects was a perſon of no merit, was in diſreputation for his want of courage, and notorious for his avarice. Notwithſtanding all which it was apprehended, that in the aſſembly of the people the votes would run in his favour. Themiſtocles, who was ſenſible, * that in calm weather almoſt any mariner may be capable of conducting a veſſel, but that in ſtorms and tempeſts the moſt able pilots are at a loſs, was convinced, that the commonwealth was ruined, if Epicydes was choſen general, whoſe venal and mercenary ſoul gave them the juſteſt reaſon to fear, that he was not proof againſt the Perſian gold. There are occaſions, when, in order to act wiſely, (I had almoſt ſaid regularly) it is neceſſary to diſpenſe with and riſe above all rule. Themiſtocles, who knew very well that in the pre-

(x) Ibid. c. 132. (y) Ibid. c. 145. (z) Plut. in Themiſt. p. 114.

* Quilibet nautarum vectorumque tranquillo mari gubernare poteſt: ubi orta ſæva tempeſtas eſt, ac turbato mari rapitur vento navis, tum viro & gubernatore opus eſt. *Liv.* l. 24. n. 8.

ſent

ſent ſtate of affairs he was the only perſon capable of commanding, did for that reaſon make no ſcruple of employing bribes and preſents to remove his competitor: * and having found means to make the ambition of Epicydes amends, by gratifying his avarice, he got himſelf elected general in his ſtead. We may here, I think, very juſtly apply to Themiſtocles what Titus Livius ſays of Fabius on a like occaſion. This great commander finding, when Hannibal was in the heart of Italy, that the people were going to make a man of no merit conſul, employed all his own credit, as well as that of his friends, to be continued in the conſulſhip, without being concerned at the clamour that might be raiſed againſt him; and he ſucceeded in the attempt. The hiſtorian adds, "† The conjuncture of affairs, and the extreme danger the commonwealth was expoſed to, were arguments of ſuch weight, that they prevented any one from being offended at a conduct, which might appear to be contrary to rules, and removed all ſuſpicion of Fabius's having acted upon any motive of intereſt or ambition. On the contrary, the public admired his generoſity and greatneſs of ſoul, in that, as he knew the commonwealth had occaſion for an accompliſhed general, and could not be ignorant or doubtful of his own ſingular merit in that reſpect, he had choſen rather in ſome ſort to hazard his own reputation, and perhaps expoſe his character to the reproaches of envious tongues, than to be wanting in any ſervice he could render his country."

(*a*) The Athenians alſo paſſed a decree to recal home all their people that were in baniſhment. They were

(*a*) Plut. in Ariſt. p. 322, 323.

* Χρήμασι τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἐξωνήσατο παρὰ τοῦ Ἐπιχύδου.

† Tempus ac neceſſitas belli, ac diſcrimen ſummæ rerum, faciebant ne quis aut in exemplum exquireret, aut ſuſpectum cupiditatis imperii conſulem haberet. Quin laudabant potiùs magnitudinem animi, quòd, cùm ſummo imperatore eſſe opus reip. ſciret, ſeque eum haud dubiè eſſe, minoris invidiam ſuam, ſi qua ex re oriretur, quàm utilitatem reip. feciſſet. *Liv.* l. 24. n. 9.

afraid,

afraid, leſt Ariſtides ſhould join their enemies, and leſt his credit ſhould carry over a great many others to the ſide of the Barbarians. But they had a very falſe notion of their citizen, who was infinitely remote from ſuch ſentiments. Be that as it would, on this extraordinary juncture they thought fit to recal him: and Themiſtocles was ſo far from oppoſing the decree for that purpoſe, that he promoted it with all his credit and authority. The hatred and diviſion of theſe great men had nothing in them of that implacable, bitter, and outragious ſpirit, which prevailed among the Romans in the later times of the republic. The danger of the ſtate was the means of their reconciliation, and when their ſervice was neceſſary to the preſervation of the public, they laid aſide all their jealouſy and rancour: and we ſhall ſee by the ſequel, that Ariſtides was ſo far from ſecretly thwarting his antient rival, that he zealouſly contributed to the ſucceſs of his enterprizes, and to the advancement of his glory.

The alarm increaſed in Greece, in proportion as they received advice that the Perſian army advanced. If the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had been able to make no other reſiſtance than with their land-forces, Greece had been utterly ruined and reduced to ſlavery. This exigence taught them how to ſet a right value upon the prudent foreſight of Themiſtocles, who upon ſome other pretext had cauſed an hundred galleys to be built. Inſtead of judging like the reſt of the Athenians, who looked upon the victory of Marathon as the end of the war, he on the contrary conſidered it rather as the beginning, or as the ſignal of ſtill greater battles, for which it was neceſſary to prepare the Athenian people: and from that very time he began to think of raiſing Athens to a ſuperiority over Sparta, which for a long time had been the miſtreſs of all Greece. With this view he judged it expedient to make the Athenian power entirely maritime, perceiving very plainly that as ſhe was ſo weak by land, ſhe had no other way to render

render herſelf neceſſary to her allies, or formidable to her enemies. His opinion herein prevailed among the people in ſpite of the oppoſition of Miltiades, whoſe difference of opinion undoubtedly aroſe from the little probability there was, that a people entirely unacquainted with fighting at ſea, and that were only capable of fitting out and arming very ſmall veſſels, ſhould be able to withſtand ſo formidable a power, as that of the Perſians, who had both a numerous land-army, and a fleet of above a thouſand ſhips.

(*b*) The Athenians had ſome ſilver mines in a part of Attica, called Laurium, the whole revenues and products of which uſed to be diſtributed amongſt them. Themiſtocles had the courage to propoſe to the people, that they ſhould aboliſh theſe diſtributions, and employ that money in building veſſels with three benches of oars, in order to make war upon the people of Ægina, againſt whom he endeavoured to enflame their antient jealouſy. No people are ever willing to ſacrifice their private intereſts to the general utility of the public: for they ſeldom have ſo much generoſity or public ſpirit, as to purchaſe the welfare or preſervation of the ſtate at their own expence. The Athenian people however did it upon this occaſion: moved by the lively remonſtrances of Themiſtocles, they conſented, that the money which aroſe from the product of the mines ſhould be employed in the building of an hundred galleys. Againſt the arrival of Xerxes they doubled the number, and to that fleet Greece owed its preſervation.

(*c*) When they came to the point of naming a general for the command of the navy, the Athenians, who alone had furniſhed the two thirds of it, laid claim to that honour, as appertaining to them, and their pretenſions were certainly juſt and well grounded. It happened, however, that the ſuffrages of the allies all concurred in favour of Eurybiades a Lacedæmonian. Themiſtocles, though very aſpiring after glory, thought it

(*b*) Plut. in Themiſt. p. 113. (*c*) Her. l. 8. c. 213.

incumbent

incumbent upon him on this occaſion to neglect his own intereſts for the common good of the nation: and giving the Athenians to underſtand, that, provided they behaved themſelves with courage and conduct, all the Grecians would quickly deſire to confer the command upon them of their own accord, he perſuaded them to conſent, as he would do himſelf, to give up that point at preſent to the Spartans. It may juſtly be ſaid, that this prudent moderation in Themiſtocles was another means of ſaving the ſtate. For the allies threatened to ſeparate themſelves from them, if they refuſed to comply; and if that had happened, Greece muſt have been inevitably ruined.

SECT. V. *The battle of Thermopylæ. The death of Leonidas.*

(*d*) THE only thing that now remained to be diſcuſſed, was to know in what place they ſhould reſolve to meet the Perſians, in order to diſpute their entrance into Greece. The people of Theſſaly repreſented, that as they were the moſt expoſed, and likely to be firſt attacked by the enemy, it was but reaſonable, that their defence and ſecurity, on which the ſafety of all Greece ſo much depended, ſhould firſt be provided for; without which they ſhould be obliged to take other meaſures, that would be contrary to their inclinations, but yet abſolutely neceſſary, in caſe their country was left unprotected and defenceleſs. It was hereupon reſolved, that ten thouſand men ſhould be ſent to guard the paſſage which ſeparates Macedonia from Theſſaly, near the river Peneus, between the mountains of Olympus and Oſſa. But Alexander, the ſon of Amyntas, king of Macedonia, having given them to underſtand, that if they waited for the Perſians in that place, they muſt inevitably be overpowered by their numbers, they retired to Thermopylæ. The Theſſalians finding themſelves thus abandoned, without any farther deliberation ſubmitted to the Perſians.

(*d*) A. M. 3524. Ant. J. C. 480. Her. l. 7. c. 172, 173.

Ther-

(*e*) Thermopylæ is a ſtrait or narrow paſs of mount Œta, between Theſſaly and Phocis, but twenty-five foot broad, which therefore might be defended by a ſmall number of forces, and which was the only way through which the Perſian land-army could enter Achaia, and advance to beſiege Athens. This was the place where the Grecian army thought fit to wait for the enemy: the perſon who commanded it was Leonidas, one of the two kings of Sparta.

(*f*) Xerxes in the mean time was upon his march: he had given orders for his fleet to follow him along the coaſt, and to regulate their motions according to thoſe of the land-army. Wherever he came, he found proviſions and refreſhments prepared beforehand purſuant to the orders he had ſent: and every city he arrived at gave him a magnificent entertainment, which coſt immenſe ſums of money. The vaſt expence of theſe treats gave occaſion to a witty ſaying of a certain citizen of Abdera in Thrace, who, when the king was gone, ſaid, they ought to thank the gods, that he ate but one meal a day.

(*g*) In the ſame country of Thrace, there was a prince who ſhewed an extraordinary greatneſs of ſoul on this occaſion: it was the king of the Biſaltes. Whilſt all the other princes ran into ſervitude, and baſely ſubmitted to Xerxes, he bravely refuſed to receive his yoke, or to obey him. Not being in a condition to reſiſt him with open force, he retired to the top of the mountain Rhodope, into an inacceſſible place, and forbad all his ſons, who were ſix in number, to carry arms againſt Greece. But they, either out of fear of Xerxes, or out of curioſity to ſee ſo important a war, followed the Perſians in contradiction to their father's injunction. On their return home, their father to puniſh ſo direct a diſobedience, condemned all his ſons to have their eyes put out. Xerxes continued his march through Thrace, Macedonia and Theſſaly,

(*e*) Her. l. 7. c. 175, 177. (*f*) Ibid. c. 108, 132.
(*g*) Her. l. 8. c. 116.

every

every thing giving way before him till he came to the ſtreight of Thermopylæ.

(*h*) One cannot ſee without the utmoſt aſtoniſhment, with what an handful of troops the Grecians oppoſed the innumerable army of Xerxes. We find a particular account of their number in Pauſanias. All their forces joined together, amounted only to eleven thouſand two hundred men. Of which number four thouſand only were employed at Thermopylæ to defend the paſs. But theſe ſoldiers, adds the hiſtorian, were all determined to a man either to conquer or die. And what is it, that an army of ſuch reſolution is not able to effect?

(*i*) When Xerxes advanced near the ſtreights of Thermopylæ, he was ſtrangely ſurprized to find, that they were prepared to diſpute his paſſage. He had always flattered himſelf, that on the firſt hearing of his arrival, the Grecians would betake themſelves to flight; nor could he ever be perſuaded to believe, what Demaratus had told him from the beginning of his project, that at the firſt paſs he came to, he would find his whole army ſtopped by an handful of men. He ſent out a ſpy before him to take a view of the enemy. The ſpy brought him word, that he found the Lacedæmonians out of their intrenchments, and that they were diverting themſelves with military exerciſes, and combing their hair: this was the Spartan manner of preparing themſelves for battle.

Xerxes, ſtill entertaining ſome hopes of their flight, waited four days on purpoſe to give them time to retreat. (*k*) And in this interval of time he uſed his utmoſt endeavours to gain Leonidas, by making him magnificent promiſes, and aſſuring him, that he would make him maſter of all Greece, if he would come over to his party. Leonidas rejected his propoſal with ſcorn and indignation. Xerxes having afterwards wrote to him to deliver up his arms, Leonidas,

(*b*) Pauſ. l. 10. p. 645. Died. l. 11. p. 5, 10.
(*i*) Her. l. 7. c. 207—231.
(*k*) Plut. in Lacon. Apoph. p. 225.

in a ſtile and ſpirit truly Laconical, anſwered him in two words: * *Come and take them.* Nothing remained, but to prepare themſelves to engage the Lacedæmonians. Xerxes firſt commanded his Median forces to march againſt them, with orders to take them all alive and bring them to him. Theſe Medes were not able to ſtand the charge of the Grecians; and being ſhamefully put to flight, they ſhewed, ſays Herodotus †, that Xerxes had a great many men, and but few ſoldiers. The next that were ſent to face the Spartans, were thoſe Perſians called the immortal band, which conſiſted of ten thouſand men, and were the beſt troops in the whole army. But theſe had no better ſucceſs than the former.

Xerxes, out of all hopes of being able to force his way through troops ſo determined to conquer or die, was extremely perplexed, and could not tell what reſolution to take, when an inhabitant of the country came to him, and diſcovered a ſecret ‖ path to the top of an eminence, which overlooked and commanded the Spartan forces. He quickly diſpatched a detachment thither, which marching all night, arrived there at the break of day, and poſſeſſed themſelves of that advantagious poſt.

The Greeks were ſoon apprized of this misfortune: and Leonidas ſeeing, that it was now impoſſible to repulſe the enemy, obliged the reſt of the allies to retire, but ſtayed himſelf with his three hundred Lacedæmonians, all reſolved to die with their leader, who being told by the oracle, that either Lacedæmon or her king muſt neceſſarily periſh, determined without the leaſt difficulty or heſitation to ſacrifice himſelf for his country. The Spartans loſt all hopes either of con-

* Ἀντέγραψε, Μολὼν λάβε.

† Ὅτι πολλοὶ μὲν ἄνθρωποι εἶεν, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἄνδρες.

Quod multi homines eſſent, pauci autem viri.

‖ *When the Gauls, two hundred years after this, came to invade Greece, they poſſeſſed themſelves of the ſtreights of Thermopylæ by means of the ſame by-path, which the Grecians had ſtill neglected to ſecure.* Pauſan. l. 1. p. 7 & 8.

quering

quering or escaping, and looked upon Thermopylæ as their burying-place. The king, exhorting his men to take some nourishment, and telling them at the same time, that they should sup together with Pluto, they set up a shout of joy, as if they had been invited to a banquet, and full of ardour advanced with their king to battle. The shock was exceeding violent and bloody. Leonidas himself was one of the first that fell. The endeavours of the Lacedæmonians to defend his dead body, were incredible. At length, not vanquished, but oppressed by numbers, they all fell, except one man, who escaped to Sparta, where he was treated as a coward and traytor to his country, and no body would keep company or converse with him. But soon afterwards he made a glorious amends for his fault at the battle of Platæa, where he distinguished himself in an extraordinary manner. (*l*) Xerxes enraged to the last degree against Leonidas for daring to make head against him, caused his dead body to be hung up on a gallows, and made his intended dishonour of his enemy his own immortal shame.

Some time after these transactions, by order of the Amphictyons, a magnificent monument was erected at Thermopylæ to the honour of these brave defenders of Greece, and upon the monument were two inscriptions, one of which was general, and related to all those that died at Thermopylæ, importing, that the Greeks of Peloponnesus, to the number only of four thousand, had made head against the Persian army, which consisted of three millions of men: the other related to the Spartans in particular. It was composed by the poet Simonides, and is very remarkable for its simplicity. It is as follows:

* Ὦ ξεῖν', ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις, ὅτι τῇ δὲ
Κείμεθα, τοῖς κείνων πειθόμενοι νομίμοις.

(*l*) Her. l. 7. c. 238.

* Pari animo Lacedæmonii in Thermopylis occiderunt, in quos Simonides:

Dic, hospes, Spartæ nos te hic vidisse jacentes,
Dum sanctis patriæ legibus obsequimur.
Cic. Tusc. Quæst. l. 1. n. 101.

that

that is to ſay; *Go, paſſenger, and tell at Lacedæmon, that we died here in obedience to her ſacred laws.* Forty years afterwards, Pauſanias, who obtained the victory of Platæa, cauſed the bones of Leonidas to be carried from Thermopylæ to Sparta, and erected a magnificent monument to his memory: near which was likewiſe another erected for Pauſanias. Every year at theſe tombs was a funeral oration pronounced to the honour of theſe heroes, and a public game, wherein none but Lacedæmonians had a right to partake, in order to ſhew, that they alone were concerned in the glory obtained at Thermopylæ.

(*m*) Xerxes in that affair loſt above twenty thouſand men, among which were two of the king's own brothers. He was very ſenſible, that ſo great a loſs, which was a manifeſt proof of the courage of their enemies, was capable of alarming and diſcouraging his ſoldiers. In order therefore to conceal the knowledge of it from them, he cauſed all his men that were killed in that action, except a thouſand, whoſe bodies he ordered to be left upon the field, to be thrown together into large holes, which were ſecretly made, and covered over afterwards with earth and herbs. This ſtratagem ſucceeded very ill: for when the ſoldiers in his fleet, being curious to ſee the field of battle, obtained leave to come thither for that purpoſe, it ſerved rather to diſcover his own littleneſs of ſoul, than to conceal the number of the ſlain.

(*n*) Diſmayed with a victory that had coſt him ſo dear, he aſked Demaratus, if the Lacedæmonians had many ſuch ſoldiers. That prince told him, that the Spartan republic had a great many cities belonging to it, of which all the inhabitants were exceeding brave; but that the inhabitants of Lacedæmon, who were properly called Spartans, and who were about eight thouſand in number, ſurpaſſed all the reſt in valour, and were all of them ſuch as thoſe who had fought under Leonidas.

(*m*) Her. l. 8. c. 24, 25. (*n*) Her. l. 7. c. 134, 137.

I return a little to the battle of Thermopylæ, the iſſue of which, fatal in appearance, might make an impreſſion upon the minds of the readers to the diſadvantage of the Lacedæmonians, and occaſion their courage to be looked upon as the effect of a preſumptuous temerity, or a deſperate reſolution.

That action of Leonidas, with his three hundred Spartans, was not the effect of raſhneſs or deſpair, but was a wiſe and noble conduct, as (o) Diodorus Siculus has taken care to obſerve, in the magnificent encomium upon that famous engagement, to which he aſcribes the ſucceſs of all the enſuing victories and campaigns. Leonidas knowing that Xerxes marched at the head of all the forces of the eaſt, in order to overwhelm and cruſh a little country by the dint of his numbers, rightly conceived from the ſuperiority of his genius and underſtanding, that if they pretended to make the ſucceſs of that war conſiſt in oppoſing force to force, and numbers to numbers, all the Grecian nations together would never be able to equal the Perſians, or to diſpute the victory with them; that it was therefore neceſſary to point out to Greece another means of ſafety and preſervation whilſt ſhe was under theſe alarms; and that they ought to ſhew the whole univerſe, who had all their eyes upon them, what glorious things may be done, when greatneſs of mind is oppoſed to force of body, true courage and bravery againſt blind impetuoſity, the love of liberty againſt tyrannical oppreſſion, and a few diſciplined veteran troops, againſt a confuſed multitude, though never ſo numerous. Theſe brave Lacedæmonians thought it became them, who were the choiceſt ſoldiers of the chief people of Greece, to devote themſelves to certain death, in order to make the Perſians ſenſible how difficult it is to reduce free men to ſlavery, and to teach the reſt of Greece, by their example, either to vanquiſh or to periſh.

I do not copy theſe ſentiments from my own inven-

(o) Diod. l. 11. p. 9.

tion,

tion, or aſcribe them to Leonidas without foundation: they are plainly comprized in that ſhort anſwer, which that worthy king of Sparta made a certain Lacedæmonian; who, being aſtoniſhed at the generous reſolution the king had taken, ſpoke to him in this manner: "(p) Is it poſſible then, Sir, that you can "think of marching with an handful of men againſt "ſuch a mighty and innumerable army?" If we are "to reckon upon numbers," replied Leonidas, "all "the people of Greece together would not be ſufficient, ſince a ſmall part of the Perſian army is equal "to all her inhabitants: but if we are to reckon upon valour, my little troop is more than ſufficient."

The event ſhewed the juſtneſs of this prince's ſentiments. That illuſtrious example of courage aſtoniſhed the Perſians, and gave new ſpirit and vigour to the Greeks. The lives then of this heroic leader and his brave troop were not thrown away, but uſefully employed; and their death was attended with a double effect, more great and laſting than they themſelves had imagined. On one hand, it was in a manner the ſeed of their enſuing victories, which made the Perſians for ever after lay aſide all thoughts of attacking Greece; ſo that during the ſeven or eight ſucceeding reigns, there was neither any prince, who durſt entertain ſuch a deſign, nor any flatterer in his court, who durſt propoſe the thing to him. On the other hand, ſuch a ſignal and exemplary inſtance of intrepidity made an indelible impreſſion upon all the reſt of the Grecians, and left a perſauſion deeply rooted in their hearts, that they were able to ſubdue the Perſians, and ſubvert their vaſt empire. Cimon was the man, who made the firſt attempt of that kind with ſucceſs. Ageſilaus afterwards puſhed that deſign ſo far, that he made the great monarch tremble in his palace at Suſa. Alexander at laſt accompliſhed it with incredible facility. He never had the leaſt doubt, no more than the Macedonians who followed him, or the whole

(p) Plut. in Lac. Apoph. p. 225.

country of Greece that choſe him general in that expedition, but that with thirty thouſand men he could reduce the Perſian empire, as three hundred Spartans had been ſufficient to check the united forces of the whole Eaſt.

SECT. VI. *Naval battle near Artemiſa.*

(q) THE very ſame day on which paſſed the glorious action at Thermopylæ, there was alſo an engagement at ſea between the two fleets. That of the Grecians, excluſive of the little galleys and ſmall boats, conſiſted of two hundred and ſeventy one veſſels. This fleet had lain by near Artemiſa, a promontory of Eubœa upon the northern coaſt towards the ſtreights. That of the enemy, which was much more numerous, was near the ſame place, but had lately ſuffered in a violent tempeſt, that had deſtroyed above four hundred of their veſſels. Notwithſtanding this loſs, as it was ſtill vaſtly ſuperior in number to that of the Grecians, which they were preparing to fall upon, they detached two hundred of their veſſels with orders to wait about Eubœa, to the end that none of the enemies veſſels might be able to eſcape them. The Grecians having got intelligence of that ſeparation, immediately ſet ſail in the night, in order to attack that detachment at day-break the next morning. But not meeting with it, they went towards the evening and fell upon the bulk of the enemy's fleet, which they treated very roughly. Night coming on, they were obliged to ſeparate, and both parties retired to their poſt. But the very night that parted them, proved more pernicious to the Perſians, than the engagement which had preceded, from a violent ſtorm of wind, accompanied with rain and thunder, which diſtreſſed and harraſſed their veſſels till break of day: and the two hundred ſhips alſo, that had been detached from their fleet, as we mentioned before, were almoſt all caſt away upon the coaſts of Eubœa; it being the

(q) Her. l. 8. c. 1—18. Diod. l. 11. p. 10 & 11.

will of the gods, ſays Herodotus, that the two fleets ſhould become very near equal.

The Athenians having the ſame day received a reinforcement of fifty-three veſſels, the Grecians, who were apprized of the wrack that had befaln part of the enemies fleet, fell upon the ſhips of the Cilicians at the ſame hour they had attacked the fleet the day before, and ſunk a great number of them. The Perſians, being aſhamed to ſee themſelves thus inſulted by an enemy, that was ſo much inferior in number, thought fit the next day to appear firſt in a diſpoſition to engage. The battle was very obſtinate this time, and the ſucceſs pretty near equal on both ſides, excepting that the Perſians, who were incommoded by the largeneſs and number of their veſſels, ſuſtained much the greater loſs. Both parties however retired in good order.

(*r*) All theſe actions, which paſſed near Artemiſa, did not bring matters to an abſolute deciſion, but contributed very much to animate the Athenians, as they were convinced by their own experience, that there is nothing really formidable, either in the number and magnificent ornaments of veſſels, or in the Barbarians inſolent ſhouts and ſongs of victory, to men that know how to come to cloſe engagement, and that have the courage to fight with ſteadineſs and reſolution; and that the beſt way of dealing with ſuch an enemy, is to deſpiſe all that vain appearance, to advance boldly up to them, and to charge them briſkly and vigorouſly without ever giving ground.

The Grecian fleet having at this time had intelligence of what had paſſed at Thermopylæ, reſolved upon the courſe they were to take without any farther deliberation. They immediately ſailed away from Artemiſa, and advancing toward the heart of Greece, they ſtopped at Salamin, a little iſle very near and over againſt Attica. Whilſt the fleet was retreating, Themiſtocles paſſed through all the places where it was

(*r*) Plut. in Themiſt. p. 115, 117. Her, l. 8. c. 21, 22.

neceſſary for the enemies to come to land, in order to take in freſh water or other proviſions, and in large characters engraved upon the rocks and the ſtones the following words, which he addreſſed to the Ionians: *Be of our ſide, ye people of Ionia: come over to the party of your fathers, who expoſe their own lives for no other end than to maintain your liberty: or, if you cannot poſſibly do that, at leaſt do the Perſians all the miſchief you can, when we are engaged with them, and put their army into diſorder and confuſion.* (s) By this means Themiſtocles hoped either to bring the Ionians really over to their party, or at leaſt to render them ſuſpected to the Barbarians. We ſee, this general had his thoughts always intent upon his buſineſs, and neglected nothing that could contribute to the ſucceſs of his deſigns.

SECT. VII. *The Athenians abandon their city, which is taken and burnt by Xerxes.*

XERXES in the mean time was entered into the country of Phocis by the upper part of Doris, and was burning and plundering the cities of the Phocians. The inhabitants of Peloponneſus having no thoughts but to ſave their own country, reſolved to abandon all the reſt, and to bring all the Grecian forces together within the Iſthmus, over which they intended to build a ſtrong wall from one ſea to the other, a ſpace of near five miles Engliſh. The Athenians were highly provoked at ſo baſe a deſertion, ſeeing themſelves ready to fall into the hands of the Perſians, and likely to bear the whole weight of their fury and vengeance. Some time before they had conſulted the oracle of Delphos, which had given them for anſwer, (t) *that there would be no way of ſaving the city but by walls of wood.* The ſentiments of the people were much divided about this ambiguous expreſſion: ſome thought it was to be underſtood to mean the citadel, becauſe heretofore it had been ſurrounded with wooden paliſades. But Themiſtocles gave another ſenſe to the words, which was

(s) Her. l. 8. c. 40, 41. (t) Her. l. 7. c. 139—143.

much

much more natural, underſtanding it to intend ſhipping; and demonſtrated, that the only meaſures they had to take were to leave the city empty, and to embark all the inhabitants. But this was a reſolution the people would not at all give ear to, as thinking themſelves inevitably loſt, and not even caring to conquer, when once they had abandoned the temples of their gods and the tombs of their anceſtors. Here Themiſtocles had occaſion for all his addreſs and all his eloquence to work upon the people. After he had repreſented to them, that Athens did not conſiſt either of its walls, or its houſes, but of its citizens, and that the ſaving of theſe was the preſervation of the city, he endeavoured to perſuade them by the argument moſt capable of making an impreſſion upon them in the unhappy, afflicted, and dangerous condition they were then in, I mean the argument and motive of divine authority; giving them to underſtand by the very words of the oracle, and by the prodigies which had happened, that their removing for a time from Athens was manifeſtly the will of the gods.

(*u*) A decree was therefore paſſed, by which, in order to ſoften what appeared ſo hard in the reſolution of deſerting the city, it was ordained, "that Athens "ſhould be given up in truſt into the hands, and com-"mitted to the keeping and protection of Minerva, "patroneſs of the Athenian people; that all ſuch in-"habitants as were able to bear arms, ſhould go on "ſhip-board; and that every citizen ſhould provide, "as well as he could, for the ſafety and ſecurity of "his wife, children and ſlaves."

(*x*) The extraordinary behaviour of Cimon, who was at this time very young, was of great weight on this ſingular occaſion. Followed by his companions, with a gay and chearful countenance, he went publickly along the ſtreet of the Ceramicus to the citadel, in order to conſecrate a bitt of a bridle, which he car-

(*u*) Her. l. 8. c. 51—54. Plut. in Themiſt. p. 117. (*x*) Plut in Cim. p. 481.

ried in his hand, in the temple of Minerva, deſigning to make the people underſtand by this religious and affecting ceremony, that they had no farther buſineſs with land-forces, and that it behoved them now to betake themſelves entirely to the ſea. After he had made an offering of this bitt, he took one of the ſhields that hung up on the wall of the temple, paid his devotions to the goddeſs, went down to the water-ſide, and was the firſt, who by his example inſpired the greateſt part of the people with confidence and reſolution, and encouraged them to imbark.

The major part of them ſent their fathers and mothers, that were old, together with their wives and children to the city of * Trezene, the inhabitants of which received them with great humanity and generoſity. For they made an ordinance that they ſhould be maintained at the expence of the public, and aſſigned for each perſon's ſubſiſtence two oboli a day, which were worth about two-pence Engliſh money. Beſides this, they permitted the children to gather fruit wherever they pleaſed, or wherever they came, and ſettled a fund for the payment of the maſters, who had the care of their education. What a beautiful thing it is to ſee a city, expoſed as this was, to the greateſt dangers and calamities, extend her care and generoſity in the very midſt of ſuch alarms, even to the education of other people's children.

When the whole city came to embark, ſo moving and melancholy a ſpectacle drew tears from the eyes of all that were preſent, and at the ſame time occaſioned great admiration with regard to the ſteadineſs and courage of thoſe men, who ſent their fathers and mothers another way and to other places, and who, without being moved either at their grief and lamentations, or at the tender embraces of their wives and children, paſſed over with ſo much firmneſs and reſolution to Salamin. But that which extremely raiſed and augmented the gene-

* *This was a ſmall city ſituate upon the ſea-ſide, in that part of the Peloponneſus called Argolis.*

ral

ral compaſſion, was the great number of old men that they were forced to leave in the city on account of their age and infirmities, and of which many voluntarily remained there, on a motive of religion, believing the citadel to be the thing meant by the oracle in the forementioned ambiguous expreſſion of wooden walls. There was no creature, (for hiſtory has judged this circumſtance worthy of being remembred) there was no creature, I ſay, even to the very domeſtic animals, but what took part in this public mourning; nor was it poſſible for a man to ſee thoſe poor creatures run howling and crying after their maſters, who were going a ſhip-board, without being touched and affected. Among all the reſt of theſe animals, particular notice is taken of a dog belonging to Xanthippus, the father of Pericles, which not being able to endure to ſee himſelf abandoned by his maſter, jumped into the ſea after him, and continued ſwimming as near as he could to the veſſel his maſter was on board of, till he landed quite ſpent at Salamin, and died the moment after upon the ſhore. In the ſame place, even in Plutarch's time, they uſed to ſhew the ſpot wherein this faithful animal was ſaid to be buried, which was called *the dog's burying-place*.

(y) Whilſt Xerxes was continuing his march, ſome deſerters from Arcadia came and joined his army. The king having aſked them what the Grecians were then doing, was extremely ſurprized when he was told, that they were employed in ſeeing the games and combats then celebrating at Olympia: and his ſurpriſe was ſtill increaſed, when he underſtood that the victor's reward in thoſe engagements was only a crown of olive. What men muſt they be, cried one of the Perſian nobles with great wonder and aſtoniſhment, that are affected only with honour, and not with money!

(z) Xerxes had ſent off a conſiderable detachment of his army to plunder the temple at Delphos, in

(y) Her. l. 8. c. 16. (z) Ibid. c. 35—39. Diod. l. 11. p. 1[illegible].

which he knew there was immenſe treaſures, being reſolved to treat Apollo with no more favour than the other gods, whoſe temples he had pillaged. If we may believe what Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus ſay of this matter, aſſoon as ever this detachment advanced near the temple of Minerva, ſurnamed the Provident, the air grew dark on a ſudden, and a violent tempeſt aroſe, accompanied with impetuous winds, thunder and lightning: and two huge rocks having ſevered themſelves from the mountain, fell upon the Perſian troops, and cruſhed the greateſt part of them.

(a) The other part of the army marched towards the city of Athens, which was deſerted by all its inhabitants, except a ſmall number of citizens who had retired into the citadel, where they defended themſelves with incredible bravery, till they were all killed, and would hearken to no terms of accommodation whatſoever. Xerxes having ſtormed the citadel, reduced it to aſhes. He immediately diſpatched a courier to Suſa to carry the agreeable news of his ſucceſs to Artabanes his uncle: and at the ſame time ſent him a great number of pictures and ſtatues. (b) Thoſe of Harmodius and Ariſtogiton, the antient deliverers of Athens, were ſent with the reſt. One of the Antiochus's, king of Syria, (I do not know which of them, nor at what time it was) returned them to the Athenians, being perſuaded he could not poſſibly make them a more acceptable preſent.

SECT. VIII. *The battle of Salamin. Precipitate return of Xerxes into Aſia. The characters of Themiſtocles and Ariſtides. The defeat of the Carthaginians in Sicily.*

(c) AT this time a diviſion aroſe among the commanders of the Grecian fleet; and the confederates, in a council of war which was held for that purpoſe, were of very different ſentiments concerning the place for engaging the enemy. Some of them,

(a) Her. l. 2. c. 50—54. (b) Pauſan. l. 1. p. 14
(c) Her. l. 8. c. 56 & 65. Plut. in Themiſt. p. 117.

and

and indeed the major part, at the head of whom was Eurybiades, the generaliſſimo of the fleet, were for having them advance near the Iſthmus of Corinth, that they might be nearer the land-army, which was poſted there to guard that paſs under the command of Cleombrotus, Leonidas's brother, and more ready for the defence of Peloponneſus. Others, at the head of whom was Themiſtocles, alledged, that it would be betraying of their country to abandon ſo advantagious a poſt as that of Salamin. And as he ſupported his opinion with abundance of warmth, Eurybiades lifted up his cane over him in a menacing manner. *Strike*, ſays the Athenian, unmoved at the inſult, *but hear me:* and continuing his diſcourſe proceeded to ſhew of what importance it was for the fleet of the Grecians, whoſe veſſels were lighter, and much fewer in number than thoſe of the Perſians, to engage in ſuch a ſtreight as that of Salamin, which would render the enemy incapable of uſing a great part of their forces. Eurybiades, who could not help being ſurprized at the moderation in Themiſtocles, ſubmitted to his reaſons, or at leaſt complied with his opinion, for fear the Athenians, whoſe ſhips made up above one half of the fleet, ſhould ſeparate themſelves from the allies, as their general had taken occaſion to inſinuate.

(*c*) A council of war was alſo held on the ſide of the Perſians, in order to determine whether they ſhould hazard a naval engagement; Xerxes himſelf was come to the fleet to take the advice of his captains and officers, who were all unanimous for a battle, becauſe they knew it was agreeable to the king's inclination. Queen Artemiſa was the only perſon who oppoſed that reſolution. She repreſented the dangerous conſequences of coming to blows with people much more converſant and more expert in maritime affairs than the Perſians; alledging, that the loſs of a battle at ſea would be attended with the ruin of their land-army; whereas by protracting the war, and ap-

(*c*) Her. l. 8. c. 67—70.

proaching

proaching Peloponneſus, they ſhould create jealouſies and diviſions among their enemies, or rather augment the diviſion already very great amongſt them; that the confederates in that caſe would not fail to ſeparate from one another, to return and defend their reſpective countries; and that then the king without difficulty, and almoſt without ſtriking a ſtroke, might make himſelf maſter of all Greece. This wiſe advice was not followed, and a battle was reſolved upon.

Xerxes, imputing the ill ſucceſs of all his former engagements at ſea to his own abſence, was reſolved to be witneſs of this from the top of an eminence, where he cauſed a throne to be erected for that purpoſe. This might have contributed in ſome meaſure to animate his forces: but there is another much more ſure and effectual means of doing it, I mean, by the prince's real preſence and example, when he himſelf ſhares in the danger, and thereby ſhews himſelf worthy of being the ſoul and head of a brave and numerous body of men ready to die for his ſervice. A prince, that has not this ſort of fortitude which nothing can ſhake, and which even takes new vigour from danger, may nevertheleſs be endued with other excellent qualities, but then he is by no means proper to command an army. No qualification whatſoever can ſupply the want of courage in a general: and the * more he labours to ſhew the appearance of it, when he has not the reality, the more he diſcovers his cowardiſe and fear. There is, it muſt be owned, a vaſt difference between a general officer, and a ſimple ſoldier. Xerxes ought not to have expoſed his perſon otherwiſe than became a prince; that is to ſay, as the head, not as the hand: as he, whoſe buſineſs it is to direct and give orders, not as thoſe who are to put them in execution. But to keep himſelf entirely at a diſtance from danger, and to act no other part than that of a ſpectator, was really renouncing the quality and office of a general.

* Quanto magis occultare ac abdere pavorem nitebantur, manifeſtiùs pavidi. *Tacit. Hiſt.*

The-

(*d*) Themiſtocles knowing, that ſome of the commanders in the Grecian fleet ſtill entertained thoughts of ſailing towards the Iſthmus, contrived to have notice given under-hand to Xerxes, that, as the Grecian allies were now aſſembled together in one place, it would be an eaſy matter for him to ſubdue and deſtroy them all together; whereas, if they once ſeparated from one another, as they were going to do, he might never meet with another opportunity ſo favourable. The king gave into this opinion; and immediately commanded a great number of his veſſels to ſurround Salamin by night, in order to make it impracticable for the Greeks to quit their poſt.

(*e*) No body among the Grecians perceived that their army was ſurrounded in this manner. Ariſtides came by night-time from Ægina, where he had ſome forces under his command, and with very great danger paſſed through the whole fleet of the enemies. When he came up to Themiſtocles's tent, he took him aſide, and ſpoke to him in the following manner: "If we "are wiſe, Themiſtocles, we ſhall from hence-for-"ward lay aſide that vain and childiſh diſſenſion, that "has hitherto divided us, and ſtrive with a more no-"ble and uſeful emulation, which of us ſhall render "the beſt ſervice to his country, you by commanding "and doing the duty of a wiſe and able captain, "and I by obeying your orders, and by aſſiſting you "with my perſon and advice." He then informed him of the army's being ſurrounded with the ſhips of the Perſians, and warmly exhorted him to give them battle without delay. Themiſtocles, extremely aſtoniſhed at ſuch a greatneſs of ſoul, and ſuch a noble and generous frankneſs, was ſomewhat aſhamed, that he had ſuffered himſelf to be ſo much excelled by his rival; but without being aſhamed to own it, he promiſed Ariſtides, that he would henceforward imitate his generoſity, and even exceed it, if it were poſſible,

(*d*) Her. l. 8. c. 74—78. (*e*) Plut. in Ariſt. p. 323. Her. l. 8. c. 78—82.

in

in the whole of his future conduct. Then, after having imparted to him the ſtratagem he had contrived to deceive the Barbarian, he deſired him to go in perſon to Eurybiades, in order to convince him that there was no other means of ſafety for them, than to engage the enemy by ſea at Salamin; which commiſſion Ariſtides executed with pleaſure and ſucceſs: for he was in great credit and eſteem with that general.

(*f*) Both ſides therefore prepared themſelves for the battle. The Grecian fleet conſiſted of three hundred and eighty ſail of ſhips, which in every thing followed the direction and orders of Themiſtocles. As nothing eſcaped his vigilance, and as, like an able commander, he knew how to improve every circumſtance and incident to advantage, before he would begin the engagement he waited till a certain wind, which roſe regularly every day at a certain hour, and which was entirely contrary to the enemy, began to blow. As ſoon as this wind roſe, the ſignal was given for battle. The Perſians, who knew that their king had his eyes upon them, advanced with ſuch a courage and impetuoſity, as were capable of ſtriking an enemy with terror. But the heat of the firſt attack quickly abated, when they came to be engaged. Every thing was contrary to, and diſadvantagious for them: the wind, which blew directly in their faces; the height, and the heavineſs of their veſſels, which could not move and turn without great difficulty, and even the number of their ſhips, which was ſo far from being of uſe to them, that it only ſerved to embarraſs them in a place ſo ſtrait and narrow, as that they fought in: whereas on the ſide of the Grecians every thing was done with good order, and without hurry and confuſion; becauſe every thing was directed by one commander. The Ionians, whom Themiſtocles had adviſed by characters engraven upon ſtones along the coaſts of Eubœa to remember from whom they derived their original, were the firſt that betook themſelves

(*f*) Her. l. 8. c. 84—96.

ſelves to flight, and were quickly followed by the reſt of the fleet. But queen Artemiſa diſtinguiſhed herſelf by incredible efforts of reſolution and courage, ſo that Xerxes, who ſaw in what manner ſhe had behaved herſelf, cried out, * that the men had behaved like women in this engagement, and that the women had ſhewed the courage of men. The Athenians, being enraged that a woman had dared to appear in arms againſt them, had promiſed a reward of ten thouſand drachma's to any one, that ſhould be able to take her alive: but ſhe had the good fortune to eſcape their purſuits. If they had taken her, ſhe could have deſerved nothing from them but the higheſt commendations, and the moſt honourable and generous treatment.

(*g*) The manner in which that † queen eſcaped ought not to be omitted. Seeing herſelf warmly purſued by an Athenian ſhip, from which it ſeemed impoſſible for her to eſcape, ſhe hung out Grecian colours, and attacked one of the Perſian veſſels, on board of which was Damaſithymus, king of (*h*) Calynda, with whom ſhe had ſome difference, and ſunk it: this made her purſuers believe, that her ſhip was one of the Grecian fleet, and give over the chace.

Such was the ſucceſs of the battle of Salamin, one

(*g*) Herod. l. 8. c. 87, 88. Polyæn. l. 8. c. 53.
(*h*) A city of Lycia.

* Οἱ μὲν ἄνδρες γεγόνασί μοι γυναῖκες, αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες ἄνδρες.

Artemiſia inter primos duces bellum acerrimè ciebat. Quippe, ut in viro muliebrem timorem, ita in muliere virilem audaciam cerneres. *Juſtin.* l. 2. c. 12.

† *It appears, that Artemiſa valued herſelf no leſs upon ſtratagem than courage, and at the ſame time was not very delicate in the choice of the meaſures ſhe uſed. It is ſaid that being deſirous of ſeizing Latmus, a ſmall city of Caria, that lay very commodiouſly for her, ſhe laid her troops in ambuſh, and under pretence of celebrating the feaſt of the mother of the gods, in a wood conſecrated to her near that city, that ſhe repaired thither with a great train of eunuchs, women, drums and trumpets. The inhabitants ran in throngs to ſee that religious ceremony; and in the mean time Artemiſa's troops took poſſeſſion of the place.* Polyæn. Stratag. l. 8. c. 53.

of

of the moſt memorable actions related in antient hiſtory, and which has, and will render the name and courage of the Grecians famous for ever. A great number of the Perſian ſhips were taken, and a much greater ſunk upon this occaſion. Many of their allies, who dreaded the king's cruelty no leſs than the enemy, made the beſt of their way into their own country.

Themiſtocles, in a ſecret converſation with Ariſtides, propoſed to his conſideration, in order to ſound him and to learn his true ſentiments, whether it would not be proper for them to ſend ſome veſſels to break down the bridge, which Xerxes had cauſed to be built, to the end, ſays he, that we may take Aſia into Europe: but though he made this propoſal, he was far from approving it. Ariſtides believing him to be in earneſt, argued very warmly and ſtrenuouſly againſt any ſuch project, and repreſented to him how dangerous it was to reduce ſo powerful an enemy to deſpair, from whom it was their buſineſs to deliver themſelves as ſoon as poſſible. Themiſtocles ſeemed to acquieſce in his reaſons; and in order to haſten the king's departure, contrived to have him ſecretly informed, that the Grecians deſigned to break down the bridge. The point Themiſtocles ſeems to have had in view by this falſe confidence, was to ſtrengthen himſelf with Ariſtides's opinion, which was of great weight againſt that of the other generals, in caſe they inclined to go and break down the bridge. Perhaps too he might aim at guarding himſelf by this means againſt the ill-will of his enemies, who might one day accuſe him of treaſon before the people, if ever they came to know that he had been the author of that ſecret advice to Xerxes.

(*i*) This prince, being frightned on ſuch news, made the beſt uſe he could of his time, and ſet out by night, leaving Mardonius behind him with an army of three hundred thouſand men, in order to reduce

(*i*) Her. l. 8. c. 115—120.

Greece,

Greece, if he was able. The Grecians, who expected that Xerxes would have come to another engagement the next day, having learnt that he was fled, purſued him as faſt as they could, but to no purpoſe. (*k*) They had deſtroyed two hundred of the enemies ſhips, beſides thoſe which they had taken. The remainder of the Perſian fleet, after having ſuffered extremely by the winds in their paſſage, retired towards the coaſt of Aſia, and entered into the port of Cuma, a city in Æolia, where they paſſed the winter, without daring afterwards to return into Greece.

Xerxes took the reſt of his army along with him, and marched by the way of the Helleſpont. As no proviſions had been prepared for them before-hand, they underwent great hardſhips during their whole march, which laſted five and forty days. After having conſumed all the fruits they could find, the ſoldiers were obliged to live upon herbs, and even upon the bark and leaves of trees. This occaſioned a great ſickneſs in the army: and great numbers died of fluxes and the plague.

The king, through eagerneſs and impatience to make his eſcape, left his army behind him, and travelled on before with a ſmall retinue, in order to reach the bridge with the greater expedition: but when he arrived at the place, he found the bridge broken down by the violence of the waves, in a great tempeſt that had happened, and was reduced to the neceſſity of paſſing the ſtreight in a cock-boat. * This was a ſpectacle very proper to ſhew mankind the mutability of all earthly things, and the inſtability of human greatneſs; a prince, whoſe armies and fleets the land and ſea were ſcarce able to contain a little while

(*k*) Her. l. 8. c. 130.

* Erat res ſpectaculo digna, et æſtimatione ſortis humanæ, rerum varietate miranda, in exiguo latentem videre navigio, quem paulo antè vix æquor omne capiebat; carentem etiam omni ſervorum miniſterio, cujus exercitus, propter multitudinem, terris graves erant. *Juſtin.* l. 2. c. 13.

before,

before, now ſtealing away in a little boat almoſt without any ſervants or attendants! Such was the event and ſucceſs of Xerxes's expedition againſt Greece.

If we compare Xerxes with himſelf at different times and on different occaſions, we ſhall hardly know him for the ſame man. When affairs were under conſideration and debate, no perſon could ſhew more courage and intrepidity than this prince: he is ſurprized and even offended, if any one foreſees the leaſt difficulty in the execution of his projects, or ſhews any apprehenſion concerning events. But when he comes to the point of execution, and to the hour of danger, he flies like a coward, and thinks of nothing but ſaving his own life and perſon. Here we have a ſenſible and evident proof of the difference, between true courage, which is never deſtitute of prudence; and temerity, always blind and preſumptuous. A wiſe and great prince weighs every thing, and examines all circumſtances, before he enters into a * war, of which he is not afraid, but at the ſame time does not deſire; and when the time of action is come, the ſight of danger ſerves only to animate his courage. Preſumption inverts this order. † When ſhe has introduced aſſurance and boldneſs, where wiſdom and circumſpection ought to preſide, ſhe admits fear and deſpair, where courage and intrepidity ought to be exerted.

(*l*) The firſt thing the Grecians took care of after the battle of Salamin, was to ſend the firſt fruits of the rich ſpoil they had taken to Delphos. Cimon, who was then very young, ſignalized himſelf in a particular manner in that engagement, and performed actions of ſuch diſtinguiſhed valour, as acquired him a great reputation, and made him be conſidered from henceforth as a citizen, that would be capable of rendering

(*l*) Her. l. 8. c. 122, 125.

* Non times bella, non provocas. *Plin. de Traj.* Fortiſſimus in ipſo diſcrimine, qui ante diſcrimen quietiſſimus. *Tac. hiſt.* l. 1. c. 14.

† Ante diſcrimen feroces, in periculo pavidi. *Ibid.* c. 68.

the

the moſt important ſervices to his country on future occaſions.

(*m*) But Themiſtocles carried off almoſt all the honour of this victory, which was the moſt ſignal that ever the Grecians obtained over the Perſians. The force of truth obliged even thoſe, who envied his glory moſt, to render him this teſtimony. It was a cuſtom in Greece, that after a battle, the commanding officers ſhould declare, who had diſtinguiſhed themſelves moſt, by writing in a paper the names of the man who had merited the firſt prize, and of him who had merited the ſecond. On this occaſion, by a judgment which ſhews the good opinion natural for every man to have of himſelf, each officer concerned, adjudged the firſt rank to himſelf, and allowed the ſecond to Themiſtocles; which was indeed giving him the preference to them all.

The Lacedæmonians, having carried him to Sparta, in order to pay him the honours due to his merit, decreed to their general Eurybiades the prize of valour, and to Themiſtocles that of wiſdom, which was a crown of olive for both of them. They alſo made a preſent to Themiſtocles of the fineſt chariot in the city; and on his departure ſent three hundred young men of the moſt conſiderable families to wait upon him to the frontiers: an honour they had never ſhewn to any perſon whatſoever before.

But that which gave him a ſtill more ſenſible pleaſure, were the public acclamations he received at the firſt Olympic games, that were celebrated after the battle of Salamin, where all the people of Greece were met together. As ſoon as he appeared, the whole aſſembly roſe up to do him honour: no body regarded either the games or the combats; Themiſtocles was the only ſpectacle. The eyes of all the company were fixed upon him, and every body was eager to ſhew him and point him out with the hand to the ſtrangers, that did not know him. He acknowledged

(*m*) Plut. in Themiſt. p. 120.

after-

afterwards to his friends, that he looked upon that day as the happieſt of his life; that he had never taſted any joy ſo ſenſible and ſo tranſporting; and that this reward, the genuine fruit of his labours, exceeded all his deſires.

The reader has undoubtedly obſerved in Themiſtocles two or three principal ſtrokes of his character, which entitle him to be ranked amongſt the greateſt men. The deſign which he formed and executed, of making the whole force of Athens maritime, ſhewed him to have a ſuperior genius, capable of the higheſt view, penetrating into futurity, and judicious to ſeize the deciſive point in great affairs. As the territory belonging to Athens was of a barren nature and ſmall extent, he rightly conceived, that the only way that city had to enrich and aggrandize herſelf was by ſea. And indeed that ſcheme may juſtly be looked upon as the ſource and cauſe of all thoſe great events, which raiſed the republic of Athens in the ſequel to ſo flouriſhing a condition.

But, in my opinion, though this wiſdom and foreſight is a moſt excellent and valuable talent, yet is it infinitely leſs meritorious than that uncommon temper and moderation, which Themiſtocles ſhewed on two critical occaſions, when Greece had been utterly undone, if he had liſtened to the dictates of an ill-judged ambition, and had piqued himſelf upon a falſe point of honour, as is uſual among perſons of his age and profeſſion. The firſt of theſe occaſions was, when, notwithſtanding the crying injuſtice that was committed, both in reference to the republic, of which he was a member, and to his own perſon, in appointing a Lacedæmonian generaliſſimo of the fleet, he exhorted and prevailed with the Athenians to deſiſt from their pretenſion, though never ſo juſtly founded, in order to prevent the fatal effects with which a diviſion among the confederates muſt have been neceſſarily attended. And what an admirable inſtance did he give of his preſence of mind and coolneſs of temper, when the ſame Eurybiades

rybiades not only affronted him with harſh and offenſive language, but lifted up his cane at him in a menacing poſture! Let it be remembered at the ſame time, that Themiſtocles was then but young; that he was full of an ardent ambition for glory; that he was commander of a numerous fleet; and that he had right and reaſon on his ſide. How would our young officers behave on the like occaſion? Themiſtocles took all patiently, and the victory of Salamin was the fruits of his patience.

As to Ariſtides, I ſhall have occaſion in the ſequel to ſpeak more extenſively upon his character and merit. He was, properly ſpeaking, the man of the commonwealth: provided that was well and faithfully ſerved, he was very little concerned by whom it was done. The merit of others was far from offending him; and inſtead of that, became his own by the approbation and encouragement he gave it. We have ſeen him make his way through the enemies fleet, at the peril of his life, in order to give Themiſtocles ſome good intelligence and advice: and * Plutarch takes notice, that during all the time the latter had the command, Ariſtides aſſiſted him on all occaſions with his counſel and credit, notwithſtanding he had reaſon to look upon him not only as his rival, but his enemy. Let us compare this nobleneſs and greatneſs of ſoul with the little-ſpiritedneſs and meanneſs of thoſe men, who are ſo nice, punctilious, and jealous in point of command; who are incompatible with their collegues, uſing all their attention and induſtry to engroſs the glory of every thing to themſelves; always ready to ſacrifice the public to their private intereſts, or to ſuffer their rivals to commit blunders, that they themſelves may reap advantage from them.

(*m*) On the very ſame day the action of Thermopylæ happened, the formidable army of Carthagini-

(*m*) Her. l. 7. c. 165, 167.

* Πάντα συνέπραττε καὶ συνεβούλευεν, ἐνδοξότατον ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ κοινῇ ποιῶν τὸν ἔχθιστον. In vit. Ariſt. p. 323.

ans,

ans, which conſiſted of three hundred thouſand men, was entirely defeated by Gelon, tyrant of Syracuſe. Herodotus places this battle on the ſame day with that of Salamin. The circumſtances of that victory in Sicily I have related in the hiſtory of the Carthaginians.

(*n*) After the battle of Salamin, the Grecians being returned from purſuing the Perſians, Themiſtocles ſailed to all the iſlands that had declared for them, to levy contributions and exact money from them. The firſt he began with was that of Andros, from whoſe inhabitants he required a conſiderable ſum, ſpeaking to them in this manner: *I come to you accompanied with two powerful divinities, Perſuaſion and Force.* The anſwer they made him was: *We alſo have two other divinities on our ſide, no leſs powerful than yours, and which do not permit us to give the money you demand of us, Poverty and Impotence.* Upon this refuſal he made a feint of beſieging them, and threatened that he would entirely ruin their city. He dealt in the ſame manner with ſeveral other iſlands, which durſt not reſiſt him as Andros had done, and drew great ſums of money from them without the privity of the other commanders: for he was eſteemed a lover of money, and to be deſirous of enriching himſelf.

SECT. IX. *The battle of Platæa.*

(*o*) MARDONIUS, who ſtaid in Greece with a body of three hundred thouſand men, let his troops paſs the winter in Theſſaly, and in the ſpring following led them into Bœotia. There was a very famous oracle in this country, the oracle I mean of Lebadia, which he thought proper to conſult, in order to know what would be the ſucceſs of the war. The prieſt in his enthuſiaſtic fit anſwered in a language

(*n*) Her. l. 8. c. 111, 112. Plut in Themiſt. p. 122. (*o*) A. M. 3525. Ant. J. C. 497. Her. l. 8. c. 113—131, 136—140, 144. Plut. in Ariſt. p. 524. Died. l. 11. p. 22, 23. Plut. de orac. defec. p. 412.

 which

which no body that was preſent underſtood, as much as to inſinuate, that the oracle would not deign to ſpeak intelligibly to a Barbarian. At the ſame time Mardonius ſent Alexander king of Macedonia, with ſeveral Perſian noblemen to Athens, and by them, in the name of his maſter, made very advantagious propoſals to the Athenian people, to divide them from the reſt of their allies. The offers he made them were, to rebuild their city which had been burnt down, to give them a conſiderable ſum of money, to ſuffer them to live according to their own laws and cuſtoms, and to give them the government and command of all Greece. Alexander, as their antient friend, exhorted them in his own name to lay hold on ſo favourable an opportunity for re-eſtabliſhing their affairs, alledging, that they were not in a condition to withſtand a power ſo formidable as that of the Perſians, and ſo much ſuperior to that of Greece. On the firſt intelligence of this embaſſy, the Spartans alſo on their ſide ſent deputies to Athens, in order to hinder it from taking effect. Theſe were preſent when the others had their audience: where, aſſoon as Alexander had finiſhed his ſpeech, they began in their turn to addreſs themſelves to the Athenians, and ſtrongly exhorted them not to ſeparate themſelves from their allies, nor to deſert the common intereſt of their country, repreſenting to them at the ſame time, that their union in the preſent ſituation of their affairs was their whole ſtrength, and would render Greece invincible. They added farther, that the Spartan commonwealth was very ſenſibly moved with the melancholy ſtate which the Athenians were in, who were deſtitute both of houſes and retreat, and who for two years together had loſt all their harveſts; that in conſideration of that calamity, ſhe would engage herſelf, during the continuance of the war, to maintain and ſupport their wives, their children, and their old men, and to furniſh a plentiful ſupply for all their wants. They concluded by obſerving on the conduct Alexander, whoſe diſcourſe, they ſaid, was ſuch, as might be

be expected from one tyrant, who ſpoke in favour of another; but that he ſeemed to have forgot, that the people to whom he addreſſed himſelf, had ſhewed themſelves on all occaſions the moſt zealous defenders of the common liberty of their country.

Ariſtides was at this time in office, that is to ſay, the principal of the Archons. As it was therefore his buſineſs to anſwer, he ſaid, that as to the Barbarians, who made ſilver and gold the chief objects of their eſteem, he forgave them for thinking they could corrupt the fidelity of a nation by large bounties and promiſes: but that he could not help being ſurprized and affected with ſome ſort of indignation, to ſee that the Lacedæmonians, regarding only the preſent diſtreſs and neceſſity of the Athenians, and forgetting their courage and magnanimity, ſhould come to perſuade them to perſiſt ſtedfaſtly in the defence of the common liberty of Greece by arguments and motives of gain, and by propoſing to give them victuals and proviſion: He deſired them to acquaint their republic, that all the gold in the world was not capable of tempting the Athenians, or of making them deſert the defence of the common liberty: that they had the grateful ſenſe they ought to have, of the kind offers which Lacedæmon had made them; but that they would endeavour to manage their affairs ſo, as not to be a burden to any of their allies. Then turning himſelf towards the ambaſſadors of Mardonius, and pointing with his hand to the ſun: *Be aſſured*, ſays he to them, *that as long as that planet ſhall continue his courſe, the Athenians will be mortal enemies to the Perſians, and will not ceaſe to take vengeance of them for ravaging their lands and burning their houſes and temples.* After which, he deſired the king of Macedonia, if he was inclined to be truly their friend, that he would not make himſelf any more the bearer of ſuch propoſals to them, which would only ſerve to reflect diſhonour upon him, without ever producing any other effect.

Ariſtides, notwithſtanding his having made this plain

plain and peremptory declaration, did not ſtop there. But that he might ſtill imprint the greater horror for ſuch propoſals, and for ever to prohibit all manner of commerce with the Barbarians by a principle of religion, he ordained, that the Athenian prieſts ſhould denounce anathemas and execrations upon any perſon whatſoever, that ſhould preſume to propoſe the making of an alliance with the Perſians, or the breaking of their alliance with the reſt of the Grecians.

(*p*) When Mardonius had learnt by the anſwer, which the Athenians had ſent him, * that they were to be prevailed upon by no propoſals or advantages whatſoever to ſell their liberty, he marched with his whole army towards Attica, waſting and deſtroying whatever he found in his way. The Athenians, not being in a condition to withſtand ſuch a torrent, retired to Salamin, and for a ſecond time abandoned their city. Mardonius, ſtill entertaining hopes of bringing them to ſome terms of accommodation, ſent another deputy to them to make the ſame propoſals as before. A certain Athenian, called Lycidas, being of opinion, that they ſhould hearken to what he had to offer, was immediately ſtoned, and the Athenian women running at the ſame time to his houſe, did the ſame execution upon his wife and children: ſo deteſtable a crime did they think it to propoſe any peace with the Perſians. But notwithſtanding this, they had a reſpect to the character wherewith the deputy was inveſted, and ſent him back without offering him any indignity or ill treatment. Mardonius now found that there was no peace to be expected with them. He therefore entered Athens, burnt and demoliſhed every thing that had eſcaped their fury the preceding year, and left nothing ſtanding.

The Spartans, inſtead of conducting their troops into Attica, according to their engagements, thought

(*p*) Her. l. 9. c. 1—11. Plut. in Ariſt.

* Poſteaquam nullo pretio libertatem his videt venalem, &c. *Juſtin.* l. 2. c. 14.

only of keeping themſelves ſhut up within the Peloponneſus for their own ſecurity, and with that view had begun to build a wall over the Iſthmus, in order to hinder the enemy from entering that way, by which means they reckoned they ſhould be ſafe themſelves, and ſhould have no farther occaſion for the aſſiſtance of the Athenians. The latter hereupon ſent deputies to Sparta, in order to complain of the ſlowneſs and neglect of their allies. But the Ephori did not ſeem to be much moved at their remonſtrances: and as that day was the feaſt of * Hyacinthus, they ſpent it in feaſts and rejoicing, and deferred giving the deputies their anſwer till the next day. And ſtill procraſtinating the affair as much as they could on various pretexts, they gained ten days time, during which the building of the wall was compleated. They were on the point of diſmiſſing the Athenian envoys in a ſcandalous manner, when a private citizen expoſtulated with them, and repreſented to them, how baſe it would be to treat the Athenians in ſuch a manner, after all the calamities and voluntary loſſes they had ſo generouſly ſuffered for the common defence of liberty, and all the important ſervices they had rendered Greece in general. This opened their eyes and made them aſhamed of their perfidious deſign. The very next night following they ſent off, unknown to the Athenian deputies, five thouſand Spartans, who had each of them ſeven Helotæ, or ſlaves to attend him. In the morning afterwards the deputies renewed their complaints with great warmth and reſentment, and were extremely ſurprized when they were told that the Spartan ſuccours were on their march, and by this time were not far from Attica.

* *Amongſt the Lacedæmonians the feaſt of Hyacinthus continued three days: the firſt and laſt of which were days of ſorrow and mourning for the death of Hyacinthus; but the ſecond was a day of rejoicing, which was ſpent in feaſting, ſports and ſpectacles, and all kinds of diverſions. This feſtival was celebrated every year in the month of Auguſt, in honour of Apollo and Hyacinthus.*

Mardonius

(*q*) Mardonius had left Attica at this time, and was on his return into the country of Bœotia. As the latter was an open and flat country, he thought it would be more convenient for him to fight there, than in Attica, which was uneven and rugged, full of hills and narrow paſſes, and which for that reaſon would not allow him ſpace enough for drawing up his numerous army in battle-array, nor leave room for his cavalry to act. When he came back into Bœotia, he encamped by the river Aſopus. The Grecians followed him thither under the command of Pauſanias, king of Sparta, and of Ariſtides general of the Athenians. The Perſian army, according to the account of Herodotus, conſiſted of three hundred thouſand, or according to that of Diodorus, of five hundred thouſand men. That of the Grecians did not amount to ſeventy thouſand: of which there were but five thouſand Spartans; but, as theſe were accompanied with thirty-five thouſand of the Helotæ, (*viz.*) ſeven for each Spartan, they made up together forty thouſand: the latter of theſe were light-armed troops: the Athenian forces conſiſted but of eight thouſand, and the troops of the allies made up the remainder. The right wing of the army was commanded by the Spartans, and the left by the Athenians; an honour which the people of Tegæa pretended to, and diſputed with them, but in vain.

(*r*) Whilſt all Greece was in ſuſpenſe, expecting a battle, that ſhould determine their fate, a ſecret conſpiracy, formed in the midſt of the Athenian camp by ſome diſcontented citizens, who intended the ſubverſion of their popular government, or to deliver up Greece into the hands of the Perſians, gave Ariſtides a great deal of perplexity and trouble. On this emergency he had occaſion for all his prudence: not knowing exactly how many people might be concerned in this conſpiracy, he contented himſelf with having eight

(*q*) Her. l. 9. c. 12—76. Plut. in Ariſt. p. 325—330. Diod. l. 11. p. 24, 26. (*r*) Plut. in Ariſt. p. 326.

of them taken up: and of thoſe eight, the only two, whom he cauſed to be accuſed, becauſe they had the moſt laid to their charge, made their eſcape out of the camp, whilſt their tryal was preparing. There is no doubt but Ariſtides favoured their eſcape, leſt he ſhould be obliged to puniſh them, and their puniſhment might occaſion ſome tumult and diſorder. The others, that were in cuſtody, he releaſed, leaving them room to believe, that he had found nothing againſt them, and telling them, that the battle with the enemy ſhould be the tribunal, where they might fully juſtify their characters, and ſhew the world, how unlikely it was, that they had ever entertained a thought of betraying their country. This well-timed and wiſe diſſimulation, which opened a door for repentance, and avoided driving the offenders to deſpair, appeaſed all the commotion and quaſhed the whole affair.

Mardonius, in order to try the Grecians, ſent out his cavalry, in which he was ſtrongeſt, to ſkirmiſh with them. The Megarians, who were encamped upon a plain, ſuffered extremely by them; and in ſpite of all the vigour and reſolution, with which they defended themſelves, they were upon the point of giving way, when a detachment of three hundred Athenians, with ſome troops armed with miſſive weapons, advanced to their ſuccour. Maſiſtius, the general of the Perſian horſe, and one of the moſt conſiderable noblemen of his country, ſeeing them advance towards him in good order, made his cavalry face about and attack them. The Athenians ſtood their ground, and waited to receive them. The ſhock was very fierce and violent, both ſides endeavouring equally to ſhew by the iſſue of this encounter, what would be the ſucceſs of the general engagement. The victory was a long time diſputed: but at laſt Maſiſtius's horſe being wounded threw his maſter, who was quickly after killed; upon which the Perſians immediately fled. As ſoon as the news of his death reached the Barbarians, their grief was exceſſive. They cut off the hair of

of their heads, as alſo the manes of their horſes and mules, filling the camp with their cries and lamentations, having loſt in their opinion the braveſt man of their army.

After this encounter with the Perſian cavalry, the two armies were a long time without coming to any action; becauſe the ſoothſayers and diviners, upon their inſpecting the entrails of their victims, equally foretold both parties, that they ſhould be victorious, provided they acted only upon the defenſive, whereas on the other hand they threatened them equally with a total overthrow, if they acted offenſively, or made the firſt attack.

They paſſed ten days in this manner in view of each other. But Mardonius, who was of a fiery, impatient nature, grew very uneaſy at ſo long a delay. Beſides, he had only a few days proviſions left for his army; and the Grecians grew ſtronger every day by the addition of new troops, that were continually coming to join them. He therefore called a council of war, in order to deliberate, whether they ſhould give battle. Artabazus, a nobleman of ſingular merit and great experience, was of opinion, that they ſhould not hazard a battle, but that they ſhould retire under the walls of Thebes, where they would be in a condition to ſupply the army with proviſions and forage. He alledged, that delays alone would be capable of diminiſhing the ardor of the allies; that they would thereby have time to tamper with them, and might be able to draw ſome of them off by gold and ſilver, which they would take care to diſtribute among the leaders, and among ſuch as had the greateſt ſway and authority in their ſeveral cities; and that in ſhort this would be both the eaſieſt and ſureſt method of ſubjecting Greece. This opinion was very wiſe, but was overruled by Mardonius, whom the reſt had not courage to contradict. The reſult therefore of their deliberations was that they ſhould give battle the next day. Alexander, king of Macedonia, who was on

the ſide of the Grecians in his heart, came ſecretly about midnight to their camp, and informed Ariſtides of all that had paſſed.

Pauſanias forthwith gave orders to the officers to prepare themſelves for battle, and imparted to Ariſtides the deſign he had formed of changing his order of battle, by placing the Athenians in the right wing, inſtead of the left, in order to their oppoſing the Perſians, with whom they had been accuſtomed to engage. Whether it was fear or prudence, that induced Pauſanias to propoſe this new diſpoſition, the Athenians accepted it with pleaſure. Nothing was heard among them but mutual exhortations, to acquit themſelves bravely, bidding each other remember, that neither they, nor their enemies, were changed ſince the battle of Marathon, unleſs it were, that victory had increaſed the courage of the Athenians, and had diſpirited the Perſians. We do not fight, (ſaid they) as they do, for a country only or a city, but for the trophies erected at Marathon and at Salamin, that they may not appear to be the work only of Miltiades and of fortune, but the work of the Athenians. Encouraging one another in this manner they went with all the alacrity imaginable to change their poſt. But Mardonius, upon the intelligence he received of this movement, having made the like change in his order of battle, both ſides rang'd their troops again according to their former diſpoſition. The whole day paſs'd in this manner without their coming to action.

In the evening the Grecians held a council of war, in which it was reſolv'd, that they ſhould decamp from the place they were in, and march to another, more conveniently ſituated for water. Night being come on, and the officers endeavouring at the head of their corps to make more haſte than ordinary to the camp marked out for them, great confuſion happen'd among the troops, ſome going one way and ſome another, without obſerving any order or regularity in their march.

march. At laſt they halted near the little city of Platæa.

On the firſt news of the Grecians being decamped, Mardonius drew his whole army into order of battle, and purſued them with the hideous ſhouting and howling of his Barbarian forces, who thought they were marching, not ſo much in order to fight, as to ſtrip and plunder a flying enemy: and their general likewiſe, making himſelf ſure of victory, proudly inſulted Artabazus, reproaching him with his fearful and cowardly prudence, and with the falſe notion he had conceived of the Lacedæmonians, who never fled, as he pretended, before an enemy; whereas here was an inſtance of the contrary. But the general quickly found, this was no falſe or ill-grounded notion. He happened to fall in with the Lacedæmonians, who were alone and ſeparated from the body of the Grecian army, to the number of fifty thouſand men, together with three thouſand of the Tegeatæ. The encounter was exceeding fierce and reſolute: on both ſides the men fought with the courage of lions; and the Barbarians perceived that they had to do with ſoldiers, who were determined to conquer or die in the field. The Athenian troops, to whom Pauſanias ſent an officer, were already upon their march to their aid: but the Greeks, who had taken party with the Perſians, to to the number of fifty thouſand men, went out to meet them on their way, and hindered them from proceeding any farther. Ariſtides with his little body of men bore up firmly againſt them and withſtood their attack, letting them ſee, how inſignificant a ſuperiority of numbers is againſt true courage and bravery.

The battle being thus divided into two, and fought in two different places, the Spartans were the firſt who broke in upon the Perſian forces and put them into diſorder. Mardonius, their general, falling dead of a wound he had received in the engagement, all his army betook themſelves to flight; and thoſe Greeks, who were engaged againſt Ariſtides, did the

ſame thing, as ſoon as they underſtood the Barbarians were defeated. The latter ran away to their former camp, which they had quitted, where they were ſheltered and fortified with an incloſure of wood. The Lacedæmonians purſued them thither, and attacked them in their intrenchment; but this they did poorly and weakly, like people that were not much accuſtomed to ſieges, and to attack walls. The Athenian troops, having advice of this, left off purſuing their Grecian adverſaries, and marched to the camp of the Perſians, which after ſeveral aſſaults they carried, and made an horrible ſlaughter of the enemy.

Artabazus, who from Mardonius's imprudent management had but too well foreſeen the misfortune that befel them, after having diſtinguiſhed himſelf in the engagement, and given all poſſible proofs of his courage and intrepidity, made a timely retreat with the forty thouſand men he commanded; and preventing his flight from being known by the expedition of his march, he arrived ſafe at Byzantium, and from thence returned into Aſia. Of all the reſt of the Perſian army not four thouſand men eſcaped after that day's ſlaughter: all were killed and cut to pieces by the Grecians, who by that means delivered themſelves at once from all further invaſions from that nation, no Perſian army having ever appeared after that time on this ſide of the Helleſpont.

(s) This battle was fought on the fourth day of the month * Boedromion, according to the Athenian manner of reckoning. Soon after, the allies, as a teſtimony of their gratitude to heaven, cauſed a ſtatue of Jupiter to be made at their joint and common expences, which they placed in his temple at Olympia. The names of all the ſeveral nations of Greece, that were preſent in the engagement, were engraven on the right ſide of the pedeſtal of the ſtatue, the Lace-

(s) A. M. 3525. Ant. J. C. 479. Pauſan. l. 5. p. 532.

* *This day anſwers to the eighth of our September.*

dæmonians

dæmonians firſt, the Athenians next, and all the reſt in order.

(*t*) One of the principal citizens of Ægina came and addreſſed himſelf to Pauſanias, deſiring him to avenge the indignity that Mardonius and Xerxes had ſhewn to Leonidas, whoſe dead body was hung up on a gallows by their order, and urging him to uſe Mardonius's body after the ſame manner. As a farther motive for doing ſo, he added, that by thus ſatisfying the manes of thoſe that were killed at Thermopylæ, he would be ſure to immortalize his own name throughout all Greece, and make his memory precious to the lateſt poſterity. "Carry thy baſe "counſel elſewhere," replied Pauſanias. "Thou "muſt have a very wrong notion of true glory, to "imagine, that the way for me to acquire it is to "reſemble the Barbarians. If the eſteem of the peo- "ple of Ægina is not to be purchaſed but by ſuch a "proceeding, I ſhall be content with preſerving that "of the Lacedæmonians only, amongſt whom the "baſe and ungenerous pleaſure of revenge is never put "in competition with that of ſhewing clemency and "moderation to their enemies, and eſpecially after "their death. As for the ſouls of my departed "countrymen, they are ſufficiently avenged by the "death of the many thouſand Perſians ſlain upon the "ſpot in the laſt engagement."

(*u*) A diſpute, which aroſe between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, about determining which of the two people ſhould have the prize of valour adjudged to them, as alſo which of them ſhould have the privilege of erecting a trophy, had like to have ſullied all the glory, and imbittered the joy of their late victory. They were juſt on the point of carrying things to the laſt extremity, and would certainly have decided the difference with their ſwords, had not Ariſtides prevailed upon them, by the wiſdom of his counſel and reaſonings, to refer the determination of the matter to the

(*t*) Her. l. 9. c. 77, 78. (*u*) Plut. in Ariſt. p. 431.

udg ment of the Grecians in general. This propoſition being accepted by both parties, and the Greeks being aſſembled upon the ſpot to decide the conteſt, Theogiton of Megara ſpeaking upon the queſtion, gave it as his opinion, that the prize of valour ought to be adjudged neither to Athens nor to Sparta, but to ſome other city; unleſs they deſired to kindle a civil war, of more fatal conſequences than that they had juſt put an end to. After he had finiſhed his ſpeech, Cleocritus of Corinth roſe up to ſpeak his ſentiments of the matter: and when he began, no body doubted but he was going to claim that honour for the city of which he was a member and a native; for Corinth was the chief city of Greece in power and dignity after thoſe of Athens and Sparta. But every body was agreeably deceived, when they found, that all his diſcourſe tended to the praiſe of the Platæans, and that the concluſion he made from the whole was, that in order to extinguiſh ſo dangerous a contention, they ought to adjudge the prize to them only, againſt whom neither of the contending parties could have any grounds of anger or jealouſy. This diſcourſe and propoſal was received with a general applauſe by the whole aſſembly. Ariſtides immediately aſſented to it on the part of the Athenians, and Pauſanias on the part of the Lacedæmonians.

(*x*) All parties being thus agreed, before they began to divide the ſpoil of the enemy, they put fourſcore talents * aſide for the Platæans, who laid them out in building a temple to Minerva, in erecting a ſtatue to her honour, and in adorning the temple with curious and valuable paintings, which were ſtill in being in Plutarch's time, that is to ſay, above ſix hundred years afterwards, and which were then as freſh as if they had lately come out of the hands of the painters. As for the trophy, which had been another article of the

(*x*) Her. l. 9. c. 79—80.

* 80000 *crowns French, about* 18000 l. *ſterling.*

diſpute,

diſpute, the Lacedæmonians erected one for themſelves in particular, and the Athenians another.

The ſpoil was immenſe: in Mardonius's camp they found prodigious ſums of money in gold and ſilver, beſides cups, veſſels, beds, tables, necklaces, and bracelets of gold and ſilver, not to be valued or numbered. It is obſerved by a certain † hiſtorian, that theſe ſpoils proved fatal to Greece, by becoming the inſtruments of introducing avarice and luxury among her inhabitants. According to the religious cuſtom of the Grecians, before they divided the treaſure, they appropriated the tithe or tenth part of the whole to the uſe of the gods: the reſt was diſtributed equally among the cities and nations that had furniſhed troops: and the chief officers who had diſtinguiſhed themſelves in the field of battle, were likewiſe diſtinguiſhed in this diſtribution. They ſent a preſent of a golden tripod to Delphos, in the inſcription upon which Pauſanias cauſed theſe words to be inſerted; (*y*) *That he had defeated the Barbarians at Platæa, and that in acknowledgment of that victory he had made this preſent to Apollo.*

This arrogant inſcription, wherein he aſcribed the honour both of victory and the offering to himſelf only, offended the Lacedæmonian people, who, in order to puniſh his pride in the very point and place where he thought to exalt himſelf, as alſo to do juſtice to their confederates, cauſed his name to be raz'd out, and that of the cities which had contributed to the victory to be put in the ſtead of it. Too ardent a thirſt after glory on this occaſion did not give him leave to conſider, that a man loſes nothing by a diſcreet modeſty, which forbears the ſetting too high a value upon one's own ſervices, and which by ſcreening a man from envy * ſerves really to enhance his reputation.

(*y*) Cor. Nep. in Pauſan. c. 1.

† Victo Mardonio caſtra referta regalis opulentiæ capta, unde primùm Græcos, diviſo inter ſe auro Perſico, divitiarum luxuria cepit. *Juſtin.* l. 2. c. 14.

* Ipſa diſſimulatione famæ famam auxit. *Tacit.*

Pauſanias

Pauſanias gave ſtill a farther ſpecimen of his Spartan ſpirit and humour in two entertainments which he ordered to be prepared a few days after the engagement, one of which was coſtly and magnificent, in which was ſerved all the variety of delicacies and dainties that uſed to be ſerved at Mardonius's table; the other was plain and frugal, after the manner of the Spartans. Then comparing the two entertainments together, and obſerving the difference of them to his officers, whom he had invited on purpoſe; "What "a madneſs," ſays he, "was it in Mardonius, who "was accuſtomed to ſuch a luxurious diet, to come "and attack a people like us, that know how to live "without all dainties and ſuperfluities, and want no-"thing of that kind."

(z) All the Grecians ſent to Delphos to conſult the oracle, concerning the ſacrifice it was proper to offer. The anſwer they received from the gods was, that they ſhould erect an altar to *Jupiter Liberator*; but that they ſhould take care not to offer any ſacrifice upon it, before they had extinguiſhed all the fire in the country, becauſe it had been polluted and profaned by the Barbarians; and that they ſhould come as far as Delphos to fetch pure fire, which they were to take from the altar, call'd the common altar.

This anſwer being brought to the Grecians from the oracle, the generals immediately diſperſed themſelves throughout the whole country, and cauſed all the fires to be extinguiſhed: and Euchidas, a citizen of Platæa, having taken upon himſelf to go and fetch the ſacred fire with all poſſible expedition, made the beſt of his way to Delphos. On his arrival he purified himſelf, ſprinkled his body with conſecrated water, put on a crown of laurel, and then approached the altar, from whence, with great reverence, he took the holy fire, and carried it with him to Platæa, where he arrived before the ſetting of the ſun, having travelled a thouſand ſtadia (which make an hundred and twenty-five

(z) Plut. in Ariſt. p. 331, 332.

miles

miles Engliſh) in one day. Aſſoon as he came back, he ſaluted his fellow-citizens, delivered the fire to them, fell down at their feet, and died in a moment afterwards. His countrymen carried away his body and buried it in the temple of Diana, ſurnamed Eucleia, which ſignifies, of good renown; and put the following epitaph upon his tomb in the compaſs of one verſe: *Here lies Euchidas, who went from hence to Delphos, and returned back the ſame day.*

In the next general aſſembly of Greece, which was held not long after this occurrence, Ariſtides propoſed the following decree: That all the cities of Greece ſhould every year ſend their reſpective deputies to Platæa, in order to offer ſacrifices to *Jupiter Liberator*, and to the gods of the city; (this aſſembly was ſtill regularly held in the time of Plutarch) that every five years there ſhould be games celebrated there, which ſhould be called the games of liberty; that the ſeveral ſtates of Greece together ſhould raiſe a body of troops, conſiſting of ten thouſand foot, and a thouſand horſe, and ſhould equip a fleet of an hundred ſhips, which ſhould be conſtantly maintained for making war againſt the Barbarians; and that the inhabitants of Platæa, entirely devoted to the ſervice of God, ſhould be looked upon as ſacred and inviolable, and be concerned in no other function than that of offering prayers and ſacrifices for the general preſervation and proſperity of Greece.

All theſe articles being approved of and paſſed into a law, the citizens of Platæa took upon them to ſolemnize every year the anniverſary feſtival in honour of thoſe perſons that were ſlain in this battle: the order and manner of performing this ſacrifice was as follows. * The ſixteenth day of the month Maimacterion, which anſwers to our month of December, at the firſt appearance of day-break they walked in a ſolemn

* *Three months after the battle of Platæa was fought. Probably theſe funeral rites were not at firſt performed, till after the enemies were entirely gone, and the country was free.*

pro-

proceſſion, which was preceded by a trumpet that ſounded to battle. Next to the trumpet marched ſeveral chariots, filled with crowns and branches of myrtle. After theſe chariots was led a black bull, behind which marched a company of young perſons, carrying pitchers in their hands full of wine and milk, the ordinary effuſions offered to the dead, and vials of oil and eſſence. All theſe young perſons were freemen; for no ſlave was allowed to have any part in this ceremony, which was inſtituted for men who had loſt their lives for liberty. In the rear of this pomp followed the Archon, or chief magiſtrate of the Platæans, for whom it was unlawful at any other time even ſo much as to touch iron, or to wear any other garment than a white one. But upon this occaſion being clad in purple raiment, having a ſword by his ſide, and holding an urn in his hands, which he took from the place where they kept their public records, he marched quite through the city to the place where the tombs of his memorable countrymen were erected. As ſoon as he came there, he drew out water with his urn from the fountain, waſhed with his own hands the little columns that ſtood by the tombs, rubbed them afterwards with eſſence, and then killed the bull upon a pile of wood prepared for that purpoſe. After having offered up certain prayers to the terreſtrial * Jupiter and Mercury, he invited thoſe valiant ſouls deceaſed to come to their feaſt, and to partake of their funeral effuſions; then taking a cup in his hand, and having filled it with wine, he poured it out on the ground, and ſaid with a loud voice: *I preſent this cup to thoſe valiant men, who died for the liberty of the Grecians.* Theſe ceremonies were annually performed even in the time of Plutarch.

(*a*) Diodorus adds, that the Athenians in particular

(*a*) Lib. 11. p. 26.

* *The terreſtrial Jupiter is no other than Pluto; and the ſame epithet of terreſtrial was alſo given to Mercury, becauſe it was believed to be his office to conduct departed ſouls to the infernal regions.*

embelliſhed the monuments of their citizens, who died in the war with the Perſians, with magnificent ornaments, inſtituted funeral games to their honour, and appointed a ſolemn panegyric to be pronounced to the ſame intent, which in all probability was repeated every year.

The reader will be ſenſible, without my obſerving it, how much theſe ſolemn teſtimonies and perpetual demonſtrations of honour, eſteem and gratitude for ſoldiers, who had ſacrificed their lives in the defence of liberty, conduced to enhance the merit of valour, and of the ſervices they rendered their country, and to inſpire the ſpectators with emulation and courage: and how exceeding proper all this was for cultivating and perpetuating a ſpirit of bravery in the people, and for making their troops victorious and invincible.

The reader, no doubt, will be as much ſurprized on the other hand, to ſee how wonderfully careful and exact theſe people were in acquitting themſelves on all occaſions of the duties of religion. The great event, which I have juſt been relating, (*viz.*) the battle of Platæa, affords us very remarkable proofs of this particular, in the annual and perpetual ſacrifice they inſtituted to *Jupiter Liberator*, which was ſtill continued in the time of Plutarch; in the care they took to conſecrate the tenth part of all their ſpoil to the gods; and in the decree propoſed by Ariſtides to eſtabliſh a ſolemn feſtival for ever, as an anniverſary commemoration of that ſucceſs. It is a delightful thing, methinks, to ſee pagan and idolatrous nations thus publickly confeſſing and declaring, that all their expectations center in the ſupreme Being; that they think themſelves obliged to aſcribe the ſucceſs of all their undertakings to him; that they look upon him as the author of all their victories and proſperities, as the ſovereign ruler and diſpoſer of ſtates and empires, as the ſource from whence all ſalutary counſels, wiſdom and courage are derived, and as entitled on all theſe accounts to the firſt and beſt part of their ſpoils, and to their

their perpetual acknowledgments and thankſgivings for ſuch diſtinguiſhed favours and benefits.

SECT. X. *The battle near Mycale. The defeat of the Perſians.*

(*b*) ON the ſame day, the Greeks fought the battle of Platæa, their naval forces obtained a memorable victory in Aſia over the remainder of the Perſian fleet. For whilſt that of the Greeks lay at Ægina under the command of Leotychides, one of the kings of Sparta, and of Xanthippus the Athenian, ambaſſadors came to thoſe generals from the Ionians to invite them into Aſia to deliver the Grecian cities from their ſubjection to the Barbarians. On this invitation they immediately ſet ſail for Aſia, and ſteered their courſe by Delos: where when they arrived, other ambaſſadors arrived from Samos, and brought them intelligence, that the Perſian fleet, which had paſſed the winter at Cumæ, was then at Samos, where it would be an eaſy matter to defeat and deſtroy it, earneſtly preſſing them at the ſame time not to neglect ſo favourable an opportunity. The Greeks hereupon ſailed away directly for Samos. But the Perſians receiving intelligence of their approach, retired to Mycale, a promontory of the continent of Aſia, where their land-army, conſiſting of an hundred thouſand men, who were the remainder of thoſe that Xerxes had carried back from Greece the year before, was encamped. Here they drew their veſſels aſhore, which was a common practice among the antients, and encompaſſed them round with a ſtrong rampart. The Grecians followed them to the very place, and with the help of the Ionians defeated their land army, forced their rampart, and burnt all their veſſels.

The battle of Platæa was fought in the morning, and that of Mycale in the afternoon on the ſame day: and yet all the Greek writers pretend that the victory of Platæa was known at Mycale, before the latter

(*b*) Her. l. 9. c. 89—105. Diod. l. 11. p. 26--28.

engagement

engagement was begun, though the whole Ægæan ſea, which requires ſeveral days ſailing to croſs it, was between thoſe two places. But Diodorus, the Sicilian, explains us this myſtery. He tells us, that Leotychides, obſerving his ſoldiers to be much dejected for fear their countrymen at Platæa ſhould ſink under the numbers of Mardonius's army, contrived a ſtratagem to reanimate them; and that therefore, when he was juſt upon the point of making the firſt attack, he cauſed a rumour to be * ſpread among his troops, that the Perſians were defeated at Platæa, though at that time he had no manner of knowledge of the matter.

(c) Xerxes, hearing the news of theſe two overthrows, left Sardis with as much haſte and hurry, as he had done Athens before, after the battle of Salamin, and retired with great precipitation into Perſia, in order to put himſelf as far as he poſſibly could out of the reach of his victorious enemies. (d) But before he ſet out, he gave orders, that his people ſhould burn and demoliſh all the temples belonging to the Grecian cities in Aſia; which order was ſo far executed, that not one eſcaped, except the temple of Diana at Epheſus. (e) He acted in this manner at the inſtigation of the Magi, who were profeſt enemies to temples and images. The ſecond Zoroaſter had thoroughly inſtructed him in their religion, and made him a zealous defender of it. (f) Pliny informs us, that Oſtanes the head of the Magi, and the patriarch of that ſect, who maintained its maxims and intereſts with the greateſt violence, attended Xerxes upon this expedition againſt Greece. (g) This prince, as he paſſed through Babylon on his return to Suſa, deſtroy'd alſo all the temples in that city, as he had done thoſe of Greece and Aſia minor; doubtleſs through

(c) Diod. l. 11. p. 28. (d) Strab. l. 1. p. 634. (e) Cic. l. 2. de leg. n. 29. (f) Plin. l. 30. cap. 1. (g) Arrian. l. 7.

* *What we are told alſo of Paulus Æmilius's victory over the Macedonians, which was known at Rome the very day it was obtained, without doubt happened in the ſame manner.*

the

the ſame principle, and out of hatred to the ſect of the Sabæans, who made uſe of images in their divine worſhip, which was a thing extremely deteſted by the Magi. Perhaps alſo, the deſire of making himſelf amends for the charges of his Grecian expedition by the ſpoil and plunder of thoſe temples might be another motive, that induced him to deſtroy them: for it is certain he found immenſe riches and treaſure in them, which had been amaſſed together through the ſuperſtition of princes and people during a long ſeries of ages.

The Grecian fleet, after the battle of Mycale, ſet ſail towards the Helleſpont, in order to poſſeſs themſelves of the bridges, which Xerxes had cauſed to be laid over that narrow paſſage, and which they ſuppoſed were ſtill entire. But finding them broken by tempeſtuous weather, Leotychides and his Peloponneſian forces returned towards their own country. As for Xanthippus, he ſtayed with the Athenians and their Ionian confederates, and they made themſelves maſters of Seſtus and the Thracian Cherſoneſus, in which places they found great booty and took a vaſt number of priſoners. After which, before winter came on, they returned to their own cities.

From this time all the cities of Ionia revolted from the Perſians, and having entered into confederacy with the Grecians, moſt of them preſerved their liberty, during the time that empire ſubſiſted.

SECT. XI. *The barbarous and inhuman revenge of Ameſtris, the wife of Xerxes.*

(*b*) DURING the reſidence of Xerxes at Sardis, he conceived a violent paſſion for the wife of his brother Maſiſtus, who was a prince of extraordinary merit, had always ſerved the king with great zeal and fidelity, and had never done any thing to diſoblige him. The virtue of this lady, her great af-

(*b*) A. M. 3525. Ant. J. C. 479. Her. l. 9. c. 107--112.

fection

fection and fidelity to her husband, made her inexorable to all the king's ſollicitations. However, he ſtill flattered himſelf, that by a profuſion of favours and liberalities he might poſſibly gain upon her; and among other kind things he did to oblige her, he married his eldeſt ſon Darius, whom he intended for his ſucceſſor, to Artainta, this princeſs's daughter, and ordered that the marriage ſhould be conſummated as ſoon as he arrived at Suſa. But Xerxes finding the lady ſtill no leſs impregnable, in ſpite of all his temptations and attacks, immediately changed his object, and fell paſſionately in love with her daughter, who did not imitate the glorious example of her mother's conſtancy and virtue. Whilſt this intrigue was carrying on, Ameſtris, wife to Xerxes, made him a preſent of a rich and magnificent robe of her own making. Xerxes, being extremely pleaſed with this robe, thought fit to put it on upon the firſt viſit he afterwards made to Artainta; and in the converſation he had with her, he mightily preſſed her to let him know what ſhe deſired he ſhould do for her, aſſuring her, at the ſame time, with an oath, that he would grant her whatever ſhe asked of him. Artainta, upon this, deſired him to give her the robe he had on. Xerxes, foreſeeing the ill conſequences that would neceſſarily enſue his making her this preſent, did all that he could to diſſuade her from inſiſting upon it, and offered her any thing in the world in lieu of it. But, not being able to prevail upon her, and thinking himſelf bound by the imprudent promiſe and oath he had made to her, he gave her the robe. The lady no ſooner received it, but ſhe put it on, and wore it publickly by way of trophy.

Ameſtris being confirmed in the ſuſpicions ſhe had entertained, by this action, was enraged to the laſt degree. But inſtead of letting her vengeance fall upon the daughter, who was the only offender, ſhe reſolved to wreak it upon the mother, whom ſhe looked upon as the author of the whole intrigue, though ſhe was entirely

entirely innocent of the matter. For the better executing of her purpoſe, ſhe waited till the grand feaſt, which was every year celebrated on the king's birth-day, and which was not far off; on which occaſion the king, according to the eſtabliſhed cuſtom of the country, granted her whatever ſhe demanded. This day then being come, the thing ſhe deſired of his majeſty was, that the wife of Maſiſtus ſhould be delivered into her hands. Xerxes, who apprehended the queen's deſign, and who was ſtruck with horror at the thoughts of it, as well out of regard to his brother, as on account of the innocence of the lady, againſt whom he perceived his wife was ſo violently exaſperated, at firſt refuſed her requeſt, and endeavoured all he could to diſſuade her from it. But not being able either to prevail upon her, or to act with ſteadineſs and reſolution himſelf, he at laſt yielded, and was guilty of the weakeſt and moſt cruel piece of complaiſance, that ever was acted, making the inviolable obligations of juſtice and humanity give way to the arbitrary laws of a cuſtom, that had only been eſtabliſhed to give occaſion for the doing of good, and for acts of beneficence and generoſity. In conſequence then of this compliance, the lady was apprehended by the king's guards, and delivered to Ameſtris, who cauſed her breaſts, tongue, noſe, ears, and lips to be cut off, ordered them to be caſt to the dogs in her own preſence, and then ſent her home to her husband's houſe in that mutilated and miſerable condition. In the mean time, Xerxes had ſent for his brother, in order to prepare him for this melancholy and tragical adventure. He firſt gave him to underſtand, that he ſhould be glad he would put away his wife; and to induce him thereto, offered to give him one of his daughters in her ſtead. But Maſiſtus, who was paſſionately fond of his wife, could not prevail upon himſelf to divorce her: whereupon Xerxes in great wrath told him, that ſince he refuſed his daughter, he ſhould neither have her nor his wife, and that he would teach him not to reject the

the offers his maſter had made him; and with this inhuman reply diſmiſſed him.

This ſtrange proceeding threw Maſiſtus into the greateſt anxiety; who, thinking he had reaſon to apprehend the worſt of accidents, made all the haſte he could home to ſee what had paſſed there during his abſence. On his arrival he found his wife in that deplorable condition we have juſt been deſcribing. Being enraged thereat to the degree we may naturally imagine, he aſſembled all his family, his ſervants and dependants, and ſet out with all poſſible expedition for Bactriana, whereof he was governor, determined, aſſoon as he arrived there, to raiſe an army and make war againſt the king, in order to avenge himſelf for his barbarous treatment. But Xerxes being informed of his haſty departure, and from thence ſuſpecting the deſign he had conceived againſt him, ſent a party of horſe after him to purſue him; which having overtaken him cut him in pieces, together with his children and all his retinue. I do not know, whether a more tragical example of revenge than I have now related, is to be found in hiſtory.

(*i*) There is ſtill another action no leſs cruel or impious than the former, related of Ameſtris. She cauſed fourteen children of the beſt families in Perſia to be burnt alive, as a ſacrifice to the infernal gods, out of compliance with a ſuperſtitious cuſtom practiſed by the Perſians.

(*k*) Maſiſtus being dead, Xerxes gave the governmen of Bactriana to his ſecond ſon Hyſtaſpes, who being by that means obliged to live at a diſtance from the court, gave his younger brother Artaxerxes the opportunity of aſcending the throne to his diſadvantage after the death of their father, as will be ſeen in the ſequel.

Here ends Herodotus's hiſtory (*viz.*) at the battle of Mycale, and the ſiege of the city of Seſtus by the Athenians.

(*i*) Her. l. 7. c. 114. (*k*) Diod. l. 11. p. 53.

SECT.

SECT. XII. *The Athenians rebuild the walls of their city, notwithſtanding the oppoſition of the Lacedæmonians.*

(*l*) THE war, commonly called the war of Media, which had laſted but two years, being terminated in the manner we have mentioned, the Athenians returned to their own country, ſent for their wives and children, whom they had committed to the care of their friends during the war, and began to think of rebuilding their city, which was almoſt entirely deſtroyed by the Perſians, and to ſurround it with ſtrong walls, in order to ſecure it from farther violence. The Lacedæmonians having intelligence of this conceived a jealouſy, and began to apprehend, that Athens, which was already very powerful by ſea, if it ſhould go on to increaſe its ſtrength by land alſo, might take upon her in time to give laws to Sparta, and to deprive her of that authority and pre-eminence, which ſhe had hitherto exerciſed over the reſt of Greece. They therefore ſent an embaſſy to the Athenians, the purport of which was to repreſent to them, that the common intereſt and ſafety required, that there ſhould be no fortified city out of the Peloponneſus, leſt, in caſe of a ſecond irruption, it ſhould ſerve for a place of arms for the Perſians, who would be ſure to ſettle themſelves in it, as they had done before at Thebes, and who from thence would be able to infeſt the whole country, and to make themſelves maſters of it very ſpeedily. Themiſtocles, who ſince the battle of Salamin was greatly conſidered and reſpected at Athens, eaſily penetrated into the true deſign of the Lacedæmonians, though it was gilded over with the ſpecious pretext of public good: but, as the latter were able, with the aſſiſtance of their allies, to hinder the Athenians by force from carrying on the work, in caſe they ſhould poſitively and abſolutely refuſe to comply

(*l*) A. M. 3526. Ant. J. C. 478. Thucyd. l. 8. p. 59—62. Diod. l. 11. p. 30, 31. Juſtin. l. 2. c. 15.

with

with their demands, he adviſed the ſenate to make uſe of cunning and diſſimulation as well as they. The anſwer therefore they made their envoys was, that they would ſend an embaſſy to Sparta, to ſatisfy the commonwealth concerning their jealouſies and apprehenſions. Themiſtocles got himſelf to be nominated one of the ambaſſadors, and perſuaded the ſenate not to let his collegues ſet out along with him, but to ſend them one after another, in order to gain time for carrying on the work. The matter was executed purſuant to his advice; and he accordingly went alone to Lacedæmon, where he let a great many days paſs without waiting upon the magiſtrates, or applying to the ſenate. And, upon their preſſing him to do it, and aſking him the reaſon why he deferred it ſo long, he made anſwer, that he waited for the arrival of his collegues, that they might all have their audience of the ſenate together, and ſeemed to be very much ſurprized that they were ſo long in coming. At length they arrived: but all came ſingly, and at a good diſtance of time from one another. During all this while, the work was carried on at Athens with the utmoſt induſtry and vigour. The women, children, ſtrangers and ſlaves were all employed in it: nor was it interrupted night or day. The Spartans were not ignorant of the matter, but made great complaints of it to Themiſtocles, who poſitively denied the fact, and preſſed them to ſend other deputies to Athens, in order to inform themſelves better of the fact, deſiring them not to give credit to looſe and flying reports, without foundation. At the ſame time he ſecretly adviſed the Athenians to detain the Spartan envoys as ſo many hoſtages, till he and his collegues were returned from their embaſſy, fearing not without good reaſon that they themſelves might be ſerved in the ſame manner at Sparta. At laſt, when all his fellow-ambaſſadors were arrived, he deſired an audience, and declared in full ſenate, that it was really true the Athenians had reſolved to fortify their city with ſtrong walls; that the work

was

was almoſt compleated; that they had judged it to be abſolutely neceſſary for their own ſecurity, and for the public good of the allies; telling them at the ſame time, that, after the great experience they had had of the Athenian people's behaviour, they could not well ſuſpect them of being wanting in their zeal for the common intereſt of their country; that, as the condition and privileges of all the allies ought to be equal, it was juſt the Athenians ſhould provide for their own ſafety by all the methods they judged neceſſary, as well as the other confederates; that they had thought this expedient, and were in a condition to defend their city againſt whomſoever ſhould preſume to attack it; and * that as for the Lacedæmonians, it was not much for their honour, that they ſhould deſire to eſtabliſh their power and ſuperiority rather upon the weak and defenceleſs condition of their allies, than upon their own ſtrength and valour. The Lacedæmonians were extremely diſpleaſed with this diſcourſe: but, either out of a ſenſe of gratitude and eſteem for their country, or out of a conviction that they were not able to oppoſe their enterprize, they diſſembled their reſentment; and the ambaſſadors on both ſides, having all ſuitable honours paid them, returned to their reſpective cities.

(*m*) Themiſtocles, who had always his thoughts fixed upon raiſing and augmenting the power and glory of the Athenian commonwealth, did not confine his views to the walls of the city. He went on with the ſame vigorous application to finiſh the building and fortifications of the Piræus: for from the time he entered into office he had begun that great work. Before his time they had no other port at Athens but that of Phalerus, which was neither very large nor commodious, and conſequently not capable of anſwering the great deſigns of Themiſtocles. For this reaſon he

(*m*) Thucyd. p. 62, 65. Diod. l. 11. v. 32, 35.

* Graviter caſtigat eos, quod non virtute, ſed imbecillitate ſociorum potentiam quærerent. *Juſtin.* l. 2. c. 15.

had caſt his eye upon the Piræus, which ſeemed to invite him by its advantagious ſituation, and by the conveniency of its three ſpacious havens, that were capable of containing above four hundred veſſels. This undertaking was proſecuted with ſo much diligence and vivacity, that the work was conſiderably advanced in a very little time. Themiſtocles likewiſe obtained a decree, that every year they ſhould build twenty veſſels for the augmentation of their fleet: and in order to engage the greater number of workmen and ſailors to reſort to Athens, he cauſed particular privileges and immunities to be granted in their favour. His deſign was, as I have already obſerved, to make the whole force of Athens maritime; in which he followed a very different ſcheme of politics from what had been purſued by their antient kings, who endeavouring all they could to alienate the minds of the citizens from ſeafaring buſineſs and from war, and to make them apply themſelves wholly to agriculture and to peaceable employments, publiſhed this fable: That Minerva diſputing with Neptune to know which of them ſhould be declared patron of Attica, and give their name to the city newly built, ſhe gained her cauſe by ſhewing her judges the branch of an olive-tree, the happy ſymbol of peace and plenty, which ſhe had planted; whereas Neptune had made a fiery-horſe, the ſymbol of war and confuſion, riſe out of the earth before them.

SECT. XIII. *The black deſign of Themiſtocles rejected unanimouſly by the people of Athens. Ariſtides's condeſcenſion to the people.*

(n) THEMISTOCLES, who conceived the deſign of ſupplanting the Lacedæmonians, and of taking the government of Greece out of their hands, in order to put it into thoſe of the Athenians, kept his eye and his thoughts continually fixed upon that great project. And as he was not very nice or ſcrupulous in the choice of his meaſures, whatever tended towards

(n) Plut. in Themiſt. p. 121, 122. in Ariſt. p. 332.

the accompliſhing of the end he had in view, he looked upon as juſt and lawful. On a certain day then he declared in a full aſſembly of the people, that he had a very important deſign to propoſe, but that he could not communicate it to the people; becauſe its ſucceſs required it ſhould be carried on with the greateſt ſecreſy: he therefore deſired they would appoint a perſon, to whom he might explain himſelf upon the matter in queſtion. Ariſtides was unanimouſly pitched upon by the whole aſſembly, that referred themſelves entirely to his opinion of the affair; ſo great a confidence had they both in his probity and prudence. Themiſtocles therefore having taken him aſide, told him, that the deſign he had conceived was to burn the fleet belonging to the reſt of the Grecian ſtates, which then lay in a neighbouring port, and that by this means Athens would certainly become miſtreſs of all Greece. Ariſtides hereupon returned to the aſſembly, and only declared to them, that indeed nothing could be more advantagious to the commonwealth than Themiſtocles's project, but that at the ſame time nothing in the world could be more unjuſt. All the people unanimouſly ordain'd, that Themiſtocles ſhould entirely deſiſt from his project. We ſee in this inſtance, that the title of *Juſt* was not given to Ariſtides even in his life-time without ſome foundation: a title, ſays Plutarch, infinitely ſuperior to all thoſe which conquerors purſue with ſo much ardour, and which in ſome meaſure approaches a man to the divinity.

I do not know whether all hiſtory can afford us a fact more worthy of admiration than this. It is not a company of philoſophers (to whom it coſts nothing to eſtabliſh fine maxims and ſublime notions of morality in the ſchools) who determine on this occaſion, that the conſideration of profit and advantage ought never to prevail in preference to what is honeſt and juſt. It is an intire people, who are highly intereſted in the propoſal made to them, who are convinced that it is of the greateſt importance to the welfare of the ſtate, and

and who however reject it with unanimous conſent and without a moment's heſitation, and that for this only reaſon, that it is contrary to juſtice. How black and perfidious on the other hand was the deſign, which Themiſtocles propoſed to them, of burning the fleet of their Grecian confederates, at a time of entire peace, ſolely to aggrandize the power of the Athenians! Had he an hundred times the merit aſcribed to him, this ſingle action would be ſufficient to ſully all his glory. For it is the heart, that is to ſay, integrity and probity, that conſtitutes and diſtinguiſhes true merit.

I am ſorry that Plutarch, who generally judges of things with great juſtneſs, does not ſeem, on this occaſion, to condemn Themiſtocles. After having ſpoken of the works he had effected in the Piræus, he goes on to the fact in queſtion, of which he ſays: (a) *Themiſtocles projected ſomething* STILL GREATER, *for the augmentation of their maritime power.*

(b) The Lacedæmonians having propoſed in the council of the Amphictyons, that all the cities, which had not taken arms againſt Xerxes, ſhould be excluded from that aſſembly, Themiſtocles, who apprehended, that if the Theſſalians, the Argives, and the Thebans, were excluded that council, the Spartans would by that means become maſters of the ſuffrages, and conſequently determine all affairs according to their pleaſure; Themiſtocles, I ſay, made a ſpeech in behalf of the cities they were for excluding, and brought the deputies, that compoſed the aſſembly, over to his ſentiments. He repreſented to them, that the greateſt part of the cities, that had entered into the confederacy, which were but one and thirty in the whole, were very ſmall and inconſiderable; that it would therefore be a very ſtrange, as well as a very dangerous proceeding, to deprive all the other cities of Greece of their votes and places in the grand aſſembly of the nation,

(a) Μεῖζόν τι διενοήθη.
(b) Plut. in Themiſt. p. 122.

and by that means ſuffer the auguſt council of the Amphictyons to fall under the direction and influence of two or three of the moſt powerful cities, which for the future would give law to all the reſt, and would ſubvert and aboliſh that equality of power, which was juſtly regarded as the baſis and ſoul of all republicks. Themiſtocles, by this plain and open declaration of his opinion, drew upon himſelf the hatred of the Lacedæmonians, who from that time became his profeſt enemies. He had alſo incurred the diſpleaſure of the reſt of the allies by his having exacted contributions from them in too rigorous and rapacious a manner.

(*c*) When the city of Athens was entirely rebuilt, the people finding themſelves in a ſtate of peace and tranquillity, endeavoured by all ſorts of methods to get the government into their hands, and to make the Athenian ſtate entirely popular. This deſign of theirs, though kept as ſecret as poſſible, did not eſcape the vigilance and penetration of Ariſtides, who ſaw all the conſequences, with which ſuch an innovation would be attended. But, as he conſidered on one hand, that the people were entitled to ſome regard, on account of the valour they had ſhewn in all the late battles they had gained, and on the other, that it would be no eaſy matter to curb and reſtrain a people, who ſtill in a manner had their arms in their hands, and who were grown more inſolent than ever from their victories; on theſe conſiderations, I ſay, he thought it proper to obſerve meaſures with them, and to find out ſome medium to ſatisfy and appeaſe them. He therefore paſſed a decree, by which it was ordained that the government ſhould be common to all the citizens, and that the Archons, who were the chief magiſtrates of the commonwealth, and who uſed to be choſen only out of the richeſt of its members, (*viz.*) from among thoſe only, who received at leaſt five hundred medim-

(*c*) Plut. in Ariſt. p. 332.

ni's of grain out of the product of their lands, ſhould for the future be elected indifferently out of all the Athenians without diſtinction. By thus giving up ſomething to the people, he prevented all diſſenſions and commotions, which might have proved fatal, not only to the Athenian ſtate, but to all Greece.

SECT. XIV. *The Lacedæmonians loſe the chief command through the pride and arrogance of Pauſanias.*

(*d*) THE Grecians, encouraged by the happy ſucceſs, which had every were attended their victorious arms, determined to ſend a fleet to ſea, in order to deliver ſuch of their allies, as were ſtill under the yoke of the Perſians, out of their hands. Pauſanias was the commander of the fleet for the Lacedæmonians; and Ariſtides, and Cimon the ſon of Miltiades, commanded for the Athenians. They firſt directed their courſe to the iſle of Cyprus, where they reſtored all the cities to their liberty: then ſteering towards the Helleſpont they attacked the city of Byzantium, of which they made themſelves maſters, and took a vaſt number of priſoners, a great part of whom were of the richeſt and moſt conſiderable families of Perſia.

Pauſanias, who from this time conceived thoughts of betraying his country, judged it proper to make uſe of this opportunity to gain the favour of Xerxes. To this end he cauſed a report to be ſpread among his troops, that the Perſian noblemen, whom he had committed to the guard and care of one of his officers, had made their eſcape by night, and were fled: whereas he had ſet them at liberty himſelf, and ſent a letter by them to Xerxes, wherein he offered to deliver the city of Sparta and all Greece into his hands, on condition he would give him his daughter in marriage. The king did not fail to give him a favourable anſwer, and to ſend him very large ſums of money alſo,

(*d*) A. M. 3528. Ant. J. C. 476. Thucyd. l. 1. p. 63, 84, 86.

in order to win over as many of the Grecians, as he ſhould find diſpoſed to enter into his deſigns. The perſon he appointed to manage this intrigue with him was Artabazus; and to the end that he might have it in his power to tranſact the matter with the greater eaſe and ſecurity, he made him governor of all the ſea-coaſts of Aſia Minor.

(e) Pauſanias, who was already dazzled with the proſpect of his future greatneſs, began from this moment to change his whole conduct and behaviour. The poor, modeſt and frugal way of living at Sparta; their ſubjection to rigid and auſtere laws, which neither ſpared nor reſpected any man's perſon, but were altogether as inexorable and inflexible to the greateſt, as to thoſe of the meaneſt condition; all this, I ſay, became inſupportable to Pauſanias. He could not bear the thoughts of going back to Sparta, after his having been poſſeſſed of ſuch high commands and employments, to return to a ſtate of equality, that confounded him with the meaneſt of the citizens; and this was the cauſe of his entering into a treaty with the Barbarians. Having done this, he entirely laid aſide the manners and behaviour of his country; aſſumed both the dreſs and ſtate of the Perſians, and imitated them in all their expenſive luxury and magnificence. He treated the allies with an inſufferable rudeneſs and inſolence; never ſpoke to the officers but with menaces and arrogance; required extraordinary and unuſual honours to be paid to him, and by his whole behaviour rendered the Spartan dominion odious to all the confederates. On the other hand, the courteous, affable and obliging deportment of Ariſtides and Cimon; an infinite remoteneſs from all imperious and haughty airs, which only tend to alienate people and multiply enemies; a gentle, kind and beneficent diſpoſition, which ſhewed itſelf in all their actions, and which ſerved to temper the authority of

(e) Plut. in Ariſt. p. 332, 333.

their

their commands, and to render it both eaſy and amiable; the juſtice and humanity, conſpicuous in every thing they did; the great care they took to offend no perſon whatſoever, and to do kind offices and ſervices to all about them: all this, I ſay, hurt Pauſanias exceedingly, by the contraſt of their oppoſite characters, and exceedingly increaſed the general diſcontent. At laſt this diſſatisfaction publickly broke out; and all the allies deſerted him, and put themſelves under the command and protection of the Athenians. Thus did Ariſtides, ſays Plutarch, by the prevalence of that humanity and gentleneſs, which he oppoſed to the arrogance and roughneſs of Pauſanias, and by inſpiring Cimon his collegue with the ſame ſentiments, inſenſibly draw off the minds of the allies from the Lacedæmonians without their perceiving it, and at length deprived them of the command; not by open force, or by ſending out armies and fleets againſt them, and ſtill leſs by making uſe of any arts or perfidious practices; but by the wiſdom and moderation of his conduct, and by rendering the government of the Athenians amiable.

It muſt be confeſſed at the ſame time, that the Spartan people on this occaſion ſhewed a greatneſs of ſoul and a ſpirit of moderation, that can never be ſufficiently admired. For when they were convinced, that their commanders grew haughty and inſolent from their two great authority, they willingly renounced the ſuperiority, which they had hitherto exerciſed over the reſt of the Grecians, and forbore ſending any more of their generals to command the Grecian armies; chooſing rather, adds the hiſtorian, to have their citizens wiſe, modeſt and ſubmiſſive to the diſcipline and laws of the commonwealth, than to maintain their preeminence and ſuperiority over all the Grecian ſtates.

SECT. XV. *Pauſanias's ſecret conſpiracy with the Perſians. His death.*

(*f*) UPON the repeated complaints the Spartan commonwealth received on all hands againſt Pauſanias, they recalled him home to give an account of his conduct. But not having ſufficient evidence to convict him of his having carried on a correſpondence with Xerxes, they were obliged to acquit him on this firſt tryal; after which he returned of his own private authority and without the conſent and approbation of the republic, to the city of Byzantium, from whence he continued to carry on his ſecret practices with Artabazus. But, as he was ſtill guilty of many violent and unjuſt proceedings, whilſt he reſided there, the Athenians obliged him to leave the place; from whence he retired to Colonæ a ſmall city of Troas. There he received an order from the Ephori to return to Sparta, on pain of being declared, in caſe of diſobedience, a public enemy and traitor to his country. He complied with the ſummons and went home, hoping he ſhould ſtill be able to bring himſelf off by dint of money. On his arrival he was committed to priſon, and was ſoon afterwards brought again upon his tryal before the judges. The charge brought againſt him was ſupported by many ſuſpicious circumſtances and ſtrong preſumptions. Several of his own ſlaves confeſſed that he had promiſed to give them their liberty, in caſe they would enter into his deſigns, and ſerve him with fidelity and zeal in the execution of his projects. But, as it was the cuſtom for the Ephori never to pronounce ſentence of death againſt a Spartan without a full and direct proof of the crime laid to his charge, they looked upon the evidence againſt him as inſufficient; and the more ſo, as he was of the royal family, and was actually inveſted with the adminiſtration of the regal office; for Pauſanias exerciſed the

(*f*) A. M. 5529. Ant. J. C. 475. Thucyd. l. 1. p. 86, & 89. Diod. l. 11. p. 34--36. Cor. Nep. in Pauſan.

function

function of king, as being the guardian and neareſt relation to Pliſtarchus, the ſon of Leonidas, who was then in his minority. He was therefore acquitted a ſecond time, and ſet at liberty.

Whilſt the Ephori were thus perplexed for want of clear and plain evidence againſt the offender, a certain ſlave, who was called the Argilian, came to them, and brought them a letter, writ by Pauſanias himſelf to the king of Perſia, which the ſlave was to have carried and delivered to Artabazus. It muſt be obſerv'd by the way, that this Perſian governor and Pauſanias had agreed together, immediately to put to death all the couriers they mutually ſent to one another, as ſoon as their packets or meſſages were delivered, that there might be no poſſibility left of tracing out or diſcovering their correſpondence. The Argilian, who ſaw none of his fellow-ſervants, that were ſent expreſſes, return back again, had ſome ſuſpicion; and when it came to his turn to go, he opened the letter he was entruſted with, in which Artabazus was really deſired to kill him purſuant to their agreement. This was the letter the ſlave put into the hands of the Ephori; who ſtill thought even this proof inſufficient in the eye of the law, and therefore endeavoured to corroborate it, by the teſtimony of Pauſanias himſelf. The ſlave, in concert with them, withdrew to the temple of Neptune in Tenaros, as to a ſecure aſylum. Two ſmall cloſets were purpoſely made there, in which the Ephori and ſome Spartans hid themſelves. The inſtant Pauſanias was informed that the Argilian had fled to this temple, he haſted thither, to enquire the reaſon. The ſlave confeſſed that he had opened the letter; and that finding by the contents of it he was to be put to death, he had fled to that temple to ſave his life. As Pauſanias could not deny the fact, he made the beſt excuſe he could; promiſed the ſlave a great reward; obliged him to promiſe, not to mention what had paſſed between them to any perſon whatſoever. Pauſanias then left him.

Pauſanias's guilt was now but too evident. The moment he was returned to the city, the Ephori were reſolved to ſeize him. From the aſpect of one of thoſe magiſtrates, he plainly perceived that ſome evil deſign was hatching againſt him, and therefore he ran with the utmoſt ſpeed to the temple of Pallas, called Chalcioecos, near that place, and got into it before the purſuers could overtake him. The entrance was immediately ſtopt up with great ſtones: and hiſtory informs us, that the criminal's mother ſet the firſt example on that occaſion. They now tore off the roof of the chapel: but as the Ephori did not dare to take him out of it by force, becauſe this would have been a violation of that ſacred aſylum, they reſolved to leave him expoſed to the inclemencies of the weather, and accordingly he was ſtarved to death. His corps was buried not far from that place: but the oracle of Delphi, whom they conſulted ſoon after, declared, that to appeaſe the anger of the goddeſs, who was juſtly offended on account of the violation of her temple, two ſtatues muſt be ſet up there in honour of Pauſanias, which was done accordingly.

Such was the end of Pauſanias, whoſe wild and inconſiderate ambition had ſtifled in him all ſentiments of probity, honour, love of his country, zeal for liberty, and of hatred and averſion for the Barbarians: ſentiments which, in ſome meaſure, were inherent in all the Greeks, and particularly in the Lacedæmonians.

SECT. XVI. *Themiſtocles, being purſued by the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, as an accomplice in Pauſanias's conſpiracy, flies for ſhelter to king Admetus.*

(g) THEMISTOCLES was alſo charged with being an accomplice of Pauſanias. He was then in exile. A paſſionate thirſt of glory, and a ſtrong deſire to command arbitrarily over the citizens,

(g) Thucyd. l. 1. p. 89, 90. Plut. in Themiſt. c. 123, 124. Cornel. Nep. in Themiſt. c. 8.

had

had made him very odious to them. He had built, very near his houſe, a temple in honour of Diana, under this title, *To Diana goddeſs of good counſel*; as hinting to the Athenians, that he had given good counſel to their city and to all Greece; and he alſo had placed his ſtatue in it, which was ſtanding in Plutarch's time. It appeared, ſays he, from this ſtatue, that his phyſiognomy was as heroic as his valour. Finding that men liſtned with pleaſure to all the calumnies his enemies ſpread againſt him, to ſilence them, he was for ever expatiating, in all public aſſemblies, on the ſervices he had done his country. As they were at laſt tired with hearing him repeat this ſo often, *How!* ſays he to them, *are you weary of having good offices frequently done you by the ſame perſons?* He did not conſider, that putting them ſo often in mind * of his ſervices, was in a manner reproaching them with their having forgot them, which was not very obliging; and he ſeemed not to know, that the ſureſt way to acquire applauſe, is to leave the beſtowing of it to others, and to reſolve to do ſuch things only as are praiſe-worthy; and that a frequent repetition of one's own virtue and exalted actions, is ſo far from appeaſing envy, that it only enflames it.

(*b*) Themiſtocles, after having been baniſhed from Athens by the oſtraciſm, withdrew to Argos. He was there, when Pauſanias was proſecuted as a traytor, who had conſpired againſt his country. He had at firſt concealed his machinations from Themiſtocles, though he was one of his beſt friends; but as ſoon as he was expelled his country, and highly reſented that injury, he diſcloſed his projects to him, and preſſed him to join in them. To induce his compliance, he ſhowed him the letters which the king of Perſia wrote to him; and endeavoured to animate him againſt the Athenians, by painting their injuſtice and ingratitude

(*b*) Plut. in Themiſt. p. 112.

* Hoc moleſtum eſt. Nam iſthæc commemoratio quaſi exprobratio eſt immemoris beneficii. *Terent. in Andr.*

in

in the ſtrongeſt colours. However, Themiſtocles rejected with indignation the propoſals of Pauſanias, and refuſed peremptorily to engage in any manner in his ſchemes: but then he concealed what had paſſed between them, and did not diſcover the enterprize he had formed; whether it was that he imagined Pauſanias would renounce it of himſelf, or was perſuaded that it would be diſcovered ſome other way; it not being poſſible for ſo dangerous and ill-concerted an enterprize to take effect.

After Pauſanias's death, ſeveral letters and other things were found among his papers, which raiſed a violent ſuſpicion of Themiſtocles. The Lacedæmonians ſent deputies to Athens to accuſe and have ſentence of death paſſed upon him: and ſuch of the citizens who envied him, joined theſe accuſers. Ariſtides had now a fair opportunity of revenging himſelf on his rival, for the injurious treatment he had received from him, had his ſoul been capable of ſo cruel a ſatisfaction. But he refuſed abſolutely to join in ſo horrid a combination; as little inclined to delight in the misfortunes of his adverſary, as he had before been to regret his ſucceſſes. Themiſtocles anſwered by letters all the calumnies with which he was charged; and repreſented to the Athenians, that as he had ever been fond of ruling, and his temper being ſuch as would not ſuffer him to be lorded over by others, it was highly improbable that he ſhould have a deſign to deliver up himſelf, and all Greece, to enemies and Barbarians.

In the mean time the people, too ſtrongly wrought upon by his accuſers, ſent ſome perſons to ſeize him, that he might be tried by the council of Greece. Themiſtocles, having timely notice of it, went into the iſland of Corcyra, to whoſe inhabitants he formerly had done ſome ſervice: however, not thinking himſelf ſafe there, he fled to Epirus; and finding himſelf ſtill purſued by the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, out of deſpair, he made a very dangerous choice, which was, to fly to Admetus king of Moloſſus for refuge. This

prince,

prince, having formerly deſired the aid of the Athenians, and being refuſed with ignominy by Themiſtocles, who at that time preſided in the government, had retained the deepeſt reſentment on that account, and declared, that he would take the firſt opportunity to revenge himſelf. But Themiſtocles, imagining that in the unhappy ſituation of his affairs, the recent envy of his fellow-citizens was more to be feared than the antient grudge of that king, was reſolved to run the hazard of it. Being come into the palace of that monarch, upon being informed that he was abſent, he addreſſed himſelf to the queen, who received him very graciouſly, and inſtructed him in the manner it was proper to make his requeſt. Admetus being returned, Themiſtocles takes the king's ſon in his arms, ſeats himſelf on his hearth amidſt his houſhold gods, and there telling him who he was, and the cauſe why he fled to him for refuge, he implores his clemency, owns that his life is in his hand, intreats him to forget the paſt; and repreſents to him, that no action can be more worthy a great king than to exerciſe clemency. Admetus, ſurprized and moved with compaſſion in ſeeing at his feet, in ſo humble a poſture, the greateſt man of all Greece, and the conqueror of all Aſia, raiſed him immediately from the ground, and promiſed to protect him againſt all his enemies. Accordingly, when the Athenians and Lacedæmonians came to demand him, he refuſed abſolutely to deliver up a perſon who had made his palace his aſylum, in the firm perſuaſion that it would be ſacred and inviolable.

Whilſt he was at the court of this prince, one of his friends found an opportunity to carry off his wife and children from Athens, and to ſend them to him; for which that perſon was ſome time after ſeized and condemned to die. With regard to Themiſtocles's effects, his friends ſecured the greateſt part of them for him, which they afterwards found opportunity to remit him; but all that could be diſcovered, which amounted

mounted to an hundred † talents, was carried to the public treaſury. When he entered upon the adminiſtration, he was not worth three talents. I ſhall leave this illuſtrious exile for ſome time in the court of king Admetus, to reſume the ſequel of this hiſtory.

SECT. XVII. *Ariſtides's diſintereſted adminiſtration of the public treaſure. His death and elogium.*

(*b*) I Have before obſerved, that the command of Greece had paſſed from Sparta to the Athenians. Hitherto the cities and nations of Greece had indeed contributed ſome ſums of money towards carrying on the expence of the war againſt the Barbarians; but this repartition or diviſion had always occaſioned great feuds, becauſe it was not made in a juſt or equal proportion. It was thought proper, under this new government, to lodge in the iſland of Delos, the common treaſure of Greece; to fix new regulations with regard to the public monies; and to lay ſuch a tax as might be regulated according to the revenue of each city and ſtate; in order that the expences being equally borne by the ſeveral individuals who compoſed the body of the allies, no one might have reaſon to murmur. The buſineſs was, to find a perſon of ſo honeſt and incorrupt a mind, as to diſcharge faithfully an employment of ſo delicate and dangerous a kind, the due adminiſtration of which ſo nearly concerned the public welfare. All the allies caſt their eyes on Ariſtides; accordingly they inveſted him with full powers, and appointed him to levy a tax on each of them, relying entirely on his wiſdom and juſtice.

The citizens had no cauſe to repent their choice. * He preſided over the treaſury with the fidelity and

(*b*) Plut. in Ariſt. p. 333, 334. Dicd. l. 11. p. 36.

† *An hundred thouſand crowns French, about* 22500 l. *ſterling.*

* Tu quidem orbis terrarum rationes adminiſtras; tam abſtinenter quàm alienas, tam diligenter quàm tuas, tam religiosè quàm publicas. In officio amorem conſequeris, in quo odium vitare difficile eſt. *Senec. lib. de brevit. vit. cap.* 18.

diſinte-

diſintereſtedneſs of a man, who looks upon it as a capital crime to embezzle the ſmalleſt portion of another's poſſeſſions; with the care and activity of a father of a family, in the management of his own eſtate; and with the caution and integrity of a perſon, who conſiders the public monies as ſacred. In fine, he ſucceeded in what is equally difficult and extraordinary, *viz.* to acquire the love of all in an office, in which he that eſcapes the public odium gains a great point. Such is the glorious character which Seneca gives of a perſon charged with an employment of almoſt the ſame kind, and the nobleſt elogium that can be given ſuch as adminiſter public revenues. It is the exact picture of Ariſtides. He diſcovered ſo much probity and wiſdom in the exerciſe of this office, that no man complained; and thoſe times were conſidered ever after as the golden age, that is, the period in which Greece had attained its higheſt pitch of virtue and happineſs. And indeed, the tax which he had fixed, in the whole, to four hundred and ſixty * talents, was raiſed by Pericles to ſix hundred, and ſoon after to thirteen hundred talents: it was not that the expences of the war were increaſed, but the treaſure was employed to very uſeleſs purpoſes, in manual diſtributions to the Athenians, in ſolemnizing of games and feſtivals, in building of temples and public edifices; not to mention, that the hands of thoſe who ſuperintended the treaſury, were not always clean and uncorrupt as thoſe of Ariſtides. This wiſe and equitable conduct ſecured him, to lateſt poſterity, the glorious ſurname of *the Juſt*.

Nevertheleſs, Plutarch relates an action of Ariſtides, which ſhows that the Greeks, (the ſame may be ſaid of the Romans) had a very narrow and imperfect idea of juſtice. They confined the exerciſe of it to the interior, as it were, of civil ſociety; and acknowledged that the individuals were bound to obſerve ſtrictly

* *The talent is worth a thouſand French crowns; or, about* 225 *l. ſterling.*

its

its ſeveral maxims: But with regard to their country, to the republic, (their great idol to which they reduced every thing) they thought in a quite different manner; and imagined themſelves eſſentially obliged to ſacrifice to it, not only their lives and poſſeſſions, but even their religion and the moſt ſacred engagements, in oppoſition to and contempt of the moſt ſolemn oaths. This will appear evidently in what follows.

(*i*) After the regulation had been made in reſpect to the tributes of which I have juſt ſpoke, Ariſtides having ſettled the ſeveral articles of the alliance, made the confederates take an oath to obſerve them punctually, and he himſelf ſwore in the name of the Athenians; and in denouncing the curſes which always accompanied the oaths, he threw into the ſeas, purſuant to the uſual cuſtom, large bars of red-hot iron. But the ill ſtate of the Athenian affairs forcing them afterwards to infringe ſome of thoſe articles, and to govern a little more arbitrarily, he intreated them to vent thoſe curſes on him, and diſcharge themſelves thereby of the puniſhment due to ſuch as had forſworn themſelves, and who had been reduced to it by the unhappy ſituation of their affairs. Theophraſtus tells us, that in general (theſe words are borrowed from Plutarch) Ariſtides, who executed all matters relating to himſelf or the public with the moſt impartial and rigorous juſtice, uſed to act, in his adminiſtration, ſeveral things, according as the exigency of affairs, and the welfare of his country might require; it being his opinion, that a government, in order to ſupport itſelf, is, on ſome occaſions, obliged to have recourſe to injuſtice; of which he gives the following example. One day, as the Athenians were debating in their council, about bringing to their city, in oppoſition to the articles of the treaty, the common treaſures of Greece which were depoſited in Delos: the Samians having opened the debate; when it was Ariſtides's turn to ſpeak, he ſaid, that the diſlodging of the treaſure was

(*i*) Ibid, p. 333, 334.

an

an unjuſt action, but uſeful, and made this opinion take place. This incident ſhows, that the pretended wiſdom of the heathens was overſpread with great obſcurity and error.

It was ſcarce poſſible to have a greater contempt for riches than Ariſtides had. Themiſtocles, who was not pleaſed with the encomiums beſtowed on other men, hearing Ariſtides applauded for the noble diſintereſtedneſs with which he adminiſtred the public treaſures, did but laugh at it; and ſaid, that the praiſes beſtowed upon him for it, ſhowed no greater merit or virtue than that of a ſtrong cheſt, which faithfully preſerves all the monies that are ſhut up in it, without retaining any. This low ſneer was by way of revenge for a ſtroke of raillery that had ſtung him to the quick. Themiſtocles ſaying, that, in his opinion, the greateſt talent a general could poſſeſs, was to be able to foreſee the deſigns of an enemy: "This talent," replied Ariſtides, "is neceſſary; but there is another "no leſs noble and worthy a general, that is, to have "clean hands, and a ſoul ſuperior to venality and "views of intereſt." Ariſtides might very juſtly anſwer Themiſtocles in this manner, ſince he was really very poor, though he had poſſeſſed the higheſt employments in the ſtate. He ſeemed to have an innate love for poverty; and ſo far from being aſhamed of it, he thought it reflected as much glory on him, as all the trophies and victories he had won. Hiſtory gives us a ſhining inſtance of this.

Callias, who was a near relation of Ariſtides, and the moſt wealthy citizen in Athens, was cited to appear before the judges. The accuſer, laying very little ſtreſs on the cauſe itſelf, reproached him eſpecially with permitting Ariſtides, his wife and children, to live in poverty, at a time when he himſelf wallowed in riches. Callias perceiving that theſe reproaches made a ſtrong impreſſion on the judges, he ſummoned Ariſtides to declare before them, whether he had not often preſſed him to accept of large ſums of money;

and

and whether he had not obſtinately refuſed to accept of his offer, with ſaying, That he had more reaſon to boaſt of his poverty, than Callias of his riches: That many perſons were to be found who had made a good uſe of their wealth, but that there were few who bore their poverty with magnanimity and even joy; and that none had cauſe to bluſh at their abject condition, but ſuch as had reduced themſelves to it by their idleneſs, their intemperance, their profuſion, or diſſolute conduct. (*k*) Ariſtides declared, that his kinſman had told nothing but the truth; and added, that a man whoſe frame of mind is ſuch, as to ſuppreſs a deſire of ſuperfluous things, and who confines the wants of life within the narroweſt limits; beſides its freeing him from a thouſand importunate cares, and leaving him ſo much maſter of his time, as to devote it entirely to the public; it alſo approaches him, in ſome meaſure, to the deity, who is wholly void of cares or wants. There was no man in the aſſembly, but, at his leaving it, would have choſe to be Ariſtides, tho' ſo poor, rather than Callias with all his riches.

Plutarch gives us, in few words, Plato's glorious teſtimony of Ariſtides's virtue, for which he looks upon him as infinitely ſuperior to all the illuſtrious men his cotemporaries. Themiſtocles, Cimon, and Pericles, (ſays he) filled indeed their city with ſplendid edifices, with porticos, ſtatues, rich ornaments, and other vain ſuperfluities of that kind; but Ariſtides did all that lay in his power to enrich every part of it with virtue: Now, to raiſe a city to true happineſs, it muſt be made virtuous, not rich.

Plutarch takes notice of another circumſtance in Ariſtides's life, which, though of the ſimpleſt kind, reflects the greateſt honour on him, and may ſerve as an excellent leſſon. It is in the beautiful (*l*) treatiſe, in which he enquires, whether it is proper for old men to concern themſelves with affairs of government; and where he points out admirably well, the various ſervices

(*k*) Plut. in compar. Ariſt. & Cato. p. 355. (*l*) P. 795, 797.

they

they may do the ſtate, even in an advanced age. We are not to fancy, ſays he, that all public ſervices require great motion and hurry, ſuch as, to harangue the people, to preſide in the government, or to head armies: An old man, whoſe mind is informed with wiſdom, may, without going abroad, exerciſe a kind of magiſtracy in it, which though ſecret and obſcure, is not therefore the leſs important; and that is, in training up youth by good counſel, teaching them the various ſprings of policy, and how to act in public affairs. Ariſtides, adds Plutarch, was not always in office, but was always uſeful to it. His houſe was a public ſchool of virtue, wiſdom, and policy. It was open to all young Athenians, who were lovers of virtue, and theſe uſed to conſult him as an oracle. He gave them the kindeſt reception, heard them with patience, inſtructed them with familiarity; and endeavoured, above all things, to animate their courage, and inſpire them with confidence. It is obſerved particularly that Cimon, afterwards ſo famous, was obliged to him for this important ſervice.

Plutarch * divided the life of ſtateſmen into three ages. In the firſt, he would have them learn the principles of government; in the ſecond, reduce them to practice; and in the third, inſtruct others.

(*m*) Hiſtory does not mention the exact time when, nor place where, Ariſtides died; but then it pays a glorious teſtimony to his memory, when it aſſures us, that this great man, who had poſſeſſed the higheſt employments in the republic, and had the abſolute diſpoſal of its treaſures, died poor, and did not leave money enough to defray the expences of his funeral; ſo that the government was obliged to bear the charge of it, and to maintain his family. His

(*m*) Plut. in Ariſt. p. 334, 335.

* *He applies on this occaſion the cuſtom uſed in Rome, where the Veſtals ſpent the firſt ten years in learning their office, and this was a kind of* noviciate; *the next ten years they employed in the exerciſe of their functions, and the laſt ten in inſtructing the young novices in them.*

daughters

daughters were married, and Lyſimachus his ſon was ſubſiſted at the expence of the Prytaneum; which alſo gave the daughter of the latter, after his death, the penſion with which thoſe were honoured who had been victorious at the Olympic games. (n) Plutarch relates on this occaſion, the liberality of the Athenians in favour of the poſterity of Ariſtogiton their deliverer, who was fallen to decay; and he adds, that even in his time, (almoſt ſix hundred years after) the ſame goodneſs and liberality ſtill ſubſiſted: It was glorious for a city, to have preſerved for ſo many centuries its generoſity and gratitude; and a ſtrong motive to animate individuals, who were aſſured that their children would enjoy the rewards which death might prevent them from receiving! It was delightful to ſee the remote poſterity of the defenders and deliverers of the commonwealth, who had inherited nothing from their anceſtors but the glory of their actions, maintained for ſo many ages at the expence of the public, in conſideration of the ſervices their families had rendered. They lived in this manner with much more honour, and called up the remembrance of their anceſtors with much greater ſplendor, than a multitude of citizens, whoſe fathers had been ſtudious only of leaving them great eſtates, which generally do not long ſurvive thoſe who raiſed them, and often leave their poſterity nothing but the odious remembrance of the injuſtice and oppreſſion by which they were acquired.

The greateſt honour which the antients have done Ariſtides, is in beſtowing on him the glorious title of *the Juſt*. He gained it, not by one particular action, but by the whole tenor of his conduct and actions. Plutarch makes a reflexion on this occaſion, which being very remarkable, I think it incumbent on me not to omit.

(o) Among the ſeveral virtues of Ariſtides, ſays this judicious author, that for which he was moſt renown-

(n) Vide Vol. II. *of antient Hiſt.* p. 361. (o) Plut. in vit. Ariſt. p. 321, 322.

ed,

ed, was his juſtice; becauſe this virtue is of moſt general uſe; its benefits extending to a greater number of perſons; as it is the foundation, and in a manner the ſoul of every public office and employment. Hence it was that Ariſtides, though in low circumſtances, and of mean extraction, merited the title of *Juſt*; a title, ſays Plutarch, truly royal, or rather truly divine; but one of which princes are ſeldom ambitious, becauſe generally ignorant of its beauty and excellency. They chuſe rather to be called (*p*) the conquerors of cities, and the thunderbolts of war; and ſometimes even eagles and lions: preferring the vain honour of pompous titles, which convey no other idea but violence and ſlaughter, to the ſolid glory of thoſe expreſſive of goodneſs and virtue. They don't know, continues Plutarch, that of the three chief attributes of the deity, of whom kings boaſt themſelves the image, I mean, immortality, power, and juſtice; that of theſe three attributes, I ſay, the firſt of which excites our admiration and deſire, the ſecond fills us with dread and terror, and the third inſpires us with love and reſpect, this laſt only, is truly and perſonally communicated to man, and is the only one that can conduct him to the other two; it being impoſſible for man to become truly immortal and powerful, but by being juſt.

(*q*) Before I reſume the ſequel of this hiſtory, it may not be improper to obſerve, that it was about this period the fame of the Greeks, ſtill more renowned for the wiſdom of their polity than the glory of their victories, induced the Romans to have recourſe to their lights and knowledge. Rome, formed under kings, was in want of ſuch laws, as were neceſſary for the good government of a commonwealth. * For this purpoſe

(*p*) Poliorcetes, Cerauni, Nicanores. Of Rome, 302.

(*q*) A. M. 3532.

* Miſſi legati Athenas, juſſique inclitas leges Solonis deſcribere, & aliarum Græciæ civitatum inſtituta, mores, *juraque noſcere*. Decem tabularum leges perlatæ ſunt (quibus adjectæ poſtea duæ) qui nunc

purpoſe the Romans ſent deputies to copy the laws of the cities of Greece, and particularly of Athens, which were ſtill better adapted to the popular government that had been eſtabliſhed after the expulſion of the kings. On this model, the ten magiſtrates called *Decemviri*, and who were inveſted with abſolute authority, were created: Theſe digeſted the laws of the twelve tables, which are the baſis of the Roman law.

SECT. XVIII. *Death of Xerxes killed by Artabanus. His character.*

(*r*) THE ill ſucceſs of Xerxes in his expedition againſt the Greeks, and which continued afterwards, at length diſcouraged him. Renouncing all thoughts of war and conqueſt, he abandoned himſelf entirely to luxury and eaſe, and was ſtudious of nothing but his pleaſures. * Artabanus, a native of Hyrcania, captain of his guards, and who had long been one of his chief favourites, found that this diſſolute conduct had drawn upon him the contempt of his ſubjects. He therefore imagined that this would be a favourable opportunity to conſpire againſt his ſovereign; and his ambition was ſo vaſt, that he flattered himſelf with the hopes of ſucceeding him in the throne (*s*). It is very likely, that he was excited to the commiſſion of this crime, from another motive. Xerxes had commanded him to murder Darius, his eldeſt ſon, but for what cauſe hiſtory is ſilent. As this order had been given at a banquet, and when the company was heated with wine, he did not doubt but that Xerxes would forget it, and therefore was not in haſte to obey it: However, he was miſtaken, for the king complained upon that account, which made Artabanus

(*r*) A. M. 3531. Ant. J. C. 473. Cteſ. c. 2. Diod. l. 11. p. 52. Juſtin. l. 3. c. 1.

(*s*) Ariſt. Politic. l. 5. c. 10. p. 404.

nunc quoque in hoc immenſo aliarum ſuper alias privatarum legum cumulo, fons omnis publici privatique eſt juris. *Liv. l.* 3. *n.* 31. & 34.

* *This was not the Artabanus uncle to Xerxes.*

dread

dread his reſentment, and therefore he reſolved to prevent him. Accordingly he prevailed upon Mithridates, one of the eunuchs of the palace, and great chamberlain, to engage in his conſpiracy; and by his means entered the chamber where the king lay, and murdered him in his ſleep. He then went immediately to Artaxerxes the third ſon of Xerxes. He informed him of the murder, charging Darius his eldeſt brother with it; as if impatience to aſcend the throne had prompted him to that execrable deed. He added, that to ſecure the crown to himſelf, he was reſolved to murder him alſo, for which reaſon it would be abſolutely neceſſary for him to keep upon his guard. Theſe words having made ſuch an impreſſion on Artaxerxes (a youth) as Artabanus deſired, he went immediately into his brother's apartment, where, being aſſiſted by Artabanus and his guards, he murdered him. Hyſtaſpes, Xerxes's ſecond ſon, was next heir to the crown after Darius; but as he was then in Bactriana, of which he was governor, Artabanus ſeated Artaxerxes on the throne, but did not deſign to ſuffer him to enjoy it, longer than he had formed a faction ſtrong enough to drive him from it, and aſcend it himſelf. His great authority had gained him a multitude of creatures; beſides this, he had ſeven ſons, who were of a very tall ſtature, handſome, ſtrong, courageous, and raiſed to the higheſt employments in the empire. The aid he hoped to receive from them, was the chief motive of his raiſing his views ſo high. But, whilſt he was attempting to compleat his deſign, Artaxerxes being informed of this plot by Megabyzus, who had married one of his ſiſters, he endeavoured to anticipate him, and killed him before he had an opportunity of putting his treaſon in execution. His death eſtabliſhed this prince in the poſſeſſion of the kingdom.

Thus we have ſeen the end of Xerxes, who was one of the moſt powerful princes that ever lived. It would

would be needleſs for me to anticipate the reader, with reſpect to the judgment he ought to form of him. We ſee him ſurrounded with whatever is greateſt and moſt auguſt in the opinion of mankind: the moſt extenſive empire at that time in the world; immenſe treaſures, and an incredible number of land as well as ſea forces. But all theſe things are round him, not in him, and add no luſtre to his natural qualities: for, by a blindneſs too common to princes and great men; born in the midſt of all terreſtrial bleſſings, heir to boundleſs power, and a luſtre that had coſt him nothing, he had accuſtomed himſelf to judge of his own talents and perſonal merit, from the exterior of his exalted ſtation and rank. He diſregards the wiſe counſels of Artabanus his uncle, and of Demaratus, who alone had courage enough to ſpeak truth to him; and he abandons himſelf to courtiers, the adorers of his fortune, whoſe whole ſtudy it was to ſooth his paſſions. He proportions, and pretends to regulate the ſucceſs of his enterprizes, by the extent of his power. The ſlaviſh ſubmiſſion of ſo many nations no longer ſooths his ambition; and little affected with too eaſy an obedience, he takes pleaſure in exerciſing his power over the elements, in cutting his way through mountains, and making them navigable; in chaſtiſing the ſea for having broke down his bridge, and in fooliſhly attempting to ſhackle the waves, by throwing chains into them. Big-ſwoln with a childiſh vanity and a ridiculous pride, he looks upon himſelf as the arbiter of nature: He imagines, that not a nation in the world will dare to wait his arrival; and fondly and preſumptuouſly relies on the millions of men and ſhips which he drags after him. But when, after the battle of Salamin, he beholds the ſad ruins, the ſhameful remains of his numberleſs troops ſcattered over all Greece *; he then is ſenſible of the wide

* Stratuſque per totam paſſim Græciam Xerxes intellexit, quan- tum ab exercitu turba diſtaret. *Senec. de benef.* l. 6. c. 32.

difference

difference between an army and a crowd of men. In a word, to form a right judgment of Xerxes, we need but contraſt him with a citizen of Athens, a Miltiades, Themiſtocles, or Ariſtides. In the latter we find all the good ſenſe, prudence, ability in war, valour and greatneſs of ſoul; in the former we ſee nothing but vanity, pride, obſtinacy; the meaneſt and moſt groveling ſentiments, and ſometimes the moſt horrid barbarity.

BOOK THE SEVENTH.

THE ANTIENT HISTORY OF THE Perſians *and* Grecians.

The firſt and third chapters of this book include the hiſtory of the Perſians and Greeks, during forty-eight years and ſome months, which contain the reign of Artaxerxes Longimanus; the laſt ſix years of which anſwer to the ſix firſt of the Peloponneſian war. This ſpace of time begins at the year of the world 3531, and ends at 3579.

The ſecond chapter comprehends the other tranſactions of the Greeks, which happened both in Sicily and Italy, during the interval above-mentioned.

CHAPTER I.

THIS chapter includes the hiſtory of the Perſians and Greeks, from the beginning of Artaxerxes's reign, to the Peloponneſian war, which began in the 42d year of that king's reign.

SECT.

SECT. I. *Artaxerxes ruins the faction of Artabanus, and that of Hyſtaſpes his elder brother.*

(*a*) THE Greek hiſtorians give this prince the ſirname of Longimanus. Strabo (*b*) ſays, it was becauſe his hands were ſo long, that when he ſtood upright he could touch his knees with them; but according to (*c*) Plutarch, it was becauſe his right hand was longer than his left. Had it not been for this blemiſh, he would have been the moſt graceful man of his age. He was ſtill more remarkable for his goodneſs and generoſity. He reigned about forty-nine years.

(*d*) Although Artaxerxes, by the death of Artabanus, was delivered from a dangerous competitor, there ſtill were two obſtacles in his way, before he could eſtabliſh himſelf in the quiet poſſeſſion of his throne; one of which was, his brother Hyſtaſpes, governor of Bactriana; and the other, the faction of Artabanus. He began by the latter.

Artabanus had left ſeven ſons, and a great number of partiſans, who ſoon aſſembled to revenge his death. Theſe, and the adherents of Artaxerxes fought a bloody battle, in which a great number of Perſian nobles loſt their lives. Artaxerxes having at laſt entirely defeated his enemies, put to death all who had engaged in this conſpiracy. He took an exemplary vengeance of thoſe who were concerned in his father's murder, and particularly of Mithridates the eunuch, who had betrayed him, and who was executed in the following manner. (*e*) He was laid on his back in a kind of horſe-trough, and ſtrongly faſtened to the four corners of it. Every part of him, except his head, his hands and feet, which came out at holes made for that purpoſe, was covered with another trough. In this horrid ſituation victuals were given him from time to time; and in caſe of his refuſal to eat it, they were

(*a*) A. M. 3531. Ant. J. C. 473. (*b*) Lib. 15. p. 735. (*c*) In Artax. p. 1011. (*d*) Cteſ. c. 30. (*e*) Plut. in Artax. p. 1019.

forced down his throat: honey mixed with milk was given him to drink, and all his face was ſmeared with it, which by that means attracted a numberleſs multitude of flies, eſpecially as he was perpetually expoſed to the ſcorching rays of the ſun. The worms which bred in his excrements prey'd upon his bowels. The criminal generally lived fifteen or twenty days in inexpreſſible torments.

(*d*) Artaxerxes having cruſhed the faction of Artabanus, was powerful enough to ſend an army into Bactriana, which had declared in favour of his brother, but he was not ſucceſsful on this occaſion. The two armies engaging, Hyſtaſpes ſtood his ground ſo well, that, if he did not gain the victory, he at leaſt ſuſtained no loſs; ſo that both armies ſeparated with equal ſucceſs; and each retired to prepare for a ſecond battle. Artaxerxes having raiſed a greater army than his brother, (not to mention that the whole empire declared in his favour) defeated him in a ſecond engagement, and entirely ruined his party. By this victory he ſecured to himſelf the quiet poſſeſſion of the empire.

(*e*) To maintain himſelf in the throne, he removed all ſuch governors of cities and provinces from their employments, as he ſuſpected to hold a correſpondence with either of the factions he had overcome, and ſubſtituted others on whom he could rely. He afterwards applied himſelf to reforming the abuſes and diſorders which had crept into the government. By his wiſe conduct and zeal for the public good, he ſoon acquired great reputation and authority, with the love of his ſubjects, the ſtrongeſt ſupport of ſovereign power.

SECT. II. *Themiſtocles flies to Artaxerxes.*

(*f*) ACcording to Thucydides, Themiſtocles fled to this prince in the beginning of his reign; but other authors, as Strabo, Plutarch, Diodorus, fix this incident under Xerxes his predeceſſor. Dr. Prideaux is

(*d*) Cteſ. c. 31. (*e*) Diod. l. 11. p. 54. (*f*) A. M. 3531.

of

of the latter opinion; he likewiſe thinks, that the Artaxerxes in queſtion, is the ſame with him who is called Ahaſuerus in ſcripture, and who married Eſther: but we ſuppoſe with the learned archbiſhop Uſher, that it was Darius the ſon of Hyſtaſpes who eſpouſed this illuſtrious Jeweſs. I have already declared more than once, that I would not engage in controverſies of this kind; and therefore, with regard to this flight of Themiſtocles into Perſia, and the hiſtory of Eſther, I ſhall follow the opinion of the learned Uſher, my uſual guide on theſe occaſions.

(*g*) We have ſeen that Themiſtocles had fled to Admetus king of the Moloſſi, and had met with a gracious reception from him: But the Athenians and Lacedæmonians would not ſuffer him to live in peace, and required that prince to deliver him up; threatning, in caſe of his refuſal, to carry their arms into his country. Admetus, who was unwilling to draw ſuch formidable enemies upon himſelf, and much more to deliver up the man who had fled to him for refuge, informed him of the great danger to which he was expoſed, and favoured his flight. Themiſtocles went as far by land as Pydna, a city of Macedonia, and there embarked on board a merchant ſhip which was ſailing to Ionia. None of the paſſengers knew him. A ſtorm having carried this veſſel near the iſland of Naxos, then beſieged by the Athenians; the imminent danger to which Themiſtocles was expoſed, obliged him to diſcover himſelf to the pilot and maſter of the ſhip; after which, by intreaties and menaces, he forced them to ſail towards Aſia.

(*h*) Themiſtocles might on this occaſion call to mind the advice which his father had given him when an infant, *viz.* to lay very little ſtreſs on the favour of the common people. They were then walking together in the harbour. His father, pointing to ſome rotten

(*g*) Thucyd. l. 1. p. 90, 91. Plut. in Themiſt. p. 125, 127. Diod. l. 11. p. 42, 44. Corn. Nep. in Themiſt. c. 8, 10. (*h*) Plut. in Themiſt. p. 112.

gallies that lay neglected on the ſtrand, *Behold there*, ſays he, *ſon*, (pointing to them) *thus do the people treat their governors, when they can do them no farther ſervice.*

He was now arrived in Cumæ, a city of Æolia in Aſia minor. The king of Perſia had ſet a price upon his head, and promiſed two hundred * talents to any man who ſhould deliver him up. The whole coaſt was covered with people, who were watching for him. He fled to Ægæ, a little city of Æolia, where no one knew him except Nicogenes, at whoſe houſe he lodged. He was the moſt wealthy man in that country, and very intimate with all the lords of the Perſian court. Themiſtocles was concealed ſome days in his houſe, till Nicogenes ſent him, under a ſtrong guard, to Suſa, in one of thoſe covered chariots in which the Perſians, who were extremely jealous, uſe to carry their wives; thoſe who carried him telling every body, that they were carrying a young Greek lady to a courtier of great diſtinction.

Being come to the Perſian court, he waited upon the captain of the guards, and told him, that he was a Grecian by birth, and begged the king would admit him to audience, having matters of great importance to communicate to him. The officer informed him of a ceremony, which he knew was inſupportable to ſome Greeks, but without which none were allowed to ſpeak to the king; and this was, to fall proſtrate before him. "Our laws, ſays he, com-"mand us to honour the king in that manner, and "to worſhip him as the living image of the immortal "God, who maintains and preſerves all thing." Themiſtocles promiſed to comply. Being admitted to audience, he fell on his face before the king, after the Perſian manner; and afterwards riſing up, "Great "king †," ſays he by an interpreter, "I am Themiſtocles

* *Two hundred thouſand crowns, or about* 45000 l. *ſterling.*

† *Thucydides makes him ſay very near the ſame words; but informs us, that Themiſtocles did not ſpeak them to the king, but ſent them by way of letter before he was introduced to him.*

" miſtocles the Athenian, who having been baniſhed " by the Greeks, am come to your court in hopes of " finding an aſylum in it. I have indeed brought " many calamities on the Perſians; but, on the other " ſide, I have done them no leſs ſervices, by the ſa- " lutary advices I have given them more than once; " and I now am able to do them more important ſer- " vices than ever. My life is in your hands. You " may now exert your clemency, or diſplay your " vengeance: By the former you will preſerve your " ſuppliant; by the latter you will deſtroy the great- " eſt enemy of Greece."

The king made him no anſwer at this audience, though he was ſtruck with admiration at his great ſenſe and boldneſs; but hiſtory informs us, he told his friends, that he conſidered Themiſtocles's arrival as a very great happineſs; that he implored his god Arimanius always to inſpire his enemies with ſuch thoughts, and to prompt them to baniſh and make away with their moſt illuſtrious perſonages. It is added, that when this king was aſleep, he ſtarted up three times in exceſs of joy, and cried thrice, *I have got Themiſtocles the Athenian!*

The next morning, at day-break, he ſent for the greateſt lords of his court, and commanded Themiſtocles to be brought before him, who expected nothing but deſtruction; eſpecially after what one of his guards, upon hearing his name, had ſaid to him the night before, even in the preſence chamber, juſt as he had left the king, *Thou ſerpent of Greece, thou compound of fraud and malice, the good genius of our prince brings thee hither!* However, the ſerenity which appeared in the king's face ſeemed to promiſe him a favourable reception. Themiſtocles was not miſtaken, for the king began by making him a preſent of two hundred * talents, which ſum he had promiſed to any one who ſhould deliver him up, and which conſequently was his due, as Themiſtocles had brought him his

* *Two hundred thouſand French crowns; or, about* 45000 l. *ſterling.*

head, by ſurrendring himſelf to him. He afterwards deſired him to give an account of the affairs of Greece. But as Themiſtocles could not expreſs his thoughts to the king without the aſſiſtance of an interpreter, he deſired time might be allowed him to learn the Perſian tongue; hoping he then ſhould be able to explain thoſe things he was deſirous of communicating to him, better than he could by the aid of a third perſon. It is the ſame, ſays he, with the ſpeech of a man, as with a piece of tapeſtry, which muſt be ſpread out and unfolded, to ſhow the figures and other beauties wrought in it. Themiſtocles having ſtudied the Perſian tongue twelve months, made ſo great a progreſs, that he ſpoke it with greater elegance than the Perſians themſelves, and conſequently could converſe with the king without the help of an interpreter. This prince treated him with uncommon marks of friendſhip and eſteem; he made him marry a lady deſcended from one of the nobleſt families in Perſia; gave him a palace and an equipage ſuitable to it, and ſettled a noble penſion on him. He uſed to carry him abroad on his parties of hunting, and every banquet and entertainment; and ſometimes converſed privately with him, ſo that the lords of the court grew jealous and uneaſy upon that account. He even preſented him to the princeſſes, who honoured him with their eſteem, and received his viſits. It is obſerved, as a proof of the peculiar favour ſhewed him, that by the king's ſpecial order, Themiſtocles was admitted to hear the lectures and diſcourſes of the Magi, and was inſtructed by them in all the ſecrets of their philoſophy.

Another proof of his great credit is related. Demaratus of Sparta, who was then at court, being commanded by the king to aſk any thing of him, he deſired that he might be ſuffered to make his entry on horſeback, into the city of Sardes, with the royal tiara on his head: a ridiculous vanity! equally unworthy of the Grecian grandeur, and the ſimplicity of a Lacedæmonian! The king, exaſperated at the inſolence

lence of his demand, expreſſed his diſguſt in the ſtrongeſt terms, and ſeemed reſolved not to pardon him: but Themiſtocles having interceded, the king reſtored him to favour.

In fine, Themiſtocles was in ſuch great credit, that under the ſucceeding reigns, in which the affairs of Perſia were ſtill more mixed with thoſe of Greece, whenever the kings were deſirous of drawing over any Greek to their intereſt, they uſed to declare expreſsly in their letters, that he ſhould be in greater favour with them, than Themiſtocles had been with king Artaxerxes.

It is ſaid alſo that Themiſtocles, when in his moſt flouriſhing condition in Perſia, he was honoured and eſteemed by all the world, who were emulous in making their court to him, ſaid one day, when his table was covered magnificently: *Children, we ſhould have been ruined, if we had not been ruined.*

But at laſt, as it was judged neceſſary for the king's intereſt that Themiſtocles ſhould reſide in ſome city of Aſia minor, that he might be ready on any occaſion which ſhould preſent itſelf; accordingly he was ſent to Magneſia, ſituated on the Meander; and for his ſubſiſtence, beſides the whole revenues of that city, (which amounted to fifty * talents every year) had thoſe of Myunte and Lampſacus aſſigned him. One of the cities was to furniſh him with bread, another with wine, and a third with other proviſions. Some authors add two more, *viz.* for his furniture and clothes. Such was the cuſtom of the antient kings of the eaſt: inſtead of ſettling penſions on perſons they rewarded, they gave them cities and ſometimes even provinces, which, under the name of bread, wine, *&c.* were to furniſh them abundantly with all things neceſſary for ſupporting in a magnificent manner their family and equipage. Themiſtocles lived for ſome years in Magneſia in the utmoſt ſplendor, till he came to his end in the manner which will be related hereafter.

* *Fifty thouſand crowns; or, about* 11250 l. *ſterling.*

SECT. III. *Cimon begins to make a figure at Athens. His firſt atchievement and double victory over the Perſians, near the river Eurymedon. Death of Themiſtocles.*

(*i*) THE Athenians having loſt one of their moſt diſtinguiſhed citizens, as well as ableſt generals, by the baniſhment of Themiſtocles, endeavoured to retrieve that loſs, by beſtowing the command of the armies on Cimon, who was not inferior to him in merit.

He ſpent his youth in ſuch exceſſes as did him no honour, and preſaged no good with regard to his future conduct. (*k*) The example of this illuſtrious Athenian, who paſſed his juvenile years in ſo diſſolute a manner, and afterwards roſe to ſo exalted a pitch of glory, ſhow, that parents muſt not always deſpair of the happineſs of a ſon, when wild and irregular in his youth; eſpecially when nature has endued him with genius, goodneſs of heart, generous inclinations, and an eſteem for perſons of merit. Such was the character of Cimon. The ill reputation he had drawn upon himſelf, having prejudiced the people againſt him, he at firſt was very ill received by them; when, being diſcouraged by this repulſe, he reſolved to lay aſide all thoughts of concerning himſelf with the affairs of the public. But Ariſtides perceiving that his diſſolute turn of mind was united with many fine qualities, he conſoled him, inſpired him with hope, pointed out the paths he ſhould take, inſtilled good principles into him, and did not a little contribute, by the excellent inſtructions he gave him, and the affection he expreſſed for him on all occaſions, to make him the man he afterwards appeared. What more important ſervice could he have done his country?

(*l*) Plutarch obſerves, that after Cimon had laid aſide his juvenile extravagances, his conduct was in all things

(*i*) A. M. 3534. Ant. J. C. 470. Diod. l. 11. p. 45. Plut. in Cim. p. 482, 483. (*k*) Plut. in Cim. p. 480. (*l*) Ibid. p. 481.

great

great and noble; and that he was not inferior to Miltiades either in courage or intrepidity, nor to Themiſtocles in prudence and ſenſe, but that he was more juſt and virtuous than either of them; and that without being at all inferior to them in military virtues, he ſurpaſſed them far in the practice of the moral ones.

It would be of great advantage to a ſtate, if thoſe who excel in profeſſions of every kind, would take pleaſure, and make it their duty to faſhion and inſtruct ſuch youths as are remarkable for the pregnancy of their parts and goodneſs of diſpoſition. They would thereby have an opportunity of ſerving their country even after their death, and of perpetuating in it, in the perſon of their pupils, a taſte and inclination for true merit, and the practice of the wiſeſt maxims.

The Athenians, a little after Themiſtocles had left his country, having put to ſea a fleet under the command of Cimon the ſon of Miltiades, took Eion, on the banks of the Strymon, Amphipolis, and other places of Thrace: and as this was a very fruitful country, Cimon planted a colony in it, and ſent ten thouſand Athenians thither for that purpoſe.

(*m*) The fate of Eion is of too ſingular a kind to be omitted here. Boges * was governor of it under the king of Perſia, and acted with ſuch a zeal and fidelity for his ſovereign, as have few examples. When beſieged by Cimon and the Athenians, it was in his power to have capitulated upon honourable terms, and he might have retired to Aſia with his family and all his effects. However, being perſuaded he could not do this with honour, he reſolved to die rather than ſurrender. The city was aſſaulted with the utmoſt fury, and he defended it with incredible bravery. Being at laſt in the utmoſt want of proviſions, he threw from the walls into the river Strymon, all the gold and

(*m*) Herod. l. 7. c. 107. Plut. p. 482.

* *Plutarch calls him Butis. Herodotus ſeems to place this hiſtory under Xerxes; but it is more probable, that it happened under Artaxerxes his ſucceſſor.*

ſilver

ſilver in the place; and cauſing fire to be ſet to a pile, and having killed his wife, his children, and his whole family, he threw them into the midſt of the flames, and afterwards ruſhed into them himſelf. Xerxes could not but admire, and at the ſame time bewail, ſo ſurprizing an example of generoſity. The heathens, indeed, might give this name to what is rather ſavage ferocity and barbarity.

Cimon made himſelf maſter alſo of the iſland of Scyros, where he found the bones of Theſeus the ſon of Ægeus, who had fled from Athens to that city, and there ended his days. An oracle had commanded that ſearch ſhould be made after his bones. Cimon put them on board his galley, adorned them magnificently, and carried them to his native country, near eight hundred years after Theſeus had left it. The people received them with the higheſt expreſſions of joy; and, to perpetuate the remembrance of this event, they founded a diſputation or prize for tragic writers, which became very famous, and contributed exceedingly to the improvement of the drama, by the wonderful emulation it excited among the tragic poets, whoſe pieces were repreſented in it. For Sophocles having, in his youth, brought his firſt play on the ſtage, the archon, or chief magiſtrate who preſided at theſe games, obſerving there was a ſtrong faction among the ſpectators, prevailed with Cimon, and the reſt of the generals his collegues, (who were ten in number, and choſen out of each tribe) to ſit as judges. The prize was adjudged to Sophocles, which ſo deeply afflicted Æſchylus, who till then had been conſidered as the greateſt dramatic poet, that Athens became inſupportable to him, and he withdrew to Sicily, where he died.

(*n*) The confederates had taken a great number of Barbarian priſoners in Seſtus and Byzantium; and, as a proof of the high regard they had for Cimon, intreated him to diſtribute the booty. Accordingly

(*n*) Plut. in Cim. p. 484.

Cimon

Cimon placed all the captives, (ſtark naked) on one ſide, and on the other all their riches and ſpoils. The allies complained of this partition as too unequal; but Cimon giving them the choice, they immediately took the riches which had belonged to the Perſians, and left the priſoners for the Athenians. Cimon therefore ſet out with his portion, and was thought a perſon no ways qualified to ſettle the diſtribution of prizes: For the allies carried off a great number of chains, necklaces and bracelets of gold; a large quantity of rich habits, and fine purple cloaks; whilſt the Athenians had only for their ſhare a multitude of human creatures quite naked, and unfit for labour. However, the relations and friends of theſe captives came ſoon after from Phrygia and Lydia, and purchaſed them all at a very high price; ſo that, with the monies ariſing from the ranſom of them, Cimon had enough to maintain his fleet four months; beſides a great ſum of money which was put into the exchequer, not to mention what he himſelf had for his own ſhare. He afterwards uſed to take exceeding pleaſure, in relating this adventure to his friends.

(*o*) He made the beſt uſe of his riches, as Gorgias the rhetor has happily expreſſed it in few, but ſtrong and elegant words. * *Cimon*, ſays he, *amaſſed riches, only to uſe them; and he employed them to no other uſe, but to acquire eſteem and honour.* We may here perceive (by the way) what was the ſcope and aim of the moſt exalted actions of the heathens; and with what juſtice Tertullian defined a pagan, how perfect ſoever he might appear, a vain-glorious animal, *animal gloriæ.* The gardens and orchards of Cimon were always open, by his order, to the citizens in general; who were allowed to gather whatever fruits they pleaſed. His table was daily covered in a frugal, but polite manner.

(*o*) Plut. in Cim. p. 484. Cornel. Nep. in Cim. c. 4. Athen. l. 12. p. 533.

* Φησὶ τ Κίμωνα τὰ χρήματα κλῶδαι μὲν ὡς χρῶτο, χρῆσθαι δὲ ὡς τιμῶτο.

It

It was entirely different from thoſe delicate and ſumptuous tables, to which only a few perſons of great diſtinction are admitted; and which are covered meerly to diſplay a vain magnificence or elegance of taſte. Now that of Cimon was plain, but abundant; and all the poor citizens were received at it without diſtinction. In thus baniſhing from his entertainments, whatever had the leaſt air of oſtentation and luxury, he reſerved to himſelf an inexhauſtible fund, not only for the expences of his houſe, but for the wants of his friends, his domeſticks, and a very great number of citizens; demonſtrating, by this conduct, that he knew much better than moſt rich men, the true uſe and value of riches.

He was always followed by ſome ſervants, who were ordered to ſlip privately ſome piece of money into the hands of ſuch poor as they met, and to give clothes to thoſe who were in want of them. He often buried ſuch perſons as had not left money enough behind them to defray the expences of their funeral; and what is admirable, and which Plutarch does not fail to obſerve, he did not act in this manner, to gain credit among the people, nor to purchaſe their voices; ſince we find him, on all occaſions, declaring for the contrary faction, that is, in favour of ſuch citizens as were moſt conſiderable for their wealth or authority.

(p) Although he ſaw all the reſt of the governors of his time enrich themſelves by the plunder and oppreſſion of the public, he was always incorruptible, and his hands were never ſtained with extortion or the ſmalleſt preſent; and he continued, during his whole life, not only to ſpeak, but to act, ſpontaneouſly and without the leaſt view of intereſt, whatever he thought might be of advantage to the commonwealth.

Beſides a great number of other excellent qualities, Cimon had the fineſt ſenſe, extraordinary prudence, and a profound knowledge of the genius and charac-

(p) Plut. in Cim. p. 485.

ters of men. The allies, beſides the ſums of money in which each of them was taxed, were to furniſh a certain number of men and ſhips. Several among them, who, from the retreat of Xerxes, were ſtudious of nothing but their eaſe, and applied themſelves entirely to tilling and cultivating their lands, to free themſelves from the toils and dangers of war, choſe to furniſh their quota in money rather than in men, and left the Athenians the care of manning with ſoldiers and rowers, the ſhips they were obliged to furniſh. The other generals, who had no forecaſt and penetration for the future, gave ſuch people ſome uneaſineſs at firſt, and were for obliging them to obſerve the treaty literally. But Cimon, when in power, acted in a quite different manner, and ſuffered them to enjoy the tranquillity they choſe; plainly perceiving that the allies, from being warlike in the field, would inſenſibly loſe their martial ſpirit, and be fit for nothing but huſbandry and trade; whilſt the Athenians, by exerciſing the oar perpetually, would be more and more inured to hardſhips, and daily increaſe in power. What Cimon had foreſeen happened; this very people purchaſed themſelves maſters at their own expence; ſo that they who before had been companions and allies, became in ſome meaſure the ſubjects and tributaries of the Athenians.

(q) No Grecian general ever gave ſo great a blow to the pride and haughtineſs of the Perſian monarch as Cimon. After the Barbarians had been driven out of Greece, he did not give them time to take breath; but ſailed immediately after them with a fleet of upwards of two hundred ſhips, took their ſtrongeſt cities, and brought over all their allies; ſo that the king of Perſia had not one ſoldier left in Aſia, from Ionia to Pamphylia. Still purſuing his point he bravely attacked the enemy's fleet, though much ſtronger than his own. It lay near the mouth of the river Eurymedon,

(q) A. M. 3534. Ant. J. C. 470. Plut. in Cim. p. 485—487. Thucyd. l. 1. p. 66. Diod. l. 11. p. 45—47.

medon, and conſiſted of three hundred and fifty ſail of ſhips, ſupported by the land-army on the coaſt. It was ſoon put to flight; and two hundred ſail were taken, beſides thoſe that were ſunk. A great number of the Perſians had left their ſhips and leapt into the ſea, in order to join their land-army, which lay on the ſhore. It was very hazardous to attempt a deſcent in ſight of the enemy; and to lead on troops, which were already fatigued by their late battle, againſt freſh forces much ſuperior in number. However Cimon, finding that the whole army was eager to engage the Barbarians, thought proper to take advantage of the ardour of the ſoldiers, who were greatly animated with their firſt ſucceſs. Accordingly he * landed, and marched them directly againſt the Barbarians, who waited reſolutely for their coming up, and ſuſtained the firſt onſet with prodigious valour; however, being at laſt obliged to give way, they broke and fled. A great ſlaughter enſued, and an infinite number of priſoners, and immenſely-rich ſpoils were taken. Cimon having, in one day, gained two victories which almoſt equalled thoſe of Salamin and Platææ; to crown all, ſailed out to meet a reinforcement of eighty-four Phœnician ſhips, which were come from Cyprus, to join the Perſian fleet, and knew nothing of what had paſſed. They were all either taken or ſunk, and moſt of the ſoldiers were killed or drowned.

Cimon having atchieved ſuch glorious exploits, returned in triumph to Athens; and employed part of the ſpoils in fortifying the harbour, and in beautifying the city. The riches which a general amaſſes in the field, are applied to the nobleſt uſes when they are diſpoſed of in this manner; and muſt reflect infinitely greater honour upon him, than if he expended them in building magnificent palaces for himſelf, which muſt

* *We don't find that the antients made uſe of long-boats in making deſcents; the reaſon of which perhaps was, that as their gallies were flat-bottomed, they were brought to ſhore without any difficulty.*

one

one time or other devolve on ſtrangers; whereas works, built for public uſe, are his property in ſome meaſure for ever, and tranſmit his name to the lateſt poſterity. (r) It is well known that ſuch embelliſhments in a city give infinite pleaſure to the people, who are always ſtruck with works of this kind; and this, as Plutarch obſerves in the life of Cimon, is one of the ſureſt, and at the ſame time the moſt lawful method of acquiring their friendſhip and eſteem.

(s) The year following, this general ſailed towards the Helleſpont; and having drove the Perſians out of the Thracian Cherſoneſus, of which they had poſſeſſed themſelves, he conquered it in the name of the Athenians, though he himſelf had more right to it, as Miltiades his father had been its ſovereign. He afterwards attacked the people of the iſland of Thaſus, who had revolted from the Athenians, and defeated their fleet. Theſe maintained their revolt with an almoſt unparallelled obſtinacy and fury. (t) As if they had been in arms againſt the moſt cruel and barbarous enemies, from whom they had the worſt of evils to fear, they made a law, that the firſt man who ſhould only mention the concluding a treaty with the Athenians, ſhould be put to death. The ſiege was carried on three years, during which the inhabitants ſuffered all the calamities of war with the ſame obſtinacy. (u) The women were no leſs inflexible than the men; for the beſieged wanting ropes for their military engines, all the women cut off their hair in a ſeeming tranſport; and when the city was in the utmoſt diſtreſs by famine, which ſwept away a great number of the inhabitants, Hegetorides the Thaſian, deeply afflicted with ſeeing ſuch multitudes of his fellow-citizens periſh, reſolutely determined to ſacrifice his life for the preſervation of his country. Accordingly he put a halter round his neck, and preſenting him-

(r) Plut. de gerend. rep. p. 818. Thucyd. l. 1. p. 66, 67. Diod. l. 11. p. 53.
(s) Plut. in Cim. p. 487.
(t) Polyæn. Str. l. 2.
(u) Polyæn. l. 8.

ſelf

ſelf to the aſſembly, "Countrymen," ſays he, "do "with me as you pleaſe, and don't ſpare me if you "judge proper: but let my death ſave the reſt of the "people, and prevail with you to aboliſh the cruel "law you have enacted, ſo contrary to your welfare." The Thaſians ſtruck with theſe words, aboliſhed the law, but would not ſuffer it to coſt ſo generous a citizen his life; for they ſurrendred themſelves to the Athenians, who ſpared their lives and only diſmantled their city.

After Cimon had landed his troops on the ſhore oppoſite to Thrace, he ſeized on all the gold mines of thoſe coaſts, and ſubdued every part of that country as far as Macedonia. He might have attempted the conqueſt of that kingdom; and, in all probability, could have eaſily poſſeſſed himſelf of part of it, had he improved the occaſion. And indeed, for his neglect in this point, at his return to Athens, he was proſecuted, as having been bribed by the money of the Macedonians and of Alexander their king. But Cimon had a ſoul ſuperior to all temptations of that kind, and proved his innocence in the cleareſt light.

(x) The conqueſts of Cimon and the power of the Athenians, which increaſed every day, gave Artaxerxes great uneaſineſs. To prevent the conſequences of it, he reſolved to ſend Themiſtocles into Attica, with a great army, and accordingly propoſed it to him.

Themiſtocles was in great perplexity on this occaſion. On one ſide, the remembrance of the favours the king had heaped upon him; the poſitive aſſurances he had given that monarch, to ſerve him with the utmoſt zeal on all occaſions; the inſtances of the king who claimed his promiſe; all theſe conſiderations would not permit him to refuſe the commiſſion. On the other ſide, the love of his country, which the injuſtice and ill treatment of his fellow-citizens could

(x) A. M. 3538. Ant. J. C. 466. Thucyd. l. 1. p. 92. Plut. in Themiſt. p. 127.

not

not baniſh from his mind; his ſtrong reluctance to ſully the glory of his former laurels and mighty atchievements by ſo ignominious a ſtep; perhaps too, the fear of being unſucceſsful in a war, in which he ſhould be oppoſed by excellent generals, and particularly Cimon, who ſeemed to be as ſucceſsful as valiant; theſe different reflections would not ſuffer him to declare againſt his country, in an enterprize, which, whether ſucceſsful or not, would reflect ſhame on himſelf.

To rid himſelf at once of all theſe inward ſtruggles, he reſolved to put * an end to his life, as the only method for him not to be wanting in the duty he owed his country, nor to the promiſes he had made that prince. He therefore prepared a ſolemn ſacrifice, to which he invited all his friends; when, after embracing them all, and taking a laſt farewel of them, he drank bull's blood, or, according to others, ſwallowed a doſe of poiſon, and died in this manner at Magneſia, aged threeſcore and five years, the greateſt part of which he had ſpent either in the government of the republic, or the command of the armies. (y) When the king was told the cauſe and manner of his death, he eſteemed and admired him ſtill more, and continued his favour to his friends and domeſtics. But the unexpected death of Themiſtocles proved an obſtacle to the deſign he meditated of attacking the Greeks. The Magneſians erected a ſplendid monument to the memory of that general in the public ſquare, and granted peculiar privileges and honours to his deſcendants. They continued to enjoy them in Plutarch's time, that is, near ſix hundred years after, and his tomb was ſtill ſtanding.

(z) Atticus, in the beautiful dialogue of Cicero, entitled Brutus, refutes, in an agreeable and ingenious manner, the tragical end which ſome writers aſcribe to Themiſtocles, as related above; pretending that the

(y) Cic. de Senec. n. 72. (z) Brut. n. 42, 43.

* *The wiſeſt heathens did not think that a man was allowed to lay violent hands on himſelf.*

whole

whole is a fiction, invented by rhetoricians, who, on the bare rumour that this great man had poiſoned himſelf, had added all the other particulars to embelliſh the ſtory, which otherwiſe would have been very dry and unaffecting. He appeals for this to Thucydides, that judicious hiſtorian, who was an Athenian, and almoſt cotemporary with Themiſtocles. This author indeed owns, that a report had prevailed, that this general had poiſoned himſelf; however, his opinion was, that he died a natural death, and that his friends conveyed his bones ſecretly to Athens, where, in (*a*) Pauſanias's time, his mauſolæum was ſtanding near the great harbour. This account ſeems much more probable than the other.

Themiſtocles was certainly one of the greateſt men that Greece ever produced. He had a great ſoul, an invincible courage, which danger even enflamed; was fired with an incredible thirſt for glory, which ſometimes his country's love would temper and allay, but which ſometimes carried him too far; * his preſence of mind was ſuch, that it immediately ſuggeſted whatever it was moſt neceſſary to act: In fine, he had a ſagacity and penetration with regard to futurity, that revealed to him, in the cleareſt light, the moſt ſecret deſigns of his enemies; pointing out to him at a diſtance, the ſeveral meaſures he ſhould take to diſconcert them, and inſpired him with great, noble, bold, extenſive views with regard to the honour of his country. The moſt eſſential qualities of the mind were however wanting in him, I mean, ſincerity, integrity, and fidelity: nor was he altogether free from ſuſpicions of avarice, which is a great blemiſh in ſuch as are charged with public affairs.

(*b*) Nevertheleſs, a noble ſentiment as well as action are related of him, which ſpeak a great and diſinte-

(*a*) Lib. 1. p. 1.

(*b*) Plut. in Themiſt. p. 121.

* De inſtantibus, ut ait Thucydides, veriſſimè judicabat, & de futuris callidiſſimè conjiciebat. *Corn. Nep. in Themiſt.* cap. 1.

reſted

rested soul. † His daughter being asked of him in marriage, he preferred an honest poor man to a rich one of an indifferent character; and gave for his reason, *That in the choice of a son-in-law, he would much rather have merit without riches, than riches without merit.*

SECT. IV. *The Egyptians rise against Persia, supported by the Athenians.*

(c) ABOUT this time the Egyptians, to free themselves from a foreign yoke which was insupportable to them, revolted from Artaxerxes, and made Inarus, prince of the Lybians, their king. They demanded aid of the Athenians, who having at that time a fleet of two hundred ships at the island of Cyprus, accepted the invitation with pleasure, and immediately set sail for Egypt; judging this a very favourable opportunity to weaken the power of the Persians, by driving them out of so great a kingdom.

(d) Advice being brought Artaxerxes of this revolt, he raised an army of three hundred thousand men, and resolved to march in person against the rebels. But his friends advising him not to venture himself in that expedition, he gave the command of it to Achæmenes, one of his brothers. The latter being arrived in Egypt, encamped his great army on the banks of the Nile. During this interval, the Athenians having defeated the Persian fleet, and either destroyed or taken fifty of their ships; they went again up that river, landed their forces under the command of Charitimis their general; and having joined Inarus and his Egyptians, they charged Achæmenes, and defeated him in a great battle, in which that Persian general, and an hundred thousand of his soldiers were slain. Those

(c) A. M. 3538. Ant. J. C. 460. Thucyd. l. 1. p. 68. & 71, 72. Ctes. c. 32—35. Diod. l. 11. p. 54—59. (d) A. M. 3545. Ant. J. C. 459.

† Themistocles, cùm consuleretur utrum bono viro pauperi, an minùs probato diviti filiam collocaret: EGO VERO, inquit, MALO VIRUM QUI PECUNIA EGEAT, QUAM PECUNIAM QUÆ VIRO. *Cic. de offic.* l. 2. c. 71.

who

who escaped fled to Memphis, whither the conquerors pursued them, and immediately made themselves masters of two quarters of the city: but the Persians having fortified themselves in the third, called the *white wall*, which was the largest and strongest of the three, they were besieged in it near three years, during which they made a most vigorous defence, till they were at last delivered by the forces sent to their aid.

(*e*) Artaxerxes hearing of the defeat of his army, and how much the Athenians had contributed to it; to make a diversion of their forces, and oblige them to turn their arms another way, he sent ambassadors to the Lacedæmonians, with a large sum of money, to engage them to proclaim war against the Athenians. But the Lacedæmonians having rejected the offer, their refusal did not abate his ardor, and accordingly he gave Megabysus (*f*) and Artabazus the command of the forces designed against Egypt. These generals immediately raised an army of three hundred thousand men in Cilicia and Phœnicia. They were obliged to wait till the fleet was equipped, which was not till the next year. (*g*) Artabazus then took upon him the command of it, and sailed towards the Nile, whilst Megabysus, at the head of the land-army, marched towards Memphis. He raised the siege of that city, and afterwards fought Inarus. All the forces on both sides engaged in this battle, in which Inarus was entirely defeated: but the Egyptians, who had rebelled, suffered most in this slaughter. After this defeat, Inarus, though wounded by Megabysus, retreated with the Athenians, and such Egyptians as were willing to follow him; and reached Biblos, a city in the island of Prosopitis, which is surrounded by two arms of the Nile, and both navigable. The Athenians ran their fleet into one of these arms, where it was secured from the attacks of the enemy, and held out a siege of a year and a half in this island.

(*e*) A. M. 3546. Ant. J. C. 448. (*f*) A. M. 3547. Ant. J. C. 457. (*g*) A. M. 3548. Ant. J. C. 456.

After

After the battle, all the reſt of Egypt ſubmitted to the conqueror, and was reunited to the empire of Artaxerxes, except Amyrteus, who had ſtill a ſmall party in the fens, where he long ſupported himſelf, through the difficulty the Perſians found in penetrating far enough to reduce him.

(*b*) The ſiege of Proſopotis was ſtill carrying on. The Perſians finding that they made no advances in attacking it after the uſual methods, becauſe of the ſtratagems and intrepidity of the beſieged, they therefore had recourſe to an extraordinary expedient, which ſoon produced what force had not been able to effect. They turned the courſe, by different canals, of the arm of the Nile in which the Athenians lay, and by that means opened themſelves a paſſage for their whole army to enter the iſland. Inarus ſeeing that all was loſt, compounded with Megabyſus for himſelf, for all his Egyptians, and about fifty Athenians, and ſurrendred upon condition that their lives ſhould be ſpared. The remainder of the auxiliary forces, which formed a body of ſix thouſand men, reſolved to hold out longer; and for this purpoſe they ſet fire to their ſhips, and drawing up in order of battle, reſolved to die ſword in hand, and ſell their lives as dear as they could, in imitation of the Lacedæmonians, who refuſed to yield, and were all cut to pieces at Thermopylæ. The Perſians, hearing they had taken ſo deſperate a reſolution, did not think it adviſable to attack them. A peace was therefore offered them, with a promiſe that they ſhould all be permitted to leave Egypt, and have free paſſage to their native country either by ſea or land. They accepted the conditions, put the conquerors in poſſeſſion of Biblos and of the whole iſland, and went by ſea to Cyrene, where they embarked for Greece: but moſt of the ſoldiers who had ſerved in this expedition periſhed in it.

But this was not the only loſs the Athenians ſuſtained on this occaſion. Another fleet of fifty ſhips, which

(*b*) A. M. 3550. Ant. J. C. 454.

they

they ſent to the aid of their beſieged countrymen, ſailed up one of the arms of the Nile, (juſt after the Athenians had ſurrendred) to diſengage them, not knowing what had happened. But the inſtant they entered, the Perſian fleet, which kept out at ſea, followed them and attacked their rear, whilſt the army diſcharged ſhowers of darts upon them from the banks of the river; thus only a few ſhips eſcaped, which opened themſelves a way through the enemy's fleet, and all the reſt were loſt. Here ended the fatal war carried on by the Athenians for ſix years in Egypt, which kingdom was now united again to the Perſian empire, and continued ſo during the reſt of the reign of Artaxerxes, of which this is the twentieth (*i*) year. But the priſoners who were taken in this war met with the moſt unhappy fate.

SECT. V. *Inarus is delivered up to the king's mother, contrary to the articles of the treaty. The affliction of Megabyſus, who revolts.*

(*k*) ARTAXERXES, after refuſing to gratify the requeſt of his mother, who for five years together had been daily importuning him to put Inarus and his Athenians into her hands, in order that ſhe might ſacrifice them to the manes of Achæmenes her ſon, at laſt yielded to her ſollicitations. But how blind, how barbarouſly weak muſt this king have been, to break through the moſt ſolemn engagements merely through complaiſance; who, (deaf to remorſe) violated the law of nations, ſolely to avoid offending a moſt unjuſt mother. (*l*) This inhuman princeſs, without regard to the faith of ſolemn treaties, cauſed Inarus to be crucified, and beheaded all the reſt. Megabyſus was in the deepeſt affliction on that account; for as he had promiſed that no injury ſhould be done them, the affront reflected principally on him. He therefore left the court, and withdrew to Syria, of

(*i*) A. M. 3550. Ant. J. C. 454. (*k*) A. M. 3556. Ant. J. C. 448. Cteſ. c. 35—40. (*l*) Thucyd. l. 1. p. 72.

which

which he was governor; and his diſcontent was ſo great, that he raiſed an army and revolted openly.

(*m*) The king ſent Oſiris, who was one of the greateſt lords of the court, againſt him with an army of two hundred thouſand men. Megabyſus engaged Oſiris, wounded him, took him priſoner, and put his army to flight. Artaxerxes ſending to demand Oſiris, Megabyſus generouſly diſmiſſed him, as ſoon as his wounds were cured.

(*n*) The next year Artaxerxes ſent another army againſt him, the command of which he gave to Menoſtanes, ſon to Artarius the king's brother, and governor of Babylon. This general was not more fortunate than the former. He alſo was defeated and put to flight, and Megabyſus gained as ſignal a victory as the former.

Artaxerxes finding he could not reduce him by force of arms, ſent his brother Artarius and Amytis his ſiſter, who was the wife of Megabyſus, with ſeveral other perſons of the firſt quality, to perſuade the latter to return to his allegiance. They ſucceeded in their negotiation; the king pardoned him, and he returned to court.

One day as they were hunting, a lion raiſing himſelf on his hinder feet, was going to ruſh upon the king, when Megabyſus ſeeing the danger he was in, and fired with zeal and affection for his ſovereign, hurled a dart at the lion, which killed him. But Artaxerxes, upon pretence that he had affronted him, in darting at the lion firſt, commanded Megabyſus's head to be ſtruck off: Amytis the king's ſiſter, and Ameſtris, with the greateſt difficulty prevailed upon the king to change this ſentence into perpetual baniſhment. Megabyſus was therefore ſent to Cyrta, a city on the Red ſea, and condemned to end his days there: However, five years after, diſguiſing himſelf like a leper, he made his eſcape and returned to Suſa, where,

(*m*) A. M. 3557. Ant. J. C. 447. (*n*) A. M. 3558. Ant. J. C. 446.

by the aſſiſtance of his wife and mother-in-law, he was reſtored to favour, and continued ſo till his death, which happened ſome years after, in the ſeventy-ſixth year of his age. Megabyſus was extremely regretted by the king and the whole court. He was a man of the greateſt abilities in the kingdom, and at the ſame time the beſt general. Artaxerxes owed both his crown and life to him: * but it is of dangerous conſequence for a ſubject, when his ſovereign is under too many obligations to him. This was the cauſe of all the misfortunes of Megabyſus.

It is ſurprizing that ſo judicious a prince as Artaxerxes ſhould have been ſo imprudent, as to be fired with jealouſy againſt a nobleman of his court, merely becauſe in a party of hunting, he had wounded the beaſt they were purſuing before him. Could any thing be ſo weak; and was this placing the point of honour in a manner worthy a king? Nevertheleſs, hiſtory furniſhes us with many inſtances of this kind. I am apt to believe, from ſome expreſſions of (o) Plutarch, that Artaxerxes was aſhamed of the wild fury to which this falſe delicacy had raiſed him, and that he made ſome public kind of atonement for it: For, according to this author, he publiſhed a decree, importing, that any man who was hunting with the king, ſhould be allowed to throw his javelin firſt at the beaſt, if opportunity ſhould offer; and he, according to Plutarch, was the firſt Perſian monarch who granted ſuch a permiſſion.

SECT. VI. *Artaxerxes ſends Eſdras and afterwards Nehemiah to Jeruſalem.*

BEFORE I proceed in the hiſtory of the Perſians and Greeks, I ſhall relate, in few words, the ſeveral things which happened to the people of God

(o) Plut. in Apophthegm. p. 173.

* Beneficia eò uſque læta ſunt, dum videntur exolvi poſſe: ubi multum antevertere, pro gratia odium redditur. *Tacit. Anal.* l. 4. c. 18.

during

during the firſt twenty years of Artaxerxes, which is an eſſential part of the hiſtory of that prince.

(*p*) In the ſeventh year of the reign of Artaxerxes, Eſdras obtained of the king and his ſeven counſellors an ample commiſſion, impowering him to return to Jeruſalem with all ſuch Jews as would follow him thither, in order to ſettle the Jewiſh government and religion agreeably to their own laws. Eſdras was deſcended from Saraia, who was high-prieſt of Jeruſalem, when deſtroyed by Nabuchodonoſor, and was put to death by his command. Eſdras was a very learned and pious man, and was chiefly diſtinguiſhed from the reſt of the Jews, by his great knowledge in the ſcriptures; it being ſaid of him, (*q*) *That he was very ready in the law of Moſes that was given by the God of Iſrael.* He now ſet out from Babylon with the gifts and offerings which the king, his courtiers, and ſuch Iſraelites as had ſtaid in Babylon, had put into his hands for the ſervice of the temple, and which he gave to the prieſts upon his arrival in Jeruſalem. It appears by the commiſſion which Artaxerxes gave him, that this prince had a high veneration for the God of Iſrael, as, in commanding his officers to furniſh the Jews with all things neceſſary for their worſhip, he adds, (*r*) *Let all things be performed after the law of God diligently, unto the moſt high God, that wrath come not upon the kingdom of the king and his ſon.* This commiſſion, as I obſerved, impowered him to ſettle the religion and government of the Jews, purſuant to the law of Moſes; to appoint magiſtrates and judges to puniſh evil doers, not only by impriſoning their perſons, and confiſcating their poſſeſſions, but alſo by ſending them into baniſhment, and even ſentencing them to death, according to the crimes they ſhould commit. Such was the power with which Eſdras was inveſted, and which he exerciſed faithfully during

(*p*) A. M. 3537. Ant. J. C. 467. Eſdr. c. vii, &c. (*q*) Eſdras I. c. viii. v. 3. (*r*) Eſdras I. c. viii. v. 21.

thirteen years, till (*r*) Nehemiah brought a new commiſſion from the Perſian court.

(*s*) Nehemiah was alſo a Jew of diſtinguiſhed merit and piety, and one of the cup-bearers to king Artaxerxes. This was a very conſiderable employment in the Perſian court, becauſe of the privilege annexed to it, *viz.* of being often near the king's perſon, and of being allowed to ſpeak to him in the moſt favourable moments. However, neither his exalted ſtation, nor the ſettlement of his family in that land of captivity, could obliterate from his mind the country of his anceſtors, nor their religion: neither his love for the one, nor his zeal for the other, were abated; and his heart was ſtill in Sion. Some Jews who were come from Jeruſalem, having informed him of the ſad ſtate of that city, that its walls lay in ruin, its gates were burnt down, and the inhabitants thereby expoſed to the inſults of their enemies, and made the ſcorn of all their neighbours; the affliction of his brethren, and the dangers with which they were menaced, made ſuch an impreſſion on his mind, as might naturally be expected from one of his piety. One day as he was waiting upon the king, the latter obſerving an unuſual air of melancholy in Nehemiah's countenance, aſked him the cauſe of it; a proof that this monarch had a tenderneſs of heart rarely found in kings, and which is nevertheleſs much more valuable than the moſt ſhining qualities. Nehemiah took this opportunity to acquaint him with the calamitous ſtate of his country; owned that was the ſubject of his grief; and humbly intreated that leave might be given him to go to Jeruſalem, in order to repair the fortifications of it. The kings of Perſia his predeceſſors had permitted the Jews to rebuild the temple, but not the walls of Jeruſalem. But Artaxerxes immediately decreed, that the walls and gates of Jeruſalem ſhould be rebuilt; and Nehemiah, as governor of Judea, was appointed to put this decree in execution. The king,

(*r*) A. M. 3550. Ant. J. C. 454. (*s*) Nehem. c. i. & ii.

to

to do him the greater honour, ordered a body of horſe, commanded by a conſiderable officer, to eſcort him thither. He likewiſe writ to all the governors of the provinces on this ſide the Euphrates, to give him all the aſſiſtance poſſible in forwarding the work for which he was ſent. This pious Jew executed every part of his commiſſion with incredible zeal and activity.

(*t*) It is from this decree, enacted by Artaxerxes in the twentieth year of his reign, for the rebuilding of the walls of Jeruſalem, that we date the beginning of the ſeventy weeks mentioned in the famous prophecy of Daniel, after which the Meſſiah was to appear and be put to death. I ſhall here inſert the whole prophecy, but without giving the explication of it, as it may be found in other writers, and is not a part of this hiſtory.

" (*u*) Thou art greatly beloved, therefore under-
" ſtand the matter, and conſider the viſion. Seventy
" weeks are determined upon thy people, and upon
" thy holy city, to finiſh the tranſgreſſion, and to
" make an end of ſins, and to make reconciliation
" for iniquity, and to bring in everlaſting righteouſ-
" neſs, and to ſeal up the viſion and propheſy, and to
" anoint the Moſt Holy. Know therefore and under-
" ſtand, THAT FROM THE GOING FORTH OF
" THE COMMANDMENT TO RESTORE AND TO
" BUILD JERUSALEM, unto the Meſſiah the prince,
" ſhall be ſeven weeks; and threeſcore and two
" weeks the ſtreet ſhall be built again, and the wall,
" even in troublous times. And after threeſcore and
" two weeks ſhall Meſſiah be cut off, but not for
" himſelf: and the people of the prince that ſhall
" come, ſhall deſtroy the city and the ſanctuary, and
" the end thereof ſhall be with a flood; and unto
" the end of the war deſolations are determined. And
" he ſhall confirm the covenant with many for one
" week; and in the midſt of the week he ſhall cauſe
" the ſacrifice and the oblation to ceaſe, and for the

(*t*) Dan. c. ix. v. 24, 27. (*u*) Dan. c. ix. v. 23 to 27. *inclusive.*

" overſpreading of abominations, he ſhall make it " deſolate, even until the conſummation, and that " determined ſhall be poured upon the deſolate."

(x) When Eſdras was in power, as his chief view was to reſtore religion to its antient purity, he diſpoſed the books of ſcripture into their proper order, reviſed them all very carefully, and collected the incidents relating to the people of God in antient times; in order to compoſe out of them the two books of Chronicles, to which he added the hiſtory of his own times, which was finiſhed by Nehemiah. It is their books that end the long hiſtory which Moſes had begun, and which the writers who came after them continued in a direct ſeries, till the repairing of Jeruſalem. The reſt of the ſacred hiſtory is not written in that uninterrupted order. Whilſt Eſdras and Nehemiah were compiling the latter part of that great work, Herodotus, whom profane authors call the father of hiſtory, began to write. Thus we find that the lateſt authors of the books of ſcripture, flouriſhed about the ſame time with the firſt authors of the Grecian hiſtory; and when it began, that of God's people to compute only from Abraham, included already fifteen centuries. Herodotus made no mention of the Jews in his hiſtory; for the Greeks deſired to be informed of ſuch nations only, as were famous for their wars, their commerce and grandeur; ſo that as Judea was then but juſt riſing from its ruins, it did not excite the attention of that people.

SECT. VII. *Character of Pericles. The methods employed by him to gain the affection of the people.*

I Now return to Greece. From the baniſhment of Themiſtocles, and the death of Ariſtides, (the exact time of which is not known) two citizens, Cimon and Pericles, divided all credit and authority in Athens. Pericles was much younger than Cimon, and of a quite different character. As he will make

(x) *Biſhop of Meaux's univerſal hiſtory.*

a very

a very conſiderable figure in the following hiſtory, it is of importance to the reader to know who he was; in what manner he had been educated, and his ſcheme and method of government.

(*y*) Pericles was deſcended, by the mother's as well as father's ſide, from the greateſt and moſt illuſtrious families of Athens. His father Xanthippus, who defeated at Mycale the king of Perſia's lieutenants, married Agariſta, niece to Clyſthenes, who expelled the Piſiſtratides, deſcendants of Piſiſtratus the tyrant, and eſtabliſhed a popular government in Athens. Pericles had long prepared himſelf for the deſign he formed of engaging in ſtate affairs.

He was brought up under the moſt learned men of his age, and particularly Anaxagoras of Clazomene, ſirnamed the *Intelligence*, from his being the firſt, as we are told, who aſcribed human events, as well as the formation and government of the univerſe, not to chance, as ſome philoſophers, nor to a fatal neceſſity, but to a ſuperior intelligence, who diſpoſed and governed all things with wiſdom. This tenet or opinion ſubſiſted long before his time, but he perhaps ſet it in a ſtronger light than all others had done, and taught it methodically and from principles. Anaxagoras inſtructed his pupil perfectly in the part of philoſophy that relates to nature, and which is therefore called * phyſicks. This ſtudy gave him a ſtrength and greatneſs of ſoul which raiſed him above an infinite number of vulgar prejudices, and vain practices generally obſerved in his time; and which, in affairs of government and military enterprizes, either diſconcerted often the wiſeſt and moſt neceſſary meaſures, or defeated them by ſcrupulous delays, authorized and covered with the ſpecious veil of religion. Theſe were ſometimes dreams or auguries, at other

(*y*) Plut. in vit. Pericl. p. 153—156.

* *The antients, under this name, comprehended what we call phyſicks and metaphyſicks; that is, the knowledge of ſpiritual things, as God and ſpirits; and that of bodies.*

times dreadful phænomena, as eclipſes of the ſun or moon, or elſe omens and preſages; not to mention the wild chimeras of judiciary aſtrology. The knowledge of nature, free from the groveling and weak ſuperſtitions to which ignorance gives birth, inſpired him, ſays Plutarch, with a well-grounded piety towards the gods, attended with a ſtrength of mind that was immoveable, and a calm hope of the bleſſings to be expected from them. Altho' he found infinite charms in this ſtudy, he did not however devote himſelf to it as a philoſopher, but as a ſtateſman; and he had ſo much power over himſelf (a very difficult thing) as to preſcribe himſelf limits in the purſuit of knowledge.

But the talent he cultivated with the greateſt care, becauſe he looked upon it as the moſt neceſſary inſtrument to all who are deſirous of conducting and governing the people, was eloquence. And indeed, thoſe who poſſeſſed this talent, in a free ſtate like that of Athens, were ſure of reigning in the aſſemblies, engroſſing ſuffrages, determining affairs, and exerciſing a kind of abſolute power over the hearts and minds of the people. He therefore made this his chief object, and the mark to which all his other improvements, as well as the ſeveral ſciences he had learnt from Anaxagoras * were directed; exalting, to borrow Plutarch's expreſſion, the ſtudy of philoſophy with the dye of rhetoric; the meaning of which is, that Pericles, to embelliſh and adorn his diſcourſe, heightned the ſtrength and ſolidity of reaſoning, with the colouring and graces of eloquence.

He had no cauſe to repent his having beſtowed ſo much time in this ſtudy, for his ſucceſs far exceeded his utmoſt hopes. † The poets, his cotemporaries, uſed to ſay, that his eloquence was ſo powerful, that

* Βαφῇ τῇ ῥητορικῇ τὴν φυσιολογίαν ἐπεχεόμενον.

† Ab Ariſtophane poeta fulgurare, tonare, permiſcere Græciam dictus eſt. *Cic. in Orat. n.* 29.

he

he lightned, thundred, and agitated all Greece. ‖ It had thoſe piercing and lively ſtrokes, that reach the inmoſt ſoul; and his diſcourſe left always an irreſiſtible incentive, a kind of ſpur behind it in the minds of his auditors. He had the art of uniting beauty with ſtrength; and Cicero obſerves, that at the very time he oppoſed, with the greateſt tenaciouſneſs, the inclinations and deſires of the Athenians; he had the art to make even ſeverity itſelf, and the kind of cruelty with which he ſpoke againſt the flatterers of the people, popular. There was no reſiſting the ſolidity of his arguments, or the ſweetneſs of his words, whence it was ſaid, that the goddeſs of perſuaſion, with all her graces, reſided on his lips. And indeed, as Thucydides *, his rival and adverſary, was one day asked, whether he or Pericles was the beſt wreſtler: "Whenever, ſays he, I have given him a fall, he affirms "the contrary, in ſuch ſtrong and forcible terms, "that he perſuades all the ſpectators that I did not "throw him, though they themſelves ſaw him on the "ground." Nor was he leſs prudent and reſerved, than ſtrong and vehement in his ſpeeches; and 'tis related, that he never ſpoke in public, till after he had beſought the gods not to ſuffer any expreſſion to drop from him, either incongruous to his ſubject, or offenſive to the people. (z) Whenever he went into the aſſembly, before he came out of his houſe, he uſed to ſay to himſelf; *Remember, Pericles, that thou art going to ſpeak to men born in the arms of liberty; to Greeks, to Athenians.*

The uncommon endeavours which Pericles, according to hiſtorians, uſed, in order to improve his

(z) Plut. in Symp. lib. 1. p. 610.

‖ Quid Pericles? De cujus dicendi copia ſic accepimus, ut, cum contra voluntatem Athenienſium loqueretur pro ſalute patriæ, ſeverius tamen id ipſum, quod ille contra populares homines diceret, popularе omnibus & jucundum videretur: cujus in labris veteres comici--leporem habitaſſe dixerunt: tantamque vim in eo fuiſſe, ut in eorum mentibus, qui audiſſent, quaſi aculeos quoſdam relinqueret. *Cic. lib. 3. de Orat. n.* 138.

* *Not the hiſtorian.*

mind in knowledge, and to attain to a perfection in eloquence, are an excellent leſſon to ſuch perſons as are one day to fill the important offices of ſtate; and a juſt cenſure of * thoſe, who, diſregarding whatever is called ſtudy and learning, bring into thoſe employments, (upon which they enter without knowledge or experience,) nothing but a ridiculous ſelf-ſufficiency, and a raſh boldneſs in deciding. (*a*) Plutarch, in a treatiſe where he ſhows, that 'tis to ſtateſmen that a philoſopher ought chiefly to attach himſelf, preferably to any other claſs of men; (becauſe in inſtructing them he, at the ſame time, teaches whole cities and republics) verifies his aſſertion from the example of the greateſt men both of Greece and Italy, who derived this help from philoſophy. Pericles, of whom we now write, was taught by Anaxagoras; Dionyſius of Syracuſe by Plato; many princes of Italy by Pythagoras; Cato, the famous cenſor, travelled to the place where Athenodorus lived for the ſame purpoſe; and laſtly, the famous Scipio, the deſtroyer of Carthage, always kept Panetius the philoſopher near his perſon.

One of the chief endeavours of Pericles alſo was, to ſtudy thoroughly the genius and diſpoſition of the Athenians, that he might diſcover the ſecret ſprings which were to be employed in order to ſet them in motion; and the manner it was proper to act for acquiring their confidence; † for it was principally in that the great men among the antients uſed to make their ſkill and politicks conſiſt. He found by the reflections he had made on the ſeveral tranſactions of his time, that the predominant paſſions of this people were, a violent averſion to tyranny, and a ſtrong love of liberty, which inſpired them with ſentiments of fear,

(*a*) P. 777.

* Nunc contrà plerique ad honores adipiſcendos, & ad remp. gerendam, nudi veniunt & inermes, nulla cognitione rerum, nulla ſcientia ornati. *Cic. lib.* 3. *de Orat. n.* 136.

† Olim noſcenda vulgi natura, & quibus modis temperanter haberetur; Senatuſque & optimatium ingenia qui maximè perdidicerant, callidi temporum & ſapientes habebantur. *Tacit. Annal. lib.* 4. *cap.* 33.

jea'ouſy

jealouſy and ſuſpicion of all ſuch citizens as were too conſpicuous for their birth, their perſonal merit; their own credit and authority, or that of their friends. He not only was very like Piſiſtratus, with regard to the ſweetneſs of his voice, and fluency of expreſſion, but he alſo reſembled him very much in the features of his face, and his whole air and manner; and he obſerved, that the moſt antient Athenians who had ſeen the tyrant, were prodigiouſly ſtruck at the reſemblance. Beſides, he was very rich; was deſcended from an illuſtrious family, and had very powerful friends. To prevent therefore his being obnoxious to the ſuſpicion and jealouſy of the people, he at firſt ſhunned all affairs of government, which require a conſtant attendance in the city; and was ſolely intent upon diſtinguiſhing himſelf in war and dangers.

Seeing Ariſtides dead, Themiſtocles baniſhed, and Cimon engaged almoſt continually in foreign wars, and abſent from Greece; he began to appear in public with greater confidence than before, and entirely devoted himſelf to the party of the people, but not out of inclination, for he was far from affecting popular power, but to remove all ſuſpicions of his aſpiring to the tyranny, and ſtill more, to raiſe a ſtrong bulwark againſt the credit and authority of Cimon, who had joined with the nobles.

At the ſame time, he quite changed his conduct and way of life; and aſſumed, in all things, the character of a ſtateſman, wholly buſied in affairs of government, and entirely devoted to the ſervice of his country. He was never ſeen in the ſtreets except when he was going either to the aſſembly of the people, or to the council. He left off going to banquets, aſſemblies, and other diverſions of that kind which he had uſed to frequent; and during the many years that he preſided in the adminiſtration, he was never ſeen to go to ſupper with his friends, except once at the nuptials of a near relation.

He

(*b*) He † knew that the people, who are naturally fickle and inconſtant, commonly increaſe their diſregard for thoſe who are always in their ſight; and that too ſtrong a deſire to pleaſe them, grows at laſt tireſome and importunate; and it was obſerved that ſuch a behaviour did Themiſtocles great prejudice. To avoid this error, he uſed to go very rarely to the aſſemblies; and never appeared before the people but at intervals, in order to make himſelf deſired; and to preſerve ſuch an aſcendant over their minds as might be always new, and not worn and in a manner withered by an over-great aſſiduity; wiſely reſerving himſelf for great and important occaſions. (*c*) Hence it was ſaid that he imitated Jupiter, who, in the government of the world, according to ſome philoſophers, buſied himſelf in great events only; and left the direction of thoſe of leſs importance to ſubaltern deities. And indeed, Pericles uſed to tranſact all petty affairs by his friends, and by certain orators that were entirely devoted to him, among whom was Ephialtes.

(*d*) Pericles employed his whole induſtry and application to gain the favour and eſteem of the people, in order to counter-balance the fame and credit of Cimon. However, he could not equal the magnificence and liberality of his rival, whoſe immenſe riches gave him an opportunity of beſtowing ſuch largeſſes as appear to us almoſt incredible, ſo much they differ from our behaviour in that reſpect. Finding it impoſſible for him to rival Cimon in this particular, he had recourſe to another expedient (in order to gain the love of the populace) no leſs effectual perhaps, but certainly not ſo lawful and honourable. He was the firſt who divided the conquered lands among the citizens; who diſtributed among them the public revenues for

(*b*) Plut. de ſui laude. p. 441. (*c*) Plut. de ger. rep. p. 811.
(*d*) Plut. in Pericl. p. 156.

* Iſta noſtra aſſiduitas, Servi, neſcis quantum interdum afferat hominibus faſtidii, quantum ſatietatis —— Utrique noſtrûm deſiderium nihil obfuiſſet. *Cic. pro Mur. n.* 21.

the

the expence of their games and ſhows, and annexed penſions to all public employments; ſo that certain ſums were beſtowed on them regularly, as well to gratify them at the games, as for their preſence in the courts of juſtice, and the public aſſemblies. It is impoſſible to ſay, how fatal theſe unhappy politics were to the republic, and the many evils with which they were attended. For theſe new regulations, beſides their draining the public treaſury, gave the people a luxurious and diſſolute turn of mind; whereas they before were ſober and modeſt, and contented themſelves with getting a livelihood by their ſweat and labour.

By * ſuch arts as theſe Pericles had gained ſo great an aſcendant over the minds of the people, that he may be ſaid to have attained a monarchical power under a republican form of government; moulding the citizens into what ſhape he pleaſed, and preſiding with unlimited authority in all their aſſemblies. And indeed, Valerius Maximus makes ſcarce any other difference between Piſiſtratus and Pericles, except that the one exerciſed a tyrannical power by force of arms, and the other by the ſtrength of his eloquence, in which he had made a very great progreſs under Anaxagoras.

This credit and authority, however enormous, could not yet reſtrain the comic writers from laſhing him very ſeverely in the theatres; and it does not appear that any of the poets who cenſured Pericles with ſo much boldneſs, were ever puniſhed, or even called to account for it by the people. Perhaps it was out of prudence and policy that he did not attempt to curb this licentiouſneſs of the ſtage; nor to ſilence the poets, that he might amuſe and content the people by

* Pericles feliciſſimis naturæ incrementis, ſub Anaxagora præceptore ſummo ſtudio perpolitus & inſtructus, liberis Athenarum cervicibus jugum ſervitutis impoſuit: egit enim ille urbem & verſavit arbitrio ſuo ——Quid inter Piſiſtratum & Periclem interfuit, niſi quod ille armatus, hic ſine armis, tyrannidem exercuit? *Val. Max.* l. 8. c. 9.

this

this vain ſhadow of liberty, and prevent their diſcovering that they really were enſlaved.

(*a*) But Pericles did not ſtop here. He boldly reſolved, if poſſible, to weaken the authority of the tribunal of the Areopagus, of which he was not a member, becauſe he had never been elected either † Archon, Theſmotheta, king of the ſacrifices, nor Polemarch. Theſe were different employments in the republic, which from time immemorial had been given by lot; and none but thoſe who had behaved uprightly in them, were allowed a ſeat in the Areopagus. Pericles, taking advantage of Cimon's abſence, ſet Ephialtes, who was his creature, at work clandeſtinely; and at laſt leſſened the power of that illuſtrious body, in which the chief ſtrength of the nobility conſiſted. The people, emboldened and ſupported by ſo powerful a faction, ſubverted all the fundamental laws and antient cuſtoms; took from the ſenate of the Areopagus the cognizance of moſt cauſes that uſed to be brought before it, leaving it very few, and ſuch only as were of little conſequence, and made themſelves abſolute maſters of all the tribunals.

Cimon being returned to Athens, was afflicted to ſee the dignity of the ſenate trampled under foot, and therefore ſet every engine at work to reſtore it to its priſtine authority, and to revive the ariſtocracy, in the ſame form as it had been eſtabliſhed under Cliſthenes. But now his enemies began to exclaim and excite the people againſt him; reproaching him, among many other things, his ſtrong attachment to the Lacedæmonians. Cimon had himſelf given ſome room for this reproach, by his not paying ſufficient regard to the Athenian delicacy: For, in ſpeaking to them, he

(*a*) Plut. in Pericl. p. 157. In Cim. p. 488.

† *After ſome changes had been made in the form of the Athenian government, the ſupreme authority was at laſt inveſted in nine magiſtrates, called Archons, and laſted but one year. One was called Rex, another Polemarchus, a third Archon, and this magiſtrate was properly at the head of the reſt, and gave his name to the year; and ſix Theſmothetæ, who preſided immediately over the laws and decrees.*

would

would for ever extol Lacedæmonia; and whenever he cenſured their conduct on any occaſion, he uſed to cry, *The Spartans do not act in this manner.* Such expreſſions as theſe drew upon him the envy and hatred of his fellow-citizens; but an event, in which he nevertheleſs had no ſhare, made him the object of their utmoſt deteſtation.

SECT. VIII. *An earthquake in Sparta. Inſurrection of the Helots. Seeds of diviſion ariſe between the Athenians and Spartans. Cimon is ſent into baniſhment.*

(*b*) IN the fourth year of the reign of Archidamus, there happened the moſt dreadful earthquake in Sparta that had ever been known. In ſeveral places the country was entirely ſwallowed up; Taygetus and other mountains were ſhaken to their foundations; many of their ſummits being torn away, came tumbling down; and the whole city was laid in ruins, five houſes only excepted. To heighten the calamity, the Helots, who were ſlaves to the Lacedæmonians, looking upon this as a favourable opportunity to recover their liberty, flew up and down every part of the city, to murder ſuch as had eſcaped the earthquake: But finding them under arms, and drawn up in order of battle, by the prudent foreſight of Archidamus, who had aſſembled them round him, they retired into the neighbouring cities, and commenced that very day open war, having entered into alliance with ſeveral of the neighhouring nations, and being ſtrengthened by the Meſſenians, who at that time were engaged in a war with the Spartans.

The Lacedæmonians in this extremity ſent to Athens to implore ſuccours; but this was oppoſed by Ephialtes, who declared that it would be no way adviſable to aſſiſt them, nor to rebuild a city that was the rival of Athens, which, he ſaid, ought to be left in its ruins, and the pride of Sparta thereby humbled

(*b*) A. M. 3534. Ant. J. C. 470. Plut. in Cim. p. 488, 489.

for

for ever. But Cimon being ſtruck with horror at theſe politics, did not heſitate a moment to prefer the welfare of the Lacedæmonians to the aggrandizing of his country; declaring, in the ſtrongeſt terms, that it was abſolutely weak and inconſiſtent, *to leave Greece lame of one of its legs, and Athens without a counterpoiſe*; the people came into his opinion, and accordingly a ſuccour was voted. Sparta and Athens might indeed be conſidered as the two limbs on which Greece ſtood; ſo that if one of them was deſtroyed, the reſt were inevitably crippled. It is alſo certain, that the Athenians were ſo elate with their grandeur, and were become ſo proud and enterprizing, that they wanted a curb; for which none was ſo proper as Sparta, that ſtate being the only one that was capable of being a counterpoiſe to the head-ſtrong diſpoſition of the Athenians. Cimon therefore marched to the aid of the Lacedæmonians with four thouſand men.

We have here an example of the prodigious influence which a man of fine talents and abilities has in a ſtate, when a great fund of merit unites in his perſon, with a well-eſtabliſhed reputation for probity, diſintereſtedneſs and zeal for the good of his country. Cimon, with very little difficulty, prevails ſo far as to inſpire the Athenians with noble and magnanimous ſentiments, which in outward appearance interfered with their intereſt; and this in ſpite of the ſuggeſtions of a ſecret jealouſy, which never fails to ſhew itſelf in the moſt ſenſible manner on theſe occaſions. By the aſcendant and authority which his virtue gives him, he raiſes them above the groveling and unjuſt (though too common) political views, that prompt a people to conſider the calamities of their neighbours as an advantage, which the intereſt of their own country permits, and even enjoins them to lay hold of. The counſels of Cimon were perfectly wiſe and equitable; but it is ſurprizing, how he could prevail ſo far as to make a whole people approve them, ſince this is all that

that could be expected from an aſſembly of the wiſeſt and graveſt ſenators.

(*c*) Some time after, the Lacedæmonians again implored the aid of the Athenians againſt the Meſſenians and Helots, who had ſeized upon Ithoma. But theſe forces being arrived under the command of Cimon, the Spartans began to dread their intrepidity, their power and great fame; ſo that they affronted them ſo far, as to ſend them back upon the ſuſpicion of their harbouring ill deſigns, and of intending to turn their arms againſt them.

The Athenians being returned full of anger and reſentment, they declared themſelves, from that very day, enemies to all who ſhould favour the Lacedæmonian intereſt; for which reaſon they baniſhed Cimon by the oſtraciſm, the firſt opportunity that preſented itſelf for that purpoſe. This is the firſt time that the miſunderſtanding between theſe two nations, which afterwards augmented through mutual diſcontent, diſplayed itſelf in ſo ſtrong a manner. It was nevertheleſs ſuſpended for ſome years, by truces and treaties, which prevented its conſequences; but it at laſt broke out in the moſt violent manner in the Peloponneſian war.

Thoſe who had ſhut themſelves up in Ithoma, after making a ten years defence in it, ſurrendred at laſt to the Lacedæmonians, who gave them their lives upon condition that they ſhould never return to Peloponneſus. The Athenians, to exaſperate the Lacedæmonians, received them with their wives and children, and ſettled them in Naupactus, of which they had juſt before poſſeſſed themſelves. (*d*) The inhabitants of Megara at the ſame time went over from the Spartans to the Athenians. In this manner ſeveral leagues were concluded on both ſides, and many battles were fought, the moſt famous of which was that of

(*c*) Plut. in Cim. Thucyd. l. 1. p. 67, 68. (*d*) Thucyd. l. 1. p. 69, 71. Diod. l. 11. p. 59—65. A. M. 3548. Ant. J. C. 450.

Tanagra

Tanagra in Bœotia, which Diodorus equals with thoſe of Marathon and Platæa, and in which Myronides the Athenian general defeated the Spartans, who came to the aid of the Thebans.

(*e*) It was on this occaſion that Cimon, thinking himſelf diſpenſed from his proſcription, repaired with ſome ſoldiers to his tribe to ſerve his country, and to fight in the Athenian army againſt the Lacedæmonians: but his enemies cauſed him to be ordered to retire. However, before he went away he exhorted his companions, who were no leſs ſuſpected than himſelf of favouring the Lacedæmonians, to exert themſelves to the utmoſt, and fight with the greateſt courage, to prove their innocence; and, if poſſible, to efface from the minds of the citizens a ſuſpicion ſo injurious to them all. Accordingly thoſe brave ſoldiers, who were an hundred in number, fired by his words, demanded his whole armour of him, which they placed in the center of their little battalion, in order to have him in a manner preſent and before their eyes. They fought with ſo much valour and fury, that they were all cut to pieces, to the great regret of the Athenians, who deeply repented their having accuſed them ſo unjuſtly.

I omit ſeveral events of little importance.

SECT. IX. *Cimon is recalled. He eſtabliſhes peace between the two cities. He gains ſeveral victories, which reduce Artaxerxes to the neceſſity of concluding a treaty highly honourable to the Greeks. Cimon's death.*

(*f*) THE Athenians perceiving the great occaſion they had for Cimon, recalled him from baniſhment, in which he had ſpent five years. It was Pericles himſelf who propoſed and drew up that decree; ſo moderate in thoſe times, ſays Plutarch, were feuds and animoſities, and ſo eaſy to be appeaſed, when the welfare of their country required it; and ſo happily did ambition, which is one of the ſtrongeſt

(*e*) Plut. in Cim. p. 489. (*f*) Ibid. p. 490.

and

and moſt lively paſſions, yield to the neceſſity of the times, and comply with the occaſions of the public.

(g) The inſtant Cimon returned, he ſtifled the ſparks of war which were going to break out among the Greeks; reconciled the two cities, and prevailed with them to conclude a truce for five years. And to prevent the Athenians, who were grown haughty in effect of the many victories they had gained, from having an opportunity, or harbouring a deſign to attack their neighbours and allies, he thought it adviſable to lead them at a great diſtance from home againſt the common enemy; thus endeavouring, in an honourable way, to inure the citizens to war, and enrich them at the ſame time. Accordingly he put to ſea with a fleet of two hundred ſail. He ſent ſixty of theſe into Egypt to the aid of Amyrteus, and himſelf ſailed with the reſt againſt the iſland of Cyprus. Artabazus was at that time in thoſe ſeas with a fleet of three hundred ſail; and Megabyſus, the other general of Artaxerxes, with an army of three hundred thouſand men, on the coaſt of Cilicia. As ſoon as the ſquadron which Cimon ſent into Egypt had joined his fleet, he ſailed and attacked Artabazus, and took an hundred of his ſhips. He ſunk many of them, and chaſed the reſt as far as the coaſts of Phœnicia. But as if this victory had been only a prelude to a ſecond, he made a deſcent on Cilicia in his return, attacked Megabyſus, defeated him, and cut to pieces a prodigious number of his troops. He afterwards returned to Cyprus with this double triumph, and laid ſiege to Citium, a ſtrong city of very great importance. His deſign, after he had reduced that iſland, was to ſail for Egypt, and again embroil the affairs of the Barbarians; for he had very extenſive views, and meditated no leſs a proſpect than that of the entire ſubverſion of the mighty empire of Perſia. The rumours which prevailed, that Themiſto-

(g) A. M. 3554. Ant. J. C. 450. Plut. ibid. Diod. l. 12. p. 73, 74.

cles

cles was to command againſt him, added freſh fire to his courage; and almoſt aſſured of ſucceſs, he was infinitely pleaſed with the occaſion of trying his abilities with thoſe of that general. But we have already ſeen that Themiſtocles laid violent hands on himſelf about this time.

(*b*) Artaxerxes, tired with a war in which he had ſuſtained ſuch great loſſes, reſolved, with the advice of his council, to put an end to it. Accordingly, he ſent orders to his generals to conclude a peace with the Athenians, upon the moſt advantagious conditions they could. Megabyſus and Artabazus ſent ambaſſadors to Athens to propoſe an accommodation. Plenipotentiaries were choſen on both ſides, and Callias was at the head of thoſe of Athens. The conditions of the treaty were as follow: 1. That all the Grecian cities of Aſia ſhould enjoy their liberty, with ſuch laws and forms of government as they ſhould think fit to chuſe. 2. That no Perſian ſhip of war ſhould be allowed to enter the ſeas between the Cyanean and Chelidonian iſlands, that is, from the Euxine ſea to the coaſts of Pamphylia. 3. That no Perſian general ſhould march any troops within three days march of thoſe ſeas. 4. That the Athenians ſhould not invade any part of the dominions of the king of Perſia. Theſe articles being ratified by both parties, peace was proclaimed.

(*i*) Thus ended this war, which, from the burning of Sardis by the Athenians, had laſted fifty-one years compleat, and in which infinite numbers of Perſians as well as Greeks had periſhed.

(*k*) Whilſt this treaty was negotiating, Cimon died, either of ſickneſs, or of a wound he had received at the ſiege of Citium. When he was near his end, he commanded his officers to ſail with the fleet immediately for Athens, and to conceal his death with the utmoſt care. Accordingly this was executed with ſo much

(*b*) Diod. p. 74, 75. (*i*) A. M. 3555. Ant. J. C. 449.
(*k*) Plut. in Cim. p. 491.

ſecrecy,

ſecrecy, that neither the enemy nor the allies once ſuſpected it; and they returned ſafe to Athens, ſtill under the conduct and auſpices of Cimon, though he had been dead above thirty days.

Cimon was univerſally regretted *, which is no wonder, ſince he was poſſeſſed of all thoſe qualities that dignify the ſoul; the moſt tender ſon, a faithful friend; zealous for the good of his country; a great politician, an accompliſhed general; modeſt when raiſed to the higheſt employments and moſt diſtinguiſhed honours; liberal and beneficent almoſt to profuſion; ſimple and averſe to oſtentation of every kind, even in the midſt of riches and abundance; in fine, ſo great a lover of the poor citizens, as to ſhare his whole eſtate with them, without being aſhamed of ſuch companions of his fortune. Hiſtory mentions no ſtatues or monuments erected to his memory, nor any magnificent obſequies celebrated after his death: but the greateſt honour that could be paid him, was the ſighs and tears of the people; † theſe were permanent and laſting ſtatues, which are not obnoxious to the inclemencies of weather, or the injuries of time, and endear the memory of the good and virtuous to the remoteſt ages. For the moſt ſplendid mauſolæums, the works of braſs and marble that are raiſed in honour of wicked great men, are deſpiſed by poſterity, as ſepulchres which incloſe nothing but vile duſt and putrefaction.

What followed proved more ſtrongly the loſs which Greece had ſuſtained by his death; for Cimon was the laſt of all the Grecian generals who did any thing conſiderable or glorious againſt the Barbarians. Excited by the orators, who gained the ſtrongeſt aſcendant over the minds of the people, and ſowed the

* Sic ſe gerendo, minimè eſt mirandum, ſi & vita ejus fuit ſecura, & non acerba. *Cor. Nep. in Cim.* cap. 4.

† Hæ pulcherrimæ effigies & manſuræ. Nam, quæ ſaxo ſtruuntur, ſi judicium poſterorum in odium vertit, pro ſepulchris ſpernuntur. *Tacit. Annal.* lib. 4. cap. 38.

ſeeds

ſeeds of diviſion in their public aſſemblies, they turned their animoſity againſt each other; and at laſt proceeded to open war, the fatal conſequences of which no one endeavoured to prevent; a circumſtance that was of great advantage to the king of Perſia, and the utmoſt prejudice to the affairs of Greece.

SECT. X. *Thucydides is oppoſed to Pericles. The envy raiſed againſt the latter. He clears himſelf, and prevails to have Thucydides baniſhed.*

(*l*) THE nobles of Athens ſeeing Pericles raiſed to the higheſt degree of power, and far above all the reſt of the citizens, reſolved to oppoſe him with a man, who, in ſome meaſure, might make head againſt him, and prevent his great authority from growing up to monarchy. Accordingly they oppoſed him with Thucydides, Cimon's brother-in-law, a man who had diſplayed his wiſdom on numberleſs occaſions. He indeed did not poſſeſs the military talents in ſo eminent a degree as Pericles; but then he had as great an influence over the people; ſhaping their opinions, and directing their aſſemblies as he pleaſed: and as he never ſtirred out of the city, but continually combated Pericles in all his deſigns, he ſoon reſtored things to an equilibrium. On the other ſide, Pericles was ſollicitous of pleaſing the people on all occaſions, and ſlackened the rein more than ever; entertaining them as often as poſſible with ſhows, feſtivals, games, and other diverſions.

He found means to maintain, during eight months in the year, a great number of poor citizens, by putting them on board a fleet, conſiſting of threeſcore ſhips, which he fitted out every year; and thereby did his country an important ſervice, by training up a great number of ſeamen for its defence. He alſo planted ſeveral colonies in Cherſoneſus, in Naxos, in Andros, and among the Biſaltæ in Thrace. There was a very noble one in Italy, of which we ſhall

(*l*) Plut. in Peric. p. 158—161.

ſoon

ſoon have occaſion to ſpeak, and which built Thurium. Pericles had different views in ſettling theſe colonies, beſides the particular deſign he might have of gaining the affections of the people by that means. His chief motives were, to clear the city of a great number of idle perſons who were every ready to diſturb the government; to relieve the wants of the loweſt claſs of people, who before were unable to ſubſiſt themſelves; in fine, to awe the allies, by ſettling native Athenians among them as ſo many garriſons, which might prevent their engaging in any meaſures contrary to the intereſt of that people. The Romans acted in the ſame manner; and it may be ſaid, that ſo wiſe a policy was one of the moſt effectual methods uſed by them to ſecure the tranquillity of the ſtate.

But the circumſtance which did Pericles the greateſt honour in the ſenſe of the people, was his adorning the city with magnificent edifices and other works, which raiſed the admiration and aſtoniſhment of all foreigners, and gave them a mighty idea of the power of the Athenians. It is ſurprizing that, in ſo ſhort a ſpace, ſo many works of architecture, ſculpture, engraving and painting ſhould be performed; and at the ſame time be carried to the higheſt perfection: For it is generally found, that edifices raiſed in haſte, boaſt neither a ſolid and durable grace, nor the regularity required in works of an exquiſitely-beautiful kind. Commonly, nothing but length of time, joined to aſſiduous labour, can give them ſuch a ſtrength as may preſerve, and make them triumph over ages; and this raiſes our wonder ſtill more in regard to the works of Pericles, which were finiſhed with ſo much rapidity and however ſubſiſted through ſo great a length of time. For each of thoſe works, the very inſtant it was finiſhed, had the beauty of an antique; and at this time, *i. e.* above five hundred years after, ſays Plutarch, they retain a freſhneſs and youth as if juſt come out of the artiſt's hand; ſo happily do they preſerve the graces and charms of novelty, which will not

not ſuffer time to diminiſh their luſtre; as if an ever-blooming ſpirit, and a ſoul exempt from age, were diffuſed into every part of thoſe works.

But that circumſtance which excited the admiration of the whole world, raiſed the jealouſy of the people againſt Pericles. His enemies were for ever crying aloud in the aſſemblies, that it was diſhonourable to the Athenians, to appropriate to themſelves the bank of all Greece, which he had ſent for from Delos, where it had been depoſited; that the allies muſt neceſſarily conſider ſuch an attempt as a manifeſt tyranny, when they found that the ſums which had been extorted from them, upon pretence of their being employed in the war, were laid out by the Athenians in gilding and embelliſhing their city, in making magnificent ſtatues, and raiſing temples that coſt millions. They did not amplify on theſe occaſions; for only the temple of Minerva, called the Parthenone, had coſt three millions of livres. *

Pericles, on the contrary, remonſtrated to the Athenians, that they were not obliged to give the allies an account of the monies they had received from them; that it was enough they defended them from, and repulſed, the Barbarians, whilſt the allies furniſhed neither ſoldiers, horſes nor ſhips; and were excuſed for ſome ſums of money, which, from the inſtant they were paid in, were no longer the property of the donors, but of thoſe who received them; provided they performed the conditions agreed upon, and in conſideration of which they were received. He added, that as the Athenians were ſufficiently provided with all things neceſſary for war, it was but juſt that they ſhould employ the reſt of their riches in edifices and other works, which, when finiſhed, would give immortal glory to their city; and, the whole time they were carrying on, diffuſed a plenty of all things, and gave bread to an infinite number of citizens: That they themſelves had all kinds of materials, as timber,

* *About* 145000 *l. ſterling.*

ſtone,

ſtone, braſs, ivory, gold, ebony, and cypreſs wood; and all ſorts of artificers capable of working them, as carpenters, maſons, ſmiths, ſtone-cutters, dyers, gold-ſmiths; artificers in ebony, painters, embroiderers and turners; men fit to conduct their naval affairs, as merchants, ſailors and experienced pilots; others for land-carriage, as cartwrights, waggoners, carters, rope-makers, paviors, *&c.* That it was for the advantage of the ſtate to employ theſe different artificers and workmen, who as ſo many ſeparate bodies, formed, when united, a kind of peaceable and domeſtic army, whoſe different functions and employments diffuſed gain and encreaſe throughout all ſexes and ages: Laſtly, that whilſt men of robuſt bodies, and of an age fit to bear arms, whether ſoldiers or mariners, and thoſe who were in the different garriſons, were ſupported with the public monies; it was but juſt, that the reſt of the people who lived in the city ſhould alſo be maintained in their way; and that as all were members of the ſame republic, they all ſhould reap the ſame advantages, by doing it ſervices, which, though of a different kind, did however all contribute to its ſecurity or ornament.

One day, as the debates were growing warm, Pericles offered to defray the expence of all theſe things, provided it ſhould be declared in the public inſcriptions, that he only had been at the charge of them. At theſe words the people, either admiring his magnanimity, or fired with emulation, and determined not to let him engroſs that glory, cried with one voice, that he might take out of the public treaſury all the ſums neceſſary for his purpoſe.

Phidias the celebrated ſculptor preſided over all theſe works, as director-general. It was he who particularly caſt the gold * and ivory ſtatue repreſenting Pallas, which was ſo highly valued, by all the judges of an-

* Non Minervæ Athenis factæ amplitudine utemur, cum ea ſit cubitorum XXVI. Ebore hæc & auro conſtat. *Plin. l.* 36. *c.* 5. *This ſtatue was twenty-ſix cubits in height.*

tiquity. There aroſe an incredible ardor and emulation among the ſeveral artificers, who all ſtrove to excel each other, and immortalize their names by maſter-pieces of art.

The odeon, or muſic-theatre, which had a great number of ſeats and columns within it, and whoſe roof grew narrower by degrees, and terminated in a point, was built, as hiſtory informs us, after the model of king Xerxes's tent, according to the direction of Pericles. It was at that time he propoſed with great warmth, a decree, by which it was ordained, that muſical games ſhould be celebrated on the feſtival called Panathenæa; and having been choſen the judge and diſtributor of the prizes, he regulated the manner in which muſicians ſhould play on the flute and the lyre, as well as ſing. From that time, the muſical games were always exhibited in this theatre.

I have already taken notice, that the more the beauty and ſplendor of theſe works were admired, the greater envy and clamour were raiſed againſt Pericles. The orators of the oppoſite faction were eternally exclaiming againſt him, and tearing his character to pieces; accuſing him of ſquandering the public monies, and laying out very unſeaſonably the revenues of the ſtate in edifices, whoſe magnificence was of no uſe. At laſt, the rupture between him and Thucydides roſe to ſuch a height, that one or other of them muſt neceſſarily be baniſhed by the oſtraciſm. He got the better of Thucydides; prevailed to have him baniſhed; cruſhed by that means the faction which oppoſed him, and obtained a deſpotic authority over the city and government of Athens. He now diſpoſed at pleaſure of the public monies, troops and ſhips. The iſlands and ſea were ſubject to him; and he reigned ſingly and alone in that wide domain, which extended, not only over the Greeks, but the Barbarians alſo, and which was cemented and ſtrengthned by the obedience and fidelity of the conquered nations, by the friend-

ſhip

ſhip of kings, and treaties concluded with various princes.

Hiſtorians expatiate greatly on the magnificent edifices and other works with which Pericles adorned Athens, and I have related faithfully their teſtimony; but I cannot ſay whether, the complaints and murmurs raiſed againſt him were very ill grounded. And indeed, was it juſt in him to expend in ſuperfluous buildings, and vain decorations, the immenſe * ſums intended for carrying on the war; and would it not have been better to have eaſed the allies of part of the contributions, which, in Pericles's adminiſtration, were raiſed to a third part more than before? According to Cicero, (*m*) ſuch edifices and other works only are worthy of admiration, as are of uſe to the public, as aquæducts, city-walls, citadels, arſenals, ſea-ports; and to theſe we muſt add, the work made by Pericles, to join Athens to the port of Piræus. But Cicero obſerves at the ſame time, that Pericles was blamed for ſquandring away the public treaſure, merely to embelliſh the city with ſuperfluous ornaments. (*n*) Plato, who formed a judgment of things, not from their outward ſplendor, but from truth, obſerves (after his maſter Socrates) that Pericles, with all his grand edifices and other works, had not improved the mind of one of the citizens in virtue, but rather corrupted the purity and ſimplicity of their antient manners.

SECT. XI. *Pericles changes his conduct with regard to the people. His prodigious authority. His diſintereſtedneſs.*

(*o*) WHEN Pericles ſaw himſelf inveſted with the whole authority, he began to change his behaviour. He now was not ſo mild and tractable as before, nor did he ſubmit or abandon himſelf any

(*m*) Lib. 2. Offic. n. 60. (*n*) In Gorg. p. 515. In Alcib. 1. p. 119. (*o*) Plut. in Pericl. p. 161.

* *They amounted to upwards of ten millions French money.*

longer to the whims and caprice of the people, as ſo many winds; but drawing in, ſays Plutarch, the reins of this, too looſe, popular government, in the ſame manner as we ſcrew up the ſtrings of an inſtrument when too ſlack, he changed it into an ariſtocracy, or rather a kind of monarchy, without departing however from the public good. Chooſing always what was moſt expedient, and becoming irreproachable in all things, he gained ſo mighty an aſcendant over the minds of the people, that he turned and directed them at pleaſure. Sometimes, by his bare counſel, and by perſuaſive methods, he would win them over gently to his will, and gain their aſſent ſpontaneouſly; at other times, when he found them obſtinate, he would in a manner drag them forward againſt their will, to thoſe things which were for their good; imitating on this occaſion a skilful phyſician, who, in a tedious and ſtubborn diſeaſe, knows what times are proper for him to indulge his patient in innocent medicaments that are pleaſing; in order after to adminiſter thoſe of a ſtrong and violent nature, which indeed put him to pain, but are alone capable of reſtoring his health.

And indeed, it is manifeſt that the utmoſt skill and abilities were required, to manage and govern a populace haughty from their power and exceedingly capricious; and on this occaſion Pericles ſucceeded wonderfully. He uſed to employ, according to the different ſituation of things, ſometimes hope, and at other times fear, as a double helm, either to check the wild tranſports and ſtarts of the people, or to raiſe them when dejected and deſponding. By this conduct he ſhowed that eloquence, as Plato obſerves, is only the art of directing the minds of people at will; and that the chief excellency of this art conſiſts in moving, ſeaſonably, the various paſſions, whether gentle or violent; which being to the ſoul what ſtrings are to a muſical inſtrument, need only be touched by an ingenious and skilful hand to produce their effect.

It muſt nevertheleſs be confeſſed, that the circumſtance

ſtance which gave Pericles this great authority, was, not only the force of his eloquence; but, as Thucydides obſerves, the reputation of his life, and great probity.

(p) Plutarch points out in Pericles, one quality which is very eſſential to ſtateſmen; a quality, well adapted to win the eſteem and confidence of the public, and which ſuppoſes a great ſuperiority of mind; and that is, for a man to be fully perſuaded that he wants the counſels of others, and is not able to manage and direct all things alone; to aſſociate with himſelf perſons of merit in his labours, to employ each of theſe according to his talents; and to leave them the management of ſmall matters, which only conſume time, and deprive him of the liberty of mind, ſo neceſſary in the conduct of important affairs. Such a conduct, ſays Plutarch, is productive of two advantages. Firſt, it extinguiſhes or at leaſt breaks the force of envy and jealouſy, by dividing, in ſome meaſure, a power, which is grating and offenſive to us when we ſee it united in one ſingle perſon, as if all merit centered in him alone. Secondly, it advances and facilitates the execution of affairs, and makes their ſucceſs more certain. Plutarch, the better to explain his thought, employs a very natural and beautiful compariſon. The hand, ſays he, which, from its being divided into five fingers, ſo far from being weaker, is the ſtronger, the more active, and better adapted to motion on that very account. It is the ſame of a ſtateſman, who has the skill to divide his cares and functions in a proper manner, and who by that means makes his authority more active, more extenſive and deciſive: whereas, the indiſcreet fire of a narrow-minded man, who takes umbrage at, and is for engroſſing all things, ſerves to no other purpoſe but to ſet his weakneſs and incapacity in a ſtronger light, and to diſconcert his affairs. But Pericles, ſays Plutarch, did not act in this manner. Like a skilful pilot, who, though he ſtand al-

(p) Plut. in præc. de rep. ger. p. 812.

moſt motionleſs himſelf, however puts every thing in motion, and will ſometimes ſeat ſubaltern officers at the helm; ſo Pericles was the ſoul of the government; and, ſeeming to do nothing of himſelf, he actuated and governed all things; employing the eloquence of one man, the credit and intereſt of another, the prudence of a third, the bravery and courage of a fourth, and ſo on.

(q) To what has been here related, we may add another quality which is no leſs rare and valuable, I mean, a noble and diſintereſted ſoul. Pericles had ſo great a diſinclination to the receiving of gifts, ſo utter a contempt for riches, and was ſo far above all rapaciouſneſs and avarice, that though he had raiſed Athens to the richeſt and moſt flouriſhing ſtate; though his power had ſurpaſſed that of many tyrants and kings; though he had long diſpoſed in an abſolute manner of the treaſures of Greece, he did not however add a ſingle drachma to the eſtate he inherited from his father. This was the ſource, the true cauſe of the ſupreme authority of Pericles in the republic; the juſt and deſerved fruit of his integrity and perfect diſintereſtedneſs.

It was not only for a few ſhort moments, nor during the firſt heats of favour, which are generally ſhort-lived, that he preſerved his authority. He maintained it forty years, notwithſtanding the oppoſition of Cimon, of Tolmides, of Thucydides, and many others, who had all declared againſt him; and of theſe forty years he ſpent fifteen without a rival, from the time of Thucydides's baniſhment, and diſpoſed all affairs with abſolute power. Nevertheleſs, in the midſt of this ſupreme authority, which he had rendered perpetual and unlimited in his own perſon, his ſoul was always ſuperior to the charms and allurements of wealth, though he never neglected improving his eſtate to the utmoſt of his power. For Pericles did not act like thoſe rich men, who, notwithſtanding their immenſe revenues, either through negligence or want of œco-

(q) Plut. in vit. Pericl. p. 161, 162.

nomy,

nomy, or the expences of pride and folly, are always poor in the midſt of their riches; unable and unwilling to do the leaſt ſervice to their virtuous friends, or their faithful and zealous domeſtics; and at laſt die in every one's debt, whence their name and memory are had in the utmoſt deteſtation by their unfortunate creditors. I ſhall not expatiate on another extreme, to which this negligence and want of œconomy generally lead, I mean rapine, a love of gifts and exactions; for here, as well as in the management of the public monies, the maxim of Tacitus takes place, * viz. that when a man has ſquandered away his eſtate, he then makes it his whole ſtudy to retrieve the loſs of it by all ſorts of methods, not excepting the moſt criminal.

Pericles knew much better the uſe a ſtateſman ought to make of riches. He was ſenſible that he ought to expend them in the ſervice of the public, ſuch as the procuring of able men to aſſiſt him in the adminiſtration; the relieving good officers, who too often are in unhappy circumſtances; the rewarding and encouraging merit of every kind, and a thouſand ſuch things; to which doubtleſs, either on account of the exquiſite joy they give, or the ſolid glory that reſults from them, no one will be ſo thoughtleſs as to compare the expences laviſhed away in entertainments, equipages, or gaming. In this view Pericles managed his eſtate with the utmoſt œconomy; having himſelf taught one of his old ſervants to take care of his domeſtic concerns; and he always had the account brought him, at ſtated times, of all things that had been received as well as expended; confining himſelf and his family to a decent ſubſiſtence, (from which he baniſhed ſeverely all ſuperfluities of a vain and oſtentatious kind,) ſuitable to his eſtate and condition. This way of life, indeed, did no way pleaſe his children when they were come to years of maturity, and much leſs his wife. They thought Pericles did not live at a ſufficient expence for

* Si ambitione ærarium exhauſerimus, per ſcelera ſupplendum erit. *Tacit. Annal.* l. 2. c. 38.

perſons of their rank; and murmured at that low and ſordid œconomy, as they called it, which carried no air of the plenty which generally reigns in houſes where riches and authority are united. However, Pericles had little regard to theſe complaints, and directed his views to things of much greater importance.

I believe it will not be improper to apply on this occaſion, a very juſt remark of Plutarch, in his parallel of Ariſtides and Cato. After ſaying that political virtue, or the art of governing cities and kingdoms, is the greateſt and moſt perfect that man can acquire, he adds, that œconomy is not one of the moſt inconſiderable branches of this virtue. And indeed, as riches are one of the means which may moſt contribute to the ſecurity or ruin of a ſtate; the art that teaches to diſpoſe of, and make a good uſe of them, and which is called œconomy, is certainly a branch of the art of policy; and not one of the moſt inconſiderable branches of it, ſince great wiſdom is required, in order to the obſerving a juſt medium on theſe occaſions, and to the baniſhing poverty and too great opulence from a country. It is this art, which avoiding induſtriouſly all trifling and needleſs expences, prevents a magiſtrate from being forced to overburthen a people with taxes; and keeps always in reſerve, in the public coffers, monies ſufficient for the ſupporting a war that may break out, or for providing againſt any unforeſeen accident. Now what is ſaid of a kingdom or of a city, may be applied to particular perſons. For a city, which is compoſed of an aſſemblage of houſes, and which forms a whole of ſeveral parts united, is either powerful or weak when taken together, in proportion as all the members of which it conſiſts, are powerful or weak. Pericles certainly acquitted himſelf well with regard to that part of this ſcience which relates to the government of a family: but I do not know whether the ſame may be ſaid of his adminiſtration of the public revenues.

SECT.

SECT. XII. *Jealouſy and conteſts ariſe between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. A treaty of peace is concluded for thirty years.*

(*a*) SUCH was the conduct of Pericles with reſpect to his domeſtic concerns: and he was no leſs famous for his adminiſtration of public affairs. The Lacedæmonians beginning to grow jealous of the proſperity of the Athenians, and to take umbrage at it; Pericles, to inſpire his citizens with greater courage and magnanimity, publiſhed a decree, importing, that orders ſhould be ſent to all the Greeks, inhabiting either Europe or Aſia, and to all the cities great or ſmall, to ſend immediately their deputies or repreſentatives to Athens, to examine and debate on ways and means to rebuild the temples that had been burnt by the Barbarians; to perform the ſacrifices, which they had engaged themſelves to offer up, for the preſervation and ſafety of Greece, when war was carrying on againſt them: as alſo, to conſider on the neceſſary expedients for eſtabliſhing ſuch an order and diſcipline in their navy, that all ſhips might ſail in ſafety, and the Greeks live in peace one with another.

Accordingly twenty perſons were choſen for this embaſſy, each of whom was upwards of fifty years old. Five of theſe were ſent to the Ionians and Dorians of Aſia, and the inhabitants of the iſlands as far as Leſbos and Rhodes; five to the countries of the Helleſpont and Thrace, as far as Byzantium. Five were ordered to go to Bœotia, to Phocis, and Peloponneſus; and from thence, by the country of the Locrians to proceed to the ſeveral cities of the upper continent as far as Acarnania and Ambracia. The laſt five were ordered to croſs Eubœa, and to go to the people of mount Œta, and thoſe of the gulph of Malea, and to the inhabitants of Phthiotis, of Achaia, and of Theſſaly; to induce the ſeveral nations to come to the aſſembly convened in Athens, and to aſſiſt at the debates which ſhould be

(*a*) Plut. in Pericl. p. 162.

there carried on concerning peace, and the general affairs of Greece. I judged it neceſſary to enter into this detail, as it ſhows how far the power of the Greeks extended, and the authority which the Athenians enjoyed among them.

But all theſe ſollicitations were in vain; the cities not ſending their deputies, which, according to hiſtorians, was owing to the oppoſition made by the Lacedæmonians, a circumſtance we are not to wonder at. They were ſenſible, that Pericles's deſign was, to have Athens acknowledged as miſtreſs and ſovereign of all the other Grecian cities; and Lacedæmon was far from allowing it that honour. A ſecret leaven of diſſenſion had, for ſome years, began to diſturb the tranquillity of Greece; and we ſhall find by the ſequel, that diſguſts augmented continually.

Pericles had acquired great fame for the wiſdom with which he formed and conducted his enterprizes. The troops repoſed the higheſt confidence in him, and whenever they followed him, aſſured themſelves of ſucceſs. His chief maxim of war was, never to venture a battle unleſs he were almoſt certain of victory, and not to laviſh the blood of the citizens. He uſed to ſay frequently, that were it in his power they ſhould be immortal; that when trees were felled they ſhoot to life again in a little time, but when once men die they are loſt for ever. A victory that was only the effect of a happy temerity, appeared to him as little worthy of praiſe, though it often was much admired.

His expedition into the Thracian Cherſoneſus did him great honour, and was of great advantage to all the Greeks of that country: for he not only ſtrengthned the Grecian cities of that peninſula, by the colonies of Athenians which he carried thither, but alſo ſhut up the Iſthmus with a ſtrong wall, with forts at proper diſtances from ſea to ſea; ſecuring by that means the whole country from the perpetual incurſions of the Thracians, who were very near neighbours to it.

He

He alſo ſailed with an hundred ſhips round Peloponneſus, ſpreading the terror of the Athenian arms wherever he came, the ſucceſs of which was not once interrupted on this occaſion.

He advanced as far as the kingdom of Pontus with a large, well-mann'd, and magnificent fleet; and granted the Grecian cities all they thought fit to aſk of him. At the ſame time he diſplayed to the Barbarian nations in that neighbourhood, to their kings and princes, the greatneſs of the power of the Athenians; and proved to them, by the ſecurity with which he ſailed to all parts, that they poſſeſſed the empire of the ſeas without a rival.

(*b*) But ſo conſtant and ſhining a fortune began to dazzle the eyes of the Athenians. Intoxicated with the idea of their power and grandeur, they now revolved nothing but the boldeſt and moſt lofty projects. They were for ever talking of new attempts upon Egypt; of attacking the maritime provinces of the great king; of carrying their arms into Sicily, (a fatal and unhappy deſign, which at that time did not take effect, though it was revived ſoon after;) and to extend their conqueſts towards Hetruria on one ſide, and Carthage on the other. Pericles was far from giving into ſuch idle views, or ſupporting them with his credit and approbation. On the contrary, his whole ſtudy was to damp that reſtleſs ardour, and check an ambition which no longer knew either bounds or meaſure. It was his opinion that the Athenians ought to employ their forces for the future, only in ſecuring and preſerving their preſent acquiſitions; and he thought he had gained a great point, in reſtraining the power of the Lacedæmonians, the reducing of which he always meditated; and this was particularly ſeen in the ſacred war.

(*c*) This name was given to the war which was raiſed on account of Delphos. The Lacedæmonians having entered armed into the country where that

(*b*) Ibid. p. 164. (*c*) Plut. in Pericl. p. 164.

temple

temple is ſituated, had diſpoſſeſſed the people of Phocis of the ſuperintendence of that temple, and beſtowed it on the Delphians. As ſoon as they left it, Pericles went thither with an army, and reſtored the Phocenſes.

The Eubœans having rebelled at the ſame time, Pericles was obliged to march thither with an army. He was no ſooner arrived there, but news was brought, that the inhabitants of Megara had taken up arms; and that the Lacedæmonians, headed by Pliſtonax their king, were on the frontiers of Attica. This obliged him to quit Eubœa, and to go with all poſſible expedition to defend his country. The Lacedæmonian army being retired, he returned againſt the rebels, and again ſubjected all the cities of Eubœa to the Athenians.

(*d*) After this expedition, a truce for thirty years was concluded between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. This treaty reſtored things to a tranquillity for the preſent: but as it did not deſcend to the root of the evil, nor cure the jealouſy and enmity of the two nations, this calm was not of long duration.

SECT. XIII. *New ſubjects of contention between the two nations, occaſioned by the Athenians laying ſiege to Samos; by their ſuccouring the people of Corcyra, and beſieging Potidæa. An open rupture enſues.*

(*e*) THE Athenians, ſix years after, took up arms againſt Samos in favour of Miletus. Theſe two cities were conteſting for that of Priene, to which each claimed a right. It is pretended, that Pericles fomented this war to pleaſe a famous curtezan, of whom he was very fond; her name was Aſpaſia, a native of Miletus. After ſeveral events and battles, Pericles beſieged the capital of the iſland of Samos. It is ſaid, that this was the firſt time he uſed military en-

(*d*) A. M. 3558. Ant. J. C. 446. Thucyd. l. 1. p. 75. Diod. p. 87. (*e*) A. M. 3564. Ant. J. C. 440. Thucyd. l. 1. p. 75, 76. Diod. l. 12. p. 88, 89. Plut. in Pericl. p. 165—167.

gines,

gines, as battering-rams and tortoiſes, invented by Artemon the engineer, who was lame, and therefore was always carried in a chair to the batteries, whence he was ſurnamed Periphoretus. The uſe of theſe machines had been long known in the eaſt. The Samians, after ſuſtaining a nine months ſiege, ſurrendred, Pericles raz'd their walls, diſpoſſeſſed them of their ſhips, and demanded immenſe ſums to defray the expences of the war. Part of this ſum they paid down; agreed to diſburſe the reſt at a certain time, and gave hoſtages by way of ſecurity for the payment.

After the reduction of Samos, Pericles being returned to Athens, buried in a ſplendid manner all who had loſt their lives in this war, and pronounced in perſon the funeral oration over their graves. This cuſtom, which he firſt introduced, was afterwards regularly obſerved. The ſenate of the Areopagus always appointed the orator on theſe occaſions. He was choſen, ten years after, for the like ceremony in the beginning of the Peloponneſian war.

(*f*) Pericles, who foreſaw that a rupture would ſoon enſue between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, adviſed the former to ſend aid to the people of Corcyra, whom the Corinthians had invaded; and to win over to their intereſt that iſland, which was ſo very formidable at ſea; foretelling them, that they would be attacked by the Peloponneſians. The occaſion of the quarrel between the people of Corcyra and Corinth, which gave riſe to that of Peloponneſus, one of the moſt conſiderable events in the Grecian hiſtory, was as follows.

* Epidamnum, a maritime city of Macedonia among the Taulantii, was a colony of Corcyrans, founded by Phalius of Corinth. This city growing, in time, very large and populous, diviſions aroſe in it, and the common people expelled the moſt wealthy in-

(*f*) A. M. 3572. Ant. J. C. 432. Thucyd. l. 1. p. 17—37. Diod. l. 12. p. 90—93. Plut. in Pericl. p. 167.

* *This city was afterwards called Dyrrachium.*

habitants,

habitants, who went over to the neighbouring nations, and infeſted them greatly with their incurſions. In this extremity they firſt had recourſe to the Corcyrans, and being refuſed by them, they addreſſed the Corinthians, who took them under their protection, ſent ſuccours to, and ſettled other inhabitants in it. But they did not continue long unmoleſted there, the Corcyrans beſieging it with a large fleet. The people of Corinth haſtened to its aid, but having been defeated at ſea, the city ſurrendred that very day, upon condition that the foreigners ſhould be ſlaves, and the Corinthians priſoners, till further orders. The Corcyrans erected a trophy, murthered all their priſoners except the Corinthians, and laid waſte the whole country.

The year after the battle, the Corinthians raiſed a greater army than the former, and fitted out a new fleet. The people of Corcyra, finding it would be impoſſible for them to make head alone againſt ſuch powerful enemies, ſent to the Athenians to deſire their alliance. The treaty of peace, concluded between the ſtates of Greece, left ſuch Grecian cities as had not declared themſelves, the liberty of joining whom they pleaſed, or of ſtanding neuter. This the Corcyrans had hitherto done; judging it their intereſt not to eſpouſe any party, in conſequence of which they had hitherto been without allies. They now ſent for this purpoſe to Athens, which the Corinthians hearing, they alſo ſent deputies thither. The affair was debated with great warmth in preſence of the people, who heard the reaſons on both ſides, and it was twice put to the vote in the aſſembly. The Athenians declared the firſt time in favour of the Corinthians; but afterwards changing their opinion, (doubtleſs on the remonſtrances of Pericles) they received the Corcyrans into their alliance. However, they did not go ſo far as to conclude a league offenſive and defenſive with them; (for they could not declare war againſt Corinth, without breaking at the ſame time with all Peloponneſus,) but only agreed to ſuccour each other mutually, in caſe they ſhould

ſhould be attacked, either perſonally, or in their allies. Their real deſign was, to ſet thoſe two ſtates, very powerful by ſea, at variance; and after each ſhould have exhauſted the other, by a tedious war, to triumph over the weakeſt: For at that time there were but three ſtates in Greece, who poſſeſſed powerful fleets; and theſe were Athens, Corinth, and Corcyra. They alſo had a deſign on Italy and Sicily, which their taking the iſland of Corcyra would very much promote.

On this plan they concluded an alliance with the Corcyrans, and accordingly ſent them ten gallies, but with an order for them not to engage the Corinthians, unleſs they ſhould firſt invade the iſland of Corcyra, or ſome other place belonging to their allies: this precaution was uſed, in order that the articles of the truce might not be infringed.

But it was very difficult to obey theſe orders. A battle was fought between the Corcyrans and the Corinthians, near the iſland of Sibotis, oppoſite to Corcyra: it was one of the moſt conſiderable, with regard to the number of ſhips, that was ever fought between the Greeks. The advantage was almoſt equal on both ſides. About the end of the battle, as night was drawing on, twenty Athenian gallies came up. The Corcyrans, with this reinforcement, ſailed next day by day-break towards the port of Sibotis, whither the Corinthians had retired, to ſee if they would venture a ſecond engagement. However, the latter contented themſelves with ſailing away in order of battle, without fighting. Both parties erected a trophy in the iſland of Sibotis, each aſcribing the victory to himſelf.

(g) From this war aroſe another, which occaſioned an open rupture between the Athenians and Corinthians, and afterwards the war of Peloponneſus. Potidæa, a city of Macedonia, was a colony belonging to the Corinthians, which ſent magiſtrates thither annually;

(g) Thucyd. l. 1. p. 37—42. Diod. l. 12. p. 93, 94.

but

but it was dependent at that time on Athens, and paid tribute to it. The Athenians fearing this city would revolt, and prevail with the reſt of the Thracian allies to join them, commanded the inhabitants to demoliſh their walls on the ſide next Pallene; to deliver hoſtages to them as ſureties for their fidelity; and to ſend back the magiſtrates which Corinth had given them. Demands of ſo unjuſt a nature only fomented the revolt. (*b*) The Potidæans declared againſt the Athenians, and ſeveral neighbouring cities followed their example. Both Athens and Corinth armed and ſent forces thither. The two armies engaged near Potidæa, and that of the Athenians had the advantage. Alcibiades, who was then very young, and Socrates his maſter, ſignalized themſelves on this occaſion. It is ſomething very ſingular, to ſee a philoſopher put on his coat of mail; as well as to conſider his behaviour and conduct in a battle. There was not a ſoldier in the whole army who ſo reſolutely ſupported all the toils and fatigues of the campaign as Socrates. Hunger, thirſt, and cold, were enemies he had long accuſtomed himſelf to deſpiſe and ſubdue with eaſe. Thrace, the ſcene of this expedition, was a frozen region. Whilſt the other ſoldiers, covered with thick clothes and warm furs, lay cloſe in their tents, and ſcarce ever dared to ſtir out of them; Socrates uſed to come into the open air as thin clad as uſual, and bare-footed. His gaiety and wit were the life of all tables; and induced others to put the glaſs round chearfully, though he himſelf never drank wine to exceſs. When the armies engaged, he performed his duty to a miracle. Alcibiades having been thrown down and wounded, Socrates placed himſelf before him, defended him valiantly, and, in ſight of the whole army, prevented him and his arms from being taken by the enemy. The prize of valour was juſtly due to Socrates; but as the generals ſeemed inclined to decree it to Alcibiades, on account of his illuſtrious birth; Socrates, who

(*b*) Plut. in Conviv. p. 219, 220. Plut. in Alcib. p. 194.

only

only ſought for opportunities to inflame him with deſire of true glory, contributed more than any other perſon, by the noble elogium he made on his courage, to cauſe the crown and compleat ſuit of armour (which was the prize of valour) to be adjudged to Alcibiades.

Notwithſtanding the loſs which the Corinthians had ſuſtained in the battle, the inhabitants of Potidæa did not change their conduct. The city was therefore beſieged. (*i*) The Corinthians, fearing to loſe a place of ſo much importance, addreſſed their allies in the ſtrongeſt terms; who all in conjunction with them, ſent a deputation to Lacedæmon, to complain of the Athenians, as having infringed the articles of peace. The Lacedæmonians admitted them to audience in one of their ordinary aſſemblies. The people of Ægina, though very much diſguſted at the Athenians, did not ſend a deputation publickly thither, for fear of giving umbrage to a republic to which they were ſubject, but they acted in ſecret as ſtrenuouſly as the reſt. The Megarians complained vehemently againſt the Athenians, that (contrary to the law of nations, and in prejudice of the treaty concluded between the Greeks) they had prohibited them, by a public decree, acceſs to their fairs and markets, and excluded them from all the ports dependant on them. (*k*) By that decree, according to Plutarch *, the Athenians declared an eternal and irreconcilable hatred againſt Megara; and ordained that all Megarians ſhould be put to death, that ſet foot in Athens; and that all the Athenian generals, when they took the uſual oath, ſhould ſwear

(*i*) Thucyd. l. 1. p. 43—59.

(*k*) Plut. in Pericl. p. 168.

* *According to Plutarch, ſome perſons pretended that Pericles had cauſed this decree to be enacted, to revenge the private injury done to Aſpaſia, from whoſe houſe the people of Megara had carried off two curtezans; and he cites ſome verſes of Ariſtophanes, who, in a comedy entitled,* The Acharnanians, *reproaches Pericles with this action. But Thucydides, a cotemporary author, and who was very well acquainted with all the tranſactions of Athens, does not ſay a word of this affair; and he is much more worthy of belief than a poet who was a profeſſed ſlanderer and ſatyriſt.*

expreſsly,

expreſsly, that they would ſend a body of ſoldiers twice a year, to lay waſte the territories of the Megarenſes.

The chief complaints were made by the Corinthian embaſſador, who ſpoke with the utmoſt force and freedom. He repreſented to the Lacedæmonians, that as they themſelves never ſwerved from the moſt inviolable integrity, either in public or private tranſactions, they, for that very reaſon, were leſs ſuſpicious of the probity of others; and that their own moderation prevented their diſcovering the ambition of their enemies: That inſtead of flying, with inſtant activity, to meet dangers and calamities, they never attempted to remedy them, till they were quite cruſhed by them: That by their indolence and ſupineneſs, they had given the Athenians an opportunity of attaining by inſenſible degrees, their preſent height of grandeur and power. That it was quite different with regard to the Athenians, "That this active, vigilant "and indefatigable people were never at reſt themſelves, nor would ſuffer any other nation to be ſo. "Employed, (ſays he) wholly in their projects, they "form only ſuch as are of the greateſt and moſt intrepid nature; their deliberations are ſpeedy, and "their executions the ſame. One enterprize ſerves "only as a ſtep to a ſecond. Whether they are ſucceſsful or unfortunate, they turn every thing to their "advantage; and never ſtop in their career, or are "diſcouraged. But you, who are oppreſs'd by ſuch "formidable enemies, are lulled aſleep in a fatal tranquillity; and do not reflect, that a man who deſires to live calm and eaſy, muſt not only forbear "injuring others, but alſo not let any ill be done to "himſelf; and that juſtice conſiſts, not only in forbearing to commit evil ourſelves, but in avenging "that done to us by others. Shall I be ſo free as to "ſay it? Your integrity is of too antique a caſt for "the preſent ſtate of affairs. It is neceſſary for men, "in politicks as well as in all other things, to con-

"form

" form always to the times. When a people are at " peace, they may follow their antient maxims; but " when they are involved in a variety of difficulties, " they muſt try new expedients, and ſet every en- " gine at work to extricate themſelves. It was by " theſe arts that the Athenians have increaſed their " power ſo much. Had you imitated their activity, " they would not have diſpoſſeſſed us of Corcyra, and " would not now be laying ſiege to Potidæa. Fol- " low, at leaſt, their example on this occaſion, by " ſuccouring the Potidæans and the reſt of your allies, " as your duty obliges you; and do not force your " friends and neighbours, by forſaking them, to have " recourſe, out of deſpair, to other powers.

The Athenian embaſſador, who was come to Sparta upon other affairs, and was in the aſſembly, did not think it adviſeable to let this ſpeech go unanſwered. He put the Lacedæmonians in mind, of the ſtill recent ſervices that the republic, by which he was ſent, had done to all Greece, which (he ſaid) merited ſome regard: and that therefore it ought not to be envied, much leſs ſhould endeavours be uſed to leſſen its power. That the Athenians could not be charged with having uſurped an empire over Greece; ſince it was merely at the entreaty of their allies, and in ſome meaſure with the conſent of Sparta, that they had been forced to take the abandoned helm: That thoſe who murmured, did it without grounds; and only from the averſion which mankind in general have to dependance and ſubjection, though of the gentleſt and moſt equitable kind: That he exhorted them to employ a ſufficient time in deliberating, before they came to a reſolution; and not involve themſelves and all Greece in a war, which would neceſſarily be attended with the moſt fatal conſequences. That gentle methods may be found, for terminating the differences of the allies, without breaking at once into open violence. However, that the Athenians, in caſe of an invaſion, were able to oppoſe force with force; and

would

would prepare for a vigorous defence, after having invoked, againſt Sparta, the deities who take vengeance of thoſe that forſwear themſelves, and who violate the faith of treaties.

The embaſſadors being withdrawn, and the affair debated, the majority were for war. But before it paſſed into an act, Archidamus king of Sparta, ſetting himſelf above thoſe prejudices which ſo ſtrongly byaſſed the reſt, and directing his views to futurity, made a ſpeech, in which he ſet forth the dreadful conſequences of the war they were going to embark in; ſhewed the ſtrength of the Athenians; exhorted them firſt to try gentle methods, which they themſelves had ſeemed to approve; but to make, in the mean time, the neceſſary preparations for carrying on ſo important an enterprize, and not be under any apprehenſions, that their moderation and delays would be branded with the name of cowardice, ſince their paſt actions ſecured them from any ſuſpicion of that kind.

But, notwithſtanding all theſe wiſe expoſtulations, a war was reſolved. The people cauſed the allies to return into the aſſembly, and declared to them, that in their opinion the Athenians were the aggreſſors; but that it would be expedient firſt to aſſemble all who were in the alliance, in order that peace or war might be agreed upon unanimouſly. This decree of the Lacedæmonians was made the fourteenth year of the truce; and was not owing ſo much to the complaints of the allies, as to the jealouſy of the Athenian power, which had already ſubjected a conſiderable part of Greece.

(*k*) Accordingly the allies were convened a ſecond time. They all gave their votes, in their ſeveral turns, from the greateſt city to the leaſt, and war was reſolved by a general conſent. However, as they had not yet made any preparations, it was judged adviſeable to begin them immediately; and while this was

(*k*) Thucyd. l. 1. p. 77—84, and 93.

doing,

doing, in order to gain time, and obſerve the neceſſary formalities, to ſend embaſſadors to Athens, to complain of the violation of the treaty.

The firſt who were ſent thither, reviving an antient complaint, required of the Athenians to expel out of their city the deſcendants of thoſe who had profaned the temple of Minerva in the affair of * Cylon. As Pericles was of that family by the mother's ſide, the view of the Lacedæmonians, in their making this demand, was, either to procure his baniſhment or leſſen his authority. However, it was not complied with. The ſecond embaſſadors required, that the ſiege of Potidæa ſhould be raiſed, and the liberty of Ægina reſtored, and above all, that the decree againſt the Megarians ſhould be repealed; declaring, that otherwiſe no accommodation could take place. In fine, a third embaſſador came, who took no notice of any of theſe particulars, but only ſaid, that the Lacedæmonians were for peace; but that this could never be, except the Athenians ſhould ceaſe to infringe the liberties of Greece.

SECT. XIV. *Troubles excited againſt Pericles. He determines the Athenians to engage in war againſt the Lacedæmonians.*

(*l*) PERICLES oppoſed all theſe demands with great vigour, and eſpecially that relating to the Megarians. He had great credit in Athens, and at the ſame time had many enemies. Not daring to attack him at firſt in perſon, they cited his moſt intimate friends, and thoſe for whom he had the greateſt eſteem, as Phidias, Aſpaſia and Anaxagoras, before the

(*l*) Plut. in. Pericl. p. 168, 169.

* *This Cylon ſeized on the citadel of Athens above an hundred years before. Thoſe who followed him, being beſieged in it, and reduced to extreme famine, fled for ſhelter to the temple of Minerva, where they afterwards were taken out by force and cut to pieces. Thoſe who adviſed this murder were declared guilty of impiety and ſacrilege, and as ſuch baniſhed. However, they were recalled ſome time after.*

people,

people, and their deſign in this was, to ſound how the people ſtood affected towards Pericles himſelf.

Phidias was accuſed of having embezzled conſiderable ſums in the caſting the ſtatue of Minerva, which was his maſter-piece. The proſecution having been carried on with the uſual forms, before the aſſembly of the people, not a ſingle proof of Phidias's pretended embezzlement appeared: For, that artiſt, from beginning that ſtatue, had, by Pericles's advice, contrived the workmanſhip of the gold in ſuch a manner, that all of it might be taken off and weighed; which accordingly Pericles bid the informers do in preſence of all the ſpectators. But Phidias had witneſſes againſt him, the truth of whoſe evidence he could neither diſpute nor ſilence; theſe were the fame and beauty of his works, the ever-exiſting cauſes of the envy which attacked him. The circumſtance which they could leaſt forgive in him was, his having repreſented to the life (in the battle of the Amazons, engraved on the ſhield of the goddeſs) his own perſon, and that of Pericles (*m*): and, by an imperceptible art, he had ſo blended and incorporated theſe figures with the whole work, that it was impoſſible to eraſe them, without disfiguring and taking to pieces the whole ſtatue. Phidias was therefore dragged to priſon, where he came to his end, either by the common courſe of nature, or by poiſon. Other authors ſay, that he was only baniſhed, and that after his exile he made the famous ſtatue of Jupiter at Olympia. It is not poſſible to excuſe in any manner, the ingratitude of the Athenians, in thus making a priſon or death the reward of a maſter-piece of art; nor their exceſſive rigour, in puniſhing, as a capital crime, an action that appears innocent in itſelf; or which, to make the worſt of it, was a vanity very pardonable in ſo great an artiſt.

Aſpaſia, a native of Miletus in Aſia, had ſettled in Athens, where ſhe was become very famous, not ſo

(*m*) Ariſtot. in tractat. de mund. p. 613.

much

much for the charms of her perſon, as for her vivacity and ſolidity of wit, and her great knowledge. All the illuſtrious men in the city thought it an honour to frequent her houſe. (*m*) Socrates himſelf uſed to viſit her conſtantly; and was not aſhamed to paſs for her pupil, and to own that he had learnt rhetoric from her. Pericles declared alſo, that he was obliged to Aſpaſia for his eloquence, which ſo greatly diſtinguiſhed him in Athens; and that it was from her converſation he had imbibed the principles of the art of policy, for ſhe was exceedingly well verſed in the maxims of government. Their intimacy was owing to ſtill ſtronger motives. Pericles did not love his wife; he reſigned her very freely to another man, and ſupplied her place with Aſpaſia, whom he loved paſſionately, though her reputation was more than ſuſpicious. Aſpaſia was therefore accuſed of impiety and a diſſolute conduct; and it was with the utmoſt difficulty that Pericles ſaved her, by his intreaties and by the compaſſion he raiſed in the judges, by ſhedding abundance of tears whilſt her cauſe was pleading, a behaviour little conſiſtent with the dignity of his character, and the rank of ſupreme head of the moſt powerful ſtate of Greece.

A decree had paſſed, by which informations were ordered to be taken out againſt all ſuch * perſons as denied what was aſcribed to the miniſtry of the gods; or thoſe philoſophers and others who taught præternatural things, and the motions of the heavens, doctrines on this occaſion conſidered injurious to the eſtabliſhed religion. The ſcope and aim of this decree was, to make Pericles ſuſpected with regard to theſe matters, becauſe Anaxagoras had been his maſter. This philo-

(*m*) Plut. in Menex. p. 235.

* Τὰ θεῖα μὴ νομίζοντας, ἢ λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταρσίων διδάσκοντας. *Anaxagoras teaching, that the divine intelligence alone gave a regular motion to all the parts of nature, and preſided in the government of the univerſe; deſtroyed, by that ſyſtem, the plurality of gods, their powers, and all the peculiar functions which were aſcribed to them.*

ſopher taught, that one only intelligence had modified the chaos, and diſpoſed the univerſe in the beautiful order in which we now ſee it; which tended directly to depreciate the gods of the pagan ſyſtem. Pericles thinking it would be impoſſible for him to ſave his life, ſent him out of the city to a place of ſafety.

The enemies of Pericles ſeeing that the people approved and received with pleaſure all theſe accuſations, they impeached that great man himſelf, and charged him with embezzling the public monies during his adminiſtration. A decree was made, by which Pericles was obliged to give in immediately his accompts; was to be tried for oppreſſion and rapine; and the cauſe to be adjudged by fifteen hundred judges. Pericles had no real cauſe of fear, becauſe in the adminiſtration of the public affairs his conduct had always been irreproachable, eſpecially on the ſide of intereſt: he could not however but be under ſome apprehenſions from the ill-will of the people, when he conſidered their great levity and inconſtancy. One day when Alcibiades, (then very young) went to viſit Pericles, he was told that he was not to be ſpoke with, becauſe of ſome affairs of great conſequence in which he was then engaged. Alcibiades enquiring what theſe mighty affairs were, was anſwered, that Pericles was preparing to give in his accompts. *He ought rather*, ſays Alcibiades, *not give them in:* and indeed this was what Pericles at laſt reſolved. To allay the ſtorm, he made a reſolution to oppoſe the inclination the people diſcovered for the Peloponneſian war no longer, preparations for which had been long carrying on, firmly perſuaded that this would ſoon ſilence all complaints againſt him; that envy would yield to a more powerful motive; and that the citizens, when in ſuch imminent danger, would not fail of throwing themſelves into his arms, and ſubmit implicitly to his conduct, from his great power, and exalted reputation.

(*n*) This is what ſome hiſtorians have related; and

(*n*) Plut. de Herod. malign. p. 855, 856.

the comic poets, in the life-time, and under the eye, as it were, of Pericles, ſpread ſuch a report in public, to ſully, if poſſible, his reputation and merit, which drew upon him the envy and enmity of many. Plutarch, on this occaſion, makes a reflection which may be of great ſervice, not only to thoſe in the adminiſtration of public affairs, but to all ſorts of perſons, as well as of advantage in the ordinary commerce of life. He thinks it ſtrange, when actions are good in themſelves, and manifeſtly laudable in all reſpects, that men, purely to diſcredit illuſtrious perſonages, ſhould pretend to dive into their hearts; and from a ſpirit of the vileſt and moſt abject malice, ſhould aſcribe ſuch views and intentions to them, as they poſſibly never ſo much as imagined. He, on the contrary, wiſhes, when the motive is obſcure, and the ſame action may be conſidered in different lights, that men would always view it in the moſt favourable, and incline to judge candidly of it. He applies this maxim to the reports which had been ſpread concerning Pericles, as the fomenter of the Peloponneſian war, merely from private views of intereſt; whereas, the whole tenor of his paſt conduct ought to have convinced every body, that it was wholly from reaſons of ſtate, and for the good of the public, that he at laſt acquieſced in an opinion, which he had hitherto thought it incumbent on him to oppoſe.

(o) Whilſt this affair was carrying on at Athens, the Lacedæmonians ſent ſeveral embaſſies thither, one after another, to make the various demands above mentioned. At laſt the affair was debated in the aſſembly of the people, and it was reſolved they ſhould firſt deliberate upon all the articles, before they gave a poſitive anſwer. Opinions, as is uſual in theſe caſes, were divided; and ſome were for aboliſhing the decree enacted againſt Megara, which ſeemed the chief obſtacle to the peace.

Pericles ſpoke on this occaſion with the utmoſt force of eloquence, which his view to the public welfare

(o) Thucyd. l. 1. p. 93—99. Diod. l. 12. p. 95—97.

and the honour of his country, rendered more vehement and triumphant than it had ever appeared before. He ſhowed in the firſt place, that the decree relating to Megara, on which the greateſt ſtreſs was laid, was not of ſo little conſequence as they imagined: That the demand made by the Lacedæmonians on that head, was merely to ſound the diſpoſition of the Athenians, and to try whether it would be poſſible to frighten them out of their deſign; that ſhould they recede on this occaſion, it would betray fear and weakneſs: That the affair was of no leſs importance than the giving up to the Lacedæmonians the empire which the Athenians had poſſeſſed during ſo many years, by their courage and reſolution: That ſhould the Athenians ſubmit on this occaſion, the Lacedæmonians would immediately preſcribe new laws to them, as to a people ſeized with dread; whereas, if they made a vigorous reſiſtance, their opponents would be obliged to treat them, at leaſt, on the foot of equals: That with regard to the preſent matters in diſpute, arbiters might be choſen, in order to adjuſt them in an amicable way; but that it did not become the Lacedæmonians to command the Athenians in a magiſterial way, to quit Potidæa, to free Ægina, and revoke the decree relating to Megara: That ſuch imperious behaviour was directly contrary to the treaty, which declared in expreſs terms, *That ſhould any diſputes ariſe among the allies, they ſhould be decided by pacific methods*, AND WITHOUT ANY PARTY'S BEING OBLIGED TO GIVE UP ANY PART OF WHAT THEY POSSESSED: That the ſureſt way to prevent a government from being eternally conteſting about its poſſeſſions, is to take up arms, and diſpute its rights ſword in hand: That the Athenians had juſt reaſon to believe they would gain their cauſe this way; and to give them a ſtronger idea of this truth, he ſet before them in the moſt pompous light the preſent ſtate of Athens, giving a very particular account of its treaſures, revenues, fleets, land as well as ſea-forces, and thoſe of its allies; contraſting theſe

ſeveral things with the poverty of the Lacedæmonians, who (he ſaid) had no money, which is the ſinews of war, not to mention the poor condition of their navy, on which they moſt depended. (*p*) And indeed, it appeared by the treaſury, that the Athenians had brought from Delos to their city nine thouſand ſix hundred talents, which amount to about twelve hundred thouſand pounds ſterling. The annual contributions of the allies amounted to four hundred and ſixty talents, that is, to near fourteen hundred thouſand French livres. In caſes of neceſſity, the Athenians would find infinite reſources from the ornaments of the temples, ſince thoſe of the ſtatue of Minerva only, amounted to fifty talents of gold, that is, fifteen hundred thouſand French livres, which might be taken from the ſtatue without ſpoiling it in any manner, and be afterwards fixed on again in more auſpicious times. With regard to the land-forces, they amounted to very near thirty thouſand men, and the fleet conſiſted of three hundred gallies. Above all, he adviſed them not to venture a battle in their own country againſt the Peloponneſians, whoſe troops were ſuperior in number to theirs; not to regard the laying waſte of their lands, as they might eaſily be reſtored to their former condition; but to conſider the loſs of their men as highly important, becauſe irretrievable; to make their whole policy conſiſt in defending their city, and preſerving the empire of the ſea, which would certainly one day give them the ſuperiority over their enemies. He laid down the plan for carrying on the war, not for a ſingle campaign, but during the whole time it might laſt; and enumerated the evils they had to fear, if they deviated from that ſyſtem. Pericles, after adding other conſiderations, taken from the genius or character, and the internal government of the two republics; the one uncertain and fluctuating in its deliberations, and rendered ſtill ſlower in the

(*p*) Dion. l. 12. p. 96, 97.

execution, from its being obliged to wait for the conſent of its allies; the other ſpeedy, determinate, independent, and miſtreſs of its reſolutions, which is no indifferent circumſtance with regard to the ſucceſs of enterprizes: Pericles, I ſay, concluded his ſpeech, and gave his opinion as follows: "We have no more "to do but to diſmiſs the ambaſſadors, and to give "them this anſwer, that we permit thoſe of Megara "to trade with Athens, upon condition that the La-"cedæmonians do not prohibit either us, or our allies, "to trade with them. With regard to the cities of "Greece, we ſhall leave thoſe free who were ſo at "the time of our agreement, provided they ſhall do "the ſame with regard to thoſe dependent on them. "We do not refuſe to ſubmit the deciſion of our "differences to arbitration, and will not commit the "firſt hoſtilities: however, in caſe of being attacked, "we ſhall make a vigorous defence."

The ambaſſadors were anſwered as Pericles had dictated. They returned home and never came again to Athens; ſoon after which the Peloponneſian war broke out.

CHAPTER II.

Tranſactions of the Greeks in Sicily and Italy.

AS the Peloponneſian war is a great event of conſiderable duration, before I enter upon the hiſtory of it, it may be proper to relate, in few words, the moſt conſiderable tranſactions which had happened in Græcia major, to the time we now ſpeak of, whether in Sicily or Italy.

SECT. I. *The Carthaginians are defeated in Sicily. Theron, tyrant of Agrigentum. Reign of Gelon in Syracuſe, and his two brothers. Liberty is reſtored.*

I. GELON. WE have ſeen that (q) Xerxes, whoſe project tended to no leſs than the

(q) A. M. 3520. Ant. J. C. 484. Diod. l. 11. p. 1. & 16—22.

total

total extirpation of the Greeks, had prevailed with the Carthaginians to make war againſt the people of Sicily. They landed in it an army of above three hundred thouſand men, and ſent thither a fleet of two thouſand ſhips, and upwards of three thouſand ſmall veſſels for the baggage, &c. Hamilcar, the ableſt of the Carthaginian generals at that time, was charged with this expedition. However, the ſucceſs was not anſwerable to theſe mighty preparations; the Carthaginians were entirely defeated by Gelon, who at that time had the chief authority in Syracuſe.

(r) This Gelon was born in a city of Sicily, ſituated on the ſouthern coaſt between Agrigentum and Camarina, called Gelas, whence perhaps he received his name. He had ſignalized himſelf very much in the wars which Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, carried on againſt the neighbouring powers, moſt of whom he ſubdued, and was very near taking Syracuſe. After the death of Hippocrates, Gelon, upon pretence of defending the rights and poſſeſſion of the tyrant's children, took up arms againſt his own citizens, and having overcome them in a battle, poſſeſſed himſelf of the government in his own name. Some time after he made himſelf maſter alſo of Syracuſe, by the aſſiſtance of ſome exiles whom he had cauſed to return into it, and who had engaged the populace to open the gates of that city to him. He then gave Gela to Hiero his brother, and applied himſelf wholly in extending the limits of the territory of Syracuſe, and ſoon rendered himſelf very powerful. We may form a judgment of this * from the army which he offered the Grecian ambaſſadors, who came to deſire his aid againſt the king of Perſia; and by his demand of being appointed generaliſſimo of all their forces, which however they refuſed. The fear he was in at that time, of being ſoon invaded by the Carthaginians, was the chief occaſion of his not ſuccouring the Greeks.

(r) Her. l. 7. c. 153—167.

* *He promiſed to furniſh two hundred ſhips, and thirty thouſand men.*

He was extremely political in his conduct; and when news was brought him of Xerxes's having croſſed the Helleſpont, he ſent a truſty perſon with rich preſents, with orders for him to wait the iſſue of the firſt battle, and in caſe Xerxes ſhould be victorious, to pay homage to him in his name, otherwiſe to bring back the money. I now return to the Carthaginians.

They were landed in Sicily at the earneſt ſollicitations of Terillus, formerly tyrant of Himera, but dethroned by Theron, another tyrant who reigned at Agrigentum. The family of the latter was one of the moſt illuſtrious of all Greece, being deſcended in a direct line from Cadmus. He married into the family which at that time ruled at Syracuſe, and which conſiſted of four brothers, Gelon, Hiero, Polyzelus, and Thraſybulus. He married his daughter to the firſt, and himſelf married the daughter of the third.

Hamilcar having landed at Panormus, began by laying ſiege to Himera. Gelon haſted with a great army to the ſuccour of his father-in-law; when uniting, they defeated the Carthaginians. This was perhaps the moſt compleat victory ever gained.

The battle was fought the ſame day with that of * Thermopylæ, the circumſtances of which I have related in the (*s*) hiſtory of the Carthaginians. One remarkable circumſtance in the conditions of the peace, which Gelon preſcribed the conquered, was, that they ſhould ceaſe to ſacrifice their children to the god Saturn; which ſhows, at the ſame time, the cruelty of the Carthaginians, and the piety of Gelon.

(*s*) Vol. I. p. 153. Plut. in Apophth. p. 175.

* *Herodotus ſays, that this battle was fought the ſame day with that of Salamin, which does not appear ſo probable. For the Greeks, informed of Gelon's ſucceſſes, intreated him to ſuccour them againſt Xerxes, which they would not have done after the battle of Salamin, that exalted their courage ſo much, that after this battle, they imagined themſelves ſtrong enough to reſiſt their enemies, and to put an end to the war, to their own advantage, without the aſſiſtance of any other power.*

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The ſpoils won on this occaſion were of immenſe value. Gelon allotted the greateſt part of them for the ornament of the temples in Syracuſe. They alſo took an incredible number of priſoners. Theſe he ſhared, with the utmoſt equity, with his allies, who employed them, after putting irons on their feet, in cultivating their lands, and in building magnificent edifices, as well for the ornament as the utility of the cities. Several of the citizens of Agrigentum had each five hundred for his own ſhare.

(*t*) Gelon, after ſo glorious a victory, ſo far from growing more proud and haughty, behaved with greater affability and humanity than ever towards the citizens and his allies. Being returned from the campaign, he convened the aſſembly of the Syracuſans. who were ordered to come armed into it. However, he himſelf came unarmed thither: declared to the aſſembly every ſtep of his conduct; the uſes to which he had applied the ſeveral ſums with which he had been intruſted, and in what manner he had employed his authority; adding, that if they had any complaints to make againſt him, his perſon and life were at their diſpoſal. All the people, ſtruck with ſo unexpected a ſpeech, and ſtill more with the unuſual confidence he repoſed in them, anſwered by acclamations of joy, praiſe, and gratitude; and immediately, with one conſent, inveſted him with the ſupreme authority, and the title of king. (*u*) And, to preſerve to lateſt poſterity, the remembrance of Gelon's memorable action, who had come into the aſſembly, and put his life into the hands of the Syracuſans, they erected a ſtatue in honour of him, wherein he was repreſented in the ordinary habit of a citizen, ungirded, and unarm'd. This ſtatue met afterwards with a very ſingular fate, and worthy of the motives which had occaſioned its ſetting up. Timoleon, above a hundred and thirty years after, having reſtored the

(*t*) A. M. 3525. Ant. J. C. 479. (*u*) Plut. in Timol. p. 247. Ælian. l. 13. c. 37.

Syracuſans to their liberty, thought it adviſable, in order to eraſe from it all traces of tyrannical government, and at the ſame time to aſſiſt the wants of the people, to ſell publickly all the ſtatues of thoſe princes and tyrants who had governed it till that time. But firſt, he brought them to a trial, as ſo many criminals; hearing the depoſitions and witneſſes upon each of them. They all were condemned unanimouſly, the ſtatue of Gelon only excepted, which found an eloquent advocate and defender, in the warm and ſincere gratitude which the citizens retained for that great man, whoſe virtue they rever'd as if he had been ſtill alive.

The Syracuſans had no cauſe to repent their having intruſted Gelon with unlimited power and authority. This did not add to his known zeal for their intereſts, but only enabled him to do them more important ſervices. (*x*) For, by a change till then unheard of, and of which * Tacitus found no example except in Veſpaſian, he was the firſt man whom the ſovereignty made the better man. He made upwards of ten thouſand foreigners, who had ſerved under him, denizens. His views were, to people the capital, to increaſe the power of the ſtate, to reward the ſervices of his brave and faithful ſoldiers; and to attach them more ſtrongly to Syracuſe, from the ſenſe of the advantageous ſettlement they had obtained in being incorporated with the citizens.

(*y*) He was particularly famous for his inviolable ſincerity, truth and fidelity to his engagements; a quality very eſſential to a prince, the only one capable of gaining him the love and confidence of his ſubjects and of foreigners, and which therefore ought to be conſidered as the baſis of all juſt policy and good government. Having occaſion for money to carry on an expedition he meditated, (this, very probably, was before

(*x*) Diod. l. 11. p. 55. (*y*) Plut. in Apophth. p. 175.

* Solus omnium ante ſe principum in melius mutatus eſt. *Hiſt.* l. 1. c. 50.

he

he had triumphed over the Carthaginians) he addreſſed the people, in order to obtain a contribution from them: but finding the Syracuſans unwilling to be at that expence, he told them, that he aſked nothing but a loan, and that he would engage to repay it as ſoon as the war ſhould be over. The money was advanced, and repaid punctually at the promiſed time. How happy is that government where ſuch juſtice and equity are exerciſed; and how miſtaken are thoſe miniſters and princes, who violate them in the leaſt!

(z) One of the chief objects of his attention, and in which his ſucceſſor imitated him, was to make the cultivation of the lands be conſidered as an honourable employment. It is well known how fruitful Sicily was in corn; and the immenſe revenues which might be produced from ſo rich a ſoil when induſtriouſly cultivated. He animated the huſbandman by his preſence, and delighted ſometimes in appearing at their head, in the ſame manner as on other occaſions he had marched at the head of armies. His intention, ſays Plutarch, was not merely to make the country rich and fruitful, but alſo to exerciſe his ſubjects, to accuſtom and inure them to toils, and by that means to preſerve them from a thouſand diſorders, which inevitably follow a ſoft and indolent life. There are few maxims (in point of policy) on which the antients have inſiſted more ſtrongly, than on that relating to the cultivation of their lands; a manifeſt proof of their great wiſdom, and the profound knowledge they had of what conſtitutes the ſtrength and ſolid happineſs of a ſtate. (a) Xenophon, in a dialogue, the ſubject of which is government, entitled Hiero, ſhows the great advantage it would be to a ſtate, were the king ſtudious to reward thoſe who ſhould excel in huſbandry, and whatever relates to the cultivation of lands. He ſays the ſame of war, of trade, and of all the arts; on which occaſion, if honours were paid to all thoſe who ſhould diſtinguiſh themſelves in them, it would give

(z) Plut. ibid. (a) P. 916, 917.

univerſal life and motion; would excite a noble and laudable emulation among the citizens, and give riſe to a thouſand inventions for the improvement of thoſe arts.

It does not appear that Gelon had been educated in the ſame manner as the children of the rich among the Greeks, who were taught muſic and the art of playing on inſtruments very carefully. Poſſibly this was becauſe of his mean birth, or rather was owing to the little value he ſet on thoſe kind of exerciſes. (*b*) One day at an entertainment, when, according to the uſual cuſtom, a lyre was preſented to each of the gueſts; when it was Gelon's turn, inſtead of touching the inſtrument as the reſt had done, he cauſed his horſe to be brought, mounted him with wonderful agility and grace, and ſhowed that he had learnt a nobler exerciſe than playing on the lyre.

(*c*) From the defeat of the Carthaginians in Sicily, the ſeveral cities of it enjoyed a profound peace, and Syracuſe was particularly happy in its tranquillity, under the auſpicious government of Gelon. He was not born in Syracuſe, and yet all the inhabitants of that city, though ſo extremely jealous of their liberty, had forced him in a manner to be their king. Though an alien, the ſupreme power went in ſearch of him, not courted with any art or inducement but thoſe of merit. Gelon was thoroughly acquainted with all the duties of the regal office, as well as its great weight; and he accepted it with no other view but the good of his people. He thought himſelf only king for the defence of the ſtate, to preſerve the good order of ſociety, to protect innocence and juſtice, and to exhibit to all his ſubjects, in his ſimple, modeſt, active and regular life, a pattern of every civil virtue. The whole of royalty that he aſſumed was the toils and cares of it, a zeal for the public welfare, and the ſweet ſatisfaction which reſults from making millions happy by his cares: in a word, he conſidered the ſovereignty

(*b*) Plut. in Apophth. p. 175. (*c*) Diod. l. 11. p. 29, 30.

as

as an obligation, and a means to procure the felicity of a greater number of men. He baniſhed from it pomp, oſtentation, licentiouſneſs, and impunity for crimes. He did not affect the appearance of reigning, but contented himſelf with making the laws reign. He never made his inferiors feel that he was their maſter, but only inculcated to them that both himſelf and they ought to ſubmit to reaſon and juſtice. To induce their obedience, he employed no other methods but perſuaſion and a good example, which are the weapons of virtue, and alone produce a ſincere and uninterrupted obedience.

A rever'd old age, a name highly dear to all his ſubjects, a reputation equally diffuſed within and without his kingdoms; theſe were the fruits of that wiſdom which he retained on the throne to the laſt gaſp. His reign was ſhort, and only juſt ſhowed him in a manner to Sicily, to exhibit in his perſon an example of a great, good, and true king. He left the world, after having reigned only ſeven years, to the infinite regret of all his ſubjects. Every family imagined itſelf deprived of its beſt friend, its protector and father. The people erected, in the place where his wife Demarata had been buried, a ſplendid mauſolæum, ſurrounded with nine towers of a ſurprizing height and magnificence; and decreed thoſe honours to him, which were then paid to the demi-gods or heroes. The Carthaginians afterwards demoliſhed the mauſolæum, and Agathocles the towers: but, ſays the hiſtorian, neither violence, envy, nor time, which deſtroys all groſſer things, could deſtroy the glory of his name, or aboliſh the memory of his exalted virtues and noble actions, which love and gratitude had engraved in the hearts of the Sicilians.

II. HIERO. (*d*) After Gelon's death, the ſcepter continued near twelve years in his family. He was ſucceeded by Hiero, his eldeſt brother.

It will be neceſſary for us, in order to reconcile the

(*d*) A. M. 3532. Ant. J. C. 472.

auth.rs

authors who have writ on this prince, ſome of whom declare him to have been a good king, and others a deteſtable tyrant; it will be neceſſary, I ſay, to diſtinguiſh the periods. It is very probable that Hiero, dazzled, in the beginning of his reign, by the glitter of ſovereign power, and corrupted by the flattery of his courtiers, ſtudiouſly endeavoured to deviate from that path which his predeceſſor had pointed out to him, and in which he had found himſelf ſo happy. (*e*) This young prince was avaricious, headſtrong, unjuſt, and ſtudious of nothing but the gratification of his paſſions, without ever endeavouring to acquire the eſteem and affection of the people; who, on the other ſide, had the utmoſt averſion for a prince, whom they looked upon as a tyrant over them, rather than as a king; and nothing but the veneration they had for Gelon's memory, prevented from breaking out.

(*f*) Some time after he had aſcended the throne, he had violent ſuſpicions of Polyzelus his brother, whoſe great credit among the citizens made him fear that he had a deſign to depoſe him. However, in order to rid himſelf without noiſe of an enemy whom he fancied very dangerous, he reſolved to put him at the head of ſome forces he was going to ſend to the ſuccour of the Sibaritæ againſt the Crotonienſes, hoping that he would periſh in the expedition. His brother's refuſal to accept this command, made him the more violent againſt him. Theron, who had married Polyzelus's daughter, joined with his father-in-law. This gave riſe to great differences of long duration between the kings of Syracuſe and Agrigentum; however, they at laſt were reconciled by the wiſe mediation of (*g*) Simonides the poet; and to make their reconciliation laſting, they cemented it by a new alliance, Hiero marrying Theron's ſiſter; after which the two kings always lived in good intelligence with each other.

(*h*) At firſt, an infirm ſtate of health, which was

(*e*) Diod. l. 21. p. 51. (*f*) Diod. l. 11. p. 36. (*g*) Schol. in Pind. (*h*) Ælian. l. 4. c. 15.

increaſed

increaſed by repeated illneſſes, gave Hiero an opportunity of thinking ſeriouſly; after which he reſolved to ſend for men of learning, who might converſe agreeably with him, and furniſh him with uſeful inſtructions. The moſt famous poets of the age came to his court, as Simonides, Pindar, Bacchylides, and Epicharmus; and it is affirmed, that their delightful converſation did not a little contribute to ſoften the cruel and ſavage diſpoſition of Hiero.

(*i*) Plutarch relates a noble ſaying of his, which ſhows an excellent diſpoſition in a prince. He declared, that his palace and his ears ſhould be always open to every man who would tell him the truth, and that without diſguiſe or reſerve.

The poets above mentioned excelled, not only in poetry, but were alſo poſſeſſed of a great fund of learning, and conſidered and conſulted as the ſages of their times. This is what * Cicero ſays particularly of Simonides. He had a great aſcendant over the king; and the only uſe he made of it was, to incline him to virtue.

(*k*) They often uſed to converſe on philoſophical ſubjects. I obſerved on another occaſion, that Hiero, in one of theſe converſations, aſked Simonides his opinion with regard to the nature and attributes of the deity. The latter deſired one day's time to conſider of it; the next day he aſked two, and went on increaſing in the ſame proportion. The prince preſſing him to give his reaſons for theſe delays, he confeſſed, that the ſubject was above his comprehenſion, and that the more he reflected, the more obſcure it appeared to him.

Xenophon has left us an excellent treatiſe on the art of governing well, entitled Hiero, and writ by way of dialogue between this prince and Simonides. Hiero undertakes to prove to the poet, that tyrants and kings

(*i*) In Aph. p. 175. (*k*) Cic. l. 1. de Nat. deor. n. 60.

* Simonides, non poeta ſolùm ſuavis, verùm etiam ceteroqui doctus ſapienſque traditur. *Lib.* 1. *de Nat. Deor.* n. 60.

are

are not ſo happy as is generally imagined. Among the great number of proofs alledged by him, he inſiſts chiefly on their vaſt unhappineſs in being deprived of the greateſt comfort and bleſſing in this life, *viz.* the enjoyment of a true friend, to whoſe boſom they may ſafely confide their ſecrets and afflictions; who may ſhare with them in their joy and ſorrow; in a word, a ſecond ſelf, who may form but one heart, one ſoul with them. Simonides, on the other ſide, lays down admirable maxims with reſpect to the well-governing of a kingdom. He repreſents to him, that a king is not ſo for himſelf, but for others: that his grandeur conſiſts, not in building magnificent palaces for his own reſidence, but in erecting temples, and fortifying and embelliſhing cities: that it is his glory, not that his people ſhould fear, but be afraid for, him: that a truly royal care is, not to enter the liſts with the firſt comer at the Olympic games, (for the princes of that age were paſſionately fond of them, and eſpecially * Hiero) but to contend with the neighbouring kings, who ſhould ſucceed beſt in diffuſing wealth and abundance throughout his dominions, and endeavouring to form the felicity of his people.

Nevertheleſs, another poet (Pindar) praiſes Hiero for the victory he had won in the horſe-race. "This "prince, (ſays he, in his ode) who governs with "equity the inhabitants of opulent Sicily, has gathe-"red the faireſt flower in the garden of virtue. He takes "a noble delight in the moſt exquiſite performances "of poetry and muſic. He loves melodious airs, "ſuch as it is cuſtomary for us to play, at the ban-"quets given us by our deareſt friends. Rouze then "thy ſelf, take thy lyre, and raiſe it to the Doric "pitch. If thou feeleſt thy ſelf animated by a glori-

* *It is ſaid that Themiſtocles, ſeeing him arrive at the Olympic games with a ſplendid equipage, would have had him forbid them, becauſe he had not ſuccoured the Greeks againſt the common enemy, any more than Gelon his brother; which motion did honour to the Athenian general.* Ælian. l. 9. c. 5.

" ous fire in favour of † Piſa and Phœrenice; if they " have waked the ſweeteſt tranſports in thy breaſt, " when that generous courſer (without being quick- " ned by the ſpur) flew along the banks of the Al- " pheus, and carried his royal rider to glorious vic- " tory: O ſing the king of Syracuſe, the ornament " of the Olympic courſe!"

The whole ode, tranſlated by the late Mr. Maſſieu, is in the ſixth volume of the memoirs of the academy of inſcriptions of Belles-Lettres, from which I have made the ſmall extract above. I was very glad to give the reader ſome idea of Pindar, by this little ſpecimen.

The next ode to this was compoſed in honour of Theron king of Agrigentum, victorious in the chariot-race. The diction of it is ſo ſublime, the thoughts ſo noble, and the moral ſo pure, that many look upon it as Pindar's maſter-piece.

I cannot ſay how far we may depend on the reſt of the praiſes which Pindar gives Hiero, for poets are not always very ſincere in the elogiums they beſtow on princes: however, it is certain that Hiero had made his court the reſort of all perſons of wit and ſenſe; and that he had invited them to it by his affability and engaging behaviour, and much more by his liberality, which is a great merit in a king.

We cannot beſtow on Hiero's court the elogium which * Horace gives the houſe of Mecœnas, in which

† *Piſa was the city, near to which the Olympic games were ſolemnized: and Phœrenice, the name of Hiero's courſer, ſignifying the victor.*

* ——Non iſto vivimus illic,
Quo tu rere, modo. Domus hac nec purior ulla eſt,
Nec magis his aliena malis. Nil mî officit unquam,
Ditior hic aut eſt quia doctior. Eſt locus uni-
Cuique ſuus. *Hor. lib. 1. Satyr. 9.*

That is,

Sir, you miſtake, that's not our courſe of life,
We know no jealouſies, no brawls, no ſtrife;
From all thoſe ills our patron's houſe is free,
None, 'cauſe more learn'd or wealthy, troubles me;
We have our ſtations, all their own purſue, &c. Creech.

a cha-

a character prevailed rarely found among ſcholars, and nevertheleſs worth all their erudition. This amiable houſe, ſays Horace, was an utter ſtranger to the mean and groveling ſentiments of envy and jealouſy; and men ſaw, in thoſe who ſhared in the maſter's favour, a ſuperior merit or credit, without taking the leaſt umbrage at it. (*l*) But it was far otherwiſe in the court of Hiero or of Theron. It is ſaid that Simonides, and Bacchylides his nephew, employed all kinds of criticiſm, to leſſen the eſteem which thoſe princes had for Pindar's works. The latter, by way of repriſal, ridicules them very ſtrongly in his ode to Theron, in comparing *them to ravens, who croak in vain againſt the divine bird of Jove.* But modeſty was not the virtue which diſtinguiſhed Pindar.

(*m*) Hiero, having drove the antient inhabitants of Catana and Naxos from their country, ſettled a colony of ten thouſand men there, half of whom were Syracuſans, and the reſt Peloponneſians. This prompted the inhabitants of thoſe two cities to appoint, after his death, the ſame ſolemnities in his honour, as were beſtowed on heroes or demi-gods, becauſe they conſidered him as their founder.

(*n*) He ſhowed great favour to the children of Anaxilaus, formerly tyrant of Zancle, and a great friend to Gelon his brother. As they were arrived at years of maturity, he exhorted them to take the government into their own hands; after Micythus, their tutor, ſhould have informed them of the perfect ſtate of it, and how he himſelf had behaved in the adminiſtration. The latter, having aſſembled the neareſt relations and moſt intimate friends of the young princes, gave, in their preſence, ſo good an account of his guardianſhip, that the whole aſſembly (in perfect admiration) beſtowed the higheſt encomiums on his prudence, integrity and juſtice. Matters were carried ſo far, that the young princes were extremely urgent with him to preſide in

(*l*) Scholiaſt. Pind. (*m*) Diod. l. 11. p. 37. (*n*) Diod. p. 50.

the

the adminiſtration, as he had hitherto done. However, the wiſe tutor preferring the ſweets of eaſe to the ſplendor of authority, and perſuaded at the ſame time, that it would be for the intereſt of the ſtate if the young princes took the government into their own hands, he reſolved to retire from buſineſs. Hiero died, after having reigned eleven years.

III. THRASYBULUS. (*n*) He was ſucceeded by Thraſybulus his brother, who, by his evil conduct, contributed very much to the making him be regretted. Swelled with pride and a brutal haughtineſs, he conſidered men as mere worms; vainly fancying that they were created for him to trample upon, and that he was of a quite different nature from them. He abandoned himſelf implicitly to the flattering counſels of the giddy young courtiers who ſurrounded him. He treated all his ſubjects with the utmoſt ſeverity; baniſhing ſome, confiſcating the poſſeſſions of others, and putting great numbers to death. So ſevere a ſlavery grew ſoon inſupportable to the Syracuſans, and therefore they implored the ſuccour of the neighbouring cities, whoſe intereſt it was alſo to throw off the tyrant's yoke. Thraſybulus was beſieged even in Syracuſe, the ſovereignty of part of which he had reſerved to himſelf, *viz.* Acradina, and the iſland which was very well fortified; but the third quarter of the city, called Tyche, was poſſeſſed by the enemy. After making a feeble reſiſtance, and demanding to capitulate, he left the city, and withdrew into baniſhment among the Locrians. He had reigned but a year. In this manner the Syracuſans recovered their liberty. They alſo delivered the reſt of the cities of Sicily from tyrants; eſtabliſhed a popular government in all places, and maintained that form themſelves during threeſcore years, till the reign of Dionyſius the tyrant, who again enſlaved them.

(*o*) After Sicily had been delivered from the go-

(*n*) Diod. l. 11. p. 51, 52. (*o*) A. M. 3544. Ant. J. C. 460. Diod. l. 11. p. 55, &c.

vernment

vernment of tyrants, and all the cities of it were reſtored to their liberty; as the country was extremely fruitful in itſelf, and the peace which all places enjoyed, gave the inhabitants of this iſland an opportunity of cultivating their lands, and feeding their flocks; the people grew very powerful, and amaſſed great riches. To perpetuate to lateſt poſterity the remembrance of the happy day in which they had thrown off the yoke of ſlavery, by the baniſhment of Thraſybulus, it was decreed in the general aſſembly of the nation, that a coloſſal ſtatue ſhould be ſet up to Jupiter the deliverer; that on the anniverſary of this day, a feſtival ſhould be ſolemnized, by way of thankſgiving, for the reſtoration of their liberty; and that there ſhould be ſacrificed, in honour of the gods, four hundred and fifty bulls, with which the people ſhould be entertained as a common feaſt.

There nevertheleſs lay concealed in the minds of many, I know not what ſecret leaven of tyranny, which frequently diſturbed the harmony of this peace, and occaſioned ſeveral tumults and commotions in Sicily, the particulars of which I ſhall omit. (*p*) To prevent the evil conſequences of them, the Syracuſans eſtabliſhed the Petaliſm, which differed very little from the Athenian Oſtraciſm; and was ſo called from the Greek πέταλον, ſignifying a leaf, becauſe the votes were then given on an olive leaf. This judgment was pronounced againſt ſuch citizens whoſe great power made the people apprehenſive that they aſpired at the tyranny, and it baniſhed them for ten years; however, it did not long continue in force, and was ſoon aboliſhed; becauſe the dread of falling under its cenſure, having prompted the moſt virtuous men to retire, and renounce the government, the chief employments were now filled by ſuch citizens only as had the leaſt merit.

(*q*) DEUCETIUS, according to Diodorus, was chief over the people who were properly called Sicilians. Having united them all (the inhabitants of Hybla excepted)

(*p*) Ibid. p. 65.

(*q*) Diod. p. 67—70.

cepted) into one body, he became very powerful, and formed ſeveral great enterprizes. It was he who built the city Palica, near the temple of the gods called Palici. This city was very famous on account of ſome wonders which are related of it; and ſtill more from the ſacred nature of the oaths which were there taken, the violation whereof was ſaid to be always followed by a ſudden and exemplary puniſhment. This was a ſecure aſylum for all perſons who were oppreſſed by ſuperiour power; and eſpecially for ſlaves who were unjuſtly abuſed, or too cruelly treated by their maſters. They continued in ſafety in this temple, till certain arbiters and mediators had made their peace; and there was not a ſingle inſtance of a maſter's having ever forfeited the promiſe he had made to pardon his ſlaves; ſo famous were the gods who preſided over this temple, for the ſevere vengeance they took on thoſe who violated their oaths.

This Deucetius, after having been ſucceſsful on a great many occaſions, and gained ſeveral victories, particularly over the Syracuſans; ſaw his fortune change on a ſudden by the loſs of a battle, and was abandoned by the greateſt part of his forces. In the conſternation and deſpondency into which ſo general and ſudden a deſertion threw him, he formed ſuch a reſolution as deſpair only could ſuggeſt. He withdrew in the night to Syracuſe; advanced as far as the great ſquare of the city, and there, falling proſtrate at the foot of the altar, he abandoned his life and dominions to the mercy of the Syracuſans, that is, to his profeſſed enemies. The ſingularity of this ſpectacle drew great numbers of people to it. The magiſtrates immediately convened the people, and debated on the affair. They firſt heard the orators, whoſe buſineſs was generally to addreſs the people by their ſpeeches; and theſe animated them prodigiouſly againſt Deucetius, as a public enemy, whom providence ſeemed to throw into their way, to revenge and puniſh, by his death, all the injuries he had done the republic. A

ſpeech

ſpeech in this caſt, ſtruck all the virtuous part of the aſſembly with horror. The moſt antient and wiſeſt of the ſenators repreſented, "That they were not to "conſider what puniſhment Deucetius deſerved, but "how it behoved the Syracuſans to behave on that oc-"caſion; that they ought not to look upon him any "longer as an enemy, but as a ſuppliant, a character "by which his perſon was become ſacred and invio-"lable. That there was a goddeſs (Nemeſis) who "took vengeance of crimes, eſpecially of cruelty and "impiety, and who doubtleſs would not ſuffer that "to go unpuniſhed: That beſides the baſeneſs and in-"humanity there is in inſulting the unfortunate, and "in cruſhing thoſe who are already under one's foot; "it was worthy the grandeur and goodneſs natural to "the Syracuſans, to exert their clemency even to "thoſe who leaſt deſerved it." All the people came into this opinion, and, with one conſent, ſpared Deucetius's life. He was ordered to reſide in Corinth, the metropolis and foundreſs of Syracuſe; and the Syracuſans engaged to furniſh Deucetius with all things neceſſary for his ſubſiſting honourably there. What reader, who compares theſe two different opinions, does not perceive which of them was the nobleſt and moſt generous?

SECT. II. *Of ſome famous perſons and cities in Græcia Major. Pythagoras, Charondas, Zaleucus, Milo the Athleta: Croton, Sybaris, and Thurium.*

I. PYTHAGORAS. IN treating of what relates to Græcia Major in Italy, I muſt not omit Pythagoras, who was the glory of it. (r) He was born in Samos. After having travelled into a great many regions, and enriched his mind with the moſt excellent learning of every kind, he returned to his native country, but did not make a long ſtay in it, becauſe of the tyrannical government Polycrates had eſtabliſhed in it, who however had the

(r) Diog. Laert. in vit. Pythag. A. M. 3480. Ant. J. C. 524.

higheſt

higheſt regard for him, and ſhowed him all the eſteem due to his rare merit. But the ſtudy of the ſciences, and particularly of philoſophy, is ſcarce compatible with ſlavery, though of the mildeſt and moſt honourable kind. He therefore went into Italy, and reſided uſually either at Croton, Metapontum, Heraclea, or Tarentum. (s) Servius Tullius, or Tarquinius Superbus, reigned in Rome at that time; which abſolutely refutes the opinion of thoſe who imagined that Numa Pompilius, the ſecond king of the Romans, who lived upwards of an hundred years before, had been Pythagoras's diſciple; an opinion that very probably was grounded on the reſemblance of their manners, diſpoſition and principles.

* The whole country ſoon felt very happy effects from the preſence of this excellent philoſopher. An inclination for ſtudy, and a love of wiſdom, diffuſed themſelves almoſt univerſally in a very ſhort time. Multitudes flocked from all the neighbouring cities to get a ſight of Pythagoras, to hear him, and to improve by his ſalutary counſels. The ſeveral princes of the country took a pleaſure in inviting him to their courts, which they thought honoured by his preſence; and all were delighted with his converſation, and glad to learn from him the art of governing nations with wiſdom. His ſchool became the moſt famous that had ever been till that age. He had no leſs than four or five hundred diſciples. Before he admitted them in that quality, they were probationers five years, during which time he obliged them to keep the ſtricteſt ſilence; thinking it proper for them to be inſtructed, before they ſhould attempt to ſpeak. I ſhall take notice of his tenets and ſentiments, when I come to ſpeak of the various ſects of philoſophers; it was well known, that the tranſmigration of ſouls was one of the chief of

(s) Liv. l. 1. n. 18.

* Pythagoras, cùm in Italiam veniſſet, exornavit eam Græciam, quæ magna dicta eſt, & privatim & publicè, præſtantiſſimis & inſtitutis, & artibus, *Cic. Tuſcul. Quæſt.* l. 5. n. 10.

them. His disciples had the greatest reverence for every word he uttered; and, if he did but barely aver a thing, he was immediately believed without its being once examined; and to affirm the truth of any thing, they used to express themselves in this manner, (*t*) *The master said it.* However, the disciples carried their deference and docility too far, in thus waving all enquiry, and in sacrificing implicitly their reason and understanding; a sacrifice that ought to be made only to the divine authority, which is infinitely superior to our reason and all our knowledge; and which, consequently, is authorized to prescribe laws to us, and dictate absolute obedience.

The school of Pythagoras bred a great number of illustrious disciples, who did infinite honour to their master; as wise legislators, great politicians, persons skilled in all the sciences, and capable of governing states, and being the ministers of the greatest princes *. A long time after his death, that part of Italy which he had cultivated and improved by his instructions, was still considered as the nursery and seat of men skilled in all kinds of literature, and maintained that glorious character for several ages. (*u*) The Romans certainly entertained a high opinion of Pythagoras's virtue and merit, since the oracle of Delphos having commanded that people, during the war of the Samnites, to erect two statues in the most conspicuous part of Rome; the one to the wisest, and the other to the most valiant among the Greeks, they accordingly set up two in the *Comitium*, representing Pythagoras and Themistocles. Historians are not exact with respect to the time and place of Pythagoras's death.

II. CROTON. SYBARIS. THURIUM. (*x*) Croton

(*t*) Αυτὸς ἔφα. (*u*) Plin. l. 34. c. 6. (*x*) A. M. 3295. Ant. J. C. 709. Strab. l. 6. p. 262. & 269. Dionys. Halicarn. Antiq. Rom. l. 2. p. 121.

* Pythagoras tenuit magnam illam Græciam cum honore, & disciplina, tum etiam auctoritate, multaque secula postea sic viguit Pythagoreorum nomen, ut nulli alii docti viderentur. *Tusc. Quæst.* l. 1. n. 38.

was

was founded by Myſcellus, chief of the Achaians, the third year of the xviith olympiad. This Myſcellus being come to Delphos to conſult the oracle of Apollo, about the ſpot on which he ſhould build his city, met Archias the Corinthian there, who was arrived upon the ſame account. The god gave him a favourable audience; and after having determined them with regard to the place that would beſt ſuit their new ſettlements, he propoſed different advantages to them; and left them, among other particulars, the choice of riches or health. The offer of riches ſtruck Archias, but Myſcellus deſired health; and, if hiſtory is to be credited, Apollo performed his promiſe faithfully to both. Archias founded Syracuſe, which ſoon became the moſt opulent city of Greece. (y) Myſcellus laid the foundations of Croton, which became ſo famous for the long life and innate ſtrength of its inhabitants, that its name was uſed proverbially, to ſignify a very healthy ſpot, whoſe air was extremely pure. The people of it ſignalized themſelves in a great number of victories in the Grecian games; and Strabo relates, that in the ſame Olympiad, ſeven Crotonians were crowned in the Olympic games, and carried off all the prizes of the ſtadium.

(z) Sybaris was ten leagues (two hundred ſtadia) from Croton, and had alſo been founded by the Achaians, but before the other. This city became afterwards very powerful. Four neighbouring ſtates, and twenty-five cities were ſubject to it, ſo that it was, alone, able to raiſe an army of three hundred thouſand men. The opulence of Sybaris was ſoon followed by luxury, and ſuch a diſſoluteneſs as is ſcarcely credible. The citizens employed themſelves in nothing but banquets, games, ſhows, parties of pleaſure and carrouſals. Public rewards and marks of diſtinction were beſtowed on thoſe who gave the moſt magnificent entertainments; and even to ſuch cooks as were beſt

(y) Κρότωνος ὑγιέστερον. Athen. l. 12. p. 518—520.

(z) Strab. l. 6. p. 263.

ſkilled

ſkilled in the important art of making new diſcoveries in the dreſſing diſhes, and invented new refinements to tickle the palate. The Sybarites carried their delicacy and effiminacy to ſuch a height, that they carefully removed from their city all ſuch artificers whoſe work was noiſy; and would not ſuffer any cocks in it, leſt their ſhrill piercing crow ſhould diſturb their balmy ſlumbers.

(*a*) All theſe evils were heightned by diſſenſion and diſcord, which at laſt proved their ruin. Five hundred of the wealthieſt in the city having been expelled by the faction of one Telys, fled to Croton. Telys demanded to have them ſurrendered to him; and, on the refuſal of the Crotonians to deliver them up, (prompted to this generous reſolution by Pythagoras who then lived among them) war was declared. The Sybarites marched three hundred thouſand men into the field, and the Crotonians only an hundred thouſand; but then they were headed by Milo, the famous champion, (of whom we ſhall ſoon have occaſion to ſpeak) over whoſe ſhoulders a lion's skin was thrown, and himſelf armed with a club, like another Hercules. The latter gained a compleat victory, and made a dreadful havock of thoſe who fled, ſo that very few eſcaped, and their city was depopulated. About threeſcore years after, ſome Theſſalians came and ſettled in it; however, they did not long enjoy peace, being driven out by the Crotonians. Being thus reduced to the moſt fatal extremity, they implored the ſuccour of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians. The latter, moved to compaſſion at their deplorable condition, after cauſing proclamation to be made in Peloponneſus, that all who were willing to aſſiſt that colony were at liberty to do it, ſent the Sybarites a fleet of ten ſhips, under the command of Lampon and Xenocrates.

(*a*) A. M. 3474. Ant. J. C. 520. Diod. l. 12. p. 76—85.

They

(*b*) They built a city near the antient Sybaris, and called it Thurium. Two men, greatly renowned for their learning, the one an orator, and the other an hiſtorian, ſettled in this colony. The firſt was Lyſias, at that time but fifteen years of age. He lived in Thurium, till the ill fate which befel the Athenians in Sicily, and then went to Athens. The ſecond was Herodotus. Though he was born in Halicarnaſſus, a city of Caria, he was however conſidered as a native of Thurium, becauſe he ſettled there with that colony. I ſhall ſpeak more largely of him hereafter.

Diviſions ſoon broke out in the city, on occaſion of the new inhabitants, whom the reſt would exclude from all public employments and privileges. But as theſe were much more numerous, they repulſed all the antient Sybarites, and got the ſole poſſeſſion of the city. Being ſupported by the alliance they made with the people of Croton, they ſoon grew vaſtly powerful; and having ſettled a popular form of government in their city, they divided the citizens into ten tribes, which they called by the names of the different nations whence they ſprung.

III. CHARONDAS, *the legiſlator*. They now bent their whole thoughts to the ſtrengthning of their government by wholſome laws, for which purpoſe they made choice of Charondas, who had been educated in Pythagoras's ſchool, to digeſt and draw them up. I ſhall quote ſome of them in this place.

1. He excluded from the ſenate, and all public employments, all ſuch as ſhould marry a ſecond wife, in caſe any children by their firſt wife were living; being perſuaded, that any man who was ſo regardleſs of his children's intereſt, would be equally ſo of his country's, and be as worthleſs a magiſtrate as he had been a father.

2. He ſentenced all falſe accuſers to be carried through every part of the city crowned with heath or

(*b*) A. M. 3560. Ant. J. C. 444. Dionyſ. Halicarn. in vit. Lyſ. p. 82. Strab. l. 14. p. 656.

broom, as the vileſt of men; an ignominy which moſt of them were not able to ſurvive. The city thus delivered from thoſe peſts of ſociety, was reſtored to its former tranquillity. And indeed, * from calumniators generally ariſe all feuds and conteſts, whether of a public or private nature; and yet, according to Tacitus's obſervation, they are too much tolerated in moſt governments.

3. He enacted a new kind of law againſt another ſpecies of peſts, which in a ſtate generally firſt occaſions depravity of manners; by ſuffering all thoſe to be proſecuted who ſhould form a correſpondence or contract a friendſhip with wicked men, and by laying a heavy fine upon them.

4. He required all the children of the citizens to be educated in the Belles Lettres; the effect of which is to poliſh and civilize the minds of men, inſpiring them with gentleneſs of manners, and inclining them to virtue; all which conſtitute the felicity of a ſtate, and are equally neceſſary to citizens of all conditions. In this view he appointed ſalaries (paid by the ſtate) for maſters and preceptors; in order that learning, by being communicated *gratis*, might be acquired by all. He conſidered ignorance as the greateſt of evils, and the ſource whence all vices flowed.

5. He made a law with reſpect to orphans which appears ſufficiently judicious, by intruſting the care of their education to their relations by the mother's ſide, as their lives would not be in danger from them; and the management of their eſtates to their paternal relations, it being the intereſt of theſe to make the greateſt advantage of them, ſince they would inherit them, in caſe of the demiſe of their wards.

6. Inſtead of putting deſerters to death, and thoſe who quitted their ranks and fled in battle, he only ſentenced them to make their appearance during three days, in the city, dreſt in the habit of women, imagining,

* Delatores, genus hominum publico exitio repertum, & pœnis quidem nunquam ſatis coercitum. *Tacit. Annal.* l. 4. c. 30.

gining, that the dread of ſo ignominious a puniſhment would produce the ſame effect as putting to death; and being, at the ſame time, deſirous of giving ſuch cowardly citizens an opportunity of atoning for their fault.

7. To prevent his laws from being too raſhly or eaſily abrogated, he impoſed a very ſevere and hazardous condition on all perſons who ſhould propoſe to alter or amend them in any manner. Theſe were ſentenced to appear in the public aſſembly with a halter about their necks; and, in caſe the alteration propoſed did not paſs, they were to be immediately ſtrangled. There were but three amendments ever propoſed, and all of them admitted.

Charondas did not long ſurvive his own laws. Returning one day from purſuing ſome thieves, and finding a tumult in the city, he came armed into the aſſembly, though he himſelf had prohibited this by an expreſs law. A certain perſon objected to him, in ſevere terms, that he violated his own laws; *I do not violate them*, ſays he, *but thus ſeal them with my blood*; ſaying which, he plunged his ſword into his boſom, and expired.

IV. ZALEUCUS, *another lawgiver*. (*d*) At the ſame time, there aroſe among the Locrians another famous legiſlator, Zaleucus by name, who, as well as Charondas, had been Pythagoras's diſciple. There is now ſcarce any thing extant of his, except a kind of preamble to his laws, which gives a moſt advantageous idea of them. He requires, above all things, of the citizens, to believe and be firmly perſuaded, that there are gods; and adds, that the bare caſting up our eyes to the heavens, and contemplating their order and beauty, are ſufficient to convince us, that it is impoſſible ſo wonderful a fabric could have been formed by mere chance or human power. As the natural conſequence of this belief, he exhorts men to honour and revere the gods, as the authors of whatever is good

(*d*) Diod. l. 12. p. 79—85.

and juſt among mortals; and to honour them, not merely by ſacrifices and ſplendid gifts, but by a ſage conduct, and by purity and innocence of manners; theſe being infinitely more grateful to the immortals, than all the ſacrifices that can be offered.

After this religious exordium, in which he deſcribes the ſupreme being, as the ſource whence all laws flow, as the chief authority which commands obedience to them, as the moſt powerful motive for our faithful obſervance of them, and as the perfect model to which mankind ought to conform; he deſcends to the particulars of thoſe duties which men owe to one another; and lays down a precept which is very well adapted to preſerve peace and unity in ſociety, by enjoining the individuals of it not to make their hatred and diſſenſions perpetual, which would argue an unſociable and ſavage diſpoſition; but to treat their enemies as men who would ſoon be their friends. This is carrying morality to as great a perfection as could be expected from heathens.

With regard to the duty of judges and magiſtrates, after repreſenting to them, that, in pronouncing ſentence, they ought never to ſuffer themſelves to be byaſſed by friendſhip, hatred, or any other paſſion; he only exhorts them not to behave with the leaſt haughtineſs or ſeverity towards the parties engaged in law, ſince ſuch are but too unhappy, in being obliged to undergo all the toils and fatigues inſeparable from lawſuits. The office indeed of judges, how laborious ſoever it may be, is far from giving them a right to uſe the contending parties with ill-nature; the very form and eſſence of their employment requiring them to behave with impartiality, and to do juſtice on all occaſions; and when they diſtribute this even with mildneſs and humanity, it is only a debt they pay, and not a favour they grant.

To baniſh luxury from his republic, which he looked upon as the certain deſtruction of a government, he did not follow the practice eſtabliſhed in ſome na-

tions, where it is thought ſufficient, for the reſtraining it, to puniſh, by pecuniary mulcts, ſuch as infringe the laws made on that occaſion. But he acted, ſays the hiſtorian, in a more artful and ingenious, and at the ſame time more effectual manner. He prohibited women from wearing rich and coſtly ſtuffs, embroidered robes, precious ſtones, ear-rings, necklaces, bracelets, gold rings, and ſuch like ornaments; excepting none from this law but common proſtitutes. He enacted a like law with regard to the men; excepting, in the ſame manner, from the obſervance of it, ſuch only as were willing to paſs for debauchees and infamous wretches. By theſe regulations he eaſily, and without violence, preſerved the citizens from the leaſt approaches to luxury and effeminacy *. For no perſon was ſo abandoned to all ſenſe of honour, as to be willing to wear the badges of his ſhame, under the eye, as it were, of all the citizens; ſince this would make him the public laughing-ſtock, and reflect eternal infamy on his family.

V. MILO *the champion.* We have ſeen him at the head of an army obtain a great victory. However, he was ſtill more renowned for his athletic ſtrength, than for his military bravery. He was ſirnamed *Crotonienſis*, from Croton the place of his birth. It was his daughter, whom, as was before related, Democedes the famous phyſician, and Milo's countryman, married, after he had fled from Darius's court to Greece, his native country.

(*e*) Pauſanias relates, that Milo, when but a child, was ſeven times victorious in one day at the Pythian games; that he won ſix victories (at wreſtling) in the Olympic games, one of which was alſo gained in his childhood; and that challenging a ſeventh time, (in Olympia) any perſon to wreſtle with him, he could not engage, for want of an opponent. He

(*e*) Lib. 6. p. 369, 370.

* More inter veteres recepto, qui ſatis pœnarum adversùs impudicas in ipſa profeſſione flagitii credebant. *Tacit. Annal.* l. 2. c. 85.

would hold a pomegranate in ſuch a manner, that without breaking it, he would graſp it ſo faſt in his hand, that no force could poſſibly wreſt it from him. He would ſtand ſo firm on a * *diſcus*, which had been oiled to make it the more ſlippery, that it was impoſſible to move him on thoſe occaſions. He would bind his head with a cord, after which, holding his breath ſtrongly, the veins of his head would ſwell ſo prodigiouſly as to break the rope. When Milo, fixing his elbow on his ſide, ſtretched forth his right hand quite open, with his fingers held cloſe one to the other, his thumb excepted, which he raiſed, the utmoſt ſtrength of man could not ſeparate his little finger from the other three.

All this was only a vain and puerile oſtentation of his ſtrength. Chance, however, gave him an opportunity of making a much more laudable uſe of it. (*f*) One day as he was attending the lectures of Pythagoras, (for he was one of his moſt conſtant diſciples) the pillar which ſupported the cieling of the ſchool in which the pupils were aſſembled, being ſhaken by ſome accident, Milo ſupported it by his ſingle ſtrength, gave the auditors time to get away, and afterwards he eſcaped himſelf.

What is related of the voracious appetite of the Athletæ is almoſt incredible. (*g*) Milo's appetite was ſcarce ſatiated with twenty minæ (pounds) of meat, the ſame quantity of bread, and three † *congii* of wine every day. Athenæus relates, that this champion having run the whole length of the ſtadium, with a bull of four years old on his ſhoulders, he afterwards knocked him down with one ſtroke of his fiſt, and eat the whole beaſt that very day. I will take it for granted, that all the other particulars related of Milo are true; but is it probable, that one man could devour a whole ox in ſo ſhort a time?

(*f*) Strab. l. 6. p. 263. (*g*) Athen. l. 10. p. 412.

* *This diſcus was a kind of quoit, flat and round.* † *Thirty pounds, or fifteen quarts.*

We

(*b*) We are told that Milo, when advanced to a very great age, ſeeing the reſt of the champions wreſtling, and gazing upon his own arms which once were ſo vigorous and robuſt, but were then very much enfeebled by time, he burſt into tears and cried, *Alas! theſe arms are now dead.*

(*i*) And yet he either forgot or concealed his weakneſs from himſelf; the ſtrong perſuaſion he entertained of his own ſtrength, and which he preſerved to the laſt, proving fatal to him. Happening to meet, as he was travelling, an old oak, which had been opened by ſome wedges that were forced into it, he undertook to ſplit it in two by his bare ſtrength. But, after forcing out the wedges, his arms were catched in the trunk of the tree, by the violence with which it cloſed; ſo that being unable to diſengage his hands, he was devoured by wolves.

(*k*) An author has judiciouſly obſerved, that this ſurprizingly-robuſt champion, who prided himſelf ſo much in his bodily ſtrength, was the weakeſt of men with regard to a paſſion, which often ſubdues and captivates the ſtrongeſt; a courtezan having gained ſo great an aſcendant over Milo, that ſhe tyrannized over him in the moſt imperious manner, and made him obey whatever commands ſhe laid upon him.

CHAPTER III.

The war of Peloponneſus.

(*l*) THE Peloponneſian war, which I am now entring upon, began about the end of the firſt year of the LXXXVIIth Olympiad, and laſted twenty ſeven years. Thucydides has writ the hiſtory of it to the 21ſt year incluſively. He gives us an accurate account of the ſeveral tranſactions of every year, which he divides into campaigns and winter-quarters. However, I ſhall not be ſo minute, and ſhall only

(*b*) Cic. de Senect. n. 27.
(*i*) Pauſan. l. 6. p. 370.
(*k*) Ælian. l. 2. c. 24.
(*l*) A. M. 3573. Ant. J. C. 431.

extract ſuch parts of it as appear moſt entertaining and inſtructive. Plutarch and Diodorus Siculus will alſo be of great aſſiſtance to me on this occaſion.

SECT. I. *The ſiege of Platææ by the Thebans. Alternate ravages of Attica and Peloponneſus. Honours paid to the Athenians who fell in the firſt campaign.*

THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.

(*m*) THE firſt act of hoſtility by which the war began, was committed by the Thebans, who beſieged Platææ, a city of Bœotia, in alliance with Athens. They were introduced into it by treachery; but the citizens falling upon them in the night, killed them, about two hundred excepted that were taken priſoners, and who a little after were put to death. The Athenians, as ſoon as news was brought of the action at Platææ, ſent ſuccours and proviſions thither, and cleared the city of all perſons who were incapable of bearing arms.

The truce being evidently broke, both ſides prepared openly for war; and ambaſſadors were ſent to all places, to ſtrengthen themſelves by the alliance of the Greeks and Barbarians. Every part of Greece was in motion, ſome few ſtates and cities excepted, which continued neuter, till they ſhould ſee the event of the war. The majority were for the Lacedæmonians, as being the deliverers of Greece, and eſpouſed their intereſt very warmly, becauſe the Athenians, forgetting that the moderation and gentleneſs with which they commanded over others, had procured them many allies, had afterwards alienated the greateſt part of them by their pride and the ſeverity of their government, and incurred the hatred, not only of thoſe who were then ſubject to them, but of all ſuch as were apprehenſive of becoming their dependants. In this temper of mind were the Greeks at that time.

(*m*) Thucyd. l. 2. p. 99—122. Diod. l. 12. p. 97—100. Plut. in Pericl. p. 170.

The

The confederates of each of thoſe ſtates were as follows.

All Peloponneſus, Argos excepted, which ſtood neuter, had declared for Lacedæmonia. The Achaians, the inhabitants of Pellene excepted, had alſo joined them; but the latter alſo engaged inſenſibly in that war. Out of Peloponneſus were the people of Megara, Locris, Bœotia, Phocis, Ambracia, Leucadia, and Anactorium.

The confederates of the Athenians were, the people of Chios, Lesbos, Platææ, the Meſſenians of Naupactus; the greateſt part of the Acarnanians, Corcyrans, Cephalenians, and Zacynthians, beſides the ſeveral tributary countries, as maritime Caria, Doria that lies near it, Ionia, the Helleſpont; and the cities of Thrace, Chalcis and Potidæa excepted; all the iſlands between Crete and Peloponneſus, eaſtward; and the Cyclades, Melos and Thera excepted.

Immediately after the attempt on Platææ, the Lacedæmonians had ordered forces to be levied both within and without Peloponneſus; and made all the preparations neceſſary for entring the enemy's country. All things being ready, two thirds of the troops marched to the Iſthmus of Corinth, and the reſt were left to guard the country. Archidamus king of Lacedæmonia, who commanded the army, aſſembled the generals and chief officers, and calling up the remembrance of the great actions performed by their anceſtors, and thoſe they themſelves had done, or been eye-witneſſes to, he exhorted them to ſupport with the utmoſt efforts of their valour, the priſtine glory of their reſpective cities, as well as their own fame. He declared, that the eyes of all Greece were upon them; and that, in expectation of the iſſue of a war which would determine its fate, they were inceſſantly addreſſing heaven in favour of a people, who were as dear to them as the Athenians were become odious: That, however, he could not deny, but that they were going to march againſt an enemy, who though greatly in-

ferior to them in numbers and in ſtrength, were nevertheleſs very powerful, warlike, and daring; and whoſe courage would doubtleſs be ſtill more inflamed by the ſight of danger, and the laying waſte of their territories *: That therefore they muſt exert themſelves to the utmoſt, to ſpread an immediate terror in the country they were going to enter, and to inſpire the allies with new vigour. The whole army anſwered in the loudeſt acclamations of joy, and aſſured their generals that they would do their duty.

The aſſembly breaking up, Archidamus, ſtill zealous for the welfare of Greece, and meditating how he might beſt prevent a rupture, the dreadful conſequences of which he foreſaw, ſent a Spartan to Athens, to endeavour, before they ſhould come to hoſtilities, to prevail, if poſſible, with the Athenians to lay aſide their deſigns; ſince otherwiſe an army would ſoon march into Attica. But the Athenians, ſo far from admitting him to audience, or hearing his reaſons, would not ſo much as ſuffer him to come into their city: Pericles having prevailed with the people to make an order, that no herald or ambaſſador ſhould be received from the Lacedæmonians, till they had firſt laid down their arms. In conſequence of this, the Spartan was commanded to leave the country that very day; and an eſcort was ſent to guard him to the frontiers, and to prevent his ſpeaking to any perſon by the way. At his taking leave of the Athenians, he told them, that from that day great calamities would enſue to all Greece. Archidamus, ſeeing no hopes of a reconciliation, marched for Attica, at the head of ſixty thouſand choſen forces.

Pericles, before the Lacedæmonians had entred this country, declared to the Athenians, that ſhould Archidamus, when he was laying waſte their territories, ſpare his (Pericles's) lands, either on account of the right of hoſpitality which ſubſiſted between them, or

* Gnarus primis eventibus metum aut fiduciam gigni. *Tacit. Annal.* l. 13. c. 31.

to

to furniſh his enemies and thoſe who envied him, with a handle to ſlander him, as holding intelligence with him, he declared, that from that day he made over all his lands and houſes to the city of Athens. He remonſtrated to the Athenians, that it was their intereſt to conſume the enemy's troops, by protracting the war; and that for this purpoſe, they muſt immediately remove all their effects out of the country, retire to the city, and ſhut themſelves up in it without ever hazarding a battle. The Athenians, indeed, had not forces enough to take the field and oppoſe the enemy. Their troops, excluſive of thoſe in garriſon, amounted but to thirteen thouſand heavy-armed ſoldiers; and ſixteen thouſand inhabitants, including the young and old, the citizens as well as others, who were appointed to defend Athens: and beſides theſe, twelve hundred troopers, including the archers who rode on horſeback, and ſixteen hundred foot archers. This was the whole army of the Athenians. But their chief ſtrength conſiſted in a fleet of three hundred gallies, part of which were ordered to lay waſte the enemy's country, and the reſt to awe the allies on whom contributions were levied, without which the Athenians could not defray the expences of the war.

The Athenians, animated by the warm exhortations of Pericles, brought from the country their wives, their children, their moveables, and all their effects, after which they pulled down their houſes, and even carried off the timber of them. With regard to the cattle of all kinds, they conveyed them into the iſland of Eubœa and the neighbouring iſles. However, they were deeply afflicted at this ſad and precipitate migration, and it even forced tears from their eyes. From the time the Perſians left their country, that is, for near fifty years, they had enjoyed the ſweets of peace, wholly employed in cultivating their lands, and feeding their flocks. But now (ſad fate of war!) they were obliged to abandon every thing. They took up their habitations in the city, as conveniently

niently as they could, in the midſt of ſuch confuſion; retiring either to their relations or friends; and ſome withdrew even to the temples and other public places.

In the mean time the Lacedæmonians, being ſet out upon their march, entered the country, and encamped at Œnoe, which is the firſt fortreſs towards Bœotia. They employed a long time in preparing the attack, and raiſing the batteries; for which reaſon complaints were made againſt Archidamus, as if he carried on the war indolently, becauſe he had not approved of it. He was accuſed of being too ſlow in his marches, and of encamping too long near Corinth. He was alſo charged with having been too dilatory in raiſing the army, and having deſired to give the Athenians opportunity to carry off all their effects out of the country; whereas, (they ſaid) had he marched ſpeedily into it, all they had might have been plundered and deſtroyed. His deſign, however, was, to engage the Athenians, by theſe delays, to agree to an accommodation; and to prevent a rupture, the conſequences of which he foreſaw would be pernicious to all Greece. Finding, after making ſeveral aſſaults, that it would be impoſſible for him to take the city, he raiſed the ſiege, and entered Attica in the midſt of the harveſt. Having laid waſte the whole country, he advanced as far as Acharnæ, one of the greateſt towns near Athens, and but fifteen hundred paces from the city. He there pitched his camp, in hopes that the Athenians, exaſperated to ſee him advanced ſo near, would ſally out to defend their country, and give him an opportunity of coming to a battle.

It indeed was a great mortification to the Athenians, (haughty and imperious) to be braved and inſulted in this manner by an enemy, whom they did not think ſuperior to themſelves in courage. They were eye-witneſſes of the dreadful havock made of their lands, and ſaw all their houſes and farms in a blaze. This ſad ſpectacle was now ſo ſhocking, that they could not bear it any longer, and therefore demanded fiercely to be

be led out againſt the Lacedæmonians, be the conſequence what it would. Pericles ſaw plainly, that the Athenians would thereby hazard every thing, and expoſe their city to certain deſtruction, ſhould they march out to engage, under the walls of their city, an army of ſixty thouſand fighting men, compoſed of the choiceſt troops at that time in Bœotia and Peloponneſus. Beſides, he had made it his chief maxim, to ſpare the blood of the citizens, ſince that was an irreparable loſs. Purſuing inflexibly therefore the plan he had laid down, and ſtudious of nothing but how he might check the impatience and ardor of the Athenians, he was particularly careful not to aſſemble either the ſenate or the people; leſt they ſhould form ſome fatal reſolution, in ſpite of all the oppoſition in his power. His friends uſed all the intreaties imaginable, to make him change his conduct. His enemies, on the other ſide, endeavoured to ſtagger him, by their menaces and ſlanderous diſcourſes. They ſtrove to rouze him by ſongs and ſatires, in which they aſperſed him as a man of a cowardly, inſenſible caſt of mind, who baſely gave up his country to the ſword of the enemy. But no man ſhowed ſo much rancour againſt Pericles as * Cleon. He was the ſon of a currier, and alſo followed that trade. He had raiſed himſelf by faction, and probably by a ſpecies of merit which thoſe muſt poſſeſs who would riſe in popular governments. He had a thundering, and at the ſame time a ſpecious voice; and beſides he poſſeſſed, in a wonderful manner, the art of gaining the people, and bringing them over to his intereſt. It was he who enacted a law, that three *oboli* (not two as before) ſhould be given to each of the ſix thouſand judges. The characteriſticks which more immediately diſtinguiſhed him were, an inſupportably-vain opinion of his own abilities, a ridiculous perſuaſion of his uncommon merit; and a boldneſs of ſpeech, which he carried to ſo

* *It is he whom Ariſtophanes has inveighed ſo much againſt, in ſeveral of his comedies.*

high

high a pitch of inſolence as to ſpare no man. But none of theſe things could move Pericles *. His great ſtrength of mind raiſed him above low, vulgar clamours. Like a good pilot in a raging ſtorm, who after he has given out the proper orders, and taken all the precautions neceſſary, is ſtudious of nothing but how to make the beſt uſe of his art, without ſuffering himſelf to be moved by the tears or intreaties of thoſe whom fear has diſtracted; Pericles, in like manner, after having put the city in a good poſture of defence, and poſted guards in all places to prevent a ſurprize, followed thoſe counſels which his prudence ſuggeſted, entirely regardleſs of the complaints, the taunts and licentious diſcourſes of the citizens; from a firm perſuaſion, that he knew much better than they in what manner they were to be governed. (a) It then appeared evidently, ſays Plutarch, that Pericles was abſolute maſter of the minds of the Athenians, ſince he prevailed ſo far (at ſuch a juncture as this) † as to keep them from ſallying out of the city, as if he had kept the keys of the city in his own poſſeſſion; and fixed, on their arms, the ſeal of his authority, to forbid their making uſe of them. Things happened exactly as Pericles had foretold; for the enemy, finding the Athenians were determined not to ſtir out of their city, and having advice that the enemy's fleet carried fire and ſword into their territories, they raiſed their camp, and, after making dreadful havock in the whole country thro' which they marched, they returned to Peloponneſus, and retired to their ſeveral homes.

It might here be asked, why Pericles acted, on this occaſion, in a quite different manner from what Themiſtocles had done about fifty years before, when, at Xerxes's approach, he made the Athenians march out of their city, and abandon it to the enemy. But a

(a) Plut. An Seni ger. ſit. reſp. p. 784.

* Spernendis rumoribus validus. Tacit.

† Διεκώλυσε, μονονὺ τὰ ὅπλα τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰς κλεῖς τῶν πυλῶν ἀποφραγισάμενος.

little

little reflexion will ſhow, that the circumſtances differed widely. Themiſtocles, being invaded by all the forces of the Eaſt, juſtly concluded that it would be impoſſible for him to withſtand, in a ſingle city, thoſe millions of Barbarians who would have poured upon it like a deluge, and deprived him of all hopes of being ſuccoured by his allies. This is the reaſon given by Cicero. *Fluctum enim totius Barbariæ ferre urbs una non poterat.* It was therefore prudent in him to retire for ſome time, and to let the confuſed multitude of Barbarians conſume and deſtroy one another. But Pericles was not engaged in ſo formidable and oppreſſive a war. The odds were not very great, and he foreſaw it would allow him time to breathe. Thus, like a judicious man and an able politician, he kept cloſe in Athens, and could not be moved either by the remonſtrances or murmurs of the citizens. (*b*) Cicero, writing to his friend Atticus, condemns abſolutely the reſolution which Pompey formed and executed, to abandon Rome to Cæſar; whereas he ought, in imitation of Pericles, to have have ſhut himſelf up in it with the ſenate, the magiſtrates, and the worthieſt of the citizens who had declared in his favour.

After the Lacedæmonians were retired, the Athenians put troops into all the important poſts both by ſea and land, purſuant to the plan they intended to follow as long as the war continued. They alſo came to a reſolution, to keep always a thouſand talents in reſerve *, and an hundred gallies; and never to uſe them, except the enemy ſhould invade Attica by ſea; at the ſame time making it death for any man to propoſe the employing them any other way.

The gallies which had been ſent into Peloponneſus, made dreadful havock there, which conſol'd the Athenians, in ſome meaſure, for the loſſes they had ſuſtained. One day as the forces were going on board, and Pericles was entring his own ſhip, a ſudden and

(*b*) Lib. 7. Epiſt. 11.

* *Three millions.*

total eclipſe of the ſun enſued, and the earth was overſpread with the deepeſt gloom. This phænomenon filled the minds of the Athenians with the utmoſt terror; ſuperſtition, and the ignorance of natural cauſes, making them conſider ſuch events as fatal omens. Pericles ſeeing the pilot who was on board his ſhip aſtoniſhed, and incapable of managing the helm, threw his cloak over his face, and asked him whether he ſaw: the pilot anſwering, that the cloak took away all objects from his ſight; Pericles then gave him to underſtand, that a like cauſe, *viz.* the interpoſition of the vaſt body of the moon between his eyes and the ſun, prevented his ſeeing its ſplendor.

(*c*) The firſt year of the war of Peloponneſus being now elapſed, the Athenians, during the winter, ſolemnized public funerals, according to antient cuſtom, (a practice truly humane, and expreſſive of a juſt gratitude) in honour of thoſe who had loſt their lives in that campaign, a ceremony they obſerved during the whole courſe of that war. For this purpoſe they ſet up, three days before, a tent, in which the bones of the deceaſed citizens were expoſed, and every perſon ſtrewed flowers, incenſe, perfumes, and things of the ſame kind upon thoſe remains. They afterwards were put on a kind of chariots, in coffins made of cypreſs wood, every tribe having its particular coffin and chariot; but in one of the latter a large empty † coffin was carried, in honour of thoſe whoſe bodies had not been found. The proceſſion marched with a grave, majeſtic and religious pomp; a great number of inhabitants, both citizens and foreigners, aſſiſted at this mournful ſolemnity. The relations of the deceaſed officers and ſoldiers ſtood weeping at the ſepulchre. Theſe bones were carried to a public monument, in the fineſt ſuburb of the city, called the Ceramicus; where were buried, in all ages, thoſe who loſt their lives in the field, except the warriors of Marathon,

(*c*) Thucyd. l. 2. p. 122—130.

† *Theſe are called Cenotaphia.*

who,

who, to immortalize their rare valour, were interred in the field of battle. Earth was afterwards laid over them, and then one of the citizens of the greateſt diſtinction pronounced their funeral oration. Pericles was now appointed to exerciſe this honourable office. When the ceremony was ended, he went from the ſepulchre to the tribunal, in order to be the better heard, and ſpoke the oration, the whole of which Thucydides has tranſmitted to us. Whether it was really compoſed by Pericles, or by the hiſtorian, we may affirm that it is truly worthy the reputation of both thoſe great men, as well for the noble ſimplicity of the ſtile, as for the juſt beauty of the thoughts, and the greatneſs of the ſentiments which ſhine in every part of it. (*d*) After having paid in ſo ſolemn a manner, this double tribute of tears and applauſes, to the memory of thoſe brave ſoldiers who had ſacrificed their lives to defend the liberties of their country; the public, who did not confine their gratitude to empty ceremonies and tears, maintained their widows, and all their infant orphans. This was a powerful † incentive to animate the courage of the citizens; for, great men are formed, where merit is beſt rewarded.

About the cloſe of the ſame campaign, the Athenians concluded an alliance with Sitalces, king of the Odryſians in Thrace; and, in conſequence of this treaty, his ſon was admitted a citizen of Athens. They alſo made an accommodation with Perdiccas king of Macedonia, by reſtoring him the city of Thermæ; after which they joined their forces, in order to carry on the war in Chalcis.

(*d*) Thucyd. p. 130.

* Ἄθλα γὰρ οἷς κεῖται ἀρετῆς μέγιστα, τοῖς δὲ καὶ ἄνδρες ἄριστοι πολιτεύουσι.

SECT.

SECT. II. *The plague makes dreadful havock in Attica. Pericles is diveſted of the command. The Lacedæmonians addreſs the Perſians for aid. Potidæa is taken by the Athenians. Pericles is reſtored to his employment. His death, and that of Anaxagoras.*

SECOND AND THIRD YEARS OF THE WAR.

(e) IN the beginning of the ſecond campaign, the enemy made an incurſion into the country as before, and laid it waſte. But the plague made a much greater devaſtation in Athens; the like having never been known. It is related, that it began in Ethiopia, whence it deſcended into Egypt, from thence ſpread over Libya, and a great part of Perſia; and at laſt broke at once, like a flood, upon Athens. Thucydides, who himſelf was ſeized with that deadly diſeaſe, has deſcribed very minutely, the ſeveral circumſtances and ſymptoms of it, in order, ſays he, that a faithful and exact relation of this calamity may ſerve as an inſtruction to poſterity, in caſe the like ſhould ever happen. (f) Hippocrates, who was employed to viſit the ſick, has alſo deſcribed it in a medical, and (g) Lucretius in a poetical way. This peſtilence baffled the utmoſt efforts of art; the moſt robuſt conſtitutions were unable to withſtand its attacks; and the greateſt care and skill of the phyſicians were a feeble help to thoſe who were infected. The inſtant a perſon was ſeized, he was ſtruck with deſpair, which quite diſabled him from attempting a cure. The aſſiſtance that was given them was ineffectual, and proved mortal to all ſuch of their relations as had the courage to approach them. The prodigious quantity of baggage which had been removed out of the country into the city, proved very noxious. Moſt of the inhabitants, for want of lodging, lived in little

(e) A. M. 3574. Ant. J. C. 430. Thucyd. l. 2. p. 130 — 147. Diod. p. 101, 102. Plut. in Pericl. p. 171. (f) Epidem. l. 3. § 3. (g) Lib. 2. c. 47.

cottages,

cottages, in which they could ſcarce breathe, during the raging heat of the ſummer, ſo that they were ſeen either piled one upon the other, (the dead, as well as thoſe who were dying) or elſe crawling thro' the ſtreets; or lying along by the ſide of fountains, to which they had dragged themſelves, to quench the raging thirſt which conſumed them. The very temples were filled with dead bodies, and every part of the city exhibited a dreadful image of death; without the leaſt remedy for the preſent, or the leaſt hopes with regard to futurity.

(g) The plague, before it ſpread into Attica, had made wild havock in Perſia. Artaxerxes, who had been informed of the mighty reputation of Hippocrates of Cos, the greateſt phyſician of that or any other age, cauſed his governors to write to him, to invite him into his dominions, in order that he might preſcribe to thoſe who were infected. The king made him the moſt advantageous offers; ſetting no bounds to his rewards on the ſide of intereſt, and, with regard to honours, promiſing to make him equal with the moſt conſiderable perſons in his court. The reader has already been told, the prodigious regard which was ſhown to the Grecian phyſicians in Perſia; and, indeed, was it poſſible that ſo uſeful a man as Hippocrates could be too well rewarded? However, all the glitter of the Perſian riches and dignities were not capable to corrupt him; nor ſtifle the hatred and averſion which was become natural to the Greeks for the Perſians, ever ſince the latter had invaded them. This great phyſician therefore ſent no other anſwer but this, that he was free from either wants or deſires: that he owed all his cares to his fellow-citizens and countrymen; and was under no obligation to Barbarians, the declared enemies of Greece. Kings are not uſed to denials. Artaxerxes, therefore, in the higheſt tranſports of rage, ſent to the city of Cos, the native place of Hippocrates, and where he was at that time;

(g) Hippocrat. in Epiſt.

commanding

commanding them to deliver up to him that inſolent wretch, in order that he might be brought to condign puniſhment; and threatning, in caſe they refuſed, to lay waſte their city and iſland in ſuch a manner, that not the leaſt footſteps of it ſhould remain. However, the inhabitants of Cos were not under the leaſt terror. They made anſwer, that the menaces of Darius and Xerxes had not been able to prevail with them to give them earth and water, or to obey their orders; that Artaxerxes's threats would be equally impotent; that, let what would be the conſequence, they would never give up their fellow-citizen; and that they depended on the protection of the gods.

Hippocrates had ſaid in one of his letters, that he owed himſelf entirely to his country. And indeed, the inſtant he was ſent for to Athens, he went thither, and did not once ſtir out of the city till the plague was quite ceaſed. He devoted himſelf entirely to the ſervice of the ſick; and to multiply himſelf, as it were, he ſent ſeveral of his diſciples into all parts of the country; after having inſtructed them in what manner to treat their patients. The Athenians were ſtruck with the deepeſt ſenſe of gratitude for this generous care of Hippocrates. They therefore ordained by a public decree, that Hippocrates ſhould be initiated in the moſt exalted myſteries, in the ſame manner as Hercules the ſon of Jupiter; that a crown of gold ſhould be preſented him, of the value of a thouſand ſtaters *, amounting to five hundred piſtoles French money; and that the decree by which it was granted him, ſhould be read aloud by a herald in the public games, on the ſolemn feſtival of Panathenæa: That the freedom of the city ſhould be given him, and himſelf be maintained, at the public charge, in the Prytaneum, all his life-time, in caſe he thought proper: In fine, that the children of all the people of Cos, whoſe city had given birth to ſo great a man,

* *The Attic ſtater was a gold coin weighing two drachms. It is in the original* χρυσῶν χιλίων.

might

might be maintained and brought up in Athens, in the ſame manner as if they had been born there.

In the mean-time the enemy having marched into Attica, came down towards the coaſt, and advancing ſtill forward, laid waſte the whole country. Pericles ſtill adhering to the maxim he had eſtabliſhed, not to expoſe the ſafety of the ſtate to the hazard of a battle, would not ſuffer his troops to ſally out of the city: however, before the enemy left the plains, he ſailed to Peloponneſus with an hundred galleys, in order to haſten their retreat by his making ſo powerful a diverſion; and after having made a dreadful havock, (as he had done the firſt year) he returned into the city. The plague was ſtill there as well as in the fleet, and it ſpread to thoſe troops that were beſieging Potidæa.

The campaign being thus ended, the Athenians, who ſaw their country depopulated by two great ſcourges, war and peſtilence, began to deſpond, and to murmur againſt Pericles; conſidering him as the author of all their calamities, as he had involved them in that fatal war. They then ſent a deputation to Lacedæmonia, to obtain, if poſſible, an accommodation by ſome means or other, firmly reſolved to make whatever conceſſions ſhould be demanded of them: however, the ambaſſadors returned back without being able to obtain any terms. Complaints and murmurs now broke out afreſh; and the whole city was in ſuch a trouble and confuſion, as ſeemed to prognoſticate the worſt of evils. Pericles, in the midſt of this univerſal conſternation, could not forbear aſſembling the people; and endeavoured to ſoften, and at the ſame time to encourage them, by juſtifying himſelf. "The reaſons," ſays he, "which determined you to undertake this war, and which you approved at that time, are ſtill the ſame; and are not changed by the alteration of circumſtances, which neither you nor my ſelf could foreſee. Had it been left to your option to make choice of peace or war, the

"former

" former would certainly have been the more eligible;
" but as there was no other means for preſerving your
" liberty, but by drawing the ſword, was it poſſible
" for you to heſitate? If we are citizens who truly
" love our country, will our private misfortunes make
" us neglect the common welfare of the ſtate? Every
" man feels the evil which afflicts him, becauſe it is
" preſent; but no one is ſenſible of the good which
" will reſult from it, becauſe it is not come. Have
" you forgot the ſtrength and grandeur of your em-
" pire? Of the two parts which form this globe of
" ours, *viz.* the land and ſea, you have abſolute poſ-
" ſeſſion of the latter; and no king, or any other
" power, is able to oppoſe your fleets. It is now your
" duty to preſerve this glory and this empire, or to re-
" ſign it for ever. Be not therefore grieved becauſe
" you are deprived of a few country-houſes and gar-
" dens, which ought to be conſidered no otherwiſe
" than as the frame of the picture, though you would
" ſeem to make them the picture itſelf. Conſider,
" that if you do but preſerve your liberty, you will
" eaſily recover them; but that ſhould you ſuffer
" your ſelves to be deprived of this bleſſing, you will
" loſe every valuable poſſeſſion with it. Don't ſhow
" leſs generoſity than your anceſtors, who, for the
" ſake of preſerving it, abandoned even their city;
" and who, though they had not inherited ſuch a
" glory from their anceſtors, yet ſuffered the worſt
" of evils, and engaged in the moſt perilous enter-
" prizes, to tranſmit it to you. I will confeſs that
" your preſent calamities are exceedingly grievous,
" and I my ſelf am duly ſenſible and deeply afflicted
" for them. But is it juſt in you to exclaim againſt
" your general, merely for an accident that was not
" to be diverted by all the prudence of man; and to
" make him reſponſable for an event, in which he has
" not the leaſt concern? We muſt ſubmit patiently
" to thoſe evils which heaven inflicts upon us, and
" vigorouſly oppoſe ſuch as ariſe from our fellow-
" creatures.

" creatures. As to the hatred and jealouſy which " attend on your proſperity, they are the uſual lot of " all who believe themſelves worthy of commanding. " However, hatred and envy are not long-liv'd, but " the glory that accompanies exalted actions is immor- " tal. Revolve therefore perpetually in your minds, " how ſhameful and ignominious it is for men to " bow the neck to their enemies, and how glorious it " is to triumph over them; and then, animated by " this double reflection, march on to danger with " joy and intrepidity, and do not crouch ſo tamely in " vain to the Lacedæmonians; and call to mind, that " thoſe who diſplay the greateſt bravery and reſolu- " tion in dangers, acquire the moſt eſteem and ap- " plauſe."

The motives of honour and fame, the remembrance of the great actions of their anceſtors, the ſoothing title of ſovereigns of Greece, and above all, the jealouſy of Sparta, the antient and perpetual rival of Athens, were the uſual motives which Pericles employed to influence and animate the Athenians, and had hitherto never failed of ſucceſs. But on this occaſion, the ſenſe of the preſent evils prevailed over every other conſideration, and ſtifled all other thoughts. The Athenians indeed did not deſign to ſue the Lacedæmonians any more for peace, but the ſight and preſence only of Pericles was inſupportable to them. They therefore deprived him of the command of the army, and ſentenced him to pay a fine, which, according to ſome hiſtorians, amounted to fifteen talents *, and, according to others, fifty.

However, this public diſgrace of Pericles was not to be very laſting. The anger of the people was appeaſed by this firſt effort, and had ſpent itſelf in this injurious treatment of him, as the bee leaves its ſting in the wound. But he was not now ſo happy with regard to his domeſtic evils; for, beſides his having loſt a great number of his friends and relations by the

* *Fifteen or fifty thouſand French crowns.*

peſtilence,

peſtilence, feuds and diviſions had long reigned in his family. Xanthippus, his eldeſt ſon, who himſelf was extremely profuſe, and had married a young wife no leſs extravagant, could not bear his father's exact œconomy, who allowed him but a very ſmall ſum for his pleaſures. This made him borrow money in his father's name. When the lender demanded his debt of Pericles, he not only refuſed to pay, but even proſecuted him for it. Xanthippus was ſo enraged, that he inveighed in the moſt heinous terms againſt his father, exclaiming againſt him in all places, and ridiculing openly the aſſemblies he held at his houſe, and his conferences with the Sophiſts. He did not know that a ſon, though treated unjuſtly, (which was far otherwiſe in his caſe) ought to ſubmit patiently to the injuſtice of his father, as a citizen is obliged to ſuffer that of his country.

The plague carried off Xanthippus. At the ſame time Pericles loſt his ſiſter, with many of his relations and beſt friends, whoſe aſſiſtance he moſt wanted in the adminiſtration. But he did not ſink under theſe loſſes; his ſtrength of mind was not ſhaken by them; and he was not ſeen to weep or ſhow the uſual marks of ſorrow at the grave of any of his relations, till the death of Paralus, the laſt of his legitimate children. That rude ſtroke quite amazed him, though he did his utmoſt to preſerve his uſual tranquillity, and not ſhow any outward ſymptoms of ſorrow. But when he was to put the crown of flowers upon the head of his dead ſon, he could not ſupport the cruel ſpectacle, nor ſtifle the tranſports of his grief, which forc'd its way in cries, in ſobs, and a flood of tears.

Pericles, miſled by the principles of a falſe philoſophy, imagined, that bewailing the death of his relations and children, would betray a weakneſs that no way ſuited the greatneſs of ſoul he had ever ſhewn; and that on this occaſion, the ſenſibility of the father, would ſully the glory of the conqueror. Exceeding error, childiſh illuſion, which either makes heroiſm conſiſt

conſiſt in wild and ſavage cruelty; or leaving the ſame grief and confuſion in the mind, aſſumes a vain outſide of conſtancy and reſolution, merely to be admired. But does martial bravery extinguiſh nature? Is a man dead to all humane ſentiments, becauſe he makes a conſiderable figure in the ſtate? Antoninus the emperor had a much juſter way of thinking, when, on occaſion of Marcus Aurelius's lamenting the death of the perſon who had brought him up, he ſaid; * *Suffer him to be a man, for neither philoſophy nor ſovereignty renders us inſenſible.*

Fickleneſs and inconſtancy were the prevailing characters of the Athenians; and as theſe carried them on a ſudden to the greateſt exceſſes, they ſoon brought them back again within the bounds of moderation and gentleneſs. It was not long before they repented the injury they had done Pericles, and earneſtly wiſhed to ſee him again in their aſſemblies. By dint of ſuffering they began to bear patiently their domeſtic misfortunes, and to be fired more and more with a zeal for their country's glory; and in their ardor for reinſtating its affairs, they did not know any perſon more capable than Pericles of the adminiſtration. Pericles, at that time, never ſtirred out of his houſe, and was in the utmoſt grief for the loſs he had ſuſtained. However, Alcibiades and the reſt of his friends intreated him to go abroad, and ſhow himſelf in public. The people aſked him pardon for their ungrateful uſage of him; and Pericles, moved with their entreaties, and perſuaded that it did not become a good man to harbour the leaſt reſentment againſt his country, reſumed the government.

About the end of the ſecond campaign, ſome ambaſſadors had ſet out from Lacedæmon, in order to ſolicit the king of Perſia's alliance, and engage him to furniſh a ſum of money for maintaining the fleet: this reflected great ignominy on the Lacedæmonians,

* Permitte illi ut homo ſit: neque enim vel philoſophia vel imperium tollit affectus. *Jul. Capitol. in vit. Antonini Pii.*

who called themſelves the deliverers of Greece, ſince they thereby retracted or ſullied the glorious actions they had formerly atchieved in her defence againſt Perſia. They went by the way of Thrace, in order to diſengage, if poſſible, Sitalces from the alliance of the Athenians, and prevail with him to ſuccour Potidæa. But they here met with ſome Athenian ambaſſadors, who cauſed them to be arreſted as diſturbers of the public peace, and afterwards to be ſent to Athens, where, without ſuffering them to be heard, they were put to death the ſame day; and their bodies thrown into the open fields, by way of repriſal on the Lacedæmonians, who treated all who were not of their party in the ſame inhuman manner. It is ſcarce poſſible to conceive how two cities, which, a little before, were ſo ſtrongly united, and ought to have ſhewn a mutual civility and forbearance for each other, could contract ſo inveterate an hatred, and break into ſuch cruel acts of violence, as infringe all the laws of war, humanity, and nations; and prompted them to exerciſe greater cruelties upon one another, than if they had been at war with Barbarians.

Potidæa had now been beſieged almoſt three years; when the inhabitants, reduced to extremities, and in ſuch want of proviſions that ſome fed on human fleſh, and not expecting any ſuccours from the Peloponneſians, whoſe attempts in Attica had all proved abortive, ſurrendred on conditions. The circumſtances which made the Athenians treat them with lenity, were, the ſeverity of the weather, which exceedingly annoyed the beſiegers; and the prodigious expence of the ſiege, which had already coſt * two thouſand talents †. They therefore came out of the

* *The army which beſieged Potidæa conſiſted of three thouſand men, excluſive of the ſixteen hundred who had been ſent under the command of Phormio. Every ſoldier received (daily) two drachms, or twenty pence (French) for maſter and man; and thoſe of the gallies had the ſame pay.* Thucyd. l. 3. p. 182.

† *Six millions.*

city

city with their wives and children, as well citizens as foreigners, with each but one ſuit of cloaths, and the women two, and only a little money to carry them home. The Athenians blamed their generals for granting this capitulation without their order; becauſe otherwiſe, as the citizens were reduced to the utmoſt extremities, they would have ſurrendred at diſcretion. They ſent a colony thither.

(*a*) The firſt thing Pericles did, after his being re-elected generaliſſimo, was to propoſe the abrogating of that law, which he himſelf had cauſed to be enacted againſt baſtards, when there were legitimate children. It declared, that ſuch only ſhould be conſidered as true and legitimate Athenians, whoſe fathers and mothers were both natives of Athens; and it had been executed juſt before with the utmoſt rigour. For the * king of Egypt having ſent to Athens a preſent of forty thouſand meaſures of corn to be diſtributed among the people, the baſtards, on account of this new law, were involved in a thouſand difficulties, till then unpractiſed, and which had not been ſo much as thought of. Near five thouſand of them were condemned and ſold as ſlaves, whilſt fourteen thouſand and forty citizens were confirmed in their privileges, and recognized as true Athenians. It was thought very ſtrange, that the author and promoter of this law ſhould himſelf deſire to have it repealed. But the Athenians were moved to compaſſion at the domeſtic calamities of Pericles; ſo that they permitted him to enter his baſtard, in his own name, in the regiſter of the citizens of his tribe.

A little after he himſelf was infected with the peſtilence. Being extremely ill, and ready to breathe his laſt, the principal citizens, and ſuch of his friends as

(*a*) A. M. 3575. Ant. J. C. 429.

* *Plutarch does not name this king. Perhaps it was Inarus, ſon to Pſammetichus king of Lybia, who had cauſed part of the Egyptians to take up arms againſt Artaxerxes, and to whom the Athenians, above thirty years before, had ſent ſuccours againſt the Perſians.* Thucyd. l. 1. p. 68.

had not forſaken him, diſcourſing together in his bed-chamber about his rare merit, they ran over his exploits, and computed the number of his victories; for whilſt he was generaliſſimo of the Athenians, he had erected for the glory of their city nine trophies, in memory of as many battles gained by him. They did not imagine that Pericles heard what they were ſaying, becauſe he ſeemed to have loſt his ſenſes; but it was far otherwiſe, for not a ſingle word of their diſcourſe had eſcaped him; when, breaking ſuddenly from his ſilence; "I am ſurprized, ſays he, "that you ſhould "treaſure up ſo well in your memories, and extol ſo "highly a ſeries of actions, in which fortune had ſo "great a ſhare, and which are common to me, with "ſo many other generals; and at the ſame time ſhould "forget the moſt glorious circumſtance in my life; I "mean, *my never having cauſed a ſingle citizen to put "on mourning.*" Excellent words! which very few in high ſtations can declare with truth. The Athenians were deeply afflicted at his death.

The reader has doubtleſs obſerved, from what has been ſaid of Pericles, that in him were united moſt qualities which conſtitute the great man; as thoſe of the admiral, by his great skill in naval affairs; of the great captain, by his conqueſts and victories; of the high-treaſurer, by the excellent order in which he put the finances; of the great politician, by the extent and juſtneſs of his views, by his eloquence in public deliberations, and by the dexterity and addreſs with which he tranſacted affairs; of a miniſter of ſtate, by the methods he employed to increaſe trade and promote the arts in general: in fine, of father of his country, by the happineſs he procured to every individual, and which he always had in view, as the true ſcope and end of his adminiſtration.

But I muſt not omit another characteriſtic which was peculiar to him. He acted with ſo much wiſdom, moderation, diſintereſtedneſs and zeal for the public good; he diſcovered, in all things, ſo great a ſuperiority

ſuperiority of talents, and gave ſo exalted an idea of his experience, capacity and integrity, that he acquired the confidence of all the Athenians; and fixed (in his own favour) during forty years that he governed the Athenians, their natural fickleneſs and inconſtancy. He ſuppreſſed that jealouſy, which an extreme fondneſs for liberty had made them entertain againſt all citizens diſtinguiſhed by their merit and great authority. But the moſt ſurprizing circumſtance is, he gained this great aſcendant merely by perſuaſion, without employing force, mean artifices, or any of thoſe arts which a mean politician excuſes in himſelf, upon the ſpecious pretence, that the neceſſity of the public affairs, and reaſons of ſtate make them neceſſary.

(*b*) Anaxagoras died the ſame year as Pericles. Plutarch relates a circumſtance concerning him, that happened ſome time before, which muſt not be omitted. He ſays, that this philoſopher, who had voluntarily reduced himſelf to exceſſive poverty, in order that he might have the greater leiſure to purſue his ſtudies; finding himſelf neglected, in his old age, by Pericles, who, in the multiplicity of the public affairs, had not always time to think of him; * wrapped his cloak about his head, and threw himſelf on the ground, in the fixed reſolution to ſtarve himſelf. Pericles hearing of this accidentally, ran with the utmoſt haſte to the philoſopher's houſe, in the deepeſt affliction. He conjured him, in the ſtrongeſt and moſt moving terms, not to throw his life away; adding, that it was not Anaxagoras but himſelf that was to be lamented, if he was ſo unfortunate as to loſe ſo wiſe and faithful a friend; one who was ſo capable of giving him wholſome counſels, with regard to the preſſing occaſions of the ſtate. Anaxagoras then, uncovering a little his head, ſpoke thus to him: *Pericles, thoſe who uſe a lamp*

(*b*) Plut. in Pericl. p. 162.

* *It was the cuſtom for thoſe to cover their heads with their cloaks, who were reduced to deſpair, and reſolved to die.*

take care to feed it with oil. This was a gentle, and at the ſame time a ſtrong and piercing reproach. Pericles ought to have ſupplied his wants unaſked. Many lamps are extinguiſhed in this manner in a country, by the criminal negligence of thoſe who ought to ſupply them.

SECT. III. *The Lacedæmonians beſiege Platææ. Mitylene is taken by the Athenians. Platææ ſurrenders. The plague breaks out again in Athens.*

FOURTH AND FIFTH YEARS OF THE WAR.

(c) THE moſt memorable tranſaction of the following years, was, the ſiege of Platææ by the Lacedæmonians, This was one of the moſt famous ſieges in antiquity, on account of the vigorous efforts of both parties; but eſpecially for the glorious reſiſtance made by the beſieged, and their bold and induſtrious ſtratagem, by which ſeveral of them got out of the city, and by that means eſcaped the fury of the enemy. The Lacedæmonians beſieged this place in the beginning of the third campaign. As ſoon as they had pitched their camp round the city, in order to lay waſte the places adjacent to it, the Platæans ſent ſome deputies to Archidamus, who commanded on that occaſion, to repreſent, that he could not attack them with the leaſt ſhadow of juſtice, becauſe that, after the famous battle of Platææ, Pauſanias the Grecian general, offering up a ſacrifice in their city to Jupiter the deliverer, in preſence of all the allies, had given them their freedom to reward their valour and zeal; and therefore, that they ought not to be diſturbed in the enjoyment of their liberties, ſince it had been granted them by a Lacedæmonian. Archidamus anſwered, that their demand would be very reaſonable, had they not joined with the Athenians, the profeſſed enemies to the liberty of Greece; but that, if they

(c) A. M. 3576. Ant. J. C. 428. Thucyd. l. 2. p. 147—151. Diod. l. 22. p. 102—109.

would

would diſengage themſelves from their preſent alliance, or at leaſt remain neuter, they then ſhould be left in the full enjoyment of their privileges. The deputies replied, that they could not poſſibly come to any agreement, without firſt ſending to Athens, whither their wives and children were retired. The Lacedæmonians permitted them to ſend thither; when the Athenians promiſing ſolemnly to ſuccour them to the utmoſt of their power, the Platæans reſolved to ſuffer the laſt extremities rather than ſurrender; and accordingly they informed the Lacedæmonians, from their walls, that they could not comply with what was deſired.

Archidamus then, after calling upon the gods to witneſs, that he did not firſt infringe the alliance, and was not the cauſe of the calamities which might befal the Platæans, for having refuſed the juſt and reaſonable conditions offered them, prepared for the ſiege. He ſurrounded the city with a circumvallation of trees, which were laid long-ways, very cloſe together, with their boughs interwoven, and turned towards the city, to prevent any perſon from going out of it. He afterwards threw up a platform to ſet the batteries on; in hopes that, as ſo many hands were employed, they ſhould ſoon take the city. He therefore cauſed trees to be felled on mount Cithæron, and interwove them with faſcines, in order to ſupport the terraſs on all ſides; he then threw into it wood, earth, and ſtones; in a word, whatever could help to fill it up. The whole army worked night and day, without the leaſt intermiſſion, during ſeventy days; one half of the ſoldiers repoſing themſelves, whilſt the reſt were at work.

The beſieged obſerving that the work began to riſe, they threw up a wooden wall upon the walls of the city oppoſite to the platform, in order that they might always out-top the beſiegers; and filled the hollow of this wooden wall, with the bricks they took from the rubbiſh of the neighbouring houſes; ſo that the wall

of timber ſerved in a manner as a defence to keep the wall from falling, as it was carrying up. It was covered, on the outſide, with hides both raw and dry, in order to ſhelter the works and the workmen from the fires diſcharged againſt it. In proportion as it roſe, the platform was raiſed alſo, which in this manner was carried to a great height. But the beſieged made a hole in the oppoſite wall, in order to carry off the earth that ſuſtained the platform; which the beſiegers perceiving, they put large paniers filled with mortar, in the place of the earth which had been removed, becauſe theſe could not be ſo eaſily carried off. The beſieged therefore, finding their firſt ſtratagem defeated, made a mine under ground as far as the platform, in order to ſhelter themſelves, and to remove from it the earth and other materials of which it was compoſed, and which they gave from hand to hand, as far as the city. The beſiegers were a conſiderable time without perceiving this, till at laſt they found that their work did not go forward, and that the more earth they laid on, the weaker it grew. But the beſieged judging that the ſuperiority of numbers would at length prevail; without amuſing themſelves any longer at this work, or carrying the wall higher on the ſide towards the battery, they contented themſelves with building another, within, in the form of a half-moon, both ends of which joined to the wall; in order that the beſieged might retire behind it when the firſt wall ſhould be forced; and ſo oblige the enemy to make freſh works.

In the mean time the beſiegers having ſet up their machines (doubtleſs after they had filled up the ditch, though Thucydides does not ſay this) ſhook the city wall in a very terrible manner, which, though it alarmed the citizens very much, did not however diſcourage them. They employed every art that fortification could ſuggeſt againſt the enemy's batteries. They prevented the effect of the battering rams, by ropes

ropes * which turned aſide their ſtrokes. They alſo employed another artifice; the two ends of a great beam were made faſt by long iron chains to two large pieces of timber, ſupported at due diſtance upon the wall in the nature of a ballance; ſo that whenever the enemy played their machine, the beſieged lifted up this beam, and let it fall back on the head of the battering ram, which quite deaden'd its force, and conſequently made it of no effect.

The beſiegers finding the attack did not go on ſucceſsfully, and that a new wall was raiſed againſt their platform, deſpaired of being able to ſtorm the place, and therefore changed the ſiege into a blockade. However, they firſt endeavoured to ſet fire to it, imagining that the town might eaſily be burnt down, as it was ſo ſmall, whenever a ſtrong wind ſhould riſe; for they employed all the artifices imaginable, to make themſelves maſter of it as ſoon as poſſible, and with little expence. They therefore threw faſcines into the intervals between the walls of the city and the intrenchment with which they had ſurrounded them; and filled theſe intervals in a very little time, becauſe of the multitude of hands employed by them; in order to ſet fire, at the ſame time, to different parts of the city. They then lighted the fire with pitch and ſulphur, which in a moment made ſuch a prodigious blaze that the like was never ſeen. This invention was very near carrying the city, which had baffled all others: For the beſieged could not make head at once againſt the fire and the enemy in ſeveral parts of the town; and had the weather favoured the beſiegers, as they flattered themſelves it would, it had certainly been taken: But hiſtory informs us, that an exceeding heavy rain fell, which extinguiſhed the fire.

This laſt effort of the beſiegers having been defeated as ſucceſsfully as all the reſt, they now turned the ſiege

* *The end (downward) of theſe ropes formed a variety of ſlip-knots, with which they catched the head of the battering-ram, which they raiſed up by the help of the machine.*

into a blockade, and ſurrounded the city with a brick wall, ſtrengthened on each ſide with a deep foſſé. The whole army was engaged ſucceſſively in this work, and when it was finiſhed, they left a guard over half of it; the Bœotians offering to guard the reſt, upon which the Lacedæmonians returned to Sparta, about the month of October. There were now, in Platææ, but four hundred inhabitants, and fourſcore Athenians; with an hundred and ten women to dreſs their victuals, and no other perſon, whether freeman or ſlave; all the reſt having been ſent to Athens before the ſiege.

During the campaign, ſome engagements were fought both by ſea and land, which I omit, becauſe of no importance.

(*d*) The next ſummer, which was the fourth year of the war, the people of Lesbos, the citizens of Methymne excepted, reſolved to break their alliance with the Athenians. They had deſigned to rebel before the war was declared, but the Lacedæmonians would not receive them at that time. The citizens of Methymne ſent advice of this to the Athenians, aſſuring them, that if an immediate ſuccour was not ſent, the iſland would be inevitably loſt. The affliction of the Athenians, who had ſuſtained great loſſes by the war and the plague, was greatly increaſed, when news was brought of the revolt of ſo conſiderable an iſland, whoſe forces, which were quite freſh, would now join the enemy, and reinforce them on a ſudden by the addition of a powerful fleet. The Athenians therefore ſent forty gallies deſigned for Peloponneſus, which accordingly ſailed for Mitylene. The inhabitants, tho' in great conſternation becauſe they were quite unprepared, however put on an appearance of bravery, and ſailed out of the port with their ſhips; however, being repulſed, they propoſed an accommodation, which the Athenians liſtened to, from an apprehenſion that they were not ſtrong enough to reduce the iſland to their allegiance. A ſuſpenſion of arms was therefore

(*d*) Thucyd. l. 3. p. 174—207. Dicd. l. 12. p. 108, 109.

agreed

agreed upon, during which the Mitylenians ſent ambaſſadors to Athens. The fear of not obtaining their demands, made them ſend others to Lacedæmonia, to deſire ſuccours. This was not ill judged, the Athenians ſending them an anſwer which they had no reaſon to interpret in their favour.

The ambaſſadors of Mitylene, after a dangerous voyage, being arrived in Lacedæmonia, the Spartans deferred giving them audience, till the ſolemnization of the Olympic games, in order that the allies might hear the complaints they had to make. I ſhall repeat their whole ſpeech on that occaſion, as it may ſerve at once, to give a juſt idea of Thucydides's ſtile, and of the ſeveral ſtates with regard to the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. "We are ſenſible, ſaid the ambaſſa-
"dors, that it is the cuſtom to uſe deſerters well at
"firſt, becauſe of the ſervice they do thoſe whom
"they fly to; but to deſpiſe them afterwards, as trai-
"tors to their country and friends. This is far from
"being unjuſt, when they have no inducement to
"ſuch a change; when the ſame union ſubſiſts, and
"the ſame aids reciprocally granted. But it is far
"otherwiſe between us and the Athenians; and we
"intreat you not to be prejudiced againſt us, be-
"cauſe, after having been treated mildly by the Athe-
"nians during the peace, we now renounce their al-
"liance when they are unfortunate. For being come
"hither to demand admittance into the number of
"your friends and allies, we ought to begin our own
"juſtification, by ſhowing the juſtice and neceſſity of
"our procedure; it being impoſſible for a true friend-
"ſhip to be eſtabliſhed between individuals, or a ſolid
"alliance between cities, unleſs both are founded on
"virtue, and uniformity of principles and ſentiments.
"To come to the point: the treaty we concluded
"with the Athenians, was not to enſlave Greece,
"but to free it from the yoke of the Barbarians; and
"it was concluded after the retreat of the Perſians,
"when you renounced the command. We adhered

"to

" to it with pleaſure, ſo long as the Athenians con-
" tinued to entertain juſt deſigns; but, when we ſaw
" that they diſcontinued the war they were carrying
" on againſt the enemy, merely to oppreſs the allies,
" we could not but ſuſpect their conduct. And, as
" it was extremely difficult, in ſo great a diverſity of
" intereſts and opinions, for all of them to continue in
" ſtrict union; and ſtill harder to make head againſt
" them, when alone and ſeparated; they have ſub-
" jected, by inſenſible degrees, all the allies, except
" the inhabitants of Chios, and our people; and uſed
" our own forces for this end. For, at the ſame time
" that they left us ſeemingly at our liberty, they ob-
" liged us to follow them; though we could no longer
" rely on their words, and had the ſtrongeſt reaſon to
" fear the like treatment. And indeed, what pro-
" bability is there, after their enſlaving all the other
" ſtates, that they ſhould ſhow a regard to us only,
" and admit us upon the foot of equals, if they may
" become our maſters whenever they pleaſe; eſpeci-
" ally as their power increaſes daily, in proportion as
" ours leſſens? A mutual fear between confederates,
" is a ſtrong motive to make an alliance laſting, and
" to prevent unjuſt and violent attempts, by its keep-
" ing all things in an equilibrium. Their leaving us
" the enjoyment of our liberties, was merely becauſe
" they could not intrench upon them by open force,
" but only by that equity and ſpecious moderation
" they have ſhown us. Firſt, they pretended to
" prove from their moderate conduct in regard to us,
" that, as we are free, we ſhould not have marched
" in conjunction with them againſt the other allies,
" had they not given them juſt grounds for com-
" plaint. Secondly, by attacking the weakeſt firſt,
" and ſubduing them one after another, they enabled
" themſelves, by their ruin, to ſubject the moſt power-
" ful without difficulty, who at laſt would be left a-
" lone and without ſupport: whereas, had they be-
" gun by invading us, at the time that the allies were
" poſſeſſed

" poſſeſſed of all their troops, and were able to make
" ſome ſtand, they could not ſo eaſily have compleat-
" ed their deſigns. Beſides, as we had a large fleet,
" which would ſtrengthen conſiderably whatever party
" we ſhould declare for, this was a check upon them.
" Add to this, that the high regard we have always
" ſhown for their republic, and the endeavours we
" have uſed to gain the favour of thoſe who com-
" manded it, have ſuſpended our ruin. But we had
" been undone, had not this war broke out; which
" the fate of others leaves no room to doubt.

" What friendſhip then, what laſting alliance can
" be concluded with thoſe who never are friends and
" allies but when force is employed to make them
" continue ſuch? For, as they were obliged to careſs
" us during the war, to prevent our joining with the
" enemy; we were conſtrained to treat them with
" the ſame regard in time of peace, to prevent their
" falling upon us. That which love produces in other
" places, was with us the effect of fear. It was this
" circumſtance that made an alliance ſubſiſt ſome time,
" which both parties were determined to break upon
" the very firſt favourable occaſion: Let therefore no
" one accuſe us for the advantage we now take. We had
" not always the ſame opportunity to ſave, as they had
" to ruin us; but were under a neceſſity of waiting
" one, before we could venture to declare ourſelves.

" Such are the motives which now oblige us to ſol-
" licit your alliance; the equity and juſtice of which
" appear very ſtrong to us, and conſequently call
" upon us to provide for our ſafety: We ſhould have
" claimed your protection before, had you been ſoon-
" er inclined to afford it us; for we offered ourſelves
" to you, even before the war broke out: We are
" now come, at the perſuaſion of the Bœotians your
" allies, to diſengage ourſelves from the oppreſſors of
" Greece, and join our arms with its defenders; and
" to provide for the ſecurity of our ſtate, which is
" now in imminent danger. If any thing can be ob-

" jected

" jected to our conduct, it is, our declaring ſo preci-
" pitately, with more generoſity than prudence, and
" without having made the leaſt preparations. But
" this alſo ought to engage you to be the more ready
" in ſuccouring us; that you may not loſe the op-
" portunity of protecting the oppreſſed, and aveng-
" ing yourſelves on your enemies. There never was
" a more favourable conjuncture than that which now
" offers itſelf; a conjuncture, when war and peſtilence
" have conſumed their forces, and exhauſted their
" treaſure: not to mention that their fleet is divided,
" by which means they will not be in a condition to
" reſiſt you, ſhould you invade them at the ſame time
" by ſea and land. For, they either will leave us to
" attack you, and give us an opportunity of ſuccour-
" ing you; or they will oppoſe us all together, and
" then you will have but half their forces to deal
" with.

" For the reſt, let no one imagine that you will
" expoſe yourſelves to dangers for a people incapable
" of doing you ſervice. Our country indeed lies at a
" conſiderable diſtance from you, but our aid is near
" at hand. For the war will be carried on, not in
" Attica, as is ſuppoſed, but in that country whoſe
" revenues are the ſupport of Attica, and we are not
" far from it. Conſider alſo, that in abandoning us,
" you will increaſe the power of the Athenians by the
" addition of ours; and that no ſtate will then dare to
" take up arms againſt them. But in ſuccouring us,
" you will ſtrengthen yourſelves with a fleet which you
" ſo much want; you will induce many other people,
" after our example, to join you; and you will take
" off the reproach caſt upon you, of abandoning thoſe
" who have recourſe to your protection, which will
" be no inconſiderable advantage to you during the
" courſe of the war.

" We therefore implore you, in the name of Ju-
" piter Olympius, in whoſe temple we now are, not
" to fruſtrate the hopes of the Greeks, nor reject ſup-

" pliants,

" pliants, whoſe preſervation may be highly advanta-
" gious, and whoſe ruin may be infinitely pernicious
" to you. Show yourſelves ſuch now, as the idea
" entertain'd of your generoſity, and the extreme dan-
" ger to which we are reduced, may demand; that is,
" the protectors of the afflicted, and the deliverers of
" Greece."

The allies, ſtruck with theſe reaſons, admitted them into the alliance of Peloponneſus. An incurſion into the enemy's country was immediately reſolved, and that the allies ſhould rendezvous at Corinth with two thirds of their forces. The Lacedæmonians arrived firſt, and prepared engines for tranſporting the ſhips from the gulf of Corinth into the ſea of Athens, in order to invade Attica both by ſea and land. The Athenians were no leſs active on their ſide; but the allies, being employed in their harveſt, and beginning to grow weary of the war, were a long time before they met.

During this interval, the Athenians, who perceived that all theſe preparations were made againſt them, from a ſuppoſition that they were very weak; to undeceive the world, and ſhow that they alone were able to ſupport a fleet without the aid of Leſbos, put to ſea a fleet of an hundred ſail, which they mann'd with citizens as well as foreigners; not exempting a ſingle citizen, except ſuch only as were obliged to ſerve on horſeback, or whoſe revenue amounted to five hundred meaſures of corn. After having ſhewed themſelves before the Iſthmus of Corinth, the more to diſplay their power, they made deſcents into whatever parts of Peloponneſus they pleaſed.

The world never ſaw a finer fleet. The Athenians guarded their own country, and the coaſts of Eubœa and Salamis with a fleet of an hundred ſhips: they cruiſed round Peloponneſus with another fleet of the like number of veſſels, without including their fleet before Leſbos and other places. The whole amounted to upwards of two hundred and fifty gallies.

The

The expences of this powerful armament entirely exhauſted their treaſure, which had been very much drained before, by that of the ſiege of Potidæa.

The Lacedæmonians, greatly ſurprized at ſo formidable a fleet, which they no ways expected, returned with the utmoſt expedition to their own country, and only ordered forty gallies to be fitted out for the ſuccour of Mitylene. The Athenians had ſent a reinforcement thither, conſiſting of a thouſand heavy-armed troops, by whoſe aſſiſtance they made a contravallation, with forts in the moſt commodious places; ſo that it was blocked up, both by ſea and land, in the beginning of winter. The Athenians were in ſuch great want of money for carrying on this ſiege, that they were reduced to aſſeſs themſelves, which they had never done before, and by this means two hundred * talents were ſent to it.

(*a*) The people of Mitylene being in want of all things, and having waited to no purpoſe for the ſuccours which the Lacedæmonians had promiſed them, ſurrendered, upon condition that no perſon ſhould be put to death or impriſoned, till the ambaſſadors, whom they ſhould ſend to Athens, were returned; and that, in the mean time, the troops ſhould be admitted into the city. As ſoon as the Athenians had got poſſeſſion of the city, ſuch of the factious Mityleneans as had fled to the altars for refuge, were conveyed to Tenedos, and afterwards to Athens. There the affair of the Mityleneans was debated. As their revolt had greatly exaſperated the people, becauſe not preceded by any ill treatment, and it ſeemed a mere effect of their hatred for the Athenians, in the firſt tranſports of their rage, they reſolved to put all the citizens to death indiſcriminately, and to make all the women and children ſlaves; and immediately they ſent a galley to put the decree in execution.

But night gave them leiſure to make different re-

(*a*) A. M. 3577. Ant. J. C. 427.

* *Two hundred thouſand crowns, about* 45000 l. *ſterling.*

flections.

flections. This ſeverity was judged too cruel, and carried farther than conſiſted with juſtice. They imaged to themſelves the fate of that unhappy city, entirely abandoned to ſlaughter, and repented their having involved the innocent with the guilty. This ſudden change of the Athenians gave the Mitylenean ambaſſadors ſome little glimmerings of hope; and they prevailed ſo far with the magiſtrates, as to have the affair debated a ſecond time. Cleon, who had ſuggeſted the firſt decree, a man of a fiery temper, and who had great authority over the people, maintained his opinion with great vehemence and heat. He repreſented, that it was unworthy a wiſe government to change with every wind, and to annul in the morning what they had decreed the night before; and that it was highly important to take an exemplary vengeance of the Mityleneans, in order to awe the reſt of their allies who were every where ready to revolt.

Diodorus, who had contradicted Cleon in the firſt aſſembly, now oppoſed his reflections more ſtrongly than before. After deſcribing, in a tender and pathetic manner, the deplorable condition of the Mityleneans, whoſe minds (he ſaid) muſt neceſſarily be on the rack, whilſt they were expecting a ſentence that was to determine their fate; he repreſented to the Athenians, that the fame of their mildneſs and clemency had always reflected the higheſt honour on them, and diſtinguiſhed them glorioufly from all other nations: he obſerved, that the citizens of Mitylene had been drawn involuntarily into the rebellion, a proof of which was, their ſurrendring the city to them, the inſtant it was in their power to do it: they therefore, by this decree, would murder their benefactors, and conſequently be both unjuſt and ungrateful, in puniſhing the innocent with the guilty. He obſerved farther, that ſuppoſing the Mityleneans in general were guilty, it would however be for the intereſt of the Athenians to diſſemble, in order that the rigorous puniſhment they had decreed might not exaſperate the reſt

reſt of the allies; and that the beſt way to put a ſtop to the evil, would be, to leave room for repentance, and not plunge people into deſpair, by the abſolute and irrevocable refuſal of a pardon. His opinion therefore was, that they ſhould examine very deliberately the cauſe of thoſe factious Mityleneans who had been brought to Athens, and pardon all the reſt.

The aſſembly was very much divided, ſo that Diodorus carried it only by a few votes. A ſecond galley was therefore immediately fitted out. It was furniſhed with every thing that might accelerate its courſe; and the ambaſſadors of Mitylene promiſed a great reward to the crew, provided they arrived time enough. They therefore did not quit their oars, even when they took ſuſtenance, but eat and drank as they rowed, and took their reſt alternately; and, very happily for them, the wind was favourable. The firſt galley had got a day and night's ſail before them; but as thoſe on board carried ill news, they did not make great haſte. Its arrival before the city had ſpread the utmoſt conſternation in every part of it: but it increaſed infinitely, when the decree, by which all the citizens were ſentenced to die, was read in a full aſſembly. Nothing was now heard in all places but cries and loud laments. The moment that the ſentence was going to be put in execution, advice came that a ſecond galley was arrived. Immediately the cruel maſſacre was ſuſpended. The aſſembly was again convened; and the decree which granted a pardon was liſtened to with ſuch a ſilence and joy, as is much eaſier conceived than expreſſed.

All the factious Mityleneans, though upwards of a thouſand, were put to death. The city was afterwards diſmantled, the ſhips delivered up; and the whole iſland, the city of Methymne excepted, was divided into three thouſand parts or portions, three hundred of which were conſecrated to the ſervice of the gods; and the reſt divided by lot, among ſuch Athenians as were ſent thither, to whom the natives of the country gave

gave a revenue of two * minæ for every portion; on which condition they were permitted to keep poſſeſſion of the iſland, but not as proprietors. The cities which belonged to the Mityleneans on the coaſt of Aſia, were all ſubjected by the Athenians.

(*b*) During the winter of the preceding campaign, the inhabitants of Platææ, having loſt all hopes of ſuccour, and being in the utmoſt want of proviſions, formed a reſolution to cut their way through the enemy: but half of them, ſtruck with the greatneſs of the danger, and the boldneſs of the enterprize, entirely loſt courage when they came to the execution; but the reſt (who were about two hundred and twenty ſoldiers) perſiſted in their reſolution, and eſcaped in the following manner.

Before I begin the deſcription of their eſcape, it will be proper to inform my readers, in what ſenſe I uſe certain expreſſions I ſhall employ in it. In ſtrictneſs of ſpeech, the line or fortification which is made round a city when beſieged, to prevent ſallies, is called *contravallation*; and that which is made to prevent any ſuccours from without, is named *circumvallation*. Both theſe fortifications were uſed in this ſiege; however, for brevity ſake, I ſhall uſe only the former term.

The contravallation conſiſted of two walls, at ſixteen foot diſtance one from the other. The ſpace between the two walls being a kind of platform or terraſs, ſeemed to be but one ſingle building, and compoſed a range of cazerns or barracks, where the ſoldiers had their lodgings. Lofty towers were built around it at proper diſtances, extending from one wall to the other, in order that they might be able to defend themſelves at the ſame time againſt attack from within or without. There was no going from one cazern to another without croſſing thoſe towers; and on the top of the wall was a parapet on both ſides,

(*b*) Thucyd. l. 3. p. 185—188.

* *The Attic mina was worth an hundred drachms, that is, fifty French livres.*

where

where a guard was commonly kept; but in rainy weather, the ſoldiers uſed to ſhelter themſelves in the towers, which ſerved in the nature of guard-houſes. Such was the contravallation, on both ſides of which was a ditch, the earth of which had been employed in making the bricks of the wall.

The beſieged firſt took the height of the wall, by counting the rows of bricks which compoſed it; and this they did at different times, and employed ſeveral men for that purpoſe, in order that they might not miſtake in the calculation. This was the eaſier, becauſe as the wall ſtood but at a ſmall diſtance, every part of it was very viſible. They then made ladders of a proper length.

All things being now ready for executing the deſign, the beſieged left the city one night when there was no moon, in the midſt of a ſtorm of wind and rain. After croſſing the firſt ditch, they drew near to the wall undiſcovered, through the darkneſs of the night; not to mention that the noiſe made by the rain and wind prevented their being heard. They marched at ſome diſtance from one another, to prevent the claſhing of their arms, which were light, in order that thoſe who carried them might be the more active; and one of their legs was naked, to keep them from ſliding ſo eaſily in the mire. Thoſe who carried the ladders laid them in the ſpace between the towers, where they knew no guard was poſted, becauſe it rained. That inſtant twelve men mounted the ladders, armed with only a coat of mail and a dagger, and marched directly to the towers, ſix on each ſide. They were followed by ſoldiers armed only with javelins, that they might mount the eaſier; and their ſhields were carried after them to be uſed in the charge.

When moſt of theſe were got to the top of the wall, they were diſcovered by the falling of a tile, which one of their comrades, in taking hold of the parapet, had thrown down. The alarm was immediately given from the towers, and the whole camp approached the wall

wall without diſcovering the occaſion of the outcry, from the gloom of the night, and the violence of the ſtorm. Beſides which, thoſe who had ſtaid behind in the city, beat an alarm at the ſame time in another quarter, to make a diverſion; ſo that the enemy did not know which way to turn themſelves, and were afraid to quit their poſts. But a corps de reſerve, of three hundred men, who were kept for any unforeſeen accident that might happen, quitted the contravallation, and ran to that part where they heard the noiſe; and torches were held up towards Thebes, to ſhow that they muſt run that way. But thoſe in the city, to render the ſignal of no uſe, made others at the ſame time in different quarters, having prepared them on the wall for that purpoſe.

In the mean time, thoſe who had mounted firſt having poſſeſſed themſelves of the two towers which flanked the interval where the ladders were ſet; and having killed thoſe who guarded them, poſted themſelves there to defend the paſſage, and keep off the beſiegers. Then ſetting ladders from the top of the wall againſt the two towers, they cauſed a good number of their comrades to mount, in order to keep off, by the diſcharge of their arrows, as well thoſe who were advancing to the foot of the wall, as the others who were haſtening from the neighbouring towers. Whilſt this was doing, they had time to ſet up ſeveral ladders, and to throw down the parapet, that the reſt might come up with greater eaſe. As faſt as they came up, they went down on the other ſide, and drew up near the foſsé on the outſide, to ſhoot at thoſe who appeared. After they were paſſed over, the men who were in the towers came down laſt, and made to the foſsé to follow after the reſt.

That inſtant the guard of three hundred, with torches, came up. However, as the Platæans ſaw their enemies by this light, better than they were ſeen by them, they took a ſurer aim, by which means the laſt croſſed the ditch, without being attacked in their paſſage:

paſſage: however, this was not done without difficulty, becauſe the ditch was froze over, and the ice would not bear, on account of the thaw and heavy rains. The violence of the ſtorm was of great advantage to them.

After all were paſſed, they took the road towards Thebes, the better to conceal their retreat; becauſe it was not likely that they had fled towards a city of the enemy's. Immediately they perceived the beſiegers, with torches in their hands, purſuing them in the road that led to Athens. After keeping that of Thebes about ſix or ſeven * ſtadia, they turned ſhort toward the mountain, and reſumed the route of Athens, whither two hundred and twelve arrived, out of two hundred and twenty who had quitted the place; the reſt having returned back to it through fear, one archer excepted, who was taken on the ſide of the foſſé of contravallation. The beſiegers, after having purſued them to no purpoſe, returned to their camp.

In the mean time, the Platæans who remained in the city, ſuppoſing that all their companions had been killed, (becauſe thoſe who were returned, to juſtify themſelves, affirmed they were,) ſent a herald to demand the dead bodies; but being told the true ſtate of the affair, he withdrew.

(c) About the end of the following campaign, which is that wherein Mitylene was taken, the Platæans being in abſolute want of proviſions, and unable to make the leaſt defence, ſurrendred upon condition that they ſhould not be puniſhed till they had been tried and adjudged in form of juſtice. Five commiſſioners came for this purpoſe from Lacedæmon; and theſe, without charging them with any crime, barely aſked them whether they had done any ſervice to the Lacedæmonians and the allies in this war. The Platæans were much ſurprized, as well as puzzled at this queſtion; and were ſenſible, that it had been ſuggeſted

(c) Thucyd. l. 3. p. 208—220. Diod. l. 12. p. 109.

* *Upwards of a quarter of a league.*

by

by the Thebans, their profeſſed enemies, who had vowed their deſtruction. They therefore put the Lacedæmonians in mind of the ſervices they had done to Greece in general, both at the battle of Artemiſium, and that of Platææ; and particularly in Lacedæmonia, at the time of the earthquake, which was followed by the revolt of their ſlaves. The only reaſon (they declared) of their having joined the Athenians afterwards, was, to defend themſelves from the hoſtilities of the Thebans, againſt whom they had implored the aſſiſtance of the Lacedæmonians to no purpoſe: That if that was imputed to them for a crime, which was only their misfortune, it ought not however entirely to obliterate the remembrance of their former ſervices. "Caſt your eyes, ſaid they, on the "monuments of your anceſtors which you ſee here, "to whom we annually pay all the honours which "can be rendered to the manes of the dead. You "thought fit to intruſt their bodies with us, as we "were eye-witneſſes of their bravery: And yet "you will now give up their aſhes to their murther-"ers, in abandoning us to the Thebans, who fought "againſt them at the battle of Platææ. Will you en-"ſlave a province where Greece recovered its liberty? "Will you deſtroy the temples of thoſe gods, to whom "you owe the victory? Will you aboliſh the memo-"ry of their founders, who contributed ſo greatly to "your ſafety? On this occaſion, we may venture to "ſay, our intereſt is inſeparable from your glory; and "you cannot deliver up your antient friends and bene-"factors to the unjuſt hatred of the Thebans, without "eternal infamy to yourſelves.

One would conclude, that theſe juſt remonſtrances ſhould have made ſome impreſſion on the Lacedæmonians; but they were byaſſed more by the anſwer the Thebans made, and which was expreſſed in the moſt haughty and bitter terms againſt the Platæans; and beſides, they had brought their inſtructions from Lacedæmon. They ſtood therefore to their firſt queſtion,

Whether the Platæans had done them any ſervice ſince the war; and making them paſs one after another, as they ſeverally anſwered, No, he was immediately butchered, and not one eſcaped. About two hundred were killed in this manner; and twenty-five Athenians, who were among them, met with the ſame unhappy fate. Their wives, who had been taken priſoners, were made ſlaves. The Thebans afterwards peopled their city with exiles from Megara and Platææ; but the year after they demoliſhed it entirely. It was in this manner the Lacedæmonians, in the hopes of reaping great advantages from the Thebans, ſacrificed the Platæans to their animoſity, ninety-three years after their firſt alliance with the Athenians.

(*d*) In the ſixth year of the war of Peloponneſus, the plague broke out anew in Athens, and again ſwept away great numbers.

SECT. IV. *The Athenians poſſeſs themſelves of Pylus, and are afterwards beſieged in it. The Spartans are ſhut up in the little iſland of Sphacteria. Cleon makes himſelf maſter of it. Artaxerxes dies.*

THE SIXTH AND SEVENTH YEARS OF THE WAR.

I Paſs over ſeveral particular incidents of the ſucceeding campaigns, which differ very little from one another; the Lacedæmonians making regularly every year incurſions into Attica, and the Athenians into Peloponneſus: I likewiſe omit ſome ſieges in different places: (*e*) That of Pylus, a little city of Meſſenia, only four * hundred furlongs from Lacedæmon, was one of the moſt conſiderable. The Athenians, headed by Demoſthenes, had taken that city, and fortified themſelves very ſtrongly in it: this was the ſeventh year of the war. The Lacedæmonians left Attica

(*d*) A. M. 3578. Ant. J. C. 426. Thucyd. l. 8. p. 232.
(*e*) A. M. 3579. Ant. J. C. 425. Thucyd. l. 4. p. 253—280. Diod. l. 12. p. 112—114.

* *Twenty French leagues.*

immediately,

immediately, in order to go and recover, if poſſible, that place, and accordingly they attacked it both by ſea and land. Braſidas, one of their leaders, ſignalized himſelf here by the moſt extraordinary acts of bravery. Oppoſite to the city was a little iſland called Sphacteria, whence the beſieged might be greatly annoyed, and the entrance of the harbour ſhut up. They therefore threw a choſen body of Lacedæmonians into it; making, in all, four hundred and twenty, excluſive of the Helots. A battle was fought at ſea, in which the Athenians were victorious, and accordingly erected a trophy. They ſurrounded the iſland; and ſet a guard in every part of it, to prevent any of the inhabitants from going out, or any proviſions from being brought in to them.

The news of the defeat being come to Sparta, the magiſtrate thought the affair of the utmoſt importance, and therefore came himſelf upon the ſpot, in order that he might be better able to take proper meaſures; when concluding that it would be impoſſible for him to ſave thoſe who were in the iſland, and that they at laſt muſt neceſſarily be ſtarved out, or be taken by ſome other means, he propoſed an accommodation. A ſuſpenſion of arms was concluded, in order to give the Lacedæmonians time to ſend to Athens; but upon condition that in the mean time they ſhould ſurrender up all their gallies, and not attack the place either by ſea or land, till the return of the ambaſſadors: That if they complied with theſe conditions, the Athenians would permit them to carry proviſions to thoſe who were in the iſland, at the * rate of ſo much for the maſter, and half for the ſervant; and that the whole ſhould be done publickly, and in ſight of both armies: That, on the other ſide, the Athenians ſhould be allowed to keep guard round the iſland, to prevent any thing from going in or out of it, but

* *For the maſters, two Attick chœnices of flour, making about four pounds and a half, two cotyles, or half pints of wine, and a piece of meat: with half this quantity for the ſervants.*

ſhould not attack it in any manner: That in caſe this agreement ſhould be infringed in the leaſt, the truce would be broke; otherwiſe, that it ſhould continue in full force till the return of the ambaſſadors, whom the Athenians obliged themſelves, by the articles, to convey backwards and forwards; and that then the Lacedæmonians ſhould have their ſhips reſtored, in the ſame condition in which they had been delivered up. Such were the articles of the treaty. The Lacedæmonians began to put it in execution, by ſurrendring about threeſcore ſhips; after which they ſent ambaſſadors to Athens.

Being admitted to audience before the people, they began by ſaying, that they were come to the Athenians to ſue for that peace, which they themſeles were, a little before, in a condition to grant: That they now might acquire the glory of having reſtored the tranquillity of all Greece, as the Lacedæmonians conſented to their being arbitrators in this treaty: That the danger to which their citizens were expoſed in the iſland, had determined them to take ſuch a ſtep as could not but be very grating to Lacedæmonians: However, that their affairs were far from being deſperate, and therefore, that now was the time to eſtabliſh, between the two republicks, a firm and ſolid friendſhip; becauſe the affairs of both were ſtill fluctuating, and fortune had not yet declared abſolutely in favour of either: That the gods frequently abandon thoſe whom ſucceſs makes proud, by ſhifting the ſcene, and rendering them as unfortunate as they before had been happy: That they ought to conſider, that the fate of arms is very uncertain; and that the means to eſtabliſh a laſting peace, is not to triumph over an enemy by oppreſſing him, but to agree to a reconciliation on juſt and reaſonable terms: For then, conquered by generoſity and not by violence, his future thoughts being all employed, not on revenge, but on gratitude, he is delighted, and thinks it his duty, to obſerve his engagements with inviolable fidelity.

The

The Athenians had now an happy opportunity for terminating the war, by a peace which would have been as glorious to them, as advantageous to all Greece. But Cleon, who had a great aſcendant over the people, prevented its taking effect. They therefore anſwered, by his advice, that thoſe who were in the iſland ſhould firſt ſurrender at diſcretion; and afterwards be carried to Athens, on the condition of being ſent back from it, as ſoon as the Lacedæmonians ſhould have reſtored the cities, *&c.* which the Athenians had been forced to give up by the laſt treaty; and that theſe things being done, a firm and laſting peace ſhould be concluded. The Lacedæmonians demanded that deputies ſhould be appointed, and that the Athenians ſhould engage to ratify what they ſhould conclude. But Cleon exclaimed againſt this propoſal, and ſaid, it was plain they did not deal fairly, ſince they would not tranſact with the people, but with particular men, whom they might eaſily bribe; and that, if they had any thing to offer, they ſhould do it immediately. The Lacedæmonians, finding there was no poſſibility for them to treat with the people, without adviſing with their allies; and that if any thing had been granted by them to their prejudice, they muſt be reſponſible for it, went away without concluding any thing; fully perſuaded that they muſt not expect equitable treatment from the Athenians, in the preſent ſtate of their affairs and diſpoſition from proſperity.

As ſoon as they were returned to Pylus, the ſuſpenſion ceaſed: But when the Lacedæmonians came to demand back their ſhips, the Athenians refuſed to give them up, upon pretence that the treaty had been infringed in ſome particulars of little conſequence. The Lacedæmonians inveighed ſtrongly againſt this refuſal, as being a manifeſt perfidy; and immediately prepared for war with greater vigour and animoſity than before. A haughty carriage in ſucceſs, and want of faith in the obſervation of treaties, never fail, at laſt, to in-

volve a people in great calamities. This will appear by what follows.

The Athenians continued to keep a ſtrict guard round the iſland, to prevent any proviſions from being brought into it, and hoped they ſhould ſoon be able to ſtarve out the inhabitants. But the Lacedæmonians engaged the whole country in their intereſt by the views of gain, laying a heavy tax upon proviſions, and giving ſuch ſlaves their freedom as ſhould run any into it. Proviſions were therefore now brought, (at the hazard of mens lives) from all parts of Peloponneſus. There were even divers, who ſwam from the coaſt to the iſland, oppoſite to the harbour, and drew after them goats-ſkins filled with pounded linſeed, and poppies mixed with honey.

Thoſe who were beſieged in Pylus were reduced to almoſt the like extremities, being in want both of water and proviſions. When advice was brought to Athens, that their countrymen, ſo far from reducing the enemy by famine, were themſelves almoſt ſtarved; it was feared, that as it would not be poſſible for the fleet to ſubſiſt during the winter, on a deſert coaſt which belonged to the enemy, nor to lie at anchor in ſo dangerous a road, the iſland muſt by that means be leſs ſecurely guarded, which would give the priſoners an opportunity of eſcaping. But the circumſtance they chiefly dreaded was, leſt the Lacedæmonians, after their countrymen were once extricated from their danger, ſhould refuſe to hearken to any conditions of peace; ſo that they now repented their having refuſed it when offered them.

Cleon ſaw plainly that theſe complaints would terminate in him. He therefore began by aſſerting, that it was all a falſe report concerning the extreme want of proviſions, to which the Athenians, both within and without Pylus, were ſaid to be reduced. He next exclaimed, in preſence of the people, againſt the ſupineneſs and inactivity of the leaders who beſieged the iſland, pretending, that were they to exert the leaſt bravery,

bravery, they might ſoon take the iſland; and that had he commanded, he would ſoon have taken it. Upon this he was immediately appointed to command the expedition; Nicias, who was before elected, reſigning voluntarily that honour to him, either through weakneſs, for he was naturally timid, or out of a political view, in order that the ill ſucceſs which it was generally believed Cleon would meet with in this enterprize, might loſe him the favour of the people. But now Cleon was greatly ſurprized as well as embarraſſed; for he did not expect that the Athenians would take him at his word, he being a finer talker than ſoldier, and much more able with his tongue than his ſword. However, he deſired leave to wave the honour they offered him, for which he alledged ſeveral excuſes: But finding that the more he declined the command, the more they preſſed him to accept it, he changed his note; and ſupplying his want of courage with rodomontade, he declared before the whole aſſembly, with a firm and reſolute air, that he would bring, in twenty days, thoſe of the iſland priſoners, or loſe his life. The whole aſſembly, on hearing thoſe words, ſet up a laugh, for they knew the man.

Cleon however, contrary to the expectation of every body, made good his words. He and Demoſthenes (the other chief) landed in the iſland, attacked the enemy with great vigour, drove them from poſt to poſt, and gaining ground perpetually, at laſt forced them to the extremity of the iſland. The Lacedæmonians had ſtormed a fort that was thought inacceſſible. There they drew up in battle-array, faced about to that ſide only where they could be attacked, and defended themſelves like ſo many lions. As the engagement had held the greateſt part of the day, and the ſoldiers were oppreſſed with heat and wearineſs, and parched with thirſt, the general of the Meſſenians, directing himſelf to Cleon and Demoſthenes, ſaid, that all their efforts would be to no purpoſe, unleſs they charged their enemies rear; and promiſed, if they

would give him but ſome troops armed with miſſive weapons, that he would endeavour to find a paſſage. Accordingly, he and his followers climbed up certain ſteep and craggy places which were not guarded, when coming down unperceived into the fort, he appeared on a ſudden at the backs of the Lacedæmonians, which entirely damped their courage, and afterwards compleated their overthrow. They now made but a very feeble reſiſtance; and being oppreſſed with numbers, attacked on all ſides, and dejected through fatigue and deſpair, they began to give way: but the Athenians ſeized on all the paſſes to cut off their retreat. Cleon and Demoſthenes, finding that ſhould the battle continue, not a man of them would eſcape, and being deſirous of carrying them alive to Athens, they commanded their ſoldiers to deſiſt; and cauſed proclamation to be made by a herald, for them to lay down their arms and ſurrender at diſcretion. At theſe words, the greateſt part lowered their ſhields, and clapped their hands in token of approbation. A kind of ſuſpenſion of arms was agreed upon; and their commander deſired leave might be granted him, to diſpatch a meſſenger to the camp, to know the reſolution of the generals. This was not allowed, but they called heralds from the coaſt; and after ſeveral meſſages, a Lacedæmonian advanced forward, and cried aloud, that they were permitted to treat with the enemy, provided they did not ſubmit to diſhonourable terms. Upon this, they held a conference; after which they ſurrendred at diſcretion, and were kept till the next day. The Athenians then raiſing a trophy, and reſtoring the Lacedæmonians their dead, embarked for their own country, after diſtributing the priſoners among the ſeveral ſhips, and committing the guard of them to the captain of the gallies.

In this battle an hundred and twenty-eight Lacedæmonians fell, out of four hundred and twenty, which was their number at firſt; ſo that there ſurvived not quite three hundred, an hundred and twenty

ty of whom were Spartans, that is, inhabitants of the city of Sparta. The ſiege of the iſland, (to compute from the beginning of it, including the time employed in the truce) had laſted threeſcore and twelve days. They all now left Pylus; and Cleon's promiſe, though ſo vain and raſh, was found literally true. But the moſt ſurprizing circumſtance was, the capitulation that had been made; for it was believed that the Lacedæmonians, ſo far from ſurrendring their arms, would die ſword in hand.

Being come to Athens, they were ordered to remain priſoners till a peace ſhould be concluded, provided the Lacedæmonians did not make any incurſions into their country, for that then they ſhould all be put to death. They left a garriſon in Pylus. The Meſſenians of Naupactus, who had formerly poſſeſſed it, ſent thither the flower of their youth, who very much infeſted the Lacedæmonians by their incurſions; and as theſe Meſſenians ſpoke the language of the country, they prevailed with a great number of ſlaves to join them. The Lacedæmonians, dreading a greater evil, ſent ſeveral deputations to Athens, but to no purpoſe; the Athenians being too much elated with their proſperity, and eſpecially their late ſucceſs, to liſten to any terms.

(*f*) In the ſeventh year of the Peloponneſian war, Artaxerxes ſent to the Lacedæmonians an ambaſſador named Artaphernes, with a letter written in the Aſſyrian language, in which he ſaid, that he had received many embaſſies from them, but the purport of them all differed ſo widely, that he could not comprehend in any manner what it was they requeſted: that in this uncertainty, he had thought proper to ſend a Perſian, to acquaint them, that if they had any propoſal to make, they ſhould ſend a perſon in whom they could confide along with him, from whom he might be exactly informed in what they deſired. This ambaſſador, arriving at Eion on the river Strymon in

(*f*) Thucyd. l. 4. p. 285, 286.

Thrace, was there taken priſoner, about the cloſe of this year, by one of the admirals of the Athenian fleet, who ſent him to Athens. He was treated with the utmoſt civility and reſpect; the Athenians being extremely deſirous of recovering the favour of the king his maſter.

The year following, as ſoon as the ſeaſon would permit the Athenians to put to ſea, they ſent the ambaſſador back in one of their ſhips at the public expence; and appointed ſome of their citizens to wait upon him to the court of Perſia, in quality of ambaſſadors. Upon landing at Epheſus, they were informed that Artaxerxes was dead: when the Athenian ambaſſadors, thinking it not adviſable to proceed farther after this news, took leave of Artaphernes, and returned to their own country.

BOOK

BOOK THE EIGHTH.

THE ANTIENT HISTORY OF THE Perſians *and* Grecians.

Sequel of the hiſtory of the Perſians and Greeks, and of the Peloponneſian war, in the reigns of Xerxes II, of Sogdianus, and of Darius Nothus.

CHAPTER I.

THIS chapter contains the thirteen years of the Peloponneſian war, to the nineteenth inclusively.

SECT. I. *The very ſhort reigns of Xerxes* II. *and Sogdianus. They are ſucceeded by Darius Nothus. He puts a ſtop to the inſurrection of Egypt, and that of Media. He beſtows on Cyrus, his youngeſt ſon, the ſupreme command of all Aſia minor.*

(g) ARTAXERXES died about the beginning of the forty-ninth year of his reign. Xerxes, who ſucceeded him, was the only ſon which the queen his wife brought him: but he had ſeventeen others by

(g) A. M. 3579. Ant. J. C. 425. Cteſ. c. 47—51. Diod. l. 12. p. 115.

his concubines, among whom was Sogdianus, (who is called Secondianus by Cteſias) Ochus and Arſites. (*b*) Sogdianus in concert with Pharnacias one of Xerxes's eunuchs, came inſidiouſly, one feſtival day, to the new king, who, after drinking too immoderately, was retired to his chamber, in order to give the fumes of the wine he had drank time to evaporate; where he killed him without any difficulty, after he had reigned but forty-five days; and was declared king in his ſtead.

He was ſcarce on the throne, but he put to death Bagorazus, the moſt faithful of all his father's eunuchs. It was he who had been appointed to ſuperintend the interment of Artaxerxes, and of the queen, Xerxes's mother, who died the ſame day with her royal conſort. After having depoſited the two bodies in the mauſolæum, where the kings of Perſia were interred, he found, at his return, Sogdianus on the throne, who did not receive him favourably, upon account of ſome difference with him in the life-time of his father. But the new king did not ſtop here; not long after he took an opportunity to quarrel with him, on ſome trifling circumſtance relating to the obſequies of his father, and cauſed him to be ſtoned.

By theſe two murders, that of his brother Xerxes and of Bagorazus, he became the horror of the army and nobility, ſo that he did not think himſelf ſafe on a throne, to which he had forced his way by ſuch horrid murders. He ſuſpected that his brothers harboured the like deſign; and Ochus, to whom his father had left the government of Hyrcania, was the chief object of his ſuſpicion. Accordingly he ſent for him, with the intention of getting him murdered aſſoon as he arrived. However Ochus, who ſaw thro' his deſign, delayed coming upon various pretences; which he continued till he advanced at the head of a ſtrong army, which he openly declared he would em-

(*b*) A. M. 3580. Ant. J. C. 424.

ploy,

ploy, to revenge the death of his brother Xerxes. This declaration brought over to him a great number of the nobility, and ſeveral governors of the provinces, they being juſtly diſſatisfied at Sogdianus's cruelty and ill-conduct. They put the tiara on Ochus's head, and proclaimed him king. Sogdianus, ſeeing himſelf abandoned in this manner, was as mean and cowardly in the ſlight defence he made to maintain his crown, as he had before been unjuſt and barbarous in uſurping it. Contrary to the advice of his beſt friends, and the wiſeſt perſons who ſtill adhered to him, he concluded a treaty with his brother, who getting him into his hands, cauſed him to be thrown into aſhes, where he died a cruel death. (*i*) This was a kind of puniſhment peculiar to the Perſians, and exerciſed only on great criminals. One of the largeſt towers was filled to a certain height with aſhes. The criminal then was thrown headlong from the top of the tower into them; after which, the aſhes were by a wheel turned perpetually round him, till he was ſuffocated. Thus this wicked prince loſt his life and empire, which he enjoyed ſix months and fifteen days.

(*k*) Ochus, by the death of Sogdianus, now ſaw himſelf poſſeſſed of the empire. As ſoon as he was well ſettled in it, he changed his name from Ochus to that of Darius. To diſtinguiſh him, hiſtorians add the epithet Νόθος, ſignifying baſtard. He reigned nineteen years.

Arſites, ſeeing in what manner Sogdianus had ſupplanted Xerxes, and had himſelf been dethroned by Ochus, meditated to ſerve the latter in the ſame manner. Though he was his brother by the father's as well as mother's ſide, he openly revolted againſt him, and was aſſiſted in it by Artyphius ſon of Megabyzus. Ochus, whom hereafter we ſhall always call Darius, ſent Artaſyras, one of his generals, againſt

(*i*) Val. Max. l. 9. c. 2. 2 Maccab. c. xiii. (*k*) A. M. 3581. Ant. J. C. 423.

Artyphius;

Artyphius; and himſelf, at the head of another army, marched againſt Arſites. Artyphius, with the Grecian troops in his pay, defeated twice the general ſent againſt him. But engaging a third time, the Greeks were corrupted, and he himſelf was beat, and forced to ſurrender, upon his being flattered with hopes that a pardon would be granted him. The king would have had him put to death, but was diverted from that reſolution by queen Paryſatis, Darius's ſiſter and queen. She alſo was the daughter of Artaxerxes, but not by the ſame mother as Darius: ſhe was an intriguing, artful woman, and the king her huſband was governed by her on moſt occaſions. The counſel ſhe now gave was perfidious to the laſt degree. She adviſed him to exerciſe his clemency towards Artyphius, and ſhow him kind uſage, in order that his brother might hope, when he heard of his treating a rebellious ſervant with ſo much generoſity, that he himſelf ſhould meet, at leaſt, with as mild treatment, and thereby be prompted to lay down his arms. She added, that when once he ſhould have ſeized that prince, he might diſpoſe of him and Artyphius as he pleaſed. Darius followed her counſel, which proved ſucceſsful. Arſites being informed of the gentle uſage which Artyphius met with, concluded that, as he was the king's brother, he ſhould conſequently meet with ſtill more indulgent treatment; and with this hope he concluded a treaty, and ſurrendred himſelf. Darius was very much inclined to ſave his life: but Paryſatis, by inculcating to him, that he ought to puniſh this rebel to ſecure himſelf, at laſt prevailed with him to put his brother to death, and accordingly he was ſuffocated in aſhes with Artyphius. However, Darius had a violent ſtruggle with himſelf, before he could give orders for this ſacrifice; having a very tender affection for his brother. He afterwards put ſome other perſons to death, which executions did not procure him the tranquillity he had expected from them: for his reign was afterwards diſturbed with

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uch violent commotions, that he enjoyed but little repoſe.

(*l*) One of the moſt dangerous commotions was occaſioned by the rebellion of Piſuthnes, who, being governor of Lydia, wanted to throw off his allegiance to the Perſian empire, and make himſelf king in his province. What flattered him with the hopes of ſucceeding in this attempt, was, his having raiſed a conſiderable body of Grecian troops, under the command of Lycon the Athenian. Darius ſent Tiſſaphernes againſt this rebel, and gave him, with a conſiderable army, the commiſſion of governor of Lydia, of which he was to diſpoſſeſs Piſuthnes. Tiſſaphernes, who was an artful man, and capable of acting in all characters, found means of tampering with the Greeks under Piſuthnes; and by dint of preſents and promiſes, brought over the troops with their general to his party. Piſuthnes, who, by this deſertion was unable to carry on his deſigns, ſurrendred, upon his being flattered with the hopes of obtaining his pardon; but the inſtant he was brought before the king, he was ſentenced to be ſuffocated in aſhes, and accordingly met with the ſame fate as the reſt of the rebels. But his death did not put an end to all troubles; (*m*) for Amorges his ſon, with the remainder of his army, ſtill oppoſed Tiſſaphernes; and for two years laid waſte the maritime provinces of Aſia minor, till he at laſt was taken by the Greeks of Peloponneſus, in Iaſus, a city of Ionia, and delivered up by the inhabitants to Tiſſaphernes, who put him to death.

(*n*) Darius was involved in freſh troubles by one of his eunuchs. This kind of officers had, for many years, engroſſed all power in the court of Perſia; and we ſhall find by the ſequel of this hiſtory, that they always governed abſolutely in it. (*o*) We may know their character, and the danger to which they expoſe

(*l*) A. M. 3590. Ant. J. C. 414. Cteſ. c. 51. (*m*) Thucyd. l. 8. p. 554—567, 568. (*n*) Cteſ. c. 52. (*o*) Vopiſ. in vit. Aurelian. Imper.

princes,

princes, by the picture which Diocleſian, after he had reſigned the empire, and reduced himſelf to a private ſtation of life, drew of freedmen, who had gained a like aſcendant over the Roman emperors. "Four "or five perſons", ſays he, "who are cloſely united, "and reſolutely determined to impoſe on a prince, "may do it very eaſily. They never ſhew things to "him but in ſuch a light as they are ſure will pleaſe. "They conceal whatever would contribute to en-"lighten him: and as they only beſiege him conti-"nually, he cannot be informed of any thing but "through their canal, and does nothing but what they "think fit to ſuggeſt to him. Hence it is, that he "beſtows employments on thoſe he ought to exclude "from them; and, on the other ſide, removes from "offices ſuch perſons as are moſt worthy of filling "them. In a word, the beſt prince is often ſold "by theſe men, though he be ever ſo vigilant, and "even ſuſpicious of them." *Quid multa? Ut Diocletianus ipſe dicebat, bonus, cautus, optimus venditur imperator.*

In this manner was Darius's court governed. Three eunuchs had uſurped all power in it; * an infallible mark that a government is bad, and the prince of little merit. But one of thoſe three eunuchs, whoſe name was Artoxares, preſided over, and governed the reſt. He had found Darius's weak ſide, by which he inſinuated himſelf into his confidence. He had ſtudied all his paſſions, to know how to indulge them, and govern his prince by their means. He plunged him continually in pleaſures and amuſements, to engroſs his whole authority to himſelf. In fine, under the name and protection of queen Paryſatis, to whoſe will and pleaſure he was the moſt devoted of ſlaves, he diſpoſed of all the affairs of the empire, and nothing was tranſacted but by his orders. Intoxicated by the ſupreme authority which the favour of his ſovereign gave him,

* Scis præcipuum eſſe indicium non magni principis, magnos libertos. *Plin. ad Trajan.*

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he reſolved to make himſelf king, inſtead of being prime miniſter; and accordingly formed a deſign to get Darius out of the way, and afterwards aſcend the throne. However, his plot being diſcovered, he was ſeized and delivered up to Paryſatis, who put him to a moſt ignominious and cruel death.

(*p*) But the greateſt misfortune which happened in Darius's reign, was the revolt of the Egyptians. This terrible blow fell out the ſame year with Piſuthnes's rebellion. But Darius could not reduce Egypt as he had done that rebel. (*q*) The Egyptians, weary of the Perſian government, flocked from all parts to Amyrtæus of Sais, who at laſt was come out of the fens where he had defended himſelf, from the ſuppreſſion of the revolt of Inarus. The Perſians were drove out, and Amyrtæus proclaimed king of Egypt, where he reigned ſix years.

After having eſtabliſhed himſelf ſecurely on the throne, and entirely expelled the Perſians out of Egypt, he prepared to purſue them as far as Phœnicia, and had already concerted meaſures with the Arabians, to attack them in that country. News of this being brought the king of Perſia, he recalled the fleet which he had promiſed the Lacedæmonians, to employ it in the defence of his own dominions.

Whilſt Darius was carrying on the war in Egypt and Arabia, the Medes rebelled; however, they were defeated, and reduced to their allegiance by force of arms. To puniſh them for this revolt, their yoke (till then eaſy enough) was made heavier: a fate that rebellious ſubjects always experience, when the government, which they endeavoured to throw off, gains the upper hand.

(*r*) Darius's arms ſeem to have had the like ſucceſs againſt the Egyptians. Amyrtæus dying after he had reigned ſix years, (he poſſibly was killed in a battle) Herodotus obſerves, it was by the aſſiſtance of the

(*p*) Euſeb. in Chron. (*q*) Thucyd. l. 1. p. 72, 73.
(*r*) Herod. l. 3. c. 15.

Perſians

Perſians that Pauſiris his ſon ſucceeded him in the throne. To effect this, they muſt either have been maſters of Egypt, or their party the ſtrongeſt in that kingdom.

(s) After having cruſhed the rebels in Media, and reſtored the affairs of Egypt to their former ſituation, Darius gave Cyrus, the youngeſt of his ſons, the ſupreme command of all the provinces of Aſia minor: an important commiſſion, by which he commanded all the provincial governors in that part of the empire.

I thought it neceſſary to anticipate times, and draw together the facts which relate to the kings of Perſia; to prevent my being often obliged to interrupt the hiſtory of the Greeks, to which I now return.

SECT. II. *The Athenians make themſelves maſters of the iſland of Cythera. Expeditions of Braſidas into Thrace. He takes Amphipolis. Thucydides the hiſtorian is baniſhed. A battle is fought near Delium, where the Athenians are defeated.*

THE EIGHTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

THE three or four campaigns which followed the reduction of the ſmall iſland of Sphacteria, were diſtinguiſhed by very few conſiderable events.

(t) The Athenians under Nicias, took the little iſland of Cythera, ſituated on the coaſt of Lacedæmonia, near cape Malea, and from thence they infeſted the whole country.

(u) Braſidas, on the other ſide, marched towards Thrace. The Lacedæmonians were induced by more than one motive to undertake this expedition; imagining they ſhould oblige the Athenians, who had fallen upon them in their country, to divide their forces. The inhabitants of it invited them thither, and offered

(s) A. M. 3597. Ant. J. C. 407. Ant. J. C. 424. Thucyd. l. 4. p. 286. p. 304—311. Diod. l. 12. p. 117, 118.

(t) A. M. 3580.

(u) Thucyd. l. 4.

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to pay the army. In fine, they were extremely glad to embrace that opportunity, to rid themſelves of the Helots, whom they expected to riſe in rebellion, from the taking of Pylus. They had already made away with two thouſand of them in a moſt horrid manner. Upon the ſpecious pretence of rewarding merit even in ſlaves, but, in reality, to get rid of a body of men whoſe courage they dreaded, they cauſed proclamation to be made, that ſuch of the Helots as had done the greateſt ſervice to the ſtate in the laſt campaigns, ſhould enter their names in the public regiſters, in order for their being made free. Accordingly two thouſand gave in their names. They were carried in proceſſion through the temples, with chaplets of flowers on their heads, as if they were really to be ſet at liberty. After this ceremony, they all diſappeared, and were never heard of more. We have here an inſtance, in what manner an umbrageous policy, and power when filled with jealouſy and diſtruſt, excite men to the commiſſion of the blackeſt crimes, without ſcrupling to make even religion itſelf, and the authority of the gods, ſubſervient to their dark deſigns.

They therefore ſent ſeven hundred Helots with Braſidas, whom they had appointed to head this enterprize. This general brought over ſeveral cities, either by force or intelligence, and ſtill more by his wiſdom and moderation. The chief of theſe were Acanthus and Stagyra, which were two colonies from Andros. (*u*) He alſo marched afterwards towards Amphipolis, an Athenian colony, on the river Strymon. The inhabitants immediately diſpatched a meſſenger to † Thucydides the Athenian general, who was then in Thaſus, a little iſland of the Ægæan ſea, half a day's journey from Amphipolis. He inſtantly ſet ſail with ſeven ſhips that were near him, to ſecure the place before Braſidas could ſeize it; or, at worſt, to get into Eion, which lay very near Amphipolis. Bra-

(*u*) Ibid. p. 320—324.

† *The ſame who wrote the hiſtory of the Peloponneſian war.*

ſidas,

ſidas, who was afraid of Thucydides, from his great credit in all that country, where he was poſſeſſed of ſome gold-mines, made all the diſpatch imaginable, to get thither before him; and offered ſuch advantageous conditions to the beſieged, who did not expect ſuccours ſo ſoon, that they ſurrendred. Thucydides arrived the ſame evening at Eion; and had he failed to come that day, Braſidas would have taken poſſeſſion of it the next morning by day-break. Although Thucydides had made all imaginable diſpatch, the Athenians however charged him with being the cauſe of the taking of Amphipolis, and accordingly baniſhed him.

The Athenians were greatly afflicted at the loſs of that city, as well becauſe they drew great revenues from it, and timber to build their ſhips, as becauſe it was a kind of gate for entering Thrace. They were afraid that all their allies in that neighbourhood would revolt; eſpecially as Braſidas diſcovered great moderation and juſtice, and continually gave out, that he came with no other view but to free the country. He declared to the ſeveral nations, that at his leaving Sparta, he had taken an oath in preſence of the magiſtrates, to leave all thoſe the enjoyment of their liberties, who would conclude an alliance with him; and that he ought to be conſidered as the moſt abandoned of men, ſhould he employ oaths to enſnare their credulity. "For," according to Braſidas, "a fraud "cloaked with a ſpecious pretence, reflects infinitely "greater diſhonour on perſons in high ſtations, than "open violence; becauſe the latter is the effect of the "power which fortune has put into our hands; and "the former is founded wholly on perfidy, which is "the peſt of ſociety. Now I," ſaid he, "ſhould do a "great diſſervice to my country, beſides diſhonouring "it eternally, if, by procuring it ſome ſlight advanta-"ges, I ſhould ruin the reputation it enjoys of being "juſt and faithful to its promiſes; which renders it "much more powerful than all its forces united toge-"ther, becauſe it acquires it the eſteem and confi-

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"dence of other ſtates." Upon ſuch noble and equitable principles as theſe Braſidas always formed his conduct; believing, that the ſtrongeſt bulwark of a nation is juſtice, moderation, integrity; and the firm perſuaſion which their neighbours and allies entertain, that they are not ſo baſe as to harbour a deſign to uſurp their dominions, or deprive them of their liberty. By this conduct he brought over a great number of the enemies allies.

(*x*) The Athenians, under the command of Demoſthenes and Hippocrates, had entered Bœotia, expecting that ſeveral cities would join them, the moment they ſhould appear. The Thebans marched out to meet them near Delium. A conſiderable engagement enſued, in which the Athenians were defeated and put to flight. (*y*) Socrates was in this battle; and Laches, who accompanied that great man in it, gives the following teſtimony of him in Plato; that had the reſt of the army behaved as gallantly as Socrates, the Athenians would not have ſuſtained ſo great a loſs before Delium. He was borne away by the crouds who fled, and was on foot; Alcibiades, who was on horſeback, when he ſaw him, rode up to him, and did not ſtir from him, but defended him with the utmoſt bravery from the enemy who were purſuing him.

After the battle, the victors beſieged the city. Among other engines employed by them to batter it, they uſed one of a very extraordinary kind. This was a long piece of timber, cut into two parts, and afterwards made hollow and joined again, ſo that its ſhape reſembled very much that of a flute. At one of the ends was fixed a long iron tube, to which a cauldron hung; ſo that by blowing a large pair of bellows at the other end of the piece of timber, the wind being carried from thence into the tube, lighted a great fire, with pitch and brimſtone, that lay in the cauldron. This engine being carried on carts as far as

(*x*) Thucyd. l. 4. p. 311—319. (*y*) Plat. in Lach. p. 181. In conviv. p. 221. Plut. in Alcib. p. 195.

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the rampart, to that part where it was lin'd with ſtakes and faſcines, threw out ſo great a flame, that the rampart being immediately abandoned, and the paliſades burnt, the city was eaſily taken.

SECT. III. *A twelve-months truce is agreed upon between the two ſtates. Cleon and Braſidas die. A treaty of peace for fifty years, concluded between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians.*

NINTH, TENTH AND ELEVENTH YEARS OF THE WAR.

(z) THE loſſes and advantages on both ſides were pretty equal; and the two nations began to grow weary of a war, which put them to great expence, and did not procure them any real advantage. A truce, for a year, was therefore concluded between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. The former reſolved on it, in order to check the progreſs of Braſidas's conqueſts; to ſecure their cities and fortreſſes; and afterwards to conclude a general peace, in caſe they judged it would be of advantage to them. The latter were induced to it, in order that by the ſweets of repoſe, peace might become deſirable to their enemy; and to get out of their hands ſuch of their citizens as the Athenians had taken priſoners in the iſland of Sphacteria; and which they could never expect to do, if Braſidas extended his conqueſts farther. The news of this accommodation ſenſibly afflicted Braſidas, as it ſtopped him in the midſt of his career, and diſconcerted all his projects. He could not even prevail with himſelf to abandon the city of Scione, which he had taken two days before, but without knowing that a truce was concluded. He went ſtill farther; and did not ſcruple to take Mende, a little city not far from Scione, that ſurrendred to him as the former had done, which was a direct violation of the treaty: but Braſi-

(z) Thucyd. l. 4. p. 328—333. Diod. l. 12. p. 120. A. M. 3581. Ant. J. C. 423.

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das pretended he had other infractions to object to the Athenians.

It will naturally be ſuppoſed, that they were far from being pleaſed with this conduct of Braſidas. Cleon, in all public aſſemblies, was for ever inflaming the minds of the Athenians, and blowing up the fire of war. (*a*) His great ſucceſs in the expedition of Sphacteria had raiſed his credit infinitely with the people: he now was grown inſupportably proud, and his audaciouſneſs was not to be reſtrained. He had a vehement, impetuous, and furious kind of eloquence, which prevailed over the minds of his auditors, not ſo much by the ſtrength of his arguments, as by the boldneſs and fire of his ſtile and utterance. It was Cleon who firſt ſet the example of bawling in aſſemblies, where the greateſt decorum and moderation had till then been obſerved; of throwing his robe behind him, to give him the more liberty to diſplay his arms; of ſtriking his thigh; and of running up and down the roſtra whilſt he was making his ſpeech. In a word, he firſt introduced among the orators, and all thoſe who were in public employments, an ungovernable licentiouſneſs, and a contempt of decency; a licentiouſneſs and contempt, which ſoon introduced terrible irregularities and confuſion in public affairs.

(*b*) Thus two men, each on his own ſide, oppoſed the tranquillity of Greece, and raiſed, but in a very different way, an invincible obſtacle to its peace. Theſe were Cleon and Braſidas. The former, becauſe the war ſcreened his vices and malverſations; and the latter, becauſe it added a new luſtre to his virtues. And indeed, it gave Cleon an opportunity of committing enormous oppreſſions, and Braſidas of performing great and noble actions. But their death, which happened about the ſame time, made way for a new accommodation.

(*c*) The Athenians had appointed Cleon to com-

(*a*) Plut. In. vit. Niciæ, p. 528. (*b*) Ibid. (*c*) A. M. 3582. Ant. J. C. 422. Thucyd. l. 3. p. 342—351. Diod. l. 12. p. 121, 122.

mand

mand the troops which were to oppoſe Braſidas, and reduce thoſe cities that had revolted from their allegiance. The Athenians were ſolicitous for none of them ſo much as Amphipolis; and Braſidas threw himſelf into that city, in order to defend it. Cleon had written to Perdiccas king of Macedonia, and to the king of the Odomantes, to furniſh him with as many troops as poſſible, and with the utmoſt expedition. He waited for them, and had reſolved not to march immediately towards the enemy: but finding his ſoldiers, who had followed him involuntarily and with regret, grow weary of continuing ſo long unactive, and begin to compare his cowardice and inexperience with the ability and valour of Braſidas, he could no longer bear their contempt and murmurs; and imagining himſelf a great captain by his taking Sphacteria, he now fancied the ſame good fortune would attend him at Amphipolis. He therefore approached it, as he ſaid, to take a view of the place, and till ſuch time as all his forces ſhould be come up; not that he thought he wanted them for carrying that city, or that he doubted in any manner his ſucceſs, (for he was perſuaded that no one would dare to oppoſe him,) but only to enable him to inveſt the place on all ſides, and afterwards to take it by ſtorm. Accordingly he incamped before Amphipolis; when viewing very leiſurely its ſituation, he fondly ſuppoſed that it would be in his power to retire whenever he pleaſed, without drawing the ſword; for not a man came out, or appeared on the walls; and all the gates of the city were kept ſhut, ſo that Cleon began to repent his not having brought the engines, imagining that he wanted only theſe to make himſelf maſter of the city. Braſidas, who was perfectly well acquainted with Cleon's diſpoſition and character, ſtudiouſly affected an air of fear and reſerve, to increaſe his temerity, and the good opinion he had of himſelf: beſides, he knew that Cleon had brought with him the flower of the Athenian forces, and the choiceſt troops of Lemnos and of Imbrus. Accordingly

ingly Cleon, deſpiſing an enemy who did not dare to appear before him, but ſhut himſelf up in a cowardly manner in the city, went boldly from place to place, without precaution or obſerving any diſcipline among his ſoldiers. Braſidas, whoſe intention was to attack him on a ſudden before all his forces ſhould be come up, thought this the critical juncture. He had concerted proper meaſures, and given the orders neceſſary. Accordingly he made a ſudden ſally on the Athenians, which ſurprized and diſconcerted them exceedingly. Immediately the left wing drew off from the main body and fled. Braſidas then turned the whole force of his arms againſt the right wing, which gave him a warm reception. Here he was wounded and diſabled, upon which his ſoldiers carried him off, unperceived by the Athenians. As for Cleon, not having reſolved to fight, he fled, and was killed by a ſoldier who happened to meet him. The troops he commanded defended themſelves for ſome time, and ſuſtained two or three attacks without giving ground, but at laſt they were univerſally broke and routed. Braſidas was then carried into the city, where he ſurvived his victory but a few moments.

The whole army being returned from the purſuit, ſtripped the dead, and afterwards ſet up a trophy. After which all the allies under arms ſolemnized the funeral obſequies of Braſidas in a public manner; and the inhabitants of Amphipolis celebrated funeral honours every year to his memory, as to a hero, with games, combats, and ſacrifices. They conſidered him as their founder; and to ſecure this title the better to him, they demoliſhed all the monuments of him * who had really been ſo; ſo that they might not appear to owe their eſtabliſhment to an Athenian, and at the ſame time make their court to the Lacedæmonians, on whom they depended wholly for their ſecurity. The Athenians, after having carried off, with the conſent of the victors, their dead, returned to Athens, du-

* *Agnon the Athenian.*

ring

ring which the Lacedæmonians ſettled the affairs of Amphipolis.

(*d*) A ſaying is aſcribed to the mother of Braſidas, which ſtrongly intimates the Spartan character. As ſome perſons were applauding, in her preſence, the fine qualities and exalted actions of her ſon, and declared him ſuperior to all other generals: *You are miſtaken*, ſays ſhe, *my ſon was a valiant man, but Sparta has many citizens braver than him.* A mother's generoſity, in thus preferring the glory of the ſtate to that of her ſon, was admired, and did not go unrewarded; for the Ephori paid her public honours.

(*e*) After this laſt engagement, in which the two perſons who were the greateſt obſtacles to the peace loſt their lives, both nations ſeemed more inclined to an accommodation, and the war was ſuſpended in a manner on both ſides. The Athenians, from the loſs of the battles of Delium and Amphipolis, which had very much brought down their haughtineſs, were undeceived with regard to the opinion they had hitherto entertained of their own ſtrength, that had made them refuſe the advantagious offers of their enemies. Beſides, they were afraid of the revolt of their allies, who, being diſcouraged by their loſſes, might thereby be induced to abandon them, as ſeveral had already done. Theſe reflections made them ſtrongly repent their not having concluded a treaty, after the advantages they had gained at Pylus. The Lacedæmonians, on the other ſide, no longer flattered themſelves with the hopes of being able to ruin the Athenians by laying waſte their country; and were beſides dejected and terrified by their loſs in the iſland, the greateſt they had ever ſuſtained. They alſo conſidered, that their country was depopulated by the garriſon of Pylus and Cythera; that their ſlaves deſerted; that they had reaſon to dread a more conſiderable revolt; and that as the truce they had concluded with the inhabitants of Argos was near expiring, they had

(*d*) Diod. p. 122. (*e*) Thucyd. l. 5. p. 351—354.

reaſon to be apprehenſive of being abandoned by ſome of their allies of Peloponneſus, as they accordingly were. Theſe ſeveral motives, enforced by the deſire they had of recovering the priſoners, the greateſt part of whom were the moſt conſiderable citizens of Sparta, made them deſire a peace.

Thoſe who were moſt ſollicitous for having it concluded, and whoſe intereſt it was chiefly to wiſh it, were the chiefs of the two ſtates, *viz.* Pliſtonax king of Lacedæmonia, and Nicias general of the Athenians. The former was lately returned from baniſhment, to which he had been ſentenced, on acount of his being ſuſpected to have received a bribe, in order to draw off his troops from the Athenian territories; and to this precipitate retreat was aſcribed ſeveral misfortunes which followed after it. He alſo was charged with having corrupted by gifts the prieſteſs of Delphos, who had commanded the Spartans, in the name of the god, to recal him from his exile. Pliſtonax was therefore deſirous of peace, in order to put an end to the reproaches, which, on account of the perpetual calamities of the war, were daily revived. As for Nicias, the moſt fortunate general of his age, he was afraid leſt ſome unhappy accident ſhould eclipſe his glory; and he wiſhed to enjoy the fruits of peace in eaſe and tranquillity, and that his country might poſſeſs the ſame happineſs.

(*f*) Both ſtates began by agreeing to a ſuſpenſion of arms for twelve months, during which, being every day together, and taſting the ſweets of ſecurity and repoſe, and the pleaſure of correſponding with their friends and with foreigners, they grew paſſionately deſirous of leading an eaſy, undiſturbed life, remote from the alarms of war, and the horrors of blood and ſlaughter. They heard with the utmoſt demonſtrations of joy the chorus's of their tragedies ſing, *May ſpiders henceforward weave their cobwebs on our lances and ſhields!* And they remembred with pleaſure him who ſaid, *Thoſe who ſleep in the arms of peace, do not*

(*f*) Thucyd. l. 5. p. 354. Plut. in Nic. p. 528, 529.

ſtart from it at the ſound of the trumpet; and nothing interrupts their ſlumbers but the peaceful crowing of the cock.

(*g*) The whole winter was ſpent in conferences and interviews, in which each party propoſed their rights and pretenſions. (*h*) At laſt, a peace was concluded and ratified for fifty years, one of the chief articles of which was, that they ſhould reciprocally reſtore the priſoners on each ſide. This treaty was concluded ten years and ſome days from the firſt declaration of the war. The Bœotians and Corinthians were exceedingly diſguſted at it, and for that reaſon uſed their utmoſt endeavours to excite freſh troubles. (*i*) But Nicias perſuaded the Athenians and Lacedæmonians to give the laſt hand to this peace, by concluding an alliance offenſive and defenſive, which would render them more formidable to thoſe who ſhould deſire to break with them, and more aſſured with regard to each other. The Athenians, in conſequence of this treaty, at laſt reſtored the priſoners they had taken in the iſland of Sphacteria.

SECT. IV. *Alcibiades begins to appear. His character. He oppoſes Nicias in every thing, and breaks the treaty he had concluded. The baniſhment of Hyperbolus puts an end to the Oſtraciſm.*

TWELFTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

(*k*) ALCIBIADES began now to advance himſelf in the ſtate, and appear in the public aſſemblies. Socrates had attached himſelf to him for many years, and adorned his mind with a great variety of the nobleſt erudition.

The ſtrict intimacy between Alcibiades and Socrates is one of the moſt remarkable circumſtances in his life. This philoſopher obſerving excellent natural qualities in him, which were greatly heightned by the

(*g*) Diod. l. 13. p. 122. (*h*) A. M. 3583. Ant. J. C. 421.
(*i*) Thucyd. l. 5. p. 358, 359. (*k*) Plut. in Alcib. p. 192, 194.

beauty

beauty of his perſon, beſtowed incredible pains in cultivating ſo valuable a plant, leſt being neglected, it ſhould wither as it grew, and abſolutely degenerate. And indeed, Alcibiades was expoſed to numberleſs dangers; the greatneſs of his extraction, his vaſt riches, the authority of his family, the credit of his guardians, his perſonal talents, his exquiſite beauty; and, ſtill more than theſe, the flattery and complaiſance of all who approached him. One would have concluded, ſays Plutarch, that fortune had ſurrounded and inveſted him with all theſe pretended advantages as with ſo many ramparts and bulwarks, to render him inacceſſible and invulnerable to all the darts of philoſophy; thoſe ſalutary darts which ſtrike to the very heart, and leave in it the ſtrongeſt incitements to virtue and ſolid glory. But thoſe very obſtacles redoubled the zeal of Socrates.

Notwithſtanding the ſtrong endeavours that were uſed to divert this young Athenian from a correſpondence which alone was capable of ſecuring him from ſo many ſnares, he devoted himſelf entirely to it. As he had abundance of wit, he was fully ſenſible of Socrates's extraordinary merit; and could not reſiſt the charms of his ſweetly-inſinuating eloquence, which at that time had a greater aſcendant over him than the allurements of pleaſure. He was ſo zealous a diſciple of that great maſter, that he followed him wherever he went, took the utmoſt delight in his converſation, was extremely well pleaſed with his principles, received his inſtructions and even his reprimands with wonderful docility, and would be ſo moved with his diſcourſes, as even to ſhed tears and abhor himſelf; ſo weighty was the force of truth in the mouth of Socrates, and in ſo ugly and odious a light did he expoſe the vices to which Alcibiades abandoned himſelf.

Alcibiades, in thoſe moments when he liſtned to Socrates, differed ſo much from himſelf, that he appeared quite another man. However, his headſtrong, fiery temper, and his natural fondneſs for pleaſure, which was heightned and inflamed by the diſcourſes and advice of

young people, ſoon plunged him into his former irregularities, and tore him, as it were, from his maſter; who was obliged to run after him as after a ſlave who had eſcaped. This viciſſitude of flights and returns, of virtuous reſolutions and relapſes into vice, continued a long time; but ſtill Socrates was not diſguſted by his levity, and always flattered himſelf with the hope of bringing him back to his duty. And hence certainly aroſe the ſtrong mixture of good and evil, that always appeared in his conduct; the inſtructions which his maſter had given him, ſometimes prevailing; and at other times, the fire of his paſſions hurrying him in a manner againſt his own will, into things of a quite oppoſite nature.

This intimacy, which continued as long as they lived, did not paſs uncenſured. But ſome perſons * of great learning pretend, that theſe cenſures and ſuſpicions, when duly examined, quite diſappear; and that they ought to be conſidered as the effect of the malice of the enemies of both. Plato, in one of his dialogues, gives us a converſation between Socrates and Alcibiades, by which the genius and character of the latter may be known, who henceforward will have a very great ſhare in the affairs of the republic of Athens. I ſhall make a very ſhort extract from it in this place, which I hope will not diſpleaſe my readers.

(*l*) In this dialogue, Socrates is introduced converſing with Alcibiades, who at that time was under the guardianſhip of Pericles. He was then very young, and had been educated like the reſt of the Athenians; that is, he had been taught polite literature, and to play on inſtruments, and had practiſed wreſtling and other bodily exerciſes. It does not appear that Pericles had hitherto taken much pains in Alcibiades's education (a fault too common in the greateſt men) ſince he had put him under the tutorage of Zopyrus, a

(*l*) Plut. in Alcib. I.

* *Abbé Fraguier juſtifies Socrates in one of his diſſertations.* Mem. of the Academy of Belles Lettres, Tom. 4. p. 372.

Thracian,

Thracian, a man far advanced in years, and who, of all Pericles's ſlaves, both from his turn of mind and age, was the leaſt qualified to educate this young Athenian. And indeed Socrates told Alcibiades, that ſhould he compare him with the youths of Lacedæmonia, who diſplayed a ſpirit of valour, a greatneſs of ſoul, a ſtrong deſire of glory, a love of labour, attended with gentleneſs, modeſty, temperance, and a perfect obedience to the laws and diſcipline of Sparta, he would ſeem a mere child to them. Nevertheleſs, his high birth, his riches, the great families he was related to, and the authority of his guardian; all theſe things had conſpired to make him exceedingly vain and haughty. He was full of eſteem for himſelf, and of contempt for all others. He was preparing to enter upon the adminiſtration of the public affairs, and promiſed himſelf no leſs than to eclipſe entirely the glory of Pericles, and to attack the king of Perſia, even upon his throne. Socrates ſeeing him going to mount the roſtra, in order to give the people ſome advice relating to the public affairs, demonſtrates to him, by various queſtions, and by Alcibiades's anſwers, that he is quite ignorant of the affairs about which he is going to ſpeak, as he had never ſtudied them himſelf, nor been informed in them by others. After making Alcibiades confeſs this, he paints in the ſtrongeſt colours, the abſurdity of his conduct, and makes him fully ſenſible of it. What, ſays Socrates, would Ameſtris (the mother of Artaxerxes who then reigned in Perſia) ſay, were ſhe to hear, that there is a man now in Athens who is meditating war againſt her ſon, and even intends to dethrone him? She doubtleſs would ſuppoſe him to be ſome veteran general, a man of intrepid courage, of great wiſdom, and the moſt conſummate experience; that he is able to raiſe a mighty army, and march it wherever he pleaſes; and, at the ſame time, that he has long before taken the proper meaſures for putting ſo vaſt a deſign in execution. But were ſhe to hear that there are none of theſe circum-

ſtances, and that the perſon in queſtion is not twenty years old; that he is utterly ignorant of public affairs; has not the leaſt knowledge of war, and no credit with the citizens or the allies; would it be poſſible for her to refrain from laughing at the folly and extravagance of ſuch an enterprize? This nevertheleſs, ſays Socrates (directing himſelf to Alcibiades) is your picture; and unhappily reſembles moſt of thoſe who thruſt themſelves into the public employments. Socrates however excepts Pericles on this occaſion; his ſolid merit and exalted reputation being acquired by his cloſe ſtudy, during a long courſe of years, of every thing capable of forming his mind, and of qualifying him for public employments. Alcibiades could not deny that this was his caſe; he was aſhamed of his conduct, and bluſhing to ſee himſelf ſo void of merit, he asks how he muſt act for the attainment of it. Socrates, being unwilling to diſcourage his pupil, tells him, that as he is ſo young, theſe evils might be remedied, and afterwards continually gave him the wiſeſt counſels. He had entire leiſure to improve from them; as upwards of twenty years paſſed between this converſation, and his engaging in public affairs.

Alcibiades was of a convertible genius, that would take any impreſſion which the difference of times and circumſtances might require, ſtill veering either to good or evil, with the ſame facility and ardour; and ſhifting almoſt in an inſtant from one extreme to its oppoſite, ſo that people applied to him what Homer obſerves of the land of Egypt, *That it produces a great number of very excellent medicinal drugs, and at the ſame time as many poiſons.* (*m*) It might be ſaid of Alcibiades, that he was not one ſingle man, but (if ſo bold an expreſſion might be uſed) a compound of ſeveral men; either ſerious or gay; auſtere or affable; an imperious maſter, or a groveling ſlave; a friend to virtue and the virtuous, or abandoned to vice and vicious

(*m*) Quemvis hominem ſecum attulit ad nos. *Juvenal.*

men;

men; capable of ſupporting the moſt painful fatigues and toils, or inſatiably deſirous of voluptuous delights.

(*n*) His irregularities and diſſolute conduct were become the talk of the whole city; and Alcibiades would very willingly have put a ſtop to theſe reports, but without changing his courſe of life, as appears from a ſaying of his. He had a very handſome dog, of a prodigious ſize, which had coſt him threeſcore and ten minæ, * or three thouſand five hundred French livres. By this we find that a fondneſs for dogs was of great antiquity. Alcibiades cauſed his tail, which was the greateſt beauty he had about him, to be cut off. His friends cenſured him very much on that account, and ſaid, that the whole city blamed him very much for ſpoiling the beauty of ſo handſome a creature. *This is the very thing I want*, replied Alcibiades with a ſmile. *I would have the Athenians diſcourſe about what I have done to my dog, that they may not entertain themſelves with ſaying worſe things of me.*

(*o*) Among the various paſſions that were diſcovered in him, the ſtrongeſt and moſt prevailing was a haughty turn of mind, which would force all things to ſubmit to it, and could not bear a ſuperior or even an equal. Although his birth and uncommon talents ſmoothed the way to his attaining the higheſt employments in the republic; there was nothing however to which he was ſo fond of owing the credit and authority he wanted to gain over the people, as to the force of his eloquence, and the perſuaſive grace of his orations. To this his intimacy with Socrates might be of great ſervice.

(*p*) Alcibiades, with ſuch a caſt of mind as we have here deſcribed, was not born for repoſe, and had ſet every engine at work to traverſe the treaty lately con-

(*n*) Plut. in Alcib. p. 195. (*o*) Τὸ φιλόνεικον, καὶ τὸ φιλόπρωτον, Plut. in Alcib. p. 195, 196. (*p*) A. M. 3584. Ant. J. C. 420. Thucyd. l. 5. p. 368—378. Plut. in Alcib. p. 197, 198.

* *About* 160 *l. ſterling. The drachmas, and the drachma ten Attic mina was worth an hundred pence, French money.*

cluded between the two ſtates; but not ſucceeding in his attempt, he endeavoured to prevent its taking effect. He was diſguſted at the Lacedæmonians, becauſe they directed themſelves only to Nicias, of whom they had a very high opinion; and, on the contrary, ſeemed to take no manner of notice of him, though his anceſtors had enjoyed the rights of hoſpitality among them.

The firſt thing he did to infringe the peace was this; having been informed that the people of Argos only wanted an opportunity to break with the Spartans, whom they equally hated and feared, he flattered them ſecretly with the hopes that the Athenians would ſuccour them, by ſuggeſting to them that they were ready to break a peace which was no way advantageous to them.

And indeed the Lacedæmonians were not very careful to obſerve the ſeveral conditions of it religiouſly, having concluded an alliance wirh the Bœotians, in direct oppoſition to the deſign and tenor of the treaty; and having ſurrendred up the fort of Panacton to the Athenians, not fortified and in the condition it was in at the concluding of the treaty, as they had ſtipulated to do, but quite diſmantled. Alcibiades obſerving the Athenians to be extremely exaſperated at this breach of faith, did his utmoſt to widen the difference; and taking this opportunity to embarraſs Nicias, he made him odious to the people, by cauſing them to entertain a ſuſpicion of his being too ſtrongly attached to the Lacedæmonians; and by charging him with crimes which were not altogether improbable, though they were abſolutely falſe.

This new attack quite diſconcerted Nicias; but happily for him there arrived, at that very inſtant, ambaſſadors from Lacedæmonia, who were inveſted with full powers to put an end to all the diviſions. Being introduced into the council or ſenate, they ſet forth their complaints, and made their demands, which every one of the members thought very juſt and reaſonable.

ſonable. The people were to give them audience the next day. Alcibiades, who was afraid they would ſucceed with them, uſed his utmoſt endeavours to engage the ambaſſadors in a conference with him. He repreſented to them, that the council always behaved with the utmoſt moderation and humanity towards thoſe who addreſſed them; but that the people were haughty and extravagant in their pretenſions; that ſhould the ambaſſadors mention full powers, they (the people) would not fail to take advantage of this circumſtance, and oblige them to agree to whatever they ſhould take it into their heads to ask. He concluded with aſſuring them, that he would aſſiſt them with all his credit, in order to get Pylus reſtored to them; to prevent the alliance with the people of Argos, and to get that with them renewed: and he confirmed all theſe promiſes with an oath. The ambaſſadors were extremely well pleaſed with this conference, and greatly admired the profound policy and vaſt abilities of Alcibiades, whom they looked upon as an extraordinary man; and, indeed, they were not miſtaken in their conjecture.

On the morrow, the people being aſſembled, the ambaſſadors were introduced. Alcibiades asked them, in the mildeſt terms, the ſubject of their embaſſy, and the purport of the powers with which they were inveſted. They immediately anſwered, that they were come to propoſe an accommodation, but were not impowered to conclude any thing. Theſe words were no ſooner ſpoke, but Alcibiades exclaims againſt them; declares them to be treacherous knaves; calls upon the council as witneſs to the ſpeech they had made the night before; and deſires the people not to believe or hear men who ſo impudently advanced falſhoods, and ſpoke and prevaricated ſo unaccountably, as to ſay one thing one day, and the very reverſe the next.

Words could never expreſs the ſurprize and confuſion with which the ambaſſadors were ſeized, who,

gazing wildly on one another, could not believe either their eyes or ears. Nicias, who did not know the treacherous ſtratagem of Alcibiades, could not conceive the motive of this change, and tortured his brain to no purpoſe to find out the reaſon of it. The people were that moment going to ſend for the ambaſſadors of Argos, in order to conclude the league with them; when a great earthquake came to the aſſiſtance of Nicias, and broke up the aſſembly. It was with the utmoſt difficulty he prevailed ſo far, in that of next day, as to have a ſtop put to the proceedings, till ſuch time as ambaſſadors ſhould be ſent to Lacedæmon. Nicias was appointed to head them; but they returned without having done the leaſt good. The Athenians then repented very much their having delivered up, at his perſuaſion, the priſoners they had taken in the iſland, and who were related to the greateſt families in Sparta. However, though the people were highly exaſperated at Nicias, they did not proceed to any exceſſes againſt him, but only appointed Alcibiades their general; made a league with the inhabitants of Mantinea and Elis, who had quitted the party of the Lacedæmonians, in which the Argives were included, and ſent troops to Pylus, to lay waſte Laconia. In this manner they again involved themſelves in the war which they were ſo lately deſirous of avoiding.

(*a*) Plutarch, after relating the intrigue of Alcibiades, adds: "No one can approve the methods he "employed to ſucceed in his deſign; however, it "was a maſter-ſtroke, to diſunite and ſhake almoſt "every part of Peloponneſus in this manner, and "raiſe up, in one day, ſo many enemies againſt the "Lacedæmonians." In my opinion, this is too ſoft a cenſure of ſo knaviſh and perfidious an action, which, how ſucceſsful ſoever it might have been, was notwithſtanding horrid in itſelf, and of a nature never to be ſufficiently deteſted.

(*a*) In Alcib. p. 198.

There

(*b*) There was in Athens a citizen, Hyperbolus by name, a very wicked man, whom the comic poets generally made the object of their raillery and invectives. He was hardned in evil, and become inſenſible to infamy, by renouncing all ſentiments of honour, which could only be the effect of a ſoul abandoned entirely to vice. Hyperbolus was not agreeable to any one; and yet the people made uſe of him to humble thoſe in high ſtations, and involve them in difficulties. Two citizens, Nicias and Alcibiades, engroſſed at that time all authority in Athens. The diſſolute life of the latter ſhocked the Athenians, who beſides dreaded his audacity and haughtineſs. On the other ſide, Nicias, by always oppoſing, without the leaſt reſerve, their unjuſt deſires; and by obliging them to take the moſt uſeful meaſures, was become very odious to them. One would have imagined, that as the people were thus alienated from both, they would not have failed to put the oſtraciſm in force againſt one of them. Of the two parties which prevailed at that time in the city, one, which conſiſted of the young men who were eager for war, the other of the old men who were deſirous of peace; the former endeavoured to procure the baniſhment of Nicias, and the latter of Alcibiades. Hyperbolus, whoſe only merit was his impudence, in hopes of ſucceeding, which ſoever of them ſhould be removed, declared openly againſt them, and was eternally exaſperating the people againſt both. However, the two factions being afterwards reconciled, he himſelf was baniſhed by (and put an end to) the oſtraciſm, which ſeemed to have been demeaned, in being employed againſt a man of ſo baſe a character; for hitherto there was a kind of honour and dignity annexed to this puniſhment. Hyperbolus was therefore the laſt who was ſentenced by the oſtraciſm; as Hipparchus, a near relation of Piſiſtratus the tyrant, had been the firſt.

(*b*) Plut. in Alcib. p. 196, 197. In Nic. p. 530, 531.

SECT.

SECT. V. *Alcibiades engages the Athenians in the war of Sicily.*

SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH YEARS OF THE WAR.

(*c*) I Paſs over ſeveral inconſiderable events, to haſten to the relation of that of the greateſt importance, the expedition of the Athenians into Sicily, to which they were eſpecially excited by Alcibiades. This is the ſixteenth year of the Peloponneſian war.

(*d*) Alcibiades had gained a ſurprizing aſcendant over the minds of the people, though they were perfectly well acquainted with his character. For his great qualities were united with ſtill greater vices, which he did not take the leaſt pains to conceal. He paſſed his life in ſuch an exceſs of luxury and voluptuouſneſs, as was a ſcandal to that city. Nothing was ſeen in his houſe but feſtivals, rejoicings, and parties of pleaſure and debauchery. He ſhewed very little regard to the cuſtoms of his country, and leſs to religion and the gods. All perſons of ſenſe and judgment, beſides the ſtrong averſion they had for his irregularities, dreaded exceedingly the conſequences of his audacity, profuſion, and utter contempt of the laws, which they conſidered as ſo many ſteps by which Alcibiades would riſe to tyrannical power.

Ariſtophanes, in one of his comedies *, ſhows admirably well, in a ſingle verſe, the diſpoſition of the people with regard to him; *They hate Alcibiades*, ſays he, *and yet cannot do without him.* And indeed, the prodigious ſums he ſquandred on the people; the pompous games and ſhows he exhibited to pleaſe them; the magnificent and almoſt incredible preſents which he made the city; the grace and beauty of his whole perſon; his eloquence, his bodily ſtrength, joined to

(*c*) Thucyd. l. 8. p. 350—409. A. M. 3588. Ant. J. C. 416.
(*d*) Plut. in Alcib. p. 198—200. In Nic. p. 531.

* *The Frogs. Act* 5. *Scene* 4.

his

his courage and experience; in a word, this aſſemblage of great qualities made the Athenians wink at his faults, and bear them patiently, always endeavouring to leſſen and ſcreen them under ſoft and favourable names; for they called them ſports, polite paſtimes, and indications of his humanity and good nature.

Timon the man-hater, moroſe and ſavage as he was, formed a better judgment of this conduct of Alcibiades. Meeting him one day as he was coming out of the aſſembly, vaſtly pleaſed at his having been gratified in all his demands, and to ſee the greateſt honours paid him by the people in general, who were attending him in crouds to his houſe; ſo far from ſhunning him as he did all other men, on the contrary he ran to meet him, and ſtretching out his hand to him in a friendly way; *Courage, my ſon,* ſays he, *thou doſt right in puſhing thy fortune, for thy advancement will be the ruin of all theſe people.* The war of Sicily will ſhow that Timon was not miſtaken.

The Athenians, from the time of Pericles, had meditated the conqueſt of Sicily. However, that wiſe guide had always endeavoured to check this ambitious and wild project. He uſed frequently to inculcate to them, that by living in peace, by ſupporting their fleet, by contenting themſelves with the conqueſts they had already gained, and by not engaging in hazardous enterprizes, they would raiſe their city to a flouriſhing condition, and be always ſuperior to their enemies. The authority he had at that time over the people, though it kept them from invading Sicily, could not ſuppreſs the deſire they had to conquer it, and their eyes were continually upon that iſland. (*e*) Some time after Pericles's death, the Leontines being invaded by the Syracuſans, had ſent a deputation to Athens, to demand aid. They were originally of Chalcis, an Athenian colony. The chief of the deputies was Gorgias, a famous rhetorician, who was

(*e*) Diod. l. 12. p. 99.

reputed

reputed the moſt eloquent man of his times. His elegant and florid diction, heightned by ſhining figures which he firſt employed, charmed the Athenians, who were prodigiouſly affected with the beauties and graces of eloquence. Accordingly the alliance was concluded, and they ſent ſhips to Rhegium to the aid of the Leontines. The year following they ſent a greater number. Two years after they ſent a new fleet, ſomething ſtronger than the former; but the Sicilians having put an end to all their diviſions, by the advice of Hermocrates, the fleet was ſent back; and the Athenians, not being able to prevail with themſelves to pardon their generals for not conquering Sicily, ſent two of them, Pythodorus and Sophocles, into baniſhment; and ſentenced the third, Eurymedon, to pay a heavy fine; their proſperity having blinded them to ſo prodigious a degree, that they were perſuaded no power was able to reſiſt them. They made ſeveral attempts afterwards, and, upon pretence of ſending from time to time arms and ſoldiers to ſuch cities as were unjuſtly treated or oppreſſed by the Syracuſans, they by that means were preparing to invade them with a greater force.

But the perſon who moſt inflamed this ardor was Alcibiades, by his feeding the people with ſplendid hopes, with which he himſelf was for ever filled, or rather intoxicated. He was every night, in his dreams, taking Carthage, ſubduing Africa, croſſing from thence into Italy, and poſſeſſing himſelf of all Peloponneſus; looking upon Sicily not as the ſcope and end of this war, but as the beginning and the firſt ſtep of the exploits he revolved in his mind. All the citizens favoured his views, and without enquiring ſeriouſly into matters, were inchanted with the mighty hopes he gave them. This expedition was the only topic of all converſations. The young men, in the places where the public exerciſes were performed, and the old men in their ſhops and elſewhere, were employed in nothing but in drawing the plan of Sicily; in diſcourſing

on

on the nature and quality of the ſea with which it is ſurrounded; on its good harbours, and flat ſhores towards Africa: For theſe people, infatuated by the ſpeeches of Alcibiades, were (like him) perſuaded that they ſhould make Sicily only their place of arms and their arſenal, from whence they ſhould ſet out for the conqueſt of Carthage, and make themſelves maſters of all Africa and the ſea, as far as the pillars of Hercules.

(*f*) It is related that neither Socrates nor Methon the aſtronomer believed that this enterprize would be ſucceſsful; the former, being inſpired, as he inſinuated, by his familiar ſpirit, who always warned him of the evils with which he was threatened; and the other, directed by his reaſon and good ſenſe, which, pointing out what he had to apprehend in reſpect to the future, induced him to act the madman on this occaſion; and to demand, in conſideration of the unhappy condition to which he was reduced, that the Athenians would not force away his ſon, and would diſpenſe with his carrying arms.

SECT. VI. *Account of the ſeveral people who inhabited Sicily.*

BEFORE I enter on the relation of the war of Sicily, it will not be improper to give a plan of the country, and of the nations who inhabited it: Thucydides begins in the ſame manner.

(*g*) It was firſt inhabited by the Leſtrygones and the Cyclopes, of whom we do not know any particulars, except what we are told by the poets. The moſt antient, after theſe, were the Sicani, who called themſelves the original inhabitants of this country, tho' they are thought to have come into it from the neighbourhood of a river in Spain, called Sicanus, whoſe name they gave to the iſland, which before was called Trinacria: theſe people were afterwards confined to the weſtern

(*f*) Plut. in Alcib. p. 199. In Nic. p. 532. (*g*) Thucyd. l. 6. p. 410—413.

part

part of the iſland. Some Trojans, after the burning of their city, came and ſettled near them, and built Erix and * Egeſta, who all aſſumed the name of Elymæi; and were afterwards joined by ſome inhabitants of Phocis, at their return from the ſiege of Troy. Thoſe who are properly called Sicilians came from Italy in very great numbers; and having gained a conſiderable victory over the Sicani, confined them to a corner of their iſland, about three hundred years before the arrival of the Greeks; and in Thucydides's time, they ſtill inhabited the middle part of the iſland and the northern coaſt. From them the iſland was called Sicily. The Phœnicians alſo ſpread themſelves along the coaſt, and in the little iſlands which border upon it, for the convenience of trade: but after the Greeks began to ſettle there, they retired into the country of the Elymæi, in order to be nearer Carthage, and abandoned the reſt. It was in this manner the Barbarians firſt ſettled in Sicily.

(*b*) With regard to the Greeks, the firſt of them who croſſed into Sicily were the Chalcidians of Eubœa, under Theocles who founded Naxos. The year after, which, according to Dionyſius Halicarnaſſeus, was the third of the xviith Olympiad, Archias the Corinthian laid the foundations of Syracuſe. Seven years after, the Chalcidians founded Leontium and Catana, after having drove out the inhabitants of the country, who were Sicilians. Other Greeks, who came from Megara a city of Achaia, about the ſame time, founded Megara, called Hyblæa, or barely Hybla, from Hyblon a Sicilian king, by whoſe permiſſion they ſettled in his dominions. It is well known that the Hyblæan honey was very famous among the antients. An hundred years after, the inhabitants of that city built Selinonta. Gela, built on a river of the ſame name, forty-five years after the founding of Syracuſe, founded Agrigentum about an hundred and eight years after.

(*b*) A. M. 3294. Ant. J. C. 710.

* *It is called Segeſta by the Romans.*

Zancle,

Zancle, called afterwards Meſſana or Meſſene by Anaxilas tyrant of Rhegium, who was of Meſſene a city of Peloponneſus, had ſeveral founders, and at different periods. The Zanclians built the city of Himera; the Syracuſans built Acre, Caſmene, and Camarina. Theſe are moſt of the nations, whether Greeks or Barbarians, who ſettled in Sicily.

SECT. VII. *The people of Egeſta implore aid of the Athenians. Nicias oppoſes, but to no purpoſe, the war of Sicily. Alcibiades carries that point. They both are appointed generals with Lamachus.*

(*i*) ATHENS was in the diſpoſition above related, when ambaſſadors were ſent from the people of Egeſta, who, in quality of their allies, came to implore their aid againſt the inhabitants of Selinunta, who were aſſiſted by the Syracuſans. It was the ſixteenth year of the Peloponneſian war. They repreſented, among other things, that ſhould they be abandoned, the Syracuſans, after ſeizing their city as they had done that of Leontium, would poſſeſs themſelves of all Sicily, and not fail to aid the Peloponneſians who were their founders; and, that they might put them to as little charge as poſſible, they offered to pay the troops that ſhould be ſent to ſuccour them. The Athenians, who had long waited for an opportunity to declare themſelves, ſent deputies to Egeſta to enquire into the ſtate of affairs, and to ſee whether there was money enough in the treaſury to defray the expence of ſo great a war. The inhabitants of that city had been ſo artful, as to borrow from the neighbouring nations a great number of gold and ſilver vaſes, worth an immenſe ſum of money; and of theſe they made a ſhow when the Athenians arrived. (*k*) The deputies returned with thoſe of Egeſta, who carried threeſcore talents in ingots, as a month's pay for the gallies

(*i*) A. M. 3588. Ant. J. C. 416. Thucyd. l. 6. p. 413—415. Diod. l. 12. p. 129, 130. Plut. in Alcib. p. 200. In Nic. p. 531.
(*k*) A. M. 3589. Ant. J. C. 415.

which

which they demanded; and a promiſe of larger ſums, which, they ſaid, were ready both in the public treaſury and in the temples. The people, ſtruck with theſe fair appearances, the truth of which they did not give themſelves the leiſure to examine; and ſeduced by the advantageous reports which their deputies made, in the view of pleaſing them; immediately granted the Egeſtans their demand, and appointed Alcibiades, Nicias and Lamachus to command the fleet; with full power, not only to ſuccour Egeſta, and reſtore the inhabitants of Leontium to their city; but alſo to regulate the affairs of Sicily, in ſuch a manner as might beſt ſuit the intereſts of the republic.

Nicias was appointed one of the generals, to his very great regret; for, beſides other motives which made him dread that command, he ſhunned it becauſe Alcibiades was to be his collegue. But the Athenians promiſed themſelves greater ſucceſs from this war, ſhould they not reſign the whole conduct of it to Alcibiades, but temper his ardor and audacity with the coldneſs and wiſdom of Nicias.

(*l*) Five days after, to haſten the execution of the decree, and make the neceſſary preparations, a ſecond aſſembly was held. Nicias, who had had time enough to reflect deliberately on the affair propoſed, and was ſtill better convinced of the difficulties and dangers which would enſue from it; thought himſelf obliged, to ſpeak with ſome vehemence againſt a project, the conſequences of which he foreſaw might be very fatal to the republic. He ſaid, "That it was ſurprizing "ſo important an affair ſhould have been determined, "the moment almoſt it was taken into deliberation: "That without once enquiring into matters, they "had given credit to whatever was told them by "foreigners, who were very laviſh of their promiſes; "and whoſe intereſt it was to offer mighty things, in "order to extricate themſelves from their imminent "danger. After all, what advantage (ſays he) can

(*l*) Thucyd. l. 6. p. 415—428.

"accrue

" accrue from thence to the republic? Have we ſo
" few enemies at our doors, that we need go in ſearch
" of others at a diſtance from us? Will you act
" wiſely, to hazard your preſent poſſeſſions, on the
" vain hopes of an uncertain advantage? To medi-
" tate new conqueſts, before you have ſecured your
" antient ones? To ſtudy nothing but the aggran-
" dizing of your ſtate, and quite neglect your own
" ſafety? Can you depend in any manner on a truce,
" which you yourſelves know is very precarious;
" which you are ſenſible has been infringed more than
" once; and which the leaſt defeat on our ſide may
" ſuddenly change into an open war? You are not
" ignorant how the Lacedæmonians have always been,
" and ſtill continue, diſpoſed with regard to us. They
" deteſt our government as different from theirs; it
" is with grief and diſdain they ſee us poſſeſſed of the
" empire of Greece; they conſider our glory as their
" ſhame and confuſion; and there is nothing they
" would not attempt, to humble a power which ex-
" cites their jealouſy, and keeps them perpetually in
" fear. Theſe are our real enemies, and it is they
" we ought to guard againſt. Will it be a proper
" time to make theſe reflections, when (after having
" divided our troops, and our arms will be employ-
" ed elſewhere, and unable to reſiſt them,) we ſhall
" be attacked at once by all the forces of Peloponne-
" ſus? We do but juſt begin to breathe, after the ca-
" lamities in which war and the plague had plunged
" us; and we are now going to plunge ourſelves into
" greater danger. If we are ambitious of carrying our
" arms into diſtant countries, would it not be more
" expedient to march and reduce the rebels of Thrace,
" and other nations who are ſtill wavering, and un-
" fixed in their allegiance, than to fly to the ſuccour
" of the inhabitants of Egeſta, about whoſe welfare
" we ought to be very indifferent? And will it ſuit
" our intereſt, to attempt to revenge their injuries,
" at a time that we do not diſcover the leaſt reſent-

" ment

"ment for thoſe we ourſelves receive? Let us leave "the Sicilians to themſelves, and not engage in their "quarrels, which it is their buſineſs to decide. As "the inhabitants of Egeſta undertook the war with-"out us, let them extricate themſelves from it as "well as they can. Should any of our generals ad-"viſe you to this enterprize, from an ambitious or "ſelf-intereſted view; merely to make a vain parade "of his ſplendid equipages, or to raiſe money to ſup-"port his extravagance; be not guilty of ſo much "imprudence as to ſacrifice the intereſt of the re-"public to his or permit him to involve it in the "ſame ruin with himſelf. An enterprize of ſo much "importance ought not to be committed wholly to "the conduct of a young man. Remember it is pru-"dence, not prejudice and paſſion, that gives ſucceſs "to affairs." Nicias concluded with declaring it his opinion, that it would be proper to deliberate again on the affair, in order to prevent the fatal conſequences with which their taking raſh reſolutions might be attended.

It was plain he had Alcibiades in view, and that his enormous luxury was the object of his cenſure. And indeed he carried it to an incredible height; and laviſhed prodigious ſums of money, on horſes, equipages and moveables; not to mention the delicacy and ſumptuouſneſs of his table. He diſputed the prize in the olympic games with ſeven ſets of chariot horſes, which no private man had ever done before him; and he was crowned more than once on that occaſion. Extraordinary reſources were neceſſary for ſupporting ſuch luxury; and as avarice often ſerves as a reſource to ambition, there were ſome grounds to believe, that Alcibiades was no leſs ſollicitous for conquering Sicily and Carthage, (which he pretended to poſſeſs afterwards as his own) to enrich his family, than to render it glorious. It is natural to ſuppoſe, that Alcibiades did not let this ſpeech of Nicias go unanſwered.

"This,

" This, ſays Alcibiades, is not the firſt time that " merit has excited jealouſy, and glory been made the " object of envy. That very thing which is im- " puted to me for a crime, is, I will preſume to ſay " it, the honour of my country, and ought to gain " me applauſe. The ſplendor in which I live; the " great ſums I expend, particularly in the public aſ- " ſemblies; beſides their being juſt and lawful, at the " ſame time give foreigners a greater idea of the glory " of Athens; and ſhow, that it is not in ſuch want " of money as our enemies imagine. But this is not " our preſent buſineſs. Let the world form a judg- " ment of me, not from paſſion and prejudice, but " from my actions. Was it an inconſiderable ſervice " I did the republic, in bringing over, (in one day) " to its alliance, the people of Elis, of Mantinea and " of Argos, that is, the chief ſtrength of Peloponne- " ſus? Make uſe therefore, to aggrandize your em- " pire, of Alcibiades's youth and folly, (ſince his ene- " mies give it that name,) as well as of the wiſdom " and experience of Nicias; and do not repent, from " vain and idle fears, your engaging in an enterprize " publickly reſolved upon, and which may redound " infinitely both to your glory and advantage. The " cities of Sicily, weary of the unjuſt and cruel go- " vernment of their princes, and ſtill more of the ty- " rannical authority which Syracuſe exerciſes over " them, wait only for a favourable opportunity to " declare themſelves; and are ready to open their " gates to whomſoever ſhall offer to take off the yoke " under which they have ſo long groaned. Though " the citizens of Egeſta, in quality of your allies, " ſhould not have a right to your protection; yet the " glory of Athens ought to engage you to ſupport " them. Republicks aggrandize themſelves by ſuc- " couring the oppreſſed, and not by living unactive. " In the preſent ſtate of your affairs, the only way " to diſpirit your enemies, and ſhow that you are not " afraid of them, will be, to harraſs one nation, to

"check the progreſs of another, to keep them all em-
"ployed, and carry your arms into diſtant countries.
"Athens was not formed for eaſe; and it was not
"by inactivity that your anceſtors raiſed it to the
"height in which we now ſee it. For the reſt, what
"hazards will you run by engaging in the enterprize
"in queſtion? If it ſhould be crowned with ſucceſs,
"you will then poſſeſs yourſelves of all Greece; and
"ſhould it not anſwer your expectations, your fleet
"will give you an opportunity of retiring whenever
"you pleaſe. The Lacedæmonians indeed may make
"an incurſion into our country; but, beſides that it
"would not be in our power to prevent it though
"we ſhould not invade Sicily, we ſtill ſhall preſerve
"the empire of the ſea, in ſpite of them; a circum-
"ſtance which makes our enemies entirely deſpair of
"ever being able to conquer us. Be not therefore
"byaſſed by Nicias's reaſons. The only tendency of
"them is to ſow the ſeeds of diſcord between the
"young and old men, who can do nothing without
"one another; ſince it is wiſdom and courage, coun-
"ſel and execution, that give ſucceſs to all enter-
"prizes: and this in which we are going to imbark,
"cannot but turn to your advantage."

(*m*) The Athenians, flattered and pleaſed with Alcibiades's ſpeech, perſiſted in their firſt opinion. Nicias, on the other ſide, did not depart from his; but at the ſame time did not dare to oppoſe Alcibiades any further. Nicias was naturally of a ſoft and timid diſpoſition. He was not, like Pericles, maſter of that lively and vehement eloquence, which, like a torrent, bears down all things in its way. And indeed, the latter, on ſeveral occaſions and at ſeveral times, had never failed to check the wild ſtarts of the populace, who, even then, meditated the expedition into Sicily; becauſe he was always inflexible, and never ſlackened the reins of that authority and kind of ſovereignty

(*m*) Plut. in præc. de ger. rep. p. 802.

which

which he had acquired over the people; whereas * Nicias, both by acting and ſpeaking in an eaſy, gentle manner, ſo far from winning over the people, ſuffered himſelf to be forcibly and involuntarily carried away: and accordingly he at laſt yielded to the people, and accepted the command in a war which he plainly foreſaw would be attended with the moſt fatal conſequences.

Plutarch makes this reflection in his excellent treatiſe, where, ſpeaking of the qualities requiſite in a ſtateſman, he ſhows how very neceſſary eloquence and inflexible conſtancy and perſeverance are to him.

Nicias, not daring to oppoſe Alcibiades any longer openly, endeavoured to do it indirectly, by ſtarting a great number of difficulties, drawn eſpecially from the great expence of this expedition. He declared, that ſince they were reſolved upon war, they ought to carry it on in ſuch a manner as might ſuit the exalted reputation to which Athens had attained: That a fleet was not ſufficient to oppoſe ſo formidable a power as that of the Syracuſans and their allies: that they muſt raiſe an army, compoſed of good horſe and foot, if they deſired to act in a manner worthy of ſo grand a deſign: That beſides their fleet, which was to make them maſters at ſea, they muſt have a great number of tranſports, to carry proviſions perpetually to the army, which otherwiſe could not poſſibly ſubſiſt in an enemy's country: That they muſt carry vaſt ſums of money with them, without waiting for that promiſed them by the citizens of Egeſta, who perhaps were ready in words only, and very probably might break their promiſe: That they ought to weigh and examine the diſparity there was between themſelves and their enemies with regard to the conveniences and wants of the army; the Syracuſans being in their own country, in the midſt of powerful allies, diſpoſed by inclination as well as engaged by intereſt, to aſſiſt them with men,

* Καθάπερ ἀμβλεῖ χαλινῷ τῷ λόγῳ πειρώμενον ἀποτρέψειν τὸν δῆμον, ἢ κατέχειν.

arms,

arms, horſes, and proviſions; whereas the Athenians would carry on the war in a remote country poſſeſſed by their enemies, where, in the winter, news could not be brought them in leſs than four months time; a country, where all things would oppoſe the Athenians, and nothing be procured but by force of arms: That it would reflect the greateſt ignominy on the Athenians, ſhould they be forced to abandon their enterprize, and thereby become the ſcorn and contempt of their enemies, by their neglecting to take all the precautions which ſo important a deſign required: That as for himſelf, he was determined not to go, unleſs he was provided with all things neceſſary for the expedition, becauſe the ſafety of the whole army depended on that circumſtance; and that he would not rely on caprice, or the precarious engagements of the allies.

(*n*) Nicias had flattered himſelf, that this ſpeech would cool the ardor of the people, whereas it only enflamed it the more. Immediately the generals had full powers given them to raiſe as many troops, and fit out as many gallies as they ſhould judge neceſſary; and the levies were accordingly carried on in Athens and other places, with inexpreſſible activity.

SECT. VIII. *The Athenians prepare to ſet ſail. Siniſter omens. The ſtatues of Mercury are mutilated. Alcibiades is accuſed, and inſiſts upon his being tried, but his requeſt is not granted. Triumphant departure of the fleet.*

(*o*) WHEN all things were ready for their departure, and they were preparing to ſail, there happened ſeveral bad omens, which filled the minds of the people with trouble and diſquietude. The * women

(*n*) Diod. l. 13. p. 134. Thucyd. l. 6. p. 428. Plut. in Alcib. p. 200, 201.

(*o*) A. M. 3589. Ant J. C. 415.

* *This ſuperſtitious rite had extended even to God's people.* And behold there ſat women weeping for Tammuz, *Ezek.* viii. 14. N. B.

men were at that time celebrating the feſtival of Adonis, during which the whole city was in mourning, and full of images repreſenting dead perſons and funeral proceſſions; and every part echoed with the cries and groans of the women who followed thoſe ſtatues with lamentations of that kind. Whence it was feared, that this gay and magnificent armament would ſoon loſe all its ſplendor, and † wither away like a flower.

The general affliction was increaſed by another accident. The ſtatues of Mercury, which ſtood at the entrance of private houſes and temples, were all mutilated in one night, and particularly in the face; and although a great reward was promiſed to any perſon who ſhould diſcover the authors of ſo audacious a crime, no one was accuſed. The citizens could not forbear conſidering this uncommon event, not only as an unlucky omen, but as a contrivance of ſome factious men, who harboured very ill deſigns. Some young people had already been accuſed of committing much the like crime in the midſt of their cups; and particularly of having wantonly mimicked the ceremonies and myſteries of Ceres and Proſerpine; with Alcibiades, who repreſented the high-prieſt, at their head. (*p*) It highly concerns all thoſe in exalted ſtations, to be extremely careful of every ſtep they take, and not to give the leaſt opportunity to the moſt inveterate malice to cenſure them. They ought to call to mind, ſays Plutarch, that the eyes of all men are upon their conduct, and that they are ever eagle-ey'd on theſe occaſions; that not only their outward actions paſs the moſt ſevere ſcrutiny, but that they penetrate to their moſt private apartments, and there take the ſtricteſt notice of their diſcourſes, their diverſions,

(*p*) Plut. in præc. de rep. p. 800.

N. B. *The Latin verſion of the bible, which Mr. Rollin follows, ſays,* weeping for Adonis; *which is the ſame as Tammuz, the Hebrews calling Adonis by that name.*

† *The hiſtorian alludes to the plants and flowers that were carried in that ceremony, and which went by the name of Adonis's gardens.*

and the moſt ſecret things tranſacted by them. It was this dread of the piercing eye of the people, that kept Themiſtocles and Pericles perpetually on their guard, and obliged them to refrain from moſt of thoſe pleaſures in which others indulged themſelves.

As for Alcibiades, he did not know what it was to lay himſelf under any reſtraints; and accordingly, as his character was ſo well known, people were perſuaded he very probably had been concerned in what had happened. His luxury, libertiniſm and irreligion, gave an air of probability to this charge, and the accuſer was not afraid of telling his name. This attack ſtaggered the conſtancy and reſolution of Alcibiades; but hearing the ſoldiers and ſailors declare that they were induced to engage in this expedition by no other motive but their affection for Alcibiades; and that, ſhould the leaſt injury be done him, they would all leave the ſervice; he took heart, and appeared at his trial on the day appointed for that purpoſe. His enemies, upon pretence that it was neceſſary for the fleet to ſet ſail, got the judgment ſuperſeded. It was to no purpoſe for Alcibiades to inſiſt upon being tried, in caſe he was guilty, and not be ruined in his abſence; and to repreſent, that it would be the moſt ſhocking and barbarous injuſtice to oblige him to embark for ſo important an expedition, without firſt making due enquiry into the accuſations and horrid ſlanders which were caſt upon him, the bare thoughts of which would keep him in perpetual fear and anxiety. However, none of theſe remonſtrances proved effectual, and the fleet was ordered to ſet out.

(q) They accordingly prepared to ſet ſail, after having appointed Corcyra the rendezvous for moſt of the allies, and ſuch ſhips as were to carry the proviſions, &c. All the citizens, as well as foreigners in Athens, flocked by day-break to the port of Pyræus. The former attended their children, relations, friends or companions, with a joy overcaſt with a little ſor-

(q) Thucyd. p. 430—432. Diod. l. 13. p. 135.

row,

row, upon their bidding adieu to perſons that were as dear to them as life, who were ſetting out on a far diſtant and very dangerous expedition, from which it was uncertain whether they ever would return, tho' they flattered themſelves with the hopes that it would be ſucceſsful. The foreigners came thither to feed their eyes with a ſight which was highly worthy their curioſity; for no ſingle city in the world had ever fitted out ſo gallant a fleet. Thoſe indeed which had been ſent againſt Epidaurus and Potidæa, were as conſiderable with regard to the number of ſoldiers and ſhips; but then they were not equipped with ſo much magnificence, neither was their voyage ſo long, nor their enterprize ſo important. Here were ſeen a land and a naval army, provided with the utmoſt care, and at the expence of particular perſons as well as of the public, with all things neceſſary, on account of the length of the voyage, and the duration of the war. The city furniſhed an hundred empty gallies, that is, threeſcore light ones, and forty to tranſport the ſoldiers heavily armed. Every mariner received daily a drachma, or ten-pence (French) for his pay, excluſively of what the captains of ſhips gave the * rowers of the firſt bench. Add to this, the pomp and magnificence that was diſplayed univerſally; every one ſtriving to eclipſe the reſt, and each captain endeavouring to make his ſhip the lighteſt, and at the ſame time the gaieſt in the whole fleet. I ſhall not take notice of the choice of the ſoldiers and ſeamen, who were the flower of the Athenians; nor of their emulation with regard to the beauty and neatneſs of their arms and equipage; any more than of their officers who had laid out conſiderable ſums purely to diſtinguiſh themſelves, and to give foreigners an advantageous idea of their perſons and circumſtances; ſo that this ſight had the air of a tournament, in which the utmoſt magnificence is diſplayed, rather than of a warlike expe-

* *They were called* Θρανῖται. *They had longer oars than the reſt, and conſequently more trouble in rowing.*

dition. But the boldneſs and greatneſs of the deſign ſtill exceeded its expence and ſplendor.

When the ſhips were loaded, and the troops got on board, the trumpet ſounded, and ſolemn prayers were offered up for the ſucceſs of the expedition; gold and ſilver cups were filling every where with wine, and the accuſtomed libations were poured out; the people who lined the ſhore ſhouting at the ſame time, and lifting up their hands to heaven, to wiſh their fellow-citizens a good voyage and ſucceſs. And now, the hymn being ſung, and the ceremonies ended, the ſhips ſailed one after another out of the harbour; after which they ſtrove to outſail one another, till the whole fleet met at Ægina. From thence it made for Corcyra, where the army of the allies was aſſembling with the reſt of the fleet.

SECT. IX. *Syracuſe is alarmed. The Athenian fleet arrives in Sicily.*

(r) ADVICE of this expedition coming to Syracuſe from all quarters, it was thought ſo improbable, that at firſt no body would believe it. But as it was more and more confirmed every day, the Syracuſans began to think ſeriouſly of making the neceſſary preparations; and ſent deputations to every part of the iſland, to aſk aſſiſtance of ſome, and ſend ſuccours to others. They garriſoned all the caſtles and forts in the country; reviewed all the ſoldiers and horſes; examined the arms in the magazines; and ſettled and prepared all things, as if the enemy had been in their country.

In the mean time the fleet ſailed in three ſquadrons, each under the command of its particular general. It conſiſted of an hundred and thirty-ſix ſhips, an hundred whereof belonged to Athens, and the reſt to the allies. On board theſe ſhips were five thouſand heavy-armed ſoldiers, two thouſand two hundred of whom were Athenian citizens, *viz.* fifteen hundred of thoſe

(r) Thucyd. l. 6. p. 432—445. Diod. l. 13. p. 135, 136.

who

who had eſtates, and ſeven hundred * who had none, but were equally citizens; the reſt conſiſted of allies. With regard to the light infantry, there were eighty archers of Crete, and four hundred of other countries; ſeven hundred Rhodian ſlingers, and an hundred and twenty exiles of Megara. There was but one company of horſe, conſiſting of thirty troopers, who had embarked on board a veſſel proper for tranſporting cavalry. Both the fleet and the land-forces were afterwards increaſed conſiderably. Thirty veſſels carried the proviſions and cooks, with maſons, carpenters, and their ſeveral tools; the whole followed by an hundred ſmall veſſels for the ſervice, excluſive of merchant-ſhips, of which there were great numbers. All this fleet had ſailed together for Corcyra. Having met with but an indifferent reception from the people of Tarentum and Locris, they ſailed with a favourable wind for Rhegium, where they made ſome ſtay. The Athenians were very urgent with the inhabitants of Rhegium to ſuccour thoſe of Leontium, who came originally from Chalcis as well as themſelves: but theſe anſwered, that they were determined to ſtand neuter, and to undertake nothing but in concert with the reſt of Italy. Here they debated on the manner in which it was neceſſary to carry on the war, and waited for the coming up of thoſe ſhips that had been ſent out to make diſcoveries of a proper place for landing, and to enquire whether the citizens of Egeſta had got their money ready. Upon their return they brought advice that they had but thirty talents in the treaſury. This Nicias had foreſeen, but no regard had been paid to his ſalutary counſels.

(s) He did not fail, the inſtant this news was brought, to expatiate on the counſel he had given in Athens; to ſhow the wrong ſtep they had taken in engaging in this war; and to amplify the fatal conſequences which might be expected from it: in all

(s) Plut. in Nic. p. 532.

* *Theſe were called* θῆτες.

which he acted very imprudently. It was extremely judicious in Nicias to oppoſe it in the beginning, and to ſet every engine at work to cruſh if poſſible this ill-fated project. But as it was reſolved, and he himſelf had accepted of the command, he ought not to be perpetually looking backward, nor to have repeated inceſſantly, that this war had been undertaken in oppoſition to all the maxims of prudence; and, by that means, to cool the ardour of his two collegues in the command, to diſpirit the ſoldiers, and blunt that edge of confidence and ardor, which aſſure the ſucceſs of great enterprizes. The Athenians, on the contrary, ought to have advanced boldly towards the enemy; ſhould have attacked them with vigour, and have ſpread an univerſal terror, by a ſudden and unexpected deſcent.

But Nicias acted in a quite different manner. His opinion, in the council of war, was, that they ſhould ſail for Selinunta, which had been the firſt occaſion of this expedition; and then, if the citizens of Egeſta performed their promiſe, and gave a month's pay to the army, to proceed forward; or otherwiſe, to oblige them to furniſh proviſions for the ſixty gallies they had demanded, and continue in that road till they ſhould have concluded a peace with the citizens of Selinunta, either by force of arms or ſome other way. He ſaid, that they afterwards ſhould return to Athens, after having thus made a parade of their forces, and the aſſiſtance they gave their allies; unleſs they ſhould have an opportunity of making ſome attempt in favour of the Leontines, or of bringing over ſome city into their alliance.

Alcibiades anſwered, that it would be inglorious, after their ſailing out with ſo noble a fleet, to return without doing any thing; and that they ſhould firſt endeavour to conclude an alliance with the Greeks and Barbarians, in order to divide them from the Syracuſans, and procure troops and proviſions from them; and eſpecially to ſend a deputation to Meſſina, which

was

was a kind of key to Sicily, and its harbour capacious enough to hold all the fleet. He declared farther, that after ſeeing who were their friends and who their enemies, and ſtrengthning themſelves by the addition of a new reinforcement, they then ſhould attack either Selinunta or Syracuſe; in caſe the one ſhould refuſe to conclude a peace with Egeſta, and the other not permit the Leontines to return to their city.

Lamachus offered a third opinion, which perhaps was the moſt prudent; that was, to ſail directly for Syracuſe, before its citizens had time to recover from their ſurprize, or prepare for their defence. He obſerved, that the ſudden arrival of an armed force always ſtrikes the greateſt terror; and that when enemies are allowed time to reflect and make preparations, it alſo revives their courage; whereas, when they are ſuddenly attacked, and ſtill in confuſion, they are generally overcome; that as they would be maſters of the open country, they ſhould not be in want of any thing, but on the contrary, would oblige the Sicilians to declare for them: That at laſt they ſhould ſettle in Megara, which was quite deſert, and a near neighbour to Syracuſe, and there lay up their fleet in ſafety. However, his counſel not being followed, he agreed to that of Alcibiades: Accordingly they ſailed for Sicily, where Alcibiades took Catana by ſurprize.

SECT. X. *Alcibiades is recalled. He flies, and is ſentenced to die as an outlaw. He retires to Sparta. Flexibility of his genius and diſpoſition.*

(*t*) THIS was the firſt and laſt exploit performed by Alcibiades in this expedition, he being immediately recalled by the Athenians, in order to be tried upon the accuſation againſt him. For, from the departure of the fleet, his enemies, who had no regard to the welfare of their country; and who, upon the ſpecious pretence of religion, which is often made a cloak to cover the darkeſt deſigns, meditated nothing

(*t*) Thucyd. l. 6. p. 446—450. Plut. in Alcib. p. 202.

but ſatiating their hatred and revenge; his enemies, I ſay, taking advantage of his abſence, had proceeded in the affair with greater vigour than ever. All thoſe againſt whom informations were lodged, were thrown into priſon, without ſo much as being ſuffered to be heard, and that too on the evidence of the moſt profligate and abandoned citizens; as if, ſays Thucydides, it was not as great a crime to puniſh the innocent, as to ſuffer the guilty to eſcape. One of the informers was proved to be perjured by his own words; having declared that he ſaw and knew one of the accuſed by moon-light; whereas it appeared, that there was no moon at that time. But notwithſtanding this manifeſt perjury, the populace were as furious as ever. The remembrance of the tyranny of the Piſiſtratides made them apprehenſive of the like fate; and ſtrongly poſſeſſed with this fear, they would not give ear to any thing.

At laſt, they ſent out the * ſhip of Salamin, ordering the captain not to carry off Alcibiades by force, for fear of raiſing a tumult in the army; but only to order him to return to Athens, to pacify the people by his preſence. Alcibiades obeyed the order, and went immediately on board his galley; but the inſtant he was arrived at Thurium, and had got on ſhore, he diſappeared, and eluded the purſuit of thoſe who ſought after him. Being asked, whether he would not rely on his country, with regard to the judgment it might paſs on him: "I would not," ſays he, "rely on my "mother, for fear leſt ſhe ſhould inadvertently miſtake "a † black bean for a white one." The galley of Salamin returned back without the commander, who was aſhamed of his having ſuffered his prey to eſcape him in that manner. Alcibiades was ſentenced to die for his contumacy. His whole eſtate was confiſcated, and

* *This was a ſacred veſſel, appointed to fetch criminals.*

† *The judges made uſe of beans in giving their ſuffrages, and the black bean denoted condemnation.*

all

all prieſts and prieſteſſes were commanded to curſe him. Among the latter was one Theano, who alone had the courage to oppoſe this decree, ſaying, † *That ſhe had been appointed prieſteſs, not to curſe but to bleſs.* Some time after, news being brought him that the Athenians had condemned him to die, *I ſhall make them ſenſible,* ſays he, *that I am alive.*

(u) Much about this time Diagoras of Melia was proſecuted at Athens. He had ſettled himſelf in the latter city, where he taught atheiſm, and was brought to a trial for his doctrine. *(x)* Diagoras eſcaped the puniſhment which would have been inflicted on him, by flying from the city; but he could not wipe off the ignominy of the ſentence which condemned him to death. The Athenians had ſo great an abhorrence for the impious principles inculcated by him, that they even ſet a price upon his head, and promiſed a reward of a talent to any man who ſhould bring him dead or alive.

(y) About twenty years before, a like affair had happened to Protagoras, for having only treated the ſame queſtion by way of problem. He had ſaid in the beginning of one of his books: "Whether the gods do "or do not exiſt, is a queſtion which I know not "whether I ought to affirm or deny: for our under-"ſtandings are too much clouded, and the life of man "is too ſhort, for the ſolution of ſo nice and difficult "a point." But the Athenians could not bear to have a ſubject of this nature made a doubt; and for this reaſon, they ordered proclamation to be made by the public cryer, for all perſons who had any copies of this book, to bring them to the magiſtrates: after which they were burnt as infamous pieces, and the author was baniſhed, for ever, from all the territories of the Athenians.

(u) Joſeph. contr. App. (x) Diod. l. 13. p. 137.
(y) Diog. Laert. in Protag. Joſeph. contr. App. Cic. l. 1. de nat. deor. n. 62.

† Φάσκουσα ἐυχῶν οὐ καταρῶν ἱέρειαν γεγονέναι.

Diagoras and Protagoras had been the diſciples of Democritus, who firſt invented the philoſophy of atoms. I ſhall ſpeak of him in another place.

(z) From the departure of Alcibiades, Nicias had poſſeſſed the whole authority: for Lamachus his colleague, though a man of bravery and experience, was however in no credit becauſe of his extreme poverty, for which he was deſpiſed by the ſoldiers. But the Athenians were not always in this way of thinking; for we have ſeen that Ariſtides, poor as he was, was not leſs eſteemed and reſpected on that account: but in this laſt expedition, the people in general had imbibed a paſſion for luxury and magnificence; the natural conſequence of which is, a love of riches. As Nicias, therefore, governed all affairs ſolely, all his actions were of the ſame caſt with his diſpoſition, that is, of a ſlow and fearful kind: he ſuffered every thing to languiſh, ſometimes either by lying ſtill and undertaking nothing, ſometimes by only ſailing along the coaſt, or loſing time in conſulting and deliberating; all which ſoon ſuppreſſed, on one ſide, the ardour and confidence the troops expreſſed at firſt; and on the other, the fear and terror with which the enemy had been ſeized, at the ſight of ſo terrible an armament. He beſieged Hybla; and though it was but a ſmall city, he was however obliged to raiſe the ſiege ſome days after, which brought him into the higheſt contempt. He retired at laſt to Catana, after having perſormed but one exploit, *viz.* the ruining of Hyccara, a ſmall town inhabited by Barbarians, from which place it is ſaid, that Lais the curtezan, at that time very young, was ſold with the reſt of the captives, and carried to Peloponneſus.

(a) In the mean time, Alcibiades having left Thurium, was arrived at Argos; and as he quite deſpaired of ever being recalled home, he ſent a meſſenger to the Spartans, deſiring leave to reſide among them, under

(z) Thucyd. p. 452, 453. Plut. in Nic. p. 533. (a) Plut. in Alcib. p. 230.

their

their guard and protection. He promiſed in the moſt ſolemn manner, that if they would conſider him as their friend, he would perform greater ſervice for their ſtate, than he before had done injuries to it. The Spartans received him with open arms; and ſoon after his arrival in their city, he gained the love and eſteem of all its inhabitants. He charmed and even inchanted them, by his conforming himſelf ſo eaſily to their way of living. Such people as ſaw Alcibiades ſhave himſelf to the ſkin, bathe in cold water; eat of the coarſe, heavy cakes which were their uſual food, and be ſo well ſatisfied with their black broth; could not perſuade themſelves, that a man who ſubmitted ſo chearfully to this kind of life, had ever kept cooks in his palace; had uſed eſſences and perfumes; had wore the rich ſtuffs of Miletus; in a word, that he had hitherto lived in the midſt of voluptuouſneſs and profuſion of all things. But flexibility was the characteriſtic that chiefly diſtinguiſhed Alcibiades. Cameleon like, he could aſſume all ſhapes and colours, to win the favour of thoſe among whom he reſided. He immediately aſſumed their manners, and adapted himſelf to their taſte, as if they had been natural in him; and though he inwardly had an averſion to them, he could however cover his diſguſt with an eaſy, ſimple and unconſtrained air. With ſome he had all the graces and vivacity of the gayeſt youth, and with others all the gravity of old age. In Sparta, he was laborious, frugal and auſtere; in Ionia, enjoyment, idleneſs and pleaſure, made up his whole life: in Thrace, he was always on horſeback or carouzing: and when he reſided with Tiſſaphernes the ſatrap, he exceeded all the magnificence of the Perſians in luxury and profuſion.

But he was not barely ſatisfied with gaining the eſteem of the Lacedæmonians. He inſinuated himſelf ſo far into the affection of Timea, the wife of king Agis, that he had a ſon by her, who, in public, went by the name of Leotychides; though his mother,

in

in private, and among her women and female friends, did not bluſh to call him Alcibiades; ſo violent was her paſſion for that Athenian. Agis was informed of this intrigue, and therefore refuſed to own Leotychides for his ſon; for which reaſon he was afterwards excluded the throne.

SECT. XI. *Deſcription of Syracuſe.*

AS the ſiege of Syracuſe is one of the moſt conſiderable in the Grecian hiſtory; the particular circumſtances of which I thought proper to relate for that reaſon, in order to give my readers an idea of the manner of beſieging by the antients; I judged it neceſſary, before I enter into that detail, to give the reader a deſcription and plan of the city of Syracuſe; in which he will alſo find the different fortifications, both of the Athenians and Syracuſans, mentioned in this ſiege.

(*b*) Syracuſe ſtood on the eaſtern coaſt of Sicily. Its vaſt extent, its advantageous ſituation, the conveniency of its double harbour; its fortifications built with the utmoſt care and labour, and the multitude and wealth of its inhabitants, made it one of the greateſt, the moſt beautiful, and moſt powerful among the Grecian cities. * We are told its air was ſo pure and ſerene, that there was no day in the year, how cloudy ſoever it might be, in which the ſun did not diſplay its beams.

(*c*) It was built by Archias the Corinthian, a year after Naxos and Megara had been founded on the ſame coaſt.

When the Athenians beſieged this city, it was divided into three parts, *viz.* the iſland, Achradina and Tyche. Thucydides mentions only theſe three diviſions.

(*b*) Cic. Verr. 6. n. 117—119. 709. Strab. l. 6. p. 269.

(*c*) A. M. 3295. Ant. J. C.

* Urbem Syracuſas elegerat, cujus hic ſitus atque hæc natura eſſe loci cœlique dicitur, ut nullus unquam dies tam magna turbulentaque tempeſtate fuerit, quin aliquo tempore ſolem ejus diei homines viderent. *Cic. Verr.* 7. n. 26.

Two

A PLAN OF THE CITY OF SYRACUSE
Besieged by the Athenians



The Fortifications of the Athenians and Syracusans

1 *The fortified Camp of the Athenians*
2 *The Wall that faces Epipolæ in its whole extent built by the Syracusans to surround Temenos.*
3 *Contravallation which the Athenians attempt to carry from the Foot of Epipolæ along the Northern Wall of Tyche as far as Trogilus.*
4 *The traverse Wall drawn by the Syracusans to cut the Contravallation of the Athenians.*
5 *Western Contravallation of the Athenians from the hills of Epipolæ downwards calld the single Wall.*
6 *Continuation of the western Contravalation of the Athenians from the Plain to the great Harbour calld the double Wall.*
7 *The Foss lind with Palisades made by the Syracusans, to cut the Contravallation thro' the Fens.*
8 *The Wall carried on by the Syracusans, going upward from the City towards Epipolæ against the single Wall built by the Athenians.*

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Two more, *viz.* Neapolis and Epipolæ, were afterwards added.

The ISLAND, ſituated to the ſouth, was called Νῆσος (Naſos) ſignifying, in Greek, an iſland, but pronounced according to the Doric dialect; and Ortygia. It was joined to the continent by a bridge. (*d*) It was in this iſland that the Syracuſans afterwards built the citadel, and the palace for their kings. This quarter or diviſion of the city was of very great importance, becauſe it might render thoſe who poſſeſſed it, maſter of the two ports which ſurround it. It was for this reaſon the Romans, when they took Syracuſe, would not ſuffer any Syracuſans to inhabit the iſland.

(*e*) There was in this iſland a very famous ſpring called Arethuſa. The antients, or rather the poets, from reaſons which have not the leaſt ſhadow of probability, ſuppoſed that Alpheus, a river of Elis in Peloponneſus, rolled its waters either through or under the waves of the ſea, without ever mixing with them, as far as the ſpring or fountain of Arethuſa. It was this fiction gave occaſion to the following lines of Virgil:

Extremum hunc, Arethuſa, mihi concede laborem.——
Sic tibi, cum fluctus ſubterlabêre Sicanos,
Doris amara ſuam non intermiſceat undam.
Virg. eclog. 10.

Thy ſacred ſuccour, Arethuſa, bring,
To crown my labour: 'tis the laſt I ſing——
So may thy ſilver ſtreams beneath the tide,
Unmix'd with briny ſeas, ſecurely glide. Dryden.

ACHRADINA, ſituated entirely on the ſea-ſide towards the eaſt, was the moſt ſpacious, the moſt beautiful, and beſt fortified quarter of the city.

TYCHE, ſo called from the temple of Fortune (Τύχη) which embelliſhed that part of the city, extended along Achradina weſtward from the north towards the

(*d*) Cic. Verr. 7. n. 97. Senec. Nat. Quæſt. l. 3. c. 26.
(*e*) Strab. l. 6. p. 270.

ſouth,

ſouth, and was very well inhabited. It had a famous gate called Hexapylum, which led into the country, and was ſituated to the north of the city.

EPIPOLÆ was a hill without the city, which it commanded. It was ſituated between Hexapylum and the point of Euryelus, towards the north and weſt. It was exceedingly ſteep in ſeveral places, and for that reaſon of very difficult acceſs. At the time of the ſiege in queſtion, it was not ſurrounded with walls; and the Syracuſans defended it with a body of troops, againſt the attacks of the enemy. Euryelus was the paſs or entrance which led to Epipolæ. On the ſame hill of Epipolæ was a fort called Labdalon or Labdalum.

It was not till long after, (under Dionyſius the tyrant,) that Epipolæ was ſurrounded with walls, and incloſed within the city, of which it formed a fifth part, but was thinly inhabited. A fourth diviſion had been added before, called NEAPOLIS, that is, the new city, which covered Tyche.

(*f*) The river Anapis ran at almoſt half a league diſtance from the city. The ſpace between them was a large and beautiful plain, terminated by two fens or moors, the one called Syraco, whence the city was named, and the other Lyſimelia. This river emptied itſelf into the great harbour. Near its mouth, ſouthward, was a kind of caſtle called Olympia, from the temple of Jupiter Olympius ſtanding there, and in which were great riches. It was five hundred paces from the city.

Syracuſe had two harbours, very near one another, and ſeparated only by the iſle, *viz.* the great harbour, and the ſmall one called otherwiſe Laccus. According to the * deſcription which the Roman orator gives of them, both were ſurrounded with buildings as parts of the city.

(*f*) Plut. in Dionyſ. vit. p. 970.

* Portus habet prope in ædificatione aſpectuque urbis incluſos. *Cic. Verr.* 6. n. 117.

The

The greateſt harbour was a little above † five thouſand paces, or two leagues in circumference. It had a gulph called Daſcon. The entrance of this port was but five hundred paces wide. It was formed, on one ſide, by the point of the iſland Ortygia; and on the other, by the little iſland and cape of Plemmyrium, which was commanded by a fort or caſtle of the ſame name.

Above Achradina was a third port, called the harbour of Trogilus.

SECT. XII. *Nicias, after ſome engagements, beſieges Syracuſe. Lamachus is killed in a battle. The city is reduced to the greateſt extremities.*

EIGHTEENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

(g) AT the end of the ſummer, news was brought Nicias that the Syracuſans, having reſumed courage, intended to march againſt him. Already their cavalry advanced with an air of inſolence to attack him even in his camp; and aſked with a loud laugh, whether he was come into Sicily to ſettle in Catana. Theſe ſevere reproaches rouzed him a little, ſo that he reſolved to ſail for Syracuſe. The enterprize was bold and dangerous. Nicias could not, without running the utmoſt hazard, attempt to land in preſence of an enemy who waited for him with the greateſt reſolution; and would not fail to charge him, the inſtant he ſhould offer to make a deſcent. Nor was it ſafer for him to march his troops by land, becauſe, as he had no cavalry, that of the Syracuſans which was very numerous, upon the firſt advice they ſhould have of their march, would come to blows, and overpower him by the ſuperiority of forces.

To extricate himſelf from this perplexity, and ena-

(g) Thucyd. l. 6. p. 453—461. Plut. in Nic. p. 533, 534. Diod. l. 137, 138.

† *According to Strabo, it is eighty ſtadia in circumference, which is twice its real extent; a plain proof that this paſſage of Strabo is corrupt.* Cluver. p. 167.

ble himſelf to ſeize without oppoſition upon an advantageous poſt, which a Syracuſan exile had diſcovered to him, Nicias had recourſe to ſtratagem. He cauſed a falſe piece of news to be given to the enemy, *viz.* that by means of a conſpiracy which was to take effect on a certain day, they might ſeize on his camp, and poſſeſs themſelves of all the arms and baggage. The Syracuſans, on this promiſe, marched towards Catana, and pitch'd their camp near Leontium. The moment the Athenians had advice of this, they embarked with all their troops and ammunition; and in the evening ſteered for Syracuſe. They arrived by day-break in the great harbour; landed near Olympia, in the place which had been pointed out to them, and there fortified themſelves. The enemy finding themſelves ſhamefully over-reached, returned immediately to Syracuſe; and, in the greateſt rage, drew up in battle-array ſome days after, before the walls of the city. Nicias marched out of the trenches, and a battle was fought. Victory was a long time doubtful, but a very heavy ſhower of rain, accompanied with thunder and lightning, coming unexpectedly, the Syracuſans, who were unexperienced, and the greateſt part of them having never carried arms before, were frighted at the tempeſt, whilſt their enemies laughed at it, as the mere effect of the ſeaſon; and regarded nothing but the enemy, who were much more to be dreaded than the ſtorm. The Syracuſans, after making a long and vigorous reſiſtance, were forced to give way. The Athenians could not purſue them far, becauſe their horſe, which was ſtill in a body and had not been defeated, covered their retreat. The Syracuſans retreated in good order into the city, after having thrown a body of troops into the temple of Olympia to prevent its being plundered.

This temple ſtood pretty near the camp of the Athenians, who were very deſirous of taking it, becauſe it abounded with gold and ſilver offerings, which the piety of kings and nations had conſecrated. Nicias having

having delayed ſending troops to ſeize it, loſt the opportunity, and gave the Syracuſans time to throw into it, as was before obſerved, a detachment to defend it. It was thought he did this on purpoſe, and out of reverence to the gods; becauſe, had the ſoldiers plundered this temple, the public would not have reaped any benefit by it, and himſelf only had been accuſed of the ſacrilege.

After the battle, the Athenians, who were not yet in a condition to attack Syracuſe, retired with their fleet to Naxos and Catana to winter there, with deſign to return in the beginning of the next ſpring, and lay ſiege to the city. To do this, they wanted money, proviſions, and particularly horſe, of which they were abſolutely deſtitute. The Athenians depended upon obtaining part of theſe ſuccours from the people of Sicily, whom they ſuppoſed would join them, the inſtant they ſhould hear of their victory; and at the ſame time they ſent an expreſs to Athens, to ſollicit the like aid. They alſo addreſſed the Carthaginians for their alliance; and ſent deputies to ſome cities of Italy, ſituated on the coaſt of the Tuſcan ſea, which had promiſed to aſſiſt them.

The Syracuſans were far from deſponding. Hermocrates, who, of all their leaders, was moſt diſtinguiſhed for his valour, his judgment and experience, repreſented to them, in order to raiſe their hopes, that they had not been wanting in courage but in conduct; that the enemies, though very brave, owed their victory to their good fortune rather than to their merit; that the having a multitude of leaders, (they were fifteen in number) from which confuſion and diſobedience are inſeparable, had done them prejudice; that it would be abſolutely neceſſary for them to chuſe experienced generals, to keep the reſt in their duty, and exerciſe their forces continually during the winter ſeaſon. This advice being followed, Hermocrates and two more were elected generals; after which they ſent deputies to Corinth and Lacedæmon to renew the alliance,

liance, and at the ſame time to engage them to make a diverſion, in order to oblige, if poſſible, the Athenians to recal their troops out of Sicily, or at leaſt to prevent their ſending a reinforcement thither. The fortifying of Syracuſe was the chief object of their care. Accordingly they took into the city, by a wall, all the tract of land towards Epipolæ, from the northern extremity of Tyche, deſcending weſtward towards the quarter or diviſion of the city called afterwards Neapolis, in order to remove the enemy to a greater diſtance, and to give them more trouble in making their contravallation, by obliging them to give a larger extent to it. This part, in all probability, had been neglected, becauſe it ſeemed to be ſufficiently defended by its rugged and ſteep ſituation. They alſo garriſoned Megara and Olympia, and drove ſtakes into all thoſe parts of the ſea-ſhore, where the enemy might eaſily make a deſcent. Hearing afterwards that the Athenians were at Naxos, they went and burnt the camp of Catana, and retired, after laying waſte the country adjacent to it.

(*b*) The ambaſſadors of Syracuſe being arrived among the Corinthians, aſked ſuccour of them as having been their founders, which was immediately granted; and at the ſame time they ſent an embaſſy to the Lacedæmonians, to invite them to declare in their favour. Alcibiades enforced their demand with all his credit and eloquence, which his reſentment againſt Athens inflamed prodigiouſly. He adviſed and exhorted the Lacedæmonians to appoint Gylippus their general, and ſend him into Sicily; and at the ſame time to invade the Athenians, in order to make a powerful diverſion. In the third place, he counſelled them to fortify Decelia in Attica, which quite compleated the ruin of the city of Athens, it not being able ever to recover that blow: For by this fort, the Lacedæmonians made themſelves maſters of the coun-

(*b*) Thucyd. l. 6. p. 471—482. Plut. in Alcib. p. 203. In Nic. p. 534, 535. Diod. l. 13. p. 138.

try,

try, by which the Athenians were deprived of their ſilver mines of Laurium, and of the revenues of their lands; nor could they be ſuccoured by their neighbours, Decelia becoming the aſylum of all the male-contents and partizans of Sparta.

(*i*) Nicias had received ſome ſuccours from Athens. It conſiſted of two hundred and fifty horſemen, whom the Athenians ſuppoſed would be furniſhed with horſes in Sicily, (the troops bringing only the furniture) and of thirty horſe-archers, with three hundred talents, that is, three hundred thouſand French crowns *. Nicias now began to prepare for action. He was accuſed of often letting ſlip opportunities, by his loſing time in deliberating, arguing and concerting meaſures; however, when once he entered upon action, he was as bold and vigorous in executing, as he before had been ſlow and timorous in undertaking, as he ſhowed on the preſent occaſion.

The Syracuſans hearing that the Athenians had a reinforcement of cavalry, and would ſoon march and lay ſiege to their city; and knowing they could not poſſibly approach it, or make a contravallation, unleſs they ſhould poſſeſs themſelves of the hill of Epipolæ which commanded Syracuſe, they reſolved to guard the avenue to it, which was the only paſs by which the enemy could get up to it, every other part being rugged and inacceſſible. Marching therefore down into the meadow or plain, bordered by the river Anapis, and reviewing their troops there, they appointed ſeven hundred foot, under the command of Diomilus, to guard that important poſt; and commanded them to repair to it, at the firſt ſignal which ſhould be given for that purpoſe. But Nicias conducted his deſign with ſo much prudence, expedition, and ſecrecy, that they had not time to do this. He ſailed from Catana with all his fleet, without the enemy's having the leaſt ſuſpicion of his deſign. Being arrived at the port of

(*i*) A. M. 3590. Ant. J. C. 414.

* *About* 67000 l. *ſterling.*

Trogilus

Trogilus near Leontium, which is but a quarter of a league (ſix or ſeven furlongs) from Epipolæ, he put his land-forces on ſhore, after which he retired with his fleet to Thapſus, a ſmall peninſula of Syracuſe, the entrance to which he ſhut up with a ſtaccado.

The land-forces marched with the utmoſt expedition to ſeize on Epipolæ, by the paſs of Euryelus, before the enemy, who were in the plains of Anapis at above a league's diſtance, had the leaſt notice of their arrival. At the firſt news of this, the ſeven hundred ſoldiers under the command of Diomilus, advanced forward in confuſion, but were eaſily defeated; and three hundred of them, with their leader, left dead in the field. The Athenians, after ſetting up a trophy, built a fort in Labdalon, on the ſummit of Epipolæ, in order to ſecure their baggage and moſt valuable effects in it, whenever they ſhould be forced to fight, or work at the contravallation.

Soon after, the inhabitants of Egeſta ſent the Athenians three hundred horſe, to which ſome of their Sicilian allies added a hundred more, that with the two hundred and fifty ſent before by the Athenians, and who had furniſhed themſelves with horſes in Sicily, made a body of ſix hundred and fifty horſe.

The plan laid down by Nicias, in order for taking Syracuſe, was, to ſurround all the city on the land-ſide with a ſtrong contravallation, in order to cut off all communication with the place from without, in hopes no doubt that his fleet would afterwards enable him to prevent the Syracuſans from receiving any ſuccours or proviſions by ſea.

Having left a garriſon in Labdalon, he came down from the hill, advanced towards the northern extremity of Tyche, and halting there, he employed the whole army in throwing up a line of contravallation, to ſhut up their city northward from Tyche as far as Trogilus, ſituate on the ſea-ſide. This work was carried on with ſuch a rapidity, as terrified the Syracuſans. They thought it abſolutely neceſſary to prevent the carrying

carrying on of this work, and accordingly made ſome ſallies and attacks, but always with diſadvantage, and even their cavalry was routed. The day after the action, the contravallation (northward) was continued by part of the army, during which the reſt carried ſtones and other materials towards Trogilus, in order to finiſh it.

The beſieged, by the advice of Hermocrates, thought it adviſable not to venture a ſecond battle with the Athenians; and only endeavoured to put a ſtop to their works, at leaſt to render them uſeleſs, by running a line to cut that carried on by the Athenians. They imagined, that in caſe they ſhould be ſuffered to complete their wall, it would be impoſſible for the Athenians to make any farther progreſs in their work: or that, ſhould they endeavour to prevent it, it would ſuffice for the Syracuſans to oppoſe them with a part of their forces, after having ſhut up ſuch avenues as were moſt acceſſible with ſtrong paliſades; and that the Athenians, on the contrary, would be obliged to ſend for all their forces, and entirely abandon their works.

Accordingly they came out of their city, and working with inexpreſſible ardor, they began to raiſe a wall; and, in order to carry it on with leſs moleſtation, they covered it with ſtrong paliſades, and flanked it with wooden towers, at proper diſtances, to defend it. The Athenians ſuffered the Syracuſans to carry on their works undiſturbed, becauſe, had they marched only part of their troops againſt them, they would have been too weak; and if they had brought them all, they then muſt have been obliged to diſcontinue their works, which they were reſolved not to do. The work being compleated, the Syracuſans left a body of troops to defend the paliſade and guard the wall, and then returned into the city.

In the mean time the Athenians cut off the canals by which water was conveyed into the city; and obſerving the Syracuſan ſoldiers who had been left to

guard

guard the wall, very negligent in their duty; ſome returning at noon either into the city or their tents, and the reſt not keeping a proper guard; they detached three hundred choſen ſoldiers, and ſome light infantry, to attack this poſt; during which the reſt of the army marched towards the city, to prevent any ſuccours from coming out of it. Accordingly, the three hundred ſoldiers having forced the paliſade, purſued thoſe who guarded it as far as that part of the city wall which covered Temenos, where, pouring in indiſcriminately with them, they were repulſed by the inhabitants with loſs. The whole army afterwards demoliſhed the wall, and pulled up the paliſades of the intrenchment, and carried them off.

After this ſucceſs, whereby the Athenians were maſters of the northern parts, they began, the very next day, a ſtill more important work, and which would quite finiſh their incloſure of the city; *viz.* to carry a wall from the hills of Epipolæ, weſtward, thro' the plain and the fens as far as the great harbour. To prevent this, the beſieged beginning the ſame kind of work as they had carried on on the other ſide, ran a trench, lined with paliſades, from the city through the fens, to prevent the Athenians from carrying their contravallations as far as the ſea. But the latter, after finiſhing the firſt part of the wall on the hills of Epipolæ, reſolved to attack this new work. For this purpoſe, they ordered their fleet to ſail from Thapſus to the great harbour of Syracuſe, it having continued in that road hitherto; and the beſieged had always the ſea open to them, by which the beſiegers were obliged to get their proviſions from Thapſus by land. The Athenians came down therefore from Epipolæ into the plain, before day-break; when throwing planks and beams in that part where the fen was only ſlimy and more firm than in other places, they immediately carried the greateſt part of the foſsé lined with paliſades, and then the reſt, after having beat the Syracuſans, who gave way and retired; ſuch as were on the right,

towards

towards the city, and the reſt towards the river. Three hundred choſen Athenians having attempted to cut off the paſſage of the latter, flew towards the bridge; but the enemy's cavalry, the greateſt part of which were drawn up in battle, repulſed them; and afterwards charged the right wing of the Athenians, and put the firſt battalions into diſorder. Lamachus perceiving this from the leſt wing where he commanded, ran thither with the Argives and ſome archers; but having paſſed a trench, and being abandoned by his ſoldiers, he was killed with five or ſix who followed him. The enemy immediately paſſed the river, and ſeeing the reſt of the army come up, they retired.

At the ſame time their right wing, which had returned towards the city, reſumed courage from this ſucceſs, and drew up in order of battle before the Athenians; after having detached ſome troops to attack the fort on the hills of Epipolæ, which ſerved as a magazine to the enemy, and was thought to be unguarded. They forced an intrenchment that covered the fort, but Nicias ſaved it. He was ſick in this fort, and at that time in his bed, with only his domeſticks about him. Animated by the danger and the preſence of the enemy, he ſtruggles with his indiſpoſition; riſes up, and commands his ſervants to ſet fire immediately to all the timber, lying between the intrenchment and the fort for the military engines, and to the engines themſelves. This unexpected conflagration ſtopped the Syracuſans, ſaved Nicias, the fort, and all the rich effects of the Athenians, who made haſte to the relief of that general. At the ſame time, the fleet was ſeen ſailing into the great harbour, according to the orders given for that purpoſe. The Syracuſans having perceived this from the hill, and fearing they ſhould be attacked from behind, and over-powered by the land-forces, they retired, and returned to the city with all their forces; now no longer expecting, after having loſt their foſſé lined with paliſades, that it would be

be poſſible for them to prevent the enemy from carrying on their contravallation as far as the ſea.

In the mean time the Athenians, who had contented themſelves with building a ſingle wall on the hills of Epipolæ, and through ſuch places as were craggy and of difficult acceſs, being come down into the plain, began to build, at the foot of the hills, a double wall, intending to carry it as far as the ſea; *viz.* a wall of contravallation againſt the beſieged, and another of circumvallation againſt thoſe Syracuſan troops which were out of the city, and ſuch allies as might come to its aid.

From thenceforth Nicias, who now was ſole general, conceived great hopes; for ſeveral cities of Sicily, which hitherto had not declared for either ſide, came and joined him; and there arrived from all quarters veſſels laden with proviſions for his army, all parties being eager to go over to him, becauſe he had acquired the ſuperiority, and been exceedingly ſucceſsful in all his undertakings. The Syracuſans, ſeeing themſelves blocked up both by ſea and land, and loſing all hopes of being able to defend their city any longer, already propoſed an accommodation. Gylippus, who was coming from Lacedæmon to their aſſiſtance, having heard, in his paſſage, the extremity to which they were reduced, and looking upon the whole iſland as loſt, ſailed forward nevertheleſs; not in the view of defending Sicily, but only to preſerve to the nations of Italy, ſuch cities as were ſubject to them in that iſland, if it were not too late, and if this could be done. For fame had declared, in all places, that the Athenians had already poſſeſſed themſelves of the whole iſland; and were headed by a general, whoſe wiſdom and good fortune rendred him invincible. Nicias himſelf, now (contrary to his natural diſpoſition) confiding in his own ſtrength, and elate from his ſucceſs; perſuaded alſo by the ſecret advices which were brought him daily from Syracuſe, and the meſſengers who were ſent to him, that the city would immediately capitulate,

late, did not regard Gylippus's approach, and in conſequence took no precautions to prevent his landing, eſpecially when he heard that he brought but very few veſſels; terming him a trifling pyrate, not worthy, in any manner, his notice. But a general ought to be extremely careful not to abate his cares and vigilance upon account of ſucceſs, becauſe the leaſt negligence may ruin every thing. Had Nicias ſent the ſmalleſt detachment to oppoſe Gylippus's landing, he would have taken Syracuſe, and the whole affair had been ended.

SECT. XIII. *The Syracuſans reſolve to capitulate, but Gylippus's arrival changes the face of affairs. Nicias is forced by his collegues to engage in a ſea-fight, and is overcome. His land-forces are alſo defeated.*

NINETEENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

(*k*) THE fortifications of the Athenians were now almoſt compleated; and they had drawn a double wall, near half a league in length, along the plain and the fens towards the great port, and had almoſt reached it. There now remained, on the ſide towards Trogilus, only a ſmall part of the wall to be finiſhed. The Syracuſans were therefore on the brink of ruin, and had no hopes left, as they were no longer able to defend themſelves, and did not expect any ſuccours. For this reaſon they reſolved to ſurrender. Accordingly, a council was held to ſettle articles of capitulation, in order to preſent them to Nicias; and ſeveral were of opinion, that it would be proper to capitulate ſoon, before the city ſhould be entirely inveſted.

It was at that very inſtant, and in the moſt critical juncture, that an officer, Gongyles by name, arrived from Corinth on board a ſhip with three benches of oars. At his arrival, all the citizens flocked round

(*k*) A. M. 3591. Ant. J. C. 413. Thucyd. l. 7. p. 485—489. Plut. in Nic. p. 535, 536. Diod. l. 13. p. 138, 139.

him. He informed them, that Gylippus would be with them immediately, and was followed by a great many other gallies, which came to their aid. The Syracuſans aſtoniſhed, or rather ſtupefied, as it were, with this news, could ſcarce believe what they heard. Whilſt they were thus fluctuating and in doubt, a courier arrived from Gylippus to inform them of his approach, and order them to march out all their troops to meet him. He himſelf, after having taken a * fort in his way, marched in battle directly for Epipolæ; and aſcending by Euryelus, as the Athenians had done, he prepared to attack them from without, whilſt the Syracuſans ſhould charge them, on their ſide, with the forces of Syracuſe and his. The Athenians, exceedingly ſurprized by his arrival, drew up haſtily, and without order, under the walls. With regard to himſelf, laying down his arms when he approached, he ſent word by a herald, that he would allow the Athenians five days to leave Sicily. Nicias did not condeſcend to make the leaſt anſwer to this propoſal; and ſome of his ſoldiers burſting out a laughing, aſked the herald, *Whether the preſence of a Lacedæmonian privateer, and a trifling wand, could make any change in the preſent ſtate of the city?* Both ſides therefore prepared for battle.

Gylippus ſtormed the fort of Labdalon, and cut to pieces all who were found in it. The ſame day an Athenian galley was taken, as it ſailed into the harbour. The beſieged afterwards drew a wall from the city, towards Epipolæ, in order to cut (about the extremity of it) the ſingle wall of the Athenians; and to deprive them of all communication with the troops, poſted in the intrenchments which ſurrounded the city on the north ſide towards Tyche and Trogilus. The Athenians, after having finiſhed the wall, which extended as far as the ſea towards the great harbour, were returned to the hills. Gylippus perceiving, in the ſingle wall which the Athenians had built on the

* *Jeges.*

hills

hills of Epipolæ, a part that was weaker and lower than the reſt, marched thither in the night with his troops; but being diſcovered by the Athenians who were encamped without, he was forced to retire, upon ſeeing them advance directly towards him. They raiſed the wall higher, and themſelves undertook the guard of it; after having fixed their allies in the ſeveral poſts of the remainder of the intrenchment.

Nicias, on the other ſide, thought proper to fortify the cape of Plemmyrium, which, by its running into the ſea, ſtraitned the mouth of the great harbour; and his deſign thereby was, to procure proviſions, and all other things he might want, the more eaſily; becauſe the Athenians, by poſſeſſing themſelves of that poſt, drew near the little port, wherein lay the chief naval forces of the Syracuſans, and were the better able to obſerve the various motions of it; and that beſides, by having the ſea open, they would not be forced to have all their proviſions from the bottom of the great harbour; as they muſt have been, ſhould the enemy, by ſeizing on the mouth of it, oblige them to keep cloſe in the harbour, in the manner they then did. For Nicias, from the arrival of Gylippus, had no hopes left but from the ſide next the ſea. Sending therefore his fleet and part of his troops thither, he built three forts, by which the ſhips were enabled to lie at anchor; he alſo ſecured there a great part of the baggage and ammunition. It was then that the troops on board the fleet ſuffered very much; for, as they were obliged to go a great way to fetch wood and water, they were ſurrounded by the enemy's horſe, the third part of which were poſted at Olympia, to prevent the garriſon of Plemmyrium from ſallying, and were maſters of the field. Advice being brought Nicias, that the Corinthian fleet was advancing, he ſent twenty gallies againſt it; ordering them to obſerve the enemy towards Locris, Rhegium, and the reſt of the avenues of Sicily.

In the mean time Gylippus, employing thoſe very ſtones which the Athenians had got together for their uſe, went on with the wall which the Syracuſans had begun to carry through Epipolæ; and drew up daily in battle-array before it, as did the Athenians. When he ſaw it was a proper time for engaging, he began the battle in the ſpot lying between the two walls. The narrowneſs of it having rendered his cavalry and archers uſeleſs, he came off with loſs, and the Athenians ſet up a trophy. Gylippus, to reanimate his ſoldiers, by doing them juſtice, had the courage to reproach himſelf for the ill ſucceſs they had met with; and to declare publickly, that he, not they, had occaſioned the late defeat; becauſe he had made them fight in too narrow a ſpot of ground. However, he promiſed ſoon to give them an opportunity of recovering both their honour and his; and accordingly, the very next day, he led them againſt the enemy, after having exhorted them in the ſtrongeſt terms, to behave in a manner worthy of their antient glory. Nicias perceiving, that though he ſhould not deſire to come to a battle, it would however be abſolutely neceſſary for him to prevent the enemy from extending their line beyond the contravallation, to which they were already very near; (becauſe otherwiſe this would be granting them a certain victory) he therefore marched againſt the Syracuſans. Gylippus brought up his troops beyond that place, where the walls terminated on both ſides, in order that he might leave the more room to extend his battle; when charging the enemy's left wing with his horſe, he put it to flight, and ſoon after defeated the right. We have here an inſtance of what the experience and abilities of a great captain are capable of producing: for Gylippus, with the ſame men, the ſame arms, the ſame horſes, and the ſame ground; by only changing his order of battle, defeated the Athenians, and beat them quite to their camp. The following night, the victors carried on their wall beyond the contravallation of the Athenians, and thereby

thereby deprived them of all hopes of being ever able to ſurround them.

(*a*) After this ſucceſs, the Syracuſans, to whoſe aid the Corinthian fleet was arrived unperceived by that of the Athenians, reſumed courage, armed ſeveral gallies; and marching into the plains with their cavalry and other forces, took a great number of priſoners. They ſent deputies to Lacedæmonia and Corinth to deſire a reinforcement; Gylippus went in perſon to all the cities of Sicily, to ſollicit them to join him; and brought over the greateſt part of them, who accordingly ſent him powerful ſuccours. Nicias, finding his troops leſſen, and thoſe of the enemy increaſe daily, began to be diſcouraged; and not only ſent expreſſes to the Athenians, to acquaint them with the ſituation of affairs, but likewiſe wrote to them in the ſtrongeſt terms. I repeat his whole letter, both as it gives a clear and exact account of the ſtate of things at that time in Syracuſe, and may ſerve as a model for ſuch kind of relations.

"Athenians: I have already informed you, by "ſeveral expreſſes, of what paſſed here: but it is ne-"ceſſary you ſhould know the preſent ſituation of af-"fairs, that you may reſolve accordingly. After we "had been victorious in ſeveral engagements, and al-"moſt compleated our contravallation, Gylippus ar-"rived in Syracuſe with a body of Lacedæmonian and "Sicilian troops; and, having been defeated the firſt "time, he was victorious the ſecond, by means of "his cavalry and archers. We are in conſequence "ſhut up in our intrenchments, without daring to "make any attempt, or compleat our works through "the ſuperiority of the enemy's forces; for part of "our ſoldiers are employed in guarding our forts, and "conſequently we have not an opportunity of em-"ploying all our forces in battle. Beſides, as the "Syracuſans have cut our lines, by a wall, in that

(*a*) Thucyd. l. 7. p. 490—494. Plut. in Nic. p. 536. Diod. l. 13. p. 139.

" part where they were not compleat; it will no
" longer be poſſible for us to inveſt the city, unleſs
" we ſhould force their intrenchments; ſo that in-
" ſtead of beſieging, we ourſelves are beſieged, and
" dare not ſtir out, for fear of their horſe.

" Not contented with theſe advantages, they are
" bringing new ſuccours from Peloponneſus, and have
" ſent Gylippus to force all the neutral cities of Si-
" cily to declare for them; and the reſt to furniſh
" them with men and ſhips, to attack us both by
" ſea and land. I ſay by ſea, which though very
" ſurprizing is however but too true. For our fleet,
" which before was conſiderable, from the good con-
" dition of the gallies and mariners, is now very
" deficient, in thoſe very circumſtances, and prodi-
" giouſly weakned.

" Our gallies leak every where; becauſe we cannot
" draw them on ſhore to careen them, for fear, leſt
" thoſe of the enemy, which are more numerous,
" and in better condition than ours, ſhould attack us
" on a ſudden, which they ſeem to threaten every
" moment. Beſides, we are under a neceſſity of
" ſending many backwards and forwards to guard the
" convoys which we are forced to fetch from a great
" diſtance, and bring along in ſight of the enemy;
" ſo that ſhould we be ever ſo little negligent in this
" point, our army would be ſtarved.

" With regard to the ſhips crews, they decreaſe
" ſenſibly every day; for as great numbers of them
" diſperſe to maraud, or to fetch wood and water, they
" are often cut to pieces by the enemy's horſe. Our
" ſlaves, allured by the neighbourhood of the enemy's
" camp, deſert very faſt to it. The foreigners which
" we forced into the ſervice, diminiſh daily; and ſuch
" as have been raiſed with money, who came for
" plunder rather than fighting, finding themſelves
" baulked, go over to the enemy who are ſo near us,
" or elſe hide themſelves in Sicily, which they may
" eaſily do, in ſo large an iſland. A great number

" of

" of citizens, though long uſed to, and well ſkilled " in working of ſhips, by bribing the captains, put " others in their room who are wholly unexperienced, " and incapable of ſerving, and by that means have " quite ſubverted all diſcipline. I am now writing to " men perfectly well verſed in naval affairs; and who " are very ſenſible, that, when order is neglected, " every thing grows worſe and worſe, and a fleet muſt " inevitably be ruined.

" But the moſt unhappy circumſtance is, that tho' " I am generaliſſimo, I cannot put a ſtop to theſe " diſorders. For (Athenians) you are very ſenſible, " that ſuch is your diſpoſition, that you do not eaſily " brook reſtraint; beſides, I do not know where to " furniſh myſelf with ſeamen, whilſt the enemy get " numbers from all quarters. It is not in the power " of our Sicilian allies to aid us; and ſhould the cities " of Italy, from whence we have our proviſions, " (hearing the extremity to which we are reduced, " and your not taking the leaſt care to ſend us any " ſuccour) join the Syracuſans, we are undone; and " the enemy will have no occaſion to fight us.

" I could write of things which would be more " agreeable, but of none that could be more advanta- " geous to you, nor which could give you a more " juſt idea of the ſubjects on which you are to delibe- " rate. I am ſenſible that you love to have ſuch ad- " vices only ſent you as are pleaſing; but then I " know on the other ſide, that when affairs turn out " otherwiſe than you expected and hoped for, you " accuſe thoſe who deceived you; which induced me " to give you a ſincere and genuine account of things, " without concealing a ſingle circumſtance. By the " way I am to inform you, that no complaints can " be juſtly made either againſt the officers or com- " mon ſoldiers, both having done their duty very " well.

" But now that the Sicilians join all their forces a- " gainſt us, and expect a new army from Peloponne-

" ſus; you may lay this down as the foundation for " your deliberations, that our preſent troops are not " ſufficient; and therefore, we either muſt be re- " called; or elſe a land and naval force, equal to the " firſt, muſt be ſent us, with money in proportion. " You muſt alſo think of appointing a perſon to ſuc- " ceed me; it being impoſſible for me, thro' my " nephretic diſorder, to ſuſtain any longer the weight " of the command. I imagine that I deſerve this fa- " vour at your hands, on account of the ſervices I have " done you, in the ſeveral commands conferred upon " me, ſo long as my health would permit me to act.

" To conclude; whatever reſolution you may come " to, the requeſt I have to make, is, that you would " execute it ſpeedily, and in the very beginning of the " ſpring. The ſuccours which our enemies meet with " in Sicily are all ready; but thoſe which they ex- " pect from Peloponneſus may be longer in coming. " However, fix this in your minds, that if you do " not exert yourſelves, the Lacedæmonians will not " fail, as they have already done, to be beforehand " with you."

The Athenians were ſtrongly affected with this letter, which made as great an impreſſion on them as Nicias expected. However, they did not think proper to appoint him a ſucceſſor; and only nominated two officers who were under him, *viz.* Menander and Euthydemus, to aſſiſt him till other generals ſhould be ſent. Eurymedon and Demoſthenes were choſen to ſucceed Lamachus and Alcibiades. The former ſet out immediately with ten gallies, and ſome money *, about the winter ſolſtice, to aſſure Nicias that a ſpeedy ſuccour ſhould be ſent him; during which, the latter was raiſing troops and contributions, in order to ſet ſail early in the ſpring.

(*b*) The Lacedæmonians, on the other ſide, being ſupported by the Corinthians, were very induſtrious in

(*b*) Thucyd. l. 7. p. 494—496 and 502, 504. Diod. l. 13. p. 140.
A. M. 3591. Ant. J. C. 413. * 120 *talents.*

preparing

preparing reinforcements to ſend into Sicily, and to enter Attica, in order to keep the Athenian fleet from ſailing to that iſland. Accordingly they entred Attica early, under the command of king Agis; and after having laid waſte the country, they fortified Decelia; having divided the work among all the forces, to make the greater diſpatch. This poſt is about an hundred and twenty furlongs from Athens, that is, about ſix french leagues, and the ſame diſtance from Bœotia. Alcibiades was perpetually ſolliciting the Lacedæmonians; and could not be eaſy, till he had prevailed with them to begin that work. This annoyed the Athenians moſt of all: for hitherto the enemy, retiring after they had laid waſte the Athenian territories, the latter were unmoleſted all the reſt of the year; but from the fortifying of Decelia, the garriſon left in it was continually making incurſions, and alarming the Athenians, Athens being now become a kind of frontier town; for, in the day-time, a guard was mounted at all the gates; and in the night, all the citizens were either on the walls, or under arms. Such veſſels as brought proviſions from the iſland of Eubœa, and which before had a much ſhorter paſſage by Decelia, were forced to go round about, in order to double the cape of Sunium; by which means proviſions, as well as goods imported, grew much dearer. To heighten the calamity, upwards of twenty thouſand ſlaves, the greateſt part of whom were artificers, went over to the enemy, to fly from the extreme miſery with which the city was afflicted. The cattle of all kinds died. Moſt of the horſes were lamed, being continually upon guard, or upon parties. Every thing being laid waſte in this manner, and the Athenians enjoying no longer the revenues which aroſe from the produce of their lands, there was a prodigious ſcarcity of money; ſo that they were forced to take the twentieth part of all the imports, to ſupply their uſual ſubſidies.

(*n*) In the mean time Gylippus, who had made the tour of Sicily, returned with as many men as he could raiſe in the whole iſland; and prevailed with the Syracuſans to fit out the ſtrongeſt fleet in their power, and to hazard a battle at ſea, upon the preſumption that the ſucceſs would anſwer the greatneſs of the enterprize. This advice was ſtrongly enforced by Hermocrates, who exhorted the Syracuſans not to abandon to their enemies the empire of the ſeas. He obſerved, that the Athenians themſelves had not received it from their anceſtors, nor been always poſſeſſed of it: That the Perſian war had in a manner forced them into the knowledge of naval affairs, notwithſtanding two great obſtacles, their diſpoſition, and the ſituation of their city, which ſtood at a conſiderable diſtance from the ſea: That they had made themſelves formidable to other nations, not ſo much by their real ſtrength, as by their courage and intrepidity: That they ought to copy them; and ſince they had to do with enemies who were ſo enterprizing, it was fit they ſhould be equally daring.

This advice was approved, and accordingly a large fleet was equipped. Gylippus led out all his land-forces in the night-time, to attack the forts of Plemmyrium. Thirty-five gallies of Syracuſe which were in the great harbour, and forty-five in the leſſer, where was an arſenal for ſhips, were ordered to advance towards Plemmyrium, to amaze the Athenians, who would ſee themſelves attacked both by ſea and land at the ſame time. The Athenians, at this news, went on board alſo; and, with twenty-five ſhips, ſailed to fight the thirty-five Syracuſan veſſels which were ſailing out againſt them from the great harbour; and oppoſed thirty-five more to the forty-five of the enemy, which were come out of the little port. A ſharp engagement was fought at the mouth of the great har-

(*n*) Thucyd. l. 7. p. 497—500. Plut. in Nic. p. 536. Diod. p. 140.

bour;

bour; one party endeavouring to force their way into it, and the other to keep them out.

Thoſe who defended the forts of Plemmyrium, having flocked to the ſhore to view the battle, Gylippus attacked the forts unexpectedly by day-break; and having carried the greateſt of them by ſtorm, the ſoldiers who defended the other two were ſo terrified, that they abandoned them in a moment. After this advantage the Syracuſans ſuſtained a conſiderable loſs; for ſuch of their veſſels as fought at the entrance of the harbour, (after having forced the Athenians) bulged furiouſly one againſt the other as they entered it in diſorder; and by this means ſhifted the victory to their enemies, who were not contented with purſuing them, but alſo gave chaſe to thoſe who were victorious in the great harbour. Eleven Syracuſan gallies were ſunk, and great numbers of the ſailors in them killed. Three were taken; but the Athenians likewiſe loſt three, and after towing thoſe of the enemy, they raiſed a trophy in a little iſland lying before Plemmyrium, and retired to the center of their camp.

The Syracuſans alſo raiſed three trophies for their taking of the three forts; and after razing one of the ſmaller, they repaired the fortifications of the other two, and put garriſons into them. Several Athenians had been either killed or made priſoners there; and great ſums of money were taken, the property of the public, as well as of merchants and captains of gallies, beſides a large quantity of ammunition; this being a kind of magazine for the whole army. They likewiſe loſt the ſtores and rigging of forty gallies, with three ſhips that lay in the dock. But a more conſiderable circumſtance was, Gylippus thereby prevented Nicias from getting proviſions and ammunition ſo eaſily; for, whilſt the latter was poſſeſt of Plemmyrium, they procured theſe ſecurely and expeditiouſly; whereas, after their being diſpoſſeſſed of it, it was equally difficult and hazardous, becauſe they could not bring in any thing without fighting; the enemy lying

ing at anchor juſt off their fort. Thus the Athenians could have no proviſions but from the point of their ſwords; which diſpirited the ſoldiers very much, and threw the whole army into a great conſternation.

(o) There afterwards was a little ſkirmiſh in defending a ſtaccado which the inhabitants had made in the ſea, at the entrance of the old harbour, to ſecure the ſhipping. The Athenians having raiſed towers and parapets on a large ſhip, made it advance as near as poſſible to the ſtaccado, in order that it might ſerve as a bulwark to ſome ſhips which carried military engines, with which they drew up ſtakes by the help of pullies and ropes, excluſive of thoſe which the divers ſawed in two; the beſieged defending themſelves with their harbour, and the enemies with their tower. Such ſtakes as had been drove in, level with the ſurface of the water, in order to ſtrand thoſe veſſels that ſhould come near them, were the hardeſt to force away. The divers alſo bribed the enemy, and moſt of the ſtakes were torn up; but then others were immediately drove in their places. The utmoſt efforts were uſed on both ſides, in the attack as well as the defence.

(p) One circumſtance which the beſieged conſidered of the greateſt importance, was, to attempt a ſecond engagement both by ſea and land, before the fleet, and other ſuccours ſent by the Athenians, ſhould arrive. They had concerted freſh meaſures for a battle at ſea, by improving from the errors they had committed in the laſt engagement, The change made in the gallies was, their prows were now ſhorter, and at the ſame time ſtronger and more ſolid than before. For this purpoſe, they fixed great pieces of timber, projecting forward, on each ſide of the prows; and to theſe pieces they joined beams by way of props. Theſe beams extended to the length of ſix cubits on each ſide of the veſſel, both within and without. By this they hoped to gain the advantage over the gallies

(o) Thucyd. l. 7. p. 500, 501. (p) Thucyd. l. 7. p. 509—513. Plus. in Nic. p. 536. Diod. p. 140, 141.

of

of the Athenians, which did not dare, becauſe of the weakneſs of their prows, to attack an enemy in front, but only in flank; not to mention that ſhould the battle be fought in the harbour, they would not have room to ſpread themſelves, nor to paſs between two gallies, in which lay their greateſt art; nor to tack about, after they ſhould have been repulſed, in order to return to the charge; whereas the Syracuſans, by their being maſters of the whole extent of the harbour, would have all theſe advantages, and might reciprocally aſſiſt one another. On theſe circumſtances the latter founded their hopes of victory.

Gylippus therefore firſt drew all the infantry out of the camp, and advanced towards that part of the contravallation of the Athenians which faced the city; whilſt the troops of Olympia marched towards the other, and their gallies ſet ſail.

Nicias did not care to venture a ſecond battle, ſaying, that as he expected a freſh fleet every moment, and a great reinforcement under Demoſthenes, it would betray the greateſt want of judgment, ſhould he, as his troops were inferior in number to thoſe of the enemy, and already fatigued, hazard a battle without being forced to it. On the contrary, Menander and Euthydemus, who had juſt before been appointed to ſhare the command with Nicias, till the arrival of Demoſthenes; fired with ambition, and jealous of thoſe generals, were eager to perform ſome great exploit, to bereave the one of his glory, and, if poſſible, eclipſe that of the other. The pretence they alledged on this occaſion was, the fame and reputation of Athens; and they aſſerted with ſo much vehemence, that it would be entirely deſtroyed, ſhould they ſhun the battle, as the Syracuſans offered it them, that they at laſt forced Nicias to a compliance. The Athenians had ſeventy-five gallies, and the Syracuſans eighty.

The firſt day the fleets continued in ſight of each other, in the great harbour, without engaging; and only

only a few ſkirmiſhes paſſed, after which both parties retired: and it was juſt the ſame with the land-forces. The Syracuſans did not make the leaſt motion the ſecond day. Nicias, taking advantage of this inactivity, cauſed the tranſports to draw up in a line, at ſome diſtance from one another, in order that his gallies might retire behind them with ſafety, in caſe he ſhould be defeated. On the morrow, the Syracuſans came up ſooner than uſual, when a great part of the day was ſpent in ſkirmiſhing, after which they retired. The Athenians did not ſuppoſe they would return, but imagined that fear had made them fly: but having refreſhed themſelves in great diligence, and returning on board their gallies, they attacked the Athenians, who were far from expecting them. The latter being now forced to return immediately on board their ſhips, they entered them in great diſorder, ſo that they had not time to draw them up in a line of battle, and moſt of the ſailors were faſting. Victory did not long continue in ſuſpenſe. The Athenians, after making a ſhort and ſlight reſiſtance, retired behind their line of tranſport ſhips. The enemy purſued them thither, and were ſtopt by the ſailyards of thoſe ſhips, to which were fixed * dolphins of lead, which, being very heavy, had they fallen on the enemy's gallies, would have ſunk them at once. The Athenians loſt ſeven gallies in this engagement, and a great number of ſoldiers were either killed or taken priſoners.

(q) This loſs threw Nicias into the utmoſt conſternation. All the misfortunes he had met with, ever ſince the time he had firſt enjoyed the ſupreme command, came into his mind; and he now is involved in a greater than any of them, by his complying with the advice of his collegues. Whilſt he was revolving theſe gloomy ideas, Demoſthenes's fleet was ſeen coming

(q) Thucyd. l. 7. p. 513—518. Plut. in Nic. p. 537. Diod. p. 141, 142.

* *This engine, ſo violent was its motion, broke through a galley from the deck to the hold.*

forward

forward in great pomp, and with ſuch an air as ſhould fill the enemy with dread: it was now the day after the battle. This fleet conſiſted of ſeventy-three gallies, on board of which were five thouſand fighting men, and about three thouſand archers, ſlingers and bowmen. All theſe gallies were richly trimmed; their prows being adorned with ſhining ſtreamers, manned with ſtout rowers, commanded by good officers, and echoing with the ſound of clarions and trumpets; Demoſthenes having affected an air of pomp and triumph, purpoſely to ſtrike terror into the enemy.

This gallant ſight alarmed them indeed beyond expreſſion. They did not ſee any end, or even the leaſt ſuſpenſion of their calamities: all they had hitherto done or ſuffered was as nothing, and their work was to begin again. What hopes could they entertain of being able to weary out the patience of the Athenians, ſince, though they had a camp intrenched in the middle of Attica, they were however able to ſend a ſecond army into Sicily, as conſiderable as the former; and that their power, as well as their courage, ſeemed, notwithſtanding all their loſſes, inſtead of diminiſhing to increaſe daily?

Demoſthenes having made an exact enquiry into the ſtate of things, imagined that it would not be proper for him to loſe time as Nicias had done, who, having ſpread an univerſal terror at his firſt arrival, became afterwards the object of contempt, for his having wintered in Catana, inſtead of going directly to Syracuſe; and had afterwards given Gylippus an opportunity of throwing troops into it. He flattered himſelf with the hopes, that he ſhould be able to carry the city at the firſt attack, by taking advantage of the alarm which the news of his arrival would ſpread in every part of it, and by that means ſhould immediately put an end to the war: otherwiſe he intended to raiſe the ſiege, and no longer harraſs and leſſen the troops by fighting battles never deciſive; nor quite exhauſt the city of Athens, by employing its treaſures in needleſs expences.

Nicias,

Nicias, terrified by this bold and precipitate reſolution of Demoſthenes, conjured him not to be ſo haſty, but to take time to weigh things deliberately, that he might have no cauſe to repent of what he ſhould do. He obſerved to him, that the enemy would be ruined by delays; that their proviſions as well as money were entirely exhauſted; that their allies were going to abandon them; that they muſt ſoon be reduced to ſuch extremity, for want of proviſions, as would force them to ſurrender, as they had before reſolved: For there was certain perſons in Syracuſe who held a ſecret correſpondence with Nicias, and exhorted him not to be impatient, becauſe the Syracuſans were tired with the war and with Gylippus; and that ſhould the neceſſity to which they were reduced be ever ſo little increaſed, they would ſurrender at diſcretion.

As Nicias did not explain himſelf clearly, and would not declare in expreſs terms, that ſure and certain advices were ſent him of whatever was tranſacted in the city, his remonſtrances were conſidered as an effect of the timidity and ſlowneſs with which he had always been reproached. "Such, ſaid they, are his "uſual protraction, delays, diſtruſts, and fearful pre- "caution, whereby he has deadned all the vivacity, "and extinguiſhed all the ardour of the troops, in not "marching them immediately againſt the enemy; "but, on the contrary, by deferring to attack them, "till his own forces were weakned and deſpiſed." This made the reſt of the generals and all the officers come over to Demoſthenes's opinion, and Nicias himſelf was at laſt forced to acquieſce with it.

Demoſthenes, after having attacked to no purpoſe the wall which cut the contravallation of the beſiegers, confined himſelf to the attack of Epipolæ, from a ſuppoſition that ſhould he once be maſter of it, the wall would be quite undefended. He therefore took proviſions for five days, with workmen, implements, and every thing neceſſary for him to defend that poſt after he ſhould poſſeſs himſelf of it. As there was no going

ing up to it in the day-time undiſcovered, he marched thither in the night with all his forces, followed by Eurymedon and Menander; Nicias ſtaying behind to guard the camp. They went up by the way of Euryelus, as before, unperceived by the centinels; attack the firſt intrenchment, and ſtorm it, after killing part of thoſe who defended it. Demoſthenes, not ſatisfied with this advantage, to prevent the ardor of his ſoldiers froom cooling, and not delay the execution of his deſign, marches forward. During this interval, the forces of the city, ſuſtained by Gylippus, march, under arms, out of the intrenchments. Being ſeized with aſtoniſhment, which the darkneſs of the night increaſed, they were immediately repulſed and put to flight. But as the Athenians advanced in diſorder, to force whatever might reſiſt their arms, leſt the enemy might rally again, ſhould time be allowed them to breathe and recover from their ſurprize, they are ſtopt on a ſudden by the Bœotians, who make a vigorous ſtand, and marching againſt the Athenians with their pikes preſented, they repulſe them with great ſhouts, and make a dreadful ſlaughter. This ſpreads an univerſal terror through the reſt of the army. Thoſe who fled either force along ſuch as were advancing to their aſſiſtance, or elſe, miſtaking them for enemies, turn their arms againſt them. They now were all mixed indiſcriminately, it being impoſſible to diſcover objects in the horrors of a night, which was not ſo gloomy as entirely to make objects imperceptible, nor yet light enough to diſtinguiſh thoſe which were ſeen. The Athenians ſought for one another to no purpoſe; and from their often aſking the *word*, by which only they were able to know one another, a ſtrange confuſion of ſounds was heard, which occaſioned no little diſorder; not to mention that they, by this means, divulged the word to the enemy, and could not learn theirs; becauſe by their being together and in a body, they had no occaſion to repeat it. In the mean time, thoſe who were purſued, threw themſelves from

from the top of rocks, and many were daſhed to pieces by the fall; and as moſt of thoſe who eſcaped, ſtraggled from one another up and down the fields and woods, they were cut to pieces the next day by the enemy's horſe, who purſued them. Two thouſand Athenians were ſlain in this engagement, and a great number of arms were taken; thoſe who fled having thrown them away, that they might be the better able to eſcape over the precipices.

SECT. XIV. *The conſternation with which the Athenians are ſeized. They again hazard a ſea-fight, and are defeated. They reſolve to retire by land. Being cloſe purſued by the Syracuſans, they ſurrender. Nicias and Demoſthenes are ſentenced to die, and executed. The effect which the news of the defeat of the army produces in Athens.*

(r) THE Athenian generals, after ſuſtaining ſo great a loſs, were in a prodigious dilemma, and did not know how to act in the preſent diſcouragement and deſpair of the troops, who died daily, either by the diſeaſes of the autumn, or by the bad air of the fens near which they were encamped. Demoſthenes was of opinion, that it would be proper for them to leave the country immediately, ſince they had been unſucceſsful in ſo important an enterprize; eſpecially as the ſeaſon was not too far advanced for ſailing; and that they had ſhips enough to force a paſſage, in caſe the enemy ſhould diſpute it with them. He declared, that it would be of much greater advantage to oblige the enemy to raiſe their blockade of Athens, than for them to continue that of Syracuſe, by which they exhauſted themſelves to no purpoſe; that he was certain they would not be reinforced by a new army; and that they could not hope to overcome the enemy with the weak one under their command.

(r) Thucyd. l. 7. p. 511—520. Plut. in Nic. p. 538—542. Diod. p. 142.

Nicias

Nicias was ſenſible, that the arguments his collegue uſed were very juſt, and he himſelf was of his opinion: but at the ſame time he was afraid, leſt ſo public a confeſſion of the weak condition to which they were reduced, and their reſolution to leave Sicily, (the report of which would certainly reach the enemy) ſhould compleat the ruin of their affairs; and perhaps make them unable to execute their reſolution when they ſhould attempt it. Beſides, they had ſome little hopes left that the beſieged, being themſelves reduced to great extremity by their abſolute want of proviſions and money, would at laſt be inclined to ſurrender upon honourable terms. Thus, altho' he was in reality uncertain and wavering, he inſinuated, that he did not care to quit Sicily, till the Athenians ſhould have firſt ſent orders for that purpoſe; and that otherwiſe they would be highly diſpleaſed: That as thoſe who were to judge them, had not been eye-witneſſes of the ſtate of things, they would be of a different opinon; and, at the inſtigation of ſome orator, certainly condemn them: That moſt of thoſe men who now exclaimed with the greateſt vehemence againſt the difficulties they laboured under, would then change their note, and accuſe them of having been bribed to raiſe the ſiege: That knowing ſo well, as he did, the diſpoſition and character of the Athenians, he choſe to die glorioufly by the enemy's ſword, rather than be ignominiouſly condemned by his fellow-citizens.

Theſe reaſons, tho' they appeared very ſtrong, were yet not able to convince Demoſthenes; and it was ſtill his opinion, that the only good choice they could make, would be to retire. However, as he had been unſucceſsful in his former opinion, he was afraid of inſiſting upon this; and he was the more inclined to come into that of Nicias, from imagining, with many others, that this general might have ſome ſecret reſource, as he was ſo firmly reſolved to ſtay.

Gylippus,

(s) Gylippus, after having made the tour of Sicily, had brought a great body of troops with him. This new reinforcement terrified the Athenians exceedingly, whoſe army diminiſhed daily by ſickneſs; and they now began to repent their not having raiſed the ſiege, eſpecially as the beſieged were preparing to attack them both by ſea and land. Beſides, Nicias no longer oppoſed this reſolution, and only deſired to have it kept ſecret. Orders were therefore given, as privately as poſſible, for the fleet to prepare for ſetting ſail with the utmoſt expedition.

When all things were ready, the moment they were going to ſet ſail, (wholly unſuſpected by the enemy, who were far from ſurmiſing they would leave Sicily ſo ſoon) the moon was ſuddenly eclipſed in the middle of the night, and loſt all its ſplendor; which terrified Nicias and the whole army, who, from ignorance and ſuperſtition, were aſtoniſhed at ſo ſudden a change, the cauſes of which they did not know, and therefore dreaded the conſequences of it. They then conſulted the ſoothſayers; and who being equally unacquainted with the reaſons of this phænomenon, only augmented their conſternation. It was the cuſtom after ſuch accidents had happened, to ſuſpend their enterprizes but for three days. The ſoothſayers pronounced, that he muſt not ſet ſail till three times nine days were paſt, (theſe are Thucydides's words) which doubtleſs was a myſterious number in the opinion of the people. Nicias, ſcrupulous to a fault, and full of a miſtaken veneration for theſe blind interpreters of the will of the gods, declared, that he would wait a whole revolution of the moon, and not return till the ſame day of the next month; as if he had not ſeen the planet very clearly, the inſtant it had emerged from that part which was darkned by the interpoſition of the earth's body.

(s) Thucyd. l. 7. 521—548. Plut. in Nic. p. 538. Diod. l. 13. p. 142—161.

But

But he was not allowed time for this. The news of the intended departure of the Athenians being ſoon ſpread over the city, a reſolution was taken to attack the beſiegers both by ſea and land. The Syracuſans began the firſt day by attacking the intrenchments, and gained a ſlight advantage over the enemy. On the morrow they made a ſecond attack; and at the ſame time ſailed, with ſeventy ſix gallies, againſt eighty ſix of the Athenians. Eurymedon, who commanded the right of the Athenian fleet, having ſpread along the ſhore to ſurround them, this movement proved fatal to him: for, as he was detached from the body of the fleet, the Syracuſans, after forcing the main battle which was in the center, attacked him; drove him vigorouſly into the gulf called Daſcon, and there defeated him entirely. Eurymedon loſt his life in the engagement. They afterwards gave chaſe to the reſt of the gallies, and run them againſt the ſhore. Gylippus, who commanded the land-army, ſeeing the Athenian gallies were forced aground, and not able to return into their ſtaccado, landed with part of his troops, in order to charge the ſoldiers, in caſe they ſhould be forced to run aſhore; and to give his friends the more room to tow ſuch gallies as they ſhould have taken. However, he was repulſed by the Tyrrhenians, who were poſted on that ſide; and obliged by the Athenians, who flew to ſuſtain them, to retire with ſome loſs as far as the moor called Lyſimelia, which lay near it. The latter ſaved moſt of their ſhips, eighteen excepted, which were taken by the Syracuſans, and their crews cut to pieces by them. After this, reſolving to burn the reſt, they filled an old veſſel with combuſtible materials; and having ſet fire to it, they drove it by the help of the wind againſt the Athenians, who nevertheleſs extinguiſhed the fire, and drove off that ſhip.

Each ſide erected trophies: the Syracuſans for the defeat of Eurymedon, and the advantage they had gained the day before: and the Athenians, for their having

having drove part of the enemy into the moor, and put the other part to flight. But the minds of the two nations were very differently diſpoſed. The Syracuſans, who had been thrown into the utmoſt conſternation at the arrival of Demoſthenes with his fleet, ſeeing themſelves victorious in a naval engagement, reſumed freſh hope, and aſſured themſelves of a compleat victory over their enemies. The Athenians, on the contrary, fruſtrated of their only reſource, and overcome by ſea ſo contrary to their expectations, entirely loſt courage, and had no thoughts but of retiring.

The enemy, to deprive them of all reſource and prevent their eſcaping, ſhut the mouth of the great harbour, which was about five hundred paces wide, with gallies placed croſſwiſe, and other veſſels fixed with anchors and iron chains; and at the ſame time made the requiſite preparations for the battle, in caſe they ſhould have the courage to engage again. When the Athenians ſaw themſelves thus hemmed in, the generals and principal officers aſſembled, in order to deliberate on the preſent ſtate of affairs. They were in abſolute want of proviſions, which was owing to their having forbid the people of Catana to bring any, from the hopes they entertained of their being able to retire; and they could not procure any from other places, unleſs they were maſters of the ſea. This made them reſolve to venture a ſea-fight. In this view, they were determined to leave their old camp, and their walls, which extended to the temple of Hercules; and to intrench themſelves on the ſhore, near their ſhips, in the ſmalleſt compaſs poſſible. Their deſign was, to leave ſome forces in that place to guard their baggage and the ſick; and to fight with the reſt on board all the ſhips they ſhould have ſaved. They intended to retire into Catana, in caſe they ſhould be victorious; otherwiſe, to ſet fire to their ſhips, and to march by land to the neareſt city belonging to their allies.

This

This reſolution being taken, Nicias immediately filled an hundred and ten gallies (the others having loſt their oars) with the flower of his infantry; and drew up the reſt of the forces, particularly the bowmen, in order of battle on the ſhore. As the Athenians dreaded very much the beaks of the Syracuſan gallies, Nicias had provided harping-irons to grapple them, in order to break the force of the blow, and to come immediately to cloſe fight, as on ſhore. But the enemy perceiving this, covered the prows and upper parts of their gallies with leather, to prevent their being ſo eaſily laid hold of. The commanders on both ſides had employed all their rhetoric to animate their men; and none could ever have been prompted from ſtronger motives; for the battle which was going to be fought, was to determine, not only their lives and liberties, but alſo the fate of their country.

The battle was very obſtinate and bloody. The Athenians being arrived at the mouth of the port, eaſily took thoſe ſhips which defended the entrance of it; but, when they attempted to break the chain of the reſt, to widen the paſſage, the enemy came up from all quarters. As near two hundred gallies came ruſhing, on each ſide, in a narrow place, there muſt neceſſarily be a very great confuſion; and the veſſels could not eaſily advance forward, or retire, nor turn about to renew the attack. The beaks of the gallies, for this reaſon, did very little execution; but there were very furious and frequent diſcharges. The Athenians were overwhelmed with a ſhower of ſtones, which always did execution from what place ſoever they were thrown; whereas they defended themſelves only by ſhooting darts and arrows, which, by the motion of the ſhips, from the agitation of the ſea, did not carry true, and by that means the greateſt part of them did little execution. Ariſton the pilot had given the Syracuſans this counſel. Theſe diſcharges being over, the ſoldiers, heavily armed, attempted to enter the enemy's ſhips in order to fight hand to hand:

and it often happened, that whilſt they were climbing up one ſide, their own ſhips were entred on the other; and two or three ſhips would be grappled to one, which occaſioned a great perplexity and confuſion. Farther, the noiſe of the ſhips that daſhed one againſt the other, the different cries of the victors and vanquiſhed, prevented the orders of the officers from being heard. The Athenians wanted to force a paſſage, whatever might be the conſequence, to ſecure their return into their own country; and this the enemy employed their utmoſt efforts to prevent, in order that they might gain a more compleat and more glorious victory. The two land-armies, which were drawn up on the higheſt part of the ſhore, and the inhabitants of the city who were ran to the walls; whilſt the reſt, kneeling in the temples, were imploring heaven to give ſucceſs to their citizens; all theſe ſaw clearly, becauſe of their little diſtance from the fleets, every thing that paſſed; and contemplated the battle as from an amphitheatre, but not without great anxiety and terror. Attentive to, and ſhuddering at every movement, and the ſeveral changes which happened; they diſcovered the concern they had in the battle, their fears, their hopes, their grief, their joy, by different cries and different geſtures; ſtretching out their hands, ſometimes towards the combatants to animate them, and at other times towards heaven, to implore the ſuccour and protection of the gods. At laſt, the Athenian fleet, after ſuſtaining a long battle and a vigorous reſiſtance, was put to flight, and drove againſt the ſhore. The Syracuſans, who were ſpectators of this victory, conveyed to the whole city, by an univerſal ſhout, the news of this victory. The victors, now maſters of the ſea, and ſailing with a favourable wind towards Syracuſe, erected a trophy; whilſt the Athenians, who were quite dejected and over-power'd, did not ſo much as requeſt that their dead ſoldiers might be delivered to them, in order to pay the laſt ſad duty to their remains.

There

There now remained but two methods for them to chuſe; either to attempt the paſſage a ſecond time, for which they had ſhips and ſoldiers ſufficient, or to abandon their fleet to the enemy, and retire by land. Demoſthenes propoſed the former; but the ſailors, in the deepeſt affliction, refuſed to obey, fully perſuaded that it would be impoſſible for them to ſuſtain a ſecond engagement. The ſecond method was therefore reſolved upon, and accordingly they prepared to ſet out in the night, to conceal the march of their army from the enemy.

But Hermocrates, who ſuſpected their deſign, was very ſenſible that it was of the utmoſt importance not to ſuffer ſo great a body of forces to eſcape; ſince they otherwiſe might fortify themſelves in ſome corner of the iſland, and renew the war. The Syracuſans were at that time in the midſt of their feſtivity and rejoycings; and meditating nothing but how they might beſt divert themſelves, after the toils they had ſuſtained in fight. They were then ſolemnizing the feſtival of Hercules. To deſire the Syracuſans to take up arms again, in order to purſue the enemy; and to attempt to draw them from their diverſions either by force or perſuaſion, would have been to no purpoſe; for which reaſon another expedient was employed. Hermocrates ſent out a few horſemen, who were to paſs for friends of the Athenians, and ordered them to cry aloud: "Tell Nicias not to retire till day-light; for the Sy-"racuſans lie in ambuſh for him, and have ſeized on "the paſſes." This falſe advice ſtopt Nicias at once; and he did not even ſet out the next day, in order that the ſoldiers might have more time to prepare for their departure; and carry off whatever might be neceſſary for their ſubſiſtance, and abandon the reſt.

The enemy had time enough for ſeizing the avenues. The next morning early they poſſeſſed themſelves of the moſt difficult paſſes, fortified thoſe places where the rivers were fordable, broke down the bridges, and ſpread detachments of horſe up and down the

plain; ſo that there was not one place through which the Athenians could paſs without fighting. They ſet out upon their march the third day after the battle, with deſign to retire to Catana. The whole army was in an inexpreſſible conſternation, to ſee ſuch great numbers of men, either dead or dying, ſome of whom were left expoſed to wild beaſts, and the reſt to the cruelty of the enemy. Thoſe who were ſick and wounded conjured them, with tears, to take them along with the army, and held by their clothes when they were going; or elſe, dragging themſelves after them, followed them as far as their ſtrength would permit; and, when this failed, they had recourſe to tears, ſighs, imprecations; and ſending up towards heaven plaintive and dying groans, they called upon the gods as well as men to avenge their cruelty, whilſt every place echoed with lamentations.

The whole army was in as deplorable a condition. All men were ſeized with the deepeſt melancholy. They were inwardly tortured with rage and anguiſh, when they repreſented to themſelves the greatneſs from which they were fallen, the extreme miſery to which they were reduced, and the ſtill greater evils from which they foreſaw it would be impoſſible for them to eſcape. They could not bear the compariſon for ever preſent in their thoughts, of the triumphant ſtate in which they had left Athens, in the midſt of the good wiſhes and acclamations of the people; with the ignominy of their retreat, aggravated by the cries and imprecations of their relations and fellow-citizens.

But the moſt melancholy part of the ſpectacle, and that which moſt deſerved compaſſion, was Nicias. Dejected and worn out by a tedious illneſs; deprived of the moſt neceſſary things, at a time when his age and infirmities required them moſt; pierced, not only with his private grief, but with that of others, all which preyed upon his heart; this great man, ſuperior to all his evils, thought of nothing but how he might beſt comfort his ſoldiers, and revive their courage.

rage. He ran up and down in all places, crying aloud, that matters were not yet desperate, and that other armies had escaped from greater dangers; that they ought not to accuse themselves, or grieve too immoderately, for misfortunes which they had not occasioned; that if they had offended some god, his vengeance must be satiated by this time; that fortune, after having so long favoured the enemy, would at last be tired of persecuting them; that their bravery and their numbers made them still formidable, (being still near forty thousand strong;) that no city in Sicily would be able to withstand them, nor prevent their settling wherever they might think proper; that they had no more to do, but to take care severally of themselves, and march in good order; that by a prudent and courageous retreat, which was now become their only resource, they would not only save themselves, but also their country, and enable it to recover its former grandeur.

The army marched in two bodies, both drawn up in the form of a phalanx; the first being commanded by Nicias, and the second by Demosthenes, with the baggage in the center. Being come to the river Anapis, they forced the passage, and afterwards were charged by all the enemy's cavalry, as well as archers, who discharged perpetually upon them. They were annoyed in this manner during several days march; every one of the passes being guarded, and the Athenians being obliged to dispute every inch of their way. The enemy did not care to hazard a battle against an army which despair alone migh render invincible; and, the instant the Athenians presented the Syracusans battle, the latter retired; but whenever the former would proceed in their march, they advanced and charged them in their retreat.

Demosthenes and Nicias, seeing the miserable condition to which the troops were reduced, being in extreme want of provisions, and great numbers of them wounded, judged it advisable to retire towards the sea,

by a quite contrary way from that in which they then marched, and to make directly for Camarina and Gela, inſtead of proceeding to Catana as they firſt intended. They ſet out in the night, after lighting a great number of fires. The retreat was made in great confuſion and diſorder, as generally happens to great armies in the gloomy horrors of the night, eſpecially when the enemy is not far off. However, the vanguard, commanded by Nicias, came forward in good order; but above half the rearguard, with Demoſthenes at their head, quitted from the main body, and loſt their way. On the next day the Syracuſans, who, on the report of their retreat, had marched with the utmoſt diligence, came up with him about noon; and having ſurrounded him with their horſe, they drove him into a narrow place incloſed with a wall, where his ſoldiers fought like lions. Perceiving, at the cloſe of the day, that they were oppreſſed with the fatigue, and covered with wounds, they gave the iſlanders leave to retire, which ſome of them accepted; and afterwards ſpared the lives of the reſt, who ſurrendred at diſcretion with Demoſthenes, after having ſtipulated, that they ſhould not be put to death, nor ſentenced to perpetual impriſonment. About ſix thouſand ſoldiers ſurrendred on theſe conditions.

Nicias arrived the ſame evening at the river Erineus, and paſſing it, encamped on a mountain, where the enemy came up with him the next day, and ſummoned him to ſurrender at diſcretion, as Demoſthenes had done. Nicias could not perſuade himſelf at firſt, that what they told him concerning that general was true, and therefore deſired leave to ſend ſome horſe for information. Upon their returning with the news that Demoſthenes had really ſurrendred in that manner, Nicias offered to pay the expences of the war, upon condition that they would permit him to leave the country with his forces, and to give as many Athenians for hoſtages, as they ſhould be obliged to pay talents. But the enemy rejected this propoſal with diſ-

dain

dain and inſolence, and renewed the attack. Nicias, though in abſolute want of all things, however ſuſtained the charge the whole night, and marched towards the river Aſinarus. When they were got to the banks of it, the Syracuſans advancing up to them, threw moſt of them into the ſtream; the reſt having already plunged voluntarily into it to quench their thirſt. Here the greateſt and moſt bloody havock was made, the poor wretches being butchered without the leaſt pity as they were drinking. Nicias, finding all loſt, and unable to bear this diſmal ſpectacle, ſurrendred at diſcretion; upon condition that Gylippus ſhould diſcontinue the fight, and ſpare the reſt of his army. A great number were killed, and more taken priſoners, ſo that all Sicily was filled with them. (*t*) The Athenians ſeemed to have been diſpleaſed with their general, for ſurrendring in this manner at diſcretion; and, for this reaſon, his name was omitted in a public monument, on which was engraved the names of thoſe commanders who had loſt their lives in fighting for their country.

The victors adorned with the arms taken from the priſoners, the fineſt and largeſt trees they could find on the banks of the rivers, and made a kind of trophies of thoſe trees; when crowning themſelves with chaplets of flowers, dreſſing their horſes in the richeſt capariſons, and cropping thoſe of their enemies, they entered triumphantly into Syracuſe, after having happily terminated the moſt conſiderable war in which they had ever been engaged with the Greeks; and won, by their ſtrength and valour, a moſt ſignal and moſt compleat victory. The next day a council was held, to deliberate on what was to be done with the priſoners. Diocles, one of the leaders of greateſt authority among the people, propoſed, That all the Athenians who were born of free parents, and all ſuch Sicilians as had joined with them, ſhould be impriſoned, and only two meaſures of flouer, and one of water given them daily; that the ſlaves and all the allies ſhould be publickly ſold;

(*t*) Pauſan. l. 1. p. 56.

and that the two Athenian generals ſhould be firſt ſcourged with rods, and afterwards put to death.

(*u*) This laſt article was exceedingly diſguſted by all wiſe and compaſſionate Syracuſans. Hermocrates, who was very famous for his probity and juſtice, attempted to make ſome remonſtrances to the people, but they would not hear him; and the ſhouts which echoed on all ſides, prevented him from continuing his ſpeech. At that inſtant an * antient man, venerable for his great age and gravity, who, in this war, had loſt two ſons, the only heirs to his name and eſtate, made his ſervants carry him to the tribunal for harangues, and the inſtant he appeared a profound ſilence was made. "You "here behold, ſays he, an unfortunate father, who "has felt, more than any other Syracuſan, the fatal ef"fects of this war by the death of two ſons, who "formed all the conſolation, and were the only ſup"ports of my old age. I cannot indeed forbear ad"miring their courage and felicity, in ſacrificing, to "their country's welfare, a life of which they would "one day have been deprived by the common courſe "of nature: but then I cannot but be ſtrongly affected "with the cruel wound which their death has made in "my heart; nor forbear hating and deteſting the "Athenians, the authors of this unhappy war, as the "murderers of my children. But however, I cannot "conceal one circumſtance, which is, that I am leſs "ſenſible to my private affliction, than to the honour "of my country: and I ſee it expoſed to eternal in"famy, by the barbarous advice which is now given "you. The Athenians indeed merit the worſt treat"ment, and every kind of puniſhment that could be "inflicted on them, for ſo unjuſtly declaring war a"gainſt us; but have not the gods, the juſt avengers "of crimes, puniſhed them and revenged us ſufficient"ly? When their generals laid down their arms, and "ſurrendred, did they not do this in the hopes of ha"ving their lives ſpared? And, if we put them to

(*u*) Diod. l. 13. p. 149—161. * *Nicolaus.*

"death,

" death, will it be poſſible for us to avoid the juſt re-
" proach, of our having violated the law of nations,
" and diſhonoured our victory by an unheard-of cru-
" elty? How! Will you ſuffer your glory to be thus
" ſullied in the face of the whole world; and have it
" ſaid, that a nation, who firſt dedicated a temple in
" their city to clemency, had not found any in yours?
" Surely victories and triumphs do not give immortal
" glory to a city; but the exerciſing mercy towards
" a vanquiſhed enemy, the uſing moderation in the
" greateſt proſperity, and fearing to offend the gods
" by a haughty and inſolent pride. You doubtleſs
" have not forgot that this Nicias, whoſe fate you are
" going to pronounce, was the very man who pleaded
" your cauſe in the aſſembly of the Athenians; and
" employed all his credit and the whole power of his
" eloquence, to diſſuade his country from embarking
" in this war. Should you therefore pronounce ſen-
" tence of death on this worthy general, would it be
" a juſt reward for the zeal he ſhowed for your inter-
" eſt? With regard to myſelf, death would be leſs
" grievous to me, than the ſight of ſo horrid an in-
" juſtice, committed by my countrymen and fellow-
" citizens."

The people ſeemed moved to compaſſion at this ſpeech, eſpecially as, when this venerable old man firſt aſcended, they expected to hear him cry aloud for vengeance on thoſe who had brought all his calamities upon him, inſtead of ſuing for their pardon. But the enemies of the Athenians, having expatiated with vehemence, on the unheard-of cruelties which their republic had exerciſed on ſeveral cities belonging to their enemies and even to their antient allies; the inveteracy which their commanders had ſhown againſt Syracuſe, and the evils they would have made it ſuffer had they been victorious; the afflictions and groans of infinite numbers of Syracuſans, who bewailed the death of their children and near relations, whoſe manes could be appeaſed no other way than by the

blood

blood of their murtherers: on theſe repreſentations, the people returned to their ſanguinary reſolution, and followed Diocles's advice in every reſpect. Gylippus uſed his utmoſt endeavours, but in vain, to have Nicias and Demoſthenes given up to him, (eſpecially as he had taken them) in order for him to carry them to Lacedæmon. But his demand was rejected with a haughty ſcorn, and the two generals were put to death.

All wiſe and compaſſionate men could not forbear ſhedding tears, for the tragical fate of two ſuch illuſtrious perſonages; and particularly for Nicias, who, of all men of his time, ſeemed leaſt to merit ſo ignominious and untimely an end. When people recollected the ſpeeches and remonſtrances he had made, to prevent this war; and, on the other ſide, when they conſidered how high a regard he had always retained for things relating to religion; the greateſt part of them were tempted to exclaim againſt providence, in ſeeing that a man, who had ever ſhown the higheſt reverence for the gods, and had always exerted himſelf to the utmoſt for their honour and worſhip, ſhould be ſo ill rewarded by them, and meet with no better fate than the moſt abandoned wretches. But it is no wonder that the calamities of good men ſhould inſpire the heathens with ſuch thoughts, and make them murmur and deſpond; ſince they did not know the holineſs of the Divine Being, nor the corruption of human nature.

The priſoners were ſhut up in the mines (*priſons of Syracuſe*) where, crouded one upon the other, they ſuffered incredible torments for eight months. Here they were for ever expoſed to the inclemencies of the weather; ſcorched, in the day-time, by the burning rays of the ſun, or frozen, in the night, by the colds of autumn; poiſoned by the ſtench of their own excrements, by the carcaſſes of thoſe who died of their wounds and of ſickneſs; in fine, worn out by hunger and thirſt, for their daily allowance to each was but a

ſmall meaſure of water, and two of meal. Thoſe who were taken out of this place two months after, in order to be ſold as ſlaves (many of whom were citizens who had concealed their condition) found a leſs rigorous fate. Their wiſdom, their patience, and a certain air of probity and modeſty were of great advantage to them; for, they were ſoon reſtored to their liberty, or met with the kindeſt and moſt generous treatment from their maſters. Several of them even owed the good uſage they met with to Euripides, the fineſt ſcenes of whoſe tragedies they repeated to the Sicilians, who were extremely fond of them; ſo that when they returned to their own country, they went and ſaluted that poet as their deliverer; and informed him of the admirable effects wrought in their favour, by his verſes.

(*x*) The news of the defeat being carried to Athens, the citizens would not believe it at firſt; and were ſo far from giving credit to it, that they ſentenced that man to death who had firſt publiſhed it. But when it was confirmed, all the Athenians were ſeized with the utmoſt conſternation; and as if themſelves had not decreed the war, they vented their rage and reſentment againſt the orators who had promoted the enterprize, as well as againſt the ſoothſayers, who, by their oracles or ſuppoſed prodigies, had flattered them with the hopes of ſucceſs. They had never been reduced to ſo deplorable a condition as now; having neither horſe, foot, money, gallies nor mariners; in a word, they were in the deepeſt deſpair, expecting every moment that the enemy, elate with ſo great a victory, and ſtrengthned by the revolt of the allies, would come and invade Athens, both by ſea and land, with all the forces of Peloponneſus. Cicero had reaſon to obſerve *, ſpeaking of the battles in the har-

(*x*) Thucyd. l. 8. p. 551—553. Plut. de Garrulit. p. 509.

* Hic primùm opes illius civitatis victæ, comminutæ, depreſſæque ſunt: in hoc portu Athenienſium nobilitatis, imperii, gloriæ naufragium factum exiſtimatur. *Cic. Verrin.* 7. *n.* 97.

bour

bour of Syracuſe, that it was there the troops of Athens as well as their gallies, were ruined and ſunk; and that, in this harbour, the power and glory of the Athenians were miſerably ſhipwrecked.

The Athenians however did not ſuffer themſelves to be wholly dejected, and reſumed courage. They now reſolved to raiſe money on all ſides, and to import timber for building of ſhips, in order to awe the allies, and particularly the inhabitants of the iſland of Eubœa. They retrenched all ſuperfluous expences, and eſtabliſhed a new council of antient men, who were to weigh and examine all affairs before they ſhould be propoſed to the people. In fine, they omitted nothing which might be of ſervice in the preſent conjuncture; the alarm in which they were in, and their common danger, obliging every individual to be attentive to the neceſſities of the ſtate, and docile to all advice that might promote its intereſts.

I cannot conclude here the hiſtory of the war of Peloponneſus; and therefore am obliged, contrary to my intention, to refer the remainder of it to the next volume. The defeat of the army under Nicias was followed by the taking of Athens, of which the antient form of government was entirely changed by Lyſander.

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The End of VOL. III.

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